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Observing Sudan's 2010 National Elections

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Observing Sudan's 2010 National Elections Observing Sudan’s 2010 National Elections April 11–18, 2010 Final Report Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. Observing Sudan’s 2010 National Elections April 11–18, 2010 Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5188 Fax (404) 420-5196 www.cartercenter.org The Carter Center Contents Foreword . .1 Postelection Developments ..................47 Executive Summary .........................3 Counting . 47 Historical and Political Tabulation . 49 Background of Sudan . .8 Election Results . .50 Census . .10 Electoral Dispute Resolution . 51 Political Context of the April Election . 10 Darfur and Other Special Topics .............54 Overview of the Carter Darfur . .54 Center Observation Mission .................13 Enfranchising the Displaced . 55 Legal Framework of the Sudan Elections.......15 Political Developments Following the Election . 56 Electoral System . 17 Census in South Kordofan Participation of Women, Minorities, and Southern Sudan . .57 and Marginalized Groups. 17 Pastoralists and the Election . 57 Election Management . 18 Bashir’s Threats . 57 Boundary Delimitation . .20 Conclusions and Recommendations ...........59 Voter Registration and the General Election Recommendations . 59 Pre-election Period . 24 Southern Sudan Referendum Voter Registration . .24 Recommendations . .70 Voter Education . 30 Abyei Referendum Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns . .31 Recommendations . .80 The Media . 35 Appendix A: Acknowledgments . .81 Civil Society . .36 Appendix B: List of Delegation and Staff ......83 Electoral Dispute Resolution. 37 Appendix C: Terms and Abbreviations ........86 Election-Related Violence. 39 Appendix D: The Carter Center in Sudan .....87 The Election Period . .40 Appendix E: Carter Center Statements Poll Opening . .40 on the Sudan Elections .....................89 Polling. 42 Appendix F: Carter Center Observer Poll Closing. 45 Deployment Plan .........................169 Appendix G: Registration and Election Day Checklists ...........................170 Appendix H: Letter of Invitation . .183 The Carter Center Foreword By Dr. John B. Hardman important step in the implementation of the CPA, President and CEO, The Carter Center the electoral process did little to build a more demo- he Carter Center has worked in Sudan for cratic, inclusive Sudan. more than 20 years. During that time, we have Without question, organizing the national elec- Tbuilt a lasting connection with its people. tions was a monumental task. Including races for The Carter Center has invested deeply in the coun- president of Sudan, president of Southern Sudan, try and worked on both health and peace projects to governorships, National Assembly, state assemblies, improve living conditions and prevent conflict in a and the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the country that has known terrible war since its inde- National Elections Commission (NEC) was tasked pendence in 1956. The world rightly congratulated with administering an election with more than 16 Sudan upon the signing million voters in the of the Comprehensive largest country in Africa, Peace Agreement with roughly 16,000 (CPA) in Naivasha, candidates running for Kenya, in 2005, and office. An election of the international com- this scale and complex- munity committed to ity would have been helping implement all challenging in any coun- stages of the accord. At try. Due partly to these the core of the CPA issues, Sudan’s national was a requirement to elections were postponed hold a national vote for twice, originally antici- political offices at six pated to be held by July different levels before In Sudan for the April 2010 elections, Dr. John Hardman, 2009 but rescheduled to the end of the agree- president and CEO of The Carter Center, takes notes at a April 2010. ment’s interim period Khartoum polling station. Despite persistent in 2011. The intent of challenges, Carter these provisions was to ensure that a democratically Center observers noted an important democratic elected government would be in place for the CPA’s opening across the country during the candidate culmination — a referendum on self-determination nomination phase, campaigning, and in the lead- for Southern Sudan that would decide the fate of the up to the elections, particularly in Southern Sudan. country as one unified state or two separate entities. Independent candidates gained large followings in Unfortunately, given delays in administration, many races, and it seemed there would be real com- logistical difficulties, a lack of sufficient safeguards petition for executive and parliamentary offices. In and transparency during the voting process, insecu- Northern Sudan, a legacy of repression and one-party rity, and in many cases direct intimidation and vio- rule was more difficult to overcome, and political lence by security forces against citizens, poll workers, parties seemed slow to respond to the initial demo- and candidates, Sudan’s April 2010 elections did not cratic opening and take the opportunity to contest meet international standards for genuine democratic the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Disparate elections. While the conduct of the elections was an resources among parties, existing security laws, and 1 The Carter Center Observing Sudan’s 2010 National Elections the inconsistent application of bureaucratic restric- was difficult for many voters to find their names on tions prevented an open and competitive campaign. voter lists and locate their polling stations. The NEC The April elections were announced as the first extended the voting time from three to five days to multiparty, democratic vote since 1986. Carter help alleviate these problems; however, the extension Center observers were impressed by and appreciative could not overcome initial problems in implemen- of the enormous effort put into the administration tation that disenfranchised many voters. Another of the elections by staff across the country, many critical shortcoming in the elections was tabulation, of whom worked long hours and extra days without which was severely disorganized and susceptible to assurances they would be properly compensated and manipulation. in some cases under harsh and insecure conditions. It is critical that the major ruling parties and Despite these efforts, planning by the NEC and the authorities in the Government of Sudan and state-level high election commissions (HECs) was Government of Southern Sudan do not repeat the inadequate, voter education was notably absent, political and technical flaws made during the April and irregularities during the polling, counting, and 2010 electoral process and ensure proper planning tabulation phases were widespread, undermining the is in place and commitments are honored before the credibility of the vote. We were disappointed by the vote is held on the referendum for Southern self- withdrawal of several candidates from the presidential determination. It is widely agreed that the voter reg- and parliamentary races in the North, which reduced istration process for the referendum must be improved the competitive nature of the elections and the even- to ensure Southern Sudanese are not disenfranchised tual diversity of the country’s population and political in this critical vote. Plans should be reviewed and forces in the parliament. improved so that all eligible voters, including those Two major problems impeded the participation of a living within or outside Southern Sudan and those significant number of voters and should be avoided in who are part of pastoral populations, take part in the future polls: the inaccuracy of the voter lists and the upcoming referendum. poor provision and allocation of polling stations by There is no question that there will have to be the NEC and state HECs. Voter lists and the alloca- a renewed commitment to build upon the opening tion of parliamentary seats were based on a contested brought about by the elections in order to ensure census. The registry was obscured by translation from a successful referendum that reflects genuinely the Arabic to English before final printing, and the late will of the people of Southern Sudan. The enormous dissemination of lists immediately before election significance of the referendum for the future of the day prevented voters from verifying their names on country as well as the wider region is understood the voter rolls and intended voting site. The number worldwide. The international community has taken of polling sites was also reduced to roughly 16,500 the preliminary steps needed to support Sudan’s refer- from 21,200, resulting in a dramatic increase in the endum, but must also support the development of an average number of registered voters assigned to each inclusive political system in Sudan that ensures both polling site. The method used to assign voters from a credible referendum and a lasting, durable peace for registration centers to polling centers was unclear. It all its people. 2 The Carter Center Executive Summary he April 2010 elections in Sudan were man- In the South, the opposition remained com- dated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace mitted to the process in spite of serious obstacles. TAgreement (CPA). They were intended to be Interference and intimidation in the campaigns of instrumental in setting the stage for the referendum opposition candidates by security agencies, particu- and corresponding negotiations and were envisioned larly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), as a critical part of a broader democratic transforma-
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