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Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (Stcm) Program SUDAN TRANSITION AND CONFLICT MITIGATION (STCM) PROGRAM January 31, 2014 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by AECOM. SUDAN TRANSITION AND CONFLICT MITIGATION (STCM) PROGRAM FINAL REPORT AUGUST 1, 2010 – JANUARY 31, 2014 Submitted to: U.S. Agency for International Development/Sudan’s Office for Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM) Office of Sudan and South Sudan Programs (AFR/SSSP) U.S. Agency for International Development Prepared for: Contract no. DOT-I-00-08-00050-00, Task Order 01 Prepared by: AECOM International Development TERMINOLOGY NOTE The significant contextual changes that occurred over the life of the program, including the birth of the independent Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) on July 9, 2011 and the split of the USAID Mission into two separate missions in Sudan/South Sudan resulted in unique requirements for project terminology. To maintain consistency, the reader will find that all general references to AECOM International Development are as AECOM, AECOM International Sudan (AIS) or AECOM International South Sudan (AISS), depending upon the activities and location; references to the donor will be as USAID; and references to the program will be as STCM, SSTCM, or STCM/SSTCM. Disclaimer: This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of AECOM and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. Acronyms and Abreviations AIS AECOM International Sudan AISS AECOM International South Sudan AUHIP African Union High-Level Implementation Panel CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CSO Civil Society Organization DDPD Doha Document for Peace in Darfur DDR Disarmament Demobilization and Re-integration DJAM Darfur Joint Assessment Mission DPA Darfur Peace Agreement DRA Darfur Regional Authority GoS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDCRDD International Donor Conference for Reconstruction and Development in Darfur IDP Internally Displaced Person INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IOM International Organization for Migration IP Implementation Protocol JEM Justice and Equality Movement JEM – Bashar Justice and Equality Movement – Mohammed Bashar JIU Joint Integrated Units NBeG Northern Bahr el Ghazal NCP National Congress Party NGO Non-Governmental Organization NISS National Intelligence and Security Service OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OTCM Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation PDF Popular Defense Forces RoSS Republic of South Sudan SAF Sudanese Armed Forces SLA – AW Sudan Liberation Army – Abdel Wahid SLA – MM Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minnawi SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLM-N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North SRF Sudan Revolutionary Front SSTCM South Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation STCM Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation SWIFT Support which Implements Fast Transition Three Areas South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State, Abyei TJRC Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Committee UNAMID African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur UNIFSA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Program Page i Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................ 1 I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2 Country Brief .................................................................................................................................................. 4 II. STCM Approach ........................................................................................................................................... 7 Project Design ................................................................................................................................................ 7 Project Numbers ............................................................................................................................................. 9 III. STCM Journey ............................................................................................................................................ 11 IV. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................................................... 37 V. Way Forward .............................................................................................................................................. 41 Appendices Appendix A. Grants List from Database ......................................................................................................... 43 Appendix B. Financial Report .......................................................................................................................... 44 List of Maps, Graphics andTables Table 1: Locations of Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 9 Table 2: Indicator Results ..................................................................................................................................... 9 Page ii Page iii Executive Summary It is difficult to negotiate peace after years of civil war; it is perhaps more difficult to make the peace endure. Sudan is a tragic illustration. In 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended nearly 22 years of civil war by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). However, the peace agreement did not adequately address some of the underlying causes of the conflict. In the years that followed, the peace was broken by renewed fighting between northern and southern Sudan. The objective of the USAID Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) program, implemented by AECOM International Sudan (AIS) and its partners, was to strengthen Sudanese capacity to address the causes and consequences of conflict and instability that posed a risk to sustainable peace and development. STCM focused on swift, strategic interventions that were calibrated to local conflict dynamics in order to ensure maximum effect. STCM sought to collaborate and foster relationships with reform-minded state government, local government, and civil society figures to identify, promote, and support timely and appropriate activities to achieve programmatic goals and country objectives. Through these strategic partnerships with governmental and non-governmental institutions, STCM encouraged Sudanese engagement and ownership of a vast array of transition and conflict-mitigation activities. The challenges were daunting. The program often operated in a dangerous environment; thus, it was critical to constantly monitor the security situation and build into the program the ability to change strategies and activities on short notice and to re-focus program resources. Nonetheless, throughout the life of the program, STCM maintained a presence in the conflict-prone regions of Southern Kordofan State, Western Kordofan State, Blue Nile State, Darfur, and in Khartoum. However, renewed violence in the disputed, resource-rich Abyei forced STCM to withdraw from that north-south border region. Over the life of the program, STCM implemented 172 grants totaling more than USD 12 million to, accomplish STCM objectives and address the priorities of the USG and USAID. The grants were used to implement projects that provided tangible, enduring peace dividends for oft-marginalized communities and addressed the resource-driven conflicts that persisted across Sudan flashpoint regions. For example, STCM built or rehabilitated infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and government offices. The program provided employment opportunities to youth as an alternative to the cattle rustling that often drove conflict. STCM engaged young boys and girls in sports and cultural activities that encouraged social dialogue and peace. In addition, it established communications systems to enable local officials to diffuse tensions and avert violence, created opportunities for opposing groups to engage in discussion and other activities aimed at conflict mitigation, and provided assistance to returning refugees. Despite security, economic, and political challenges, such as the 2011 declaration of independence by South Sudan, the program had significant achievements with a positive sustainable impact in the following ways: Reduced conflict over resources, promoted stability, and slowed migration among displaced communities by expanding access to health facilities, education services, and natural resources, such as through the creation of over 20 water yards, a rural water supply system using boreholes equipped with hand pumps or motorized pumps. Strengthened communities through media training and messaging via poetry, video, sports and activities for women and girls. Created 50 peace committees that linked communities to the state governments to help mitigate conflict. Promoted new and existing opportunities for peace dialogues at the government and community
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