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Final Draft of the Co-Chairman's Statement FINAL DRAFT OF THE CO-CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT Your Excellencies, Honorable Delegates, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of my Co-Chairman, Moulana Abel Alier, my colleagues in the Steering Committee, and on my own behalf, I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you to this Conference, which marks the final phase of the National Dialogue. This is a historic occasion for us in the National Dialogue and we believe for our country. When His Excellency, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, initiated the National Dialogue more than three years ago, we cannot say with confidence that we, or anyone else for that matter, had a clear idea how long it would take, where it would lead, and what the end result would be. It was initially thought that the Dialogue process would take several months. Many saw it as a ploy by the President to polish his political image. The National Dialogue has now lasted for over three years. And far from being a ploy by the President, it has proved to be a sincere national soul searching about the crises facing our country. 1 What we soon learned as we undertook our assignment, was that our President wanted the process to be absolutely free, inclusive, transparent and credible. He repeatedly reaffirmed that National Dialogue was not a trap or a net for catching his political opponents, and that people should speak freely without fear, harassment or any form of intimidation. And, indeed, through the nationwide grassroots consultations and regional conferences, our people spoke their minds without fear or constraint. They indeed exceeded the expectations of most people by far. We tried to adhere to the principles of inclusivity, transparency and credibility, which are essential the success of any national dialogue. We also looked at the experiences of other countries, to benefit from the lessons learned. Because the National Dialogue was initiated amidst a devastating armed conflict, inclusivity was not easily achievable, as opposition leaders suspected that it was a political tool the President intended to use against them. But we diligently pursued inclusivity, despite the political difficulties and operational constraints. One of our fifteen sub-committees was on refugees and international outreach and they went to all the neighboring countries to consult with our refugees. I personally led delegations that went to South Africa twice in an attempt to bring on board the leader of the SPLM- In Opposition, Dr. Riek Machar, with the support of the President of Southern Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, who was by then Deputy President. But Dr. Riak Machar refused to even meet us. When the Revitalized Peace Agreement was concluded, President Salva Kiir Mayardit publicly called upon the opposition parties to join the National Dialogue. That encouragement by the President, reenergized our efforts toward inclusivity. 2 With the support of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, which organized an all-party Forum, followed by a Retreat hosted by a South African Think Tank: “In Transformative Initiative (ITI)”, in Pretoria, we indeed succeeded in bringing on board all the opposition parties. The SPLM-IO later withdrew and has remained outside the process. But the door for them to enter remains open, even at the implementation phase of the National Dialogue. One of the remarkable aspects of the National Dialogue is that although there, had been an appreciable financial and in-kind support from Japan, Egypt and UNDP, the funding has been almost entirely from our government, despite the dire financial situation in the country. It is worth emphasizing that while the President of our Republic has been unwavering in providing us with the funding, he or anyone else in his government never interfered with the work of the National Dialogue. Over the last three years, we have witnessed the response to the National Dialogue move from overwhelming skepticism, both internally and externally, to strong support. We pray and hope that this enthusiastic popular support does not translate into unfulfilled expectations that the National Dialogue will end the suffering of our people and the existential threats facing the country. An important aspect of the National Dialogue, which we believe offers a fresh way of perceiving and approaching the problems of the country, is the top-down and bottom-up process which we followed in our comprehensive consultations. We conducted grassroots consultations at the local level; extended the Dialogue through 3 the regional conferences, and here we are holding the National Conference. These three stages of the National Dialogue should inspire us to approach the issues of peace, security, stability, and development the same way. Instead of focusing only at the national level for solutions, we should engage the grassroots in a bottom-up process of reconstructing and building our nation. Durable structures are not constructed from the top; they must be based on a solid foundation at the bottom. Our consultations at all levels emphasized the need to make effective use of our indigenous cultural values, institutions, and operational patterns in generating development and building our nation. This is not to advocate a return to the past; it is building the future on a sound foundation that will hold the edifice. While our state at the top has been debilitated by chronic political rivalries and armed conflicts, and our middle level is precariously connected to the crisis at the center, our rural areas, though also impacted upon negatively by this crisis, remain resilient and relatively intact. Let us make effective use of our material, human, and cultural resources at that level. For one thing, it will probably help promote social cohesion, inter-tribal understanding, peaceful coexistence and cooperation between and among our rural communities. This would help bring an end to the pervasive inter-communal violence that is devastating the country at the base. For another thing, it would energize agricultural productivity that is the means of livelihood for the masses of our people and is widely recognized as the engine of growth at the base. It is indeed at that level that our vital resources lie waiting to be tapped and developed. This will 4 have an ascending stabilizing effect at the middle and ultimately at the national level. The bottom-up approach adopted by the National Dialogue has established a constructive precedent which should be followed for the collective good of our country. Dear delegates of our National Conference, let me assure you that we believe we have done what we were set up to do. The volumes of the reports before you attest to that fact. Our people spoke very candidly and courageously. And they covered all the areas of their concern about the way the country is being governed. To the credit of our government, despite the outspoken criticism of the system and the leadership, that were voiced throughout the three years of this National Dialogue, there was never an instance of harassment or intimidation, far less arrest. While we are confident that we have done a credible job. But the real value of what we have done must ultimately depend on implementation. We have, indeed, recommended a mechanism for follow up and implementation. But our aspirations and hopes are tempered by realism, that without both the political will of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and national unity within recommendations might remain only good ideas on paper. That the leadership of SPLM-IO has refrained from joining the National Dialogue until now, does not bode well for the prospects of implementation of the resolutions of this National Dialogue. However, in the interest of our country, we remain hopeful and must continue to strive for inclusivity, using whatever vantage point at our disposal. This is a 5 national call, to which everyone of us should respond with determination. Leadership ultimately means the responsibility to protect and assist all the citizens, without discrimination of any kind, racial, ethnic, religious or cultural; to which I must add gender, with emphasis. During our liberation war, the SPLM, called for a New Sudan of full equality; we must today call for a New South Sudan of full equality. Dear Honorable Delegates, before I end my statement, I must express our deep gratitude to all those who supported our work materially, politically, and morally. Although the bulk of the funding came from our Government. The government of Japan particularly supported us with over one million dollars. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), managed the funds from our external donors and provided experts and other technical services. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has made effective use of its convening capacity to promote dialogue with the political parties to promote inclusivity. The Government of South Africa, and specifically the then Deputy President and now President, Cyril Ramaphosa, gave unfailing material and moral support when he hosted our National Dialogue Retreat in Cape Town. President Ramaphosa also strived to persuade Dr. Riek Machar to join the National Dialogue. The government of the Arab Republic of Egypt gave us substantial support in essential equipment. The Leadership of the African Union, AU. and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, IGAD, specifically Honorable Moussa Faki Mohammad, Chairman of the AU Commission and Ambassador Ismail Wais, the IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, were unwavering in their staunch support. 6 More generally, although the National Dialogue is by definition, national and owned by the people of South Sudan, we realized that we could not isolate ourselves regionally and internationally. We therefore maintained close contact with representatives of the international community including UNMISS and the diplomatic corps in Juba. We met with them periodically to exchange views on issues.
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