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DTM MONTHLY REGIONAL REPORT Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)

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DTM MONTHLY REGIONAL REPORT Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) NOV 2018 DTM MONTHLY REGIONAL REPORT Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) East & the Horn of Africa Flow monitoring in Uganda continued through the four FMPs located along the border with South Sudan in close coordi- nation with the DTM South Sudan team. Mixed Migration Flow monitoring was also initiated at an additional six points in Uganda, along the Flow Monitoring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border, bringing the total number of and Uganda Reporting Period FMPs in Uganda to 10. November 2018 Regionally, a total of 126,366 individuals were observed at the FMPs during the Active Flow Monitoring Network month of November 2018. A large pro- Burundi 8 FMPs portion of the migrants tracked were Djibouti 10 FMPs moving along the eastern corridor in the Ethiopia 5 FMPs Horn of Africa (HoA) region (48%). Of Somalia 7 FMPs these, the majority were Ethiopian na- South Sudan 5 FMPs tionals (65%), while the second-largest Uganda 10 FMPs population was Somali nationals (30%), which is comparable to what was tracked A network of 45 Flow Monitoring Points in October (31%). (FMPs) is currently operational in six countries. Fifty-two per cent of the movements tracked were incident-based move- Flow monitoring registry continued in ments, mainly between Burundi and the Burundi, and an additional four points United Republic of Tanzania, South Su- were opened in the provinces of Ruyigi dan and Sudan, as well as between and Rutana, bringing the total to eight Uganda, South Sudan and the United Re- Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan FMPs. Djibouti Flow Monitoring contin- public of Tanzania. Of these incident- ued through 10 FMPs, and Flow Monitor- based movements, the majority of those ing Surveys (FMS) also continued tracked were Burundian nationals (53%), through six of the points. In Ethiopia, flow while the second largest proportion was monitoring registry (FMR) and survey nationals from DRC (18%). data collection continued through five FMPs at various official and unofficial In the HoA region, 32 per cent of individ- border crossing points around the coun- uals intended to travel to the Kingdom of try. Somalia also continued flow monitor- Saudi Arabia (KSA), which is slightly ing activities through FMPs in seven loca- higher than what was reported in Octo- tions. Flow Monitoring Network: ber (31%). Another 25 per cent reported their intention to travel to Yemen and Dji- In South Sudan, flow monitoring activities bouti, which is higher than the 21 per cent were carried out at FMPs in Wau Town (2 that reported these destinations in the FMPs) and Abyei (1 FMP). In addition, FM previous month, and those traveling to was also reinitiated in Malakal (2 FMPs) these two countries often intend to travel bringing the total number of FMPs to five. onwards to KSA. A further 27 per cent Displacement site flow monitoring (similar to the 30% reported in the previ- (DSFM) was also carried out at eight entry EAST AND THE HORN OF AFRICA ous month) intended to travel to Somalia, and exit points to track movements in while 11 per cent reported traveling to and out of Protection of Civilian (PoC) Regional Mixed Migration Ethiopia (similar to the 10% reported in sites and collective sites in Malakal and October). Wau. [ page 1 ] DTM Monthly Regional Report November 2018 In Burundi, during the month of Novem- The majority of the migrants observed the 17% reported in October 2018), while ber, flow monitoring continued monitor- were Ethiopian nationals (88%), while six a slightly lower proportion intended to ing activities at four FMPs in the north- per cent were Somali nationals and other travel to Ethiopia (8%) or Djibouti (4%). eastern provinces of Cankuzo and nationalities made up the remaining six Another four per cent also intended to Muyinga at the border points of Mbundi, per cent. Similarly, most migrants were travel to Kenya, which is slightly higher Mukambati, Ntibitobangwa and Rusumo. outgoing, traveling out of Ethiopia (72%), than what has been observed in the past. Four additional FMPs were established in while the remaining were incoming mi- Similar to previous months, and contrary Kabuyenge, Kwa Elidadi, Kwa Ntunaguzi grants (28%). Most of the incoming mi- to regional trends, migrants were evenly and Mungano. grants were traveling from Sudan (64%), divided in terms of age and sex, with 33 while 11 per cent were from Djibouti, 8 per cent children (8% under 5 years of During the reporting period, 43,333 mi- per cent from Yemen, and the remaining age, and 10% were unaccompanied chil- grants were observed at the eight FMPs. 9 per cent from various other countries. dren) and 67 per cent adults (38% males The majority of migrants were Burundian and 29% females). The largest shares of nationals (81%), while the remaining were Regarding intended destinations, most of observed flows were forced movement Tanzanian (19%). There was a close divide the outgoing flows were heading to the due to conflict (42%) and/or undertaking between incoming (48%) and outgoing Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (59%), Yemen seasonal migration (18%). (52%) migrants, with all of the migration (11%), Djibouti (11%) and Sudan (4%), with tracked between the neighbouring coun- the remaining 15 per cent heading to var- South Sudan continues to measure tries of Burundi and the United Republic ious other countries. mixed migration flows at transportation of Tanzania. hubs inside the country and at its borders The majority of the migrants were adult with Sudan and Uganda. Additional FMPs The majority of migrants were adult men (60%) while 12 per cent were chil- along the border with DRC have been set males (46%), and 25 per cent were chil- dren. Of the total number of observed in- up in the context of Ebola preparedness dren. Short term local movement for a dividuals, two per cent (344) were chil- (see p.4). period of time less than six months was dren under the age of 5, and six per cent the most commonly cited motivation for of migrants were unaccompanied chil- During the month of November 2018, migration (indicated by 74% of migrants), dren (852 children); six per cent of the to- 2,082 migrants were observed in total at followed by tourism (17%) and seasonal tal were physically disabled. five transit hub FMPs in South Sudan, migration (5%). Most migrants travelled 1,032 of whom were observed at the FMP by boat (38%) or on foot (40%), with the Economic migration was still the most in Abyei, 420 through two new FMPs in remaining 22 per cent using land vehi- commonly cited reason for migration Malakal, and 630 at the two FMPs in Wau cles, including bicycles. (79%), followed by short term local Town. This represents no significant movement (8%). Most migrants were change compared to the 2,040 observa- In Djibouti, during the reporting period, travelling on buses or other land vehicles tions in October 2018. 18,637 migrants were observed at the 10 (cars or trucks) (83%), while seven per FMPs, which represents a four per cent travelled on trains. Most of the migrants tracked at the FMPs increase from the 19,415 individuals iden- were coming from South Sudan (88%), tified in the previous month. The majority In Somalia, during the reporting period, while the remaining were traveling from of migrants were Ethiopian nationals 28,138 migrants were observed at the Sudan (12%)). The majority intended to (97%), which is consistent with the per- seven Flow Monitoring Points. This rep- travel towards South Sudan (58%) or to- centage reported in the previous month. resents a slight decrease (5%) in compar- wards Sudan (42%). Most individuals Most migrants (74%) reported intending ison with October when 29,558 move- tracked going to Sudan were observed at to travel to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ments were observed. the Abyei FMP, while those observed at (KSA), which is comparable to the 73 per the Wau and Malakal FMPs were largely cent reported in October. In a trend that The majority of flows identified (57%) internal migrants, and the majority were is typical for migrants in Djibouti, the ma- were incoming in comparison to the 43 intending to travel to South Sudan. jority of migrants were adult males (57%), per cent outgoing, which is a slightly and 19] per cent were children, down more even breakdown compared to the The large majority of migrants (97%) from the 20 per cent observed in Octo- percentages from October 2018, which tracked at the FMPs in Abyei, Malakal and ber 2018. Economic migration for had 64 per cent incoming, and 35 per Wau Town were South Sudanese nation- greater than six months was the most cent outgoing movement. Similar to the als, while two per cent were Sudanese commonly cited motivation for migration previous months, Harirad Flow Monitor- nationals (the remaining 1% came from (indicated by 89% of migrants), followed ing Point (Awdal region at the border various other countries in the region). by short term economic migration (6%), with Ethiopia) once again recorded the Reasons for migration in Abyei were pri- and in a trend that is similar to last month, highest levels of incoming flows for No- marily to seek better health care facilities forced movement due to conflict was vember (8,176), while Bossaso continued (39%) followed by return to places of ha- four per cent. Most migrants moved on to record the highest number of out- bitual residence (22%), while most of the foot (52%), by taxi/car (37%) or by bus going flows (7,122). Migrants identified migration flows tracked in Wau Town (10%). were mostly Somali (62%), Ethiopian (39%) were to visit family or for economic (31%) and Yemeni (4%) nationals.
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