Sudan Date: 18 July 2008

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Sudan Date: 18 July 2008 Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: SDN33567 Country: Sudan Date: 18 July 2008 Keywords: Sudan – Dissidents – Darfur – Conscription – Armed forces This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Is there information to indicate that suspected dissidents are drafted into Sudan’s armed forces? If so, is there information on the situation of such persons: how they are treated; whether they are forced to serve in combat units; whether they are sent to the Darfur region? 2. Please provide an update on the state of the conflict in the Darfur region. 3. Please provide any information that might be available on the conditions affecting conscripted soldiers in Sudan’s armed forces fighting in the Darfur region. RESPONSE 1. Is there information to indicate that suspected dissidents are drafted into Sudan’s armed forces? If so, is there information on the situation of such persons: how they are treated; whether they are forced to serve in combat units; whether they are sent to the Darfur region? No specific information could be located regarding the conscription of suspected dissidents into Sudan’s armed forces. General information regarding conscription in Sudan, and the treatment of conscripts, follows below. The US Department of State’s 2007 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Sudan provides the following summary of the current Sudanese regime, including references to “cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment by security forces” and “forced military conscription”: The government’s human rights record remained poor, and there were numerous serious abuses, including: abridgement of citizens’ rights to change their government; extrajudicial and other unlawful killings by government forces and other government-aligned groups throughout the country; torture, beatings, rape, and other cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment by security forces; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention, including incommunicado detention of suspected government opponents, and prolonged pretrial detention; executive interference with the judiciary and denial of due process; forced military conscription of underage men; obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance; restrictions on privacy and freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement; harassment of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and of local and international human rights and humanitarian organisations; violence and discrimination against women, including the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM); child abuse, including sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers, particularly in Darfur; trafficking in persons; discrimination and violence against ethnic minorities; denial of workers’ rights; and forced labor, including child labor, by security forces and both aligned and non-aligned militias in Southern Sudan and Darfur. … Both the government and rebel factions continued to conscript men and boys into the fighting forces (US Department of State 2008, Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Sudan, 11 March – Attachment 13). The UK Home Office’s April 2008 ‘Country of origin information report: Sudan’ provides the following information on conscription: 9.03 The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), on 28 February 2007 provided the following information regarding military service in Sudan. [65k] “Information on the age of conscription for military service varied among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. According to the Europa World Year Book 2006 and the United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, persons between the ages of 18 to 30 years are liable for national military service (Europa World Year Book 2006, 4095; US 8 Feb. 2007). However, the Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 indicates that under Sudan’s National Service Act of 1992, persons between the ages of 18 to 33 years must submit to national military service (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 17 Nov. 2004; Denmark 2001, 68). The report also indicates that the compulsory recruitment age is 17 years for the regular armed forces and 16 years for the paramilitary Popular Defence Force (PDF), while there is no minimum age for the reserve forces and for persons volunteering in the regular armed forces (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 17 Nov. 2004). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 indicates that persons aged 17 to 19 were required to undergo military service (8 Mar. 2006, Sec. 5).” [65k] 9.04 IRB added that: “Desertion from Sudan’s national service is punishable by a jail term of up to three years (SHRO June 2003; Denmark 2001, 73). Deserters could also reportedly be fined (ibid.). According to Sudan’s 1992 National Service Act, provided in the 2001 Danish fact-finding mission report, those who fail to present themselves for recruitment, or try to avoid military service “through deceit, or by inflicting any harm to [themselves]” could face a two- to three- year jail term (ibid.; see also The Des Moines Register 24 Dec. 2005).” [65k] 9.05 The Danish Fact Finding Mission (FFM) of 2000 reports that “Military service is compulsory for all males aged 18 and over, the recruitment age being adjusted from time to time.” [23a] (p36) …9.10 The Danish Fact Finding Mission of 2001 reported that: “Besides the regular Sudanese army the National Congress (NC) party has its own military branch called the Popular Defence Forces (PDF).” [23b] (p35) The PDF was created by the Government in 1990 and has its legal basis in the Popular Defence Forces Act 1989. (War Resisters International, 1998) [21a] The Danish 2001 Fact Finding Mission reported that: “Under the 1989 Popular Defence Forces Act (attached as Annex 5 [of the Report]), PDF recruits must be at least 16 years old and Sudanese citizens. In 1992 service in the PDF became obligatory for all students, both male and female. Completion of service was a precondition for entering further education.” [23b] (p37) 9.11 The January 2005 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (UN ICI) to the United Nations Secretary-General (UN SG) states that: “For operational purposes, the Sudanese armed forces can be supplemented by the mobilization of civilians or reservists into the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) … According to information gathered by the Commission, local government officials are asked by army Headquarters to mobilize and recruit PDF forces through tribal leaders and sheikhs. The Wali is responsible for mobilization in each State because he is expected to be familiar with the local tribal leaders.” [6e] (p28) …9.13 The UN ICI recorded that “One senior commander explained the recruitment and training of PDF soldiers as follows: “‘Training is done through central barracks and local barracks in each state. A person comes forward to volunteer. We first determine whether training is needed or not. We then do a security check and a medical check. We compose a list and give it to the military. This is done at both levels – Khartoum and state or local level. We give basic training (for example, on the use of weapons, discipline …) [sic] which can take two weeks or so, depending on the individual.” …9.16 “The 1992 National Service Law was introduced in an attempt to meet [the] increasing personnel needs of the armed forces.” (War Resisters’ International’s 1998 Survey). [21a] The USSD report for 2006 stated that: “The government continued to forcibly conscript citizens for mandatory military service as part of mandatory military service for male citizens.” [3a] (Section 1f) The FCO, when commenting on the Government’s current recruitment/conscription practices in its letter of February 2005, stated that: “The relevant authority puts an advertisement in the local media calling for young people to sign up.” [4b] 9.17 The Danish FFM report of 2001 stated that during round-ups military personnel in civilian clothing stopped vehicles and “The authorities forced those passengers who were believed to be the right age for conscription and who could not prove that they had in fact already performed their military service to go with them to military training camps. Many of those who were recruited did not even have an opportunity to contact their parents or relatives to inform them of what had happened.” [23b] (p35) 9.18 A December 2002 Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Research Directorate enquiry response described “The process for reporting for military service; how recruitment calls are made; [and] exemptions from service.” [65h] (p1) In addition to the above methods of call-up the chairman of the Sudan Human Rights Group (SHRG), who was consulted by the IRB, stated that local radio and television announcements occurred asserting that all men eligible for military service should gather together at a specific place, at a certain hour and date. [65h] (p1) 9.19 The same report reported the Chairman of the SHRG’s comments that “…in case of emergency, that is to say, urgent need for fighters, the Military Police usually close main highways and roads and check the passengers and arrest those persons who are eligible for service”. [65h] (p1) However, in comments submitted to the Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) on 8 March 2006, UNHCR stated that: “Some three years ago the government stopped rounding up young men in the cities to conscript them into National Service. Students are now required to undergo 45 days to 2 months military training prior to entering University and then serve one year National service upon graduation.
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