From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party the Restructuring of Sudan People’S Liberation Movement

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party the Restructuring of Sudan People’S Liberation Movement From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party The Restructuring of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Øystein H. Rolandsen ISBN 978-82-7288-241-8 y 2007 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party The Restructuring of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Three Southern States Øystein H. Rolandsen Centre for the Study of Civil War/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (CSCW/PRIO) Oslo, July 2007 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party This paper may be downloaded from http://www.prio.no © International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the copyright holder. ISBN 978-82-7288-241-8 Rolandsen, CSCW/PRIO · 2007 Page 2 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party Contents Page 1. Introduction 5 2. Background 5 2.1 SPLM’s Political History 5 2.2 Brief Description of the Three States Included in the Survey 6 3. SPLM and Local Politics in the Southern Sudan 9 3.1 Current SPLM structures in the selected states 9 3.2 Power structures and processes of decision making within the selected 11 states 3.3 Mechanisms for influencing decisions and channels for influencing from 14 below 3.4 The position and influence of women and young people 16 3.5 General impression with regard to SPLM’s standing in the population 18 4. Conclusion 19 References 21 Rolandsen, CSCW/PRIO · 2007 Page 3 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party Acronyms and Abbreviations CANS Civil Authority of New Sudan CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement EEQ Eastern Equatoria GONU Government of National Unity GOSS Government of Southern Sudan IDP Internally Displaced People INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation IRI International Republican Institute NBEG Northern Bahr el-Ghazal NCP National Congress Party NDA National Democratic Alliance NDI National Democratic Institute PA Payam Administrator SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Rolandsen, CSCW/PRIO · 2007 Page 4 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party 1. Introduction In the period January - April 2007 a short survey of SPLM structures, capacity and processes of decision making was conducted in three out of ten states in South Sudan: Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei. 1 These states were selected because of their heterogeneity in terms of political, geographical and ethnical back- ground, but they may not be regarded as fully representative of all states in the Southern Sudan. 2 The study is based on a combination of extensive interviews in the field and the study of key SPLM documents. 2. Background 2.1 SPLM’s Political History Since 1983 SPLM has officially been the overall political body for the rebellion in the Southern Sudan. Formally, Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has been its military wing, but in reality SPLA has been the dominant part. The leading figures in SPLM were also the leading commanders of SPLA. During the first decade of the war the SPLM as a political movement was most visible within the National Democratic Alliance 3 and in the Diaspora as national chapters in a number of countries worldwide. This changed in the mid-1990s when SPLM emerged as a more independent entity both in terms of repre- senting the Southern rebellion, but also as the civil authority in the areas occupied by SPLA. 4 This change was initiated through the National Convention in Chukudum in 1994 and followed up by a series of more specialised conferences in 1995 and 1996. 5 However, the reforms of the mid-1990s were partly reversed in 2000 when SPLM/A leadership realised that the Movement at that time could not afford the econ- omical costs and political consequences of the reforms. Civilian structures, often referred to as Civilian Authority of New Sudan (CANS), already partly established at the lower levels of government (county, payam and boma) were maintained but with extremely limited capacity. 1 The Norwegian People’s Aid’s South Sudan Programme staff has been very helpful in facilitating the fieldwork for this project and in providing documents and insights. I would like to give a special thanks to my research assistants in the three states surveyed. 2 The cases should be seen as examples of Southern states, and they should not be considered as representative of the three regions of the Southern Sudan. 3 NDA is a coalition of oppositional groups from both the North and the South. Its importance waned as the bilateral negotiations between SPLM/A and NCP gained momentum. 4 For more details on SPLM in this period: Øystein H. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s (Uppsala, 2005). 5 Among others, conferences for Civil Society and Senior Officers of the SPLA. Rolandsen, CSCW/PRIO · 2007 Page 5 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 9 January 2005 and the establishment of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) demands that SPLM must go through another phase of change. SPLM has to change its current configuration as an all- compassing political movement and become a political party competing with other parties for the attention and support of the electorate. In doing this the Movement faces two major challenges. Firstly, to change its hierarchical guerrilla structures and move towards a civilian and democratic organisation. Secondly, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between government and party. A party structure was formally established 9 July 2005 together with the inauguration of the Government of South Sudan, but in reality this is a more difficult and long-lasting process. This task is made more challeng- ing by the predominance of one-party politics in the Sudan since independence and a tendency of merging government administration and political party under the notion of a “ruling party”. 6 In February 2006 the first steps towards establishing SPLM as a proper political party was announced. Interim Party bodies were introduced at the national, Southern Sudan level and at state level. In January 2007 a large meeting for the SPLM Southern Sector was held in Juba where Salva Kiir announced the year of SPLM and launched a campaign for organising party congresses at grassroots’ level and for recruitment of members. In February 2007 a SPLM leadership meeting was held in Yei where reso- lutions on crucial policy issues were adopted and SPLM’s commitment to unity of the Sudan and the New Sudan policy of John Garang was confirmed. 7 However, the first major test of SPLM’s ability to transform into a political party and open the field for multi-party elections will be the national elections which probably will take place in 2009. The transition into a political party comes within a difficult national context: There is a growing political distance between SPLM and National Congress Party (NCP).8 The war in Darfur and NCP’s lack of co-operation with the international com- munity drains government budgets; causes international isolation; and, obstructs the international contribution to the reconstruction of the South. 2.2 Brief Description of the Three States Included in the Survey Eastern Equatoria Eastern Equatoria (EEQ) is situated at the South-East corner of the Sudan and its population is divided into several ethnic groups where the Latouka is the largest one. The tribes of EEQ rely on a combination of agriculture and livestock herding. The state 6 Cf. National Congress Party and President Nimeri’s Sudan Socialist Union of the 1970s and early 1980s. 7 SPLM Interim National Council, ‘Communiqué’, Yei, 12 February 2007. 8 Alex de Waal, ‘The Wars of Sudan’, The Nation , 19 March 2007. Rolandsen, CSCW/PRIO · 2007 Page 6 From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party capital, Torit, is perhaps best known for being the site of the Torit Mutiny in 1955, which was an important pretext to the first civil war in the Southern Sudan (ca. 1963-72). 9 EEQ was heavily affected by the last civil war. Initially the local population of EEQ was not involved in the rebellion against central state in Khartoum and SPLA’s relationship with the local population was somewhat strained. This was partly due to a rather militaristic rule in the areas SPLM/A took control over in the 1980s. Later the Eastern Equatorians’ support for SPLM/A grew and a common purpose in defeating the “Arabs” of the North united them. The local political elite has still remained somewhat wary of what they per- ceive as a Dinka dominated SPLM and it is fair to say that their highest political priority remains local autonomy from Khartoum as well as Juba. Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Aweil is the main town and state capital of Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBG). The majority of the population belongs to the Dinka tribe while a minority belongs to smaller tribes, commonly referred to as Jur, mainly living in the Western part of the state. Situated at the border to Northern Sudan and being both on a major north-south road to Bahr el-Ghazal and the railway line to Wau, Aweil has been strongly influenced by Northern culture and economy. The Northern influence is compounded by the fact that albeit besieged and shelled, Aweil was one of the few towns that was never captured by the SPLA during the civil war. The Government of Sudan used Aweil as a base of operation for both the regu- lar army and the Arab Murahalin militia. Despite an oppressive military rule during the civil war. NCP still wield influence in Aweil town and the Southern opposition parties appear to have a stronger foundation here than in Torit/EEQ and Bor/Jonglei.
Recommended publications
  • Final Draft of the Co-Chairman's Statement
    FINAL DRAFT OF THE CO-CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT Your Excellencies, Honorable Delegates, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of my Co-Chairman, Moulana Abel Alier, my colleagues in the Steering Committee, and on my own behalf, I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you to this Conference, which marks the final phase of the National Dialogue. This is a historic occasion for us in the National Dialogue and we believe for our country. When His Excellency, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, initiated the National Dialogue more than three years ago, we cannot say with confidence that we, or anyone else for that matter, had a clear idea how long it would take, where it would lead, and what the end result would be. It was initially thought that the Dialogue process would take several months. Many saw it as a ploy by the President to polish his political image. The National Dialogue has now lasted for over three years. And far from being a ploy by the President, it has proved to be a sincere national soul searching about the crises facing our country. 1 What we soon learned as we undertook our assignment, was that our President wanted the process to be absolutely free, inclusive, transparent and credible. He repeatedly reaffirmed that National Dialogue was not a trap or a net for catching his political opponents, and that people should speak freely without fear, harassment or any form of intimidation. And, indeed, through the nationwide grassroots consultations and regional conferences, our people spoke their minds without fear or constraint.
    [Show full text]
  • Republic of South Sudan "Establishment Order
    REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN "ESTABLISHMENT ORDER NUMBER 36/2015 FOR THE CREATION OF 28 STATES" IN THE DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN Order 1 Preliminary Citation, commencement and interpretation 1. This order shall be cited as "the Establishment Order number 36/2015 AD" for the creation of new South Sudan states. 2. The Establishment Order shall come into force in thirty (30) working days from the date of signature by the President of the Republic. 3. Interpretation as per this Order: 3.1. "Establishment Order", means this Republican Order number 36/2015 AD under which the states of South Sudan are created. 3.2. "President" means the President of the Republic of South Sudan 3.3. "States" means the 28 states in the decentralized South Sudan as per the attached Map herewith which are established by this Order. 3.4. "Governor" means a governor of a state, for the time being, who shall be appointed by the President of the Republic until the permanent constitution is promulgated and elections are conducted. 3.5. "State constitution", means constitution of each state promulgated by an appointed state legislative assembly which shall conform to the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011, amended 2015 until the permanent Constitution is promulgated under which the state constitutions shall conform to. 3.6. "State Legislative Assembly", means a legislative body, which for the time being, shall be appointed by the President and the same shall constitute itself into transitional state legislative assembly in the first sitting presided over by the most eldest person amongst the members and elect its speaker and deputy speaker among its members.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Peacebuilding- the Role of Civilians and Civil Society in Preventing Mass Atrocities in South Sudan
    SPECIAL REPORT Strategic Peacebuilding The Role of Civilians and Civil Society in Preventing Mass Atrocities in South Sudan The Cases of the SPLM Leadership Crisis (2013), the Military Standoff at General Malong’s House (2017), and the Wau Crisis (2016–17) NYATHON H. MAI JULY 2020 WEEKLY REVIEW June 7, 2020 The Boiling Frustrations in South Sudan Abraham A. Awolich outh Sudan’s 2018 peace agreement that ended the deadly 6-year civil war is in jeopardy, both because the parties to it are back to brinkmanship over a number S of mildly contentious issues in the agreement and because the implementation process has skipped over fundamental st eps in a rush to form a unity government. It seems that the parties, the mediators and guarantors of the agreement wereof the mind that a quick formation of the Revitalized Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) would start to build trust between the leaders and to procure a public buy-in. Unfortunately, a unity government that is devoid of capacity and political will is unable to address the fundamentals of peace, namely, security, basic services, and justice and accountability. The result is that the citizens at all levels of society are disappointed in RTGoNU, with many taking the law, order, security, and survival into their own hands due to the ubiquitous absence of government in their everyday lives. The country is now at more risk of becoming undone at its seams than any other time since the liberation war ended in 2005. The current st ate of affairs in the country has been long in the making.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan's Equatoria
    SPECIAL REPORT NO. 493 | APRIL 2021 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan’s Equatoria By Alan Boswell Contents Introduction ...................................3 Descent into War ..........................4 Key Actors and Interests ............ 9 Conclusion and Recommendations ...................... 16 Thomas Cirillo, leader of the Equatoria-based National Salvation Front militia, addresses the media in Rome on November 2, 2019. (Photo by Andrew Medichini/AP) Summary • In 2016, South Sudan’s war expand- Equatorians—a collection of diverse South Sudan’s transitional period. ed explosively into the country’s minority ethnic groups—are fighting • On a national level, conflict resolu- southern region, Equatoria, trig- for more autonomy, local or regional, tion should pursue shared sover- gering a major refugee crisis. Even and a remedy to what is perceived eignty among South Sudan’s con- after the 2018 peace deal, parts of as (primarily) Dinka hegemony. stituencies and regions, beyond Equatoria continue to be active hot • Equatorian elites lack the external power sharing among elites. To spots for national conflict. support to viably pursue their ob- resolve underlying grievances, the • The war in Equatoria does not fit jectives through violence. The gov- political process should be expand- neatly into the simplified narratives ernment in Juba, meanwhile, lacks ed to include consultations with of South Sudan’s war as a power the capacity and local legitimacy to local community leaders. The con- struggle for the center; nor will it be definitively stamp out the rebellion. stitutional reform process of South addressed by peacebuilding strate- Both sides should pursue a nego- Sudan’s current transitional period gies built off those precepts.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan: Colonialism, Independence, and Conflict
    Sudan: Colonialism, Independence, and Conflict Overview Students will analyze the impact of colonization on Sudan including regional divisions, independence movements, and conflict. Students will understand the various economic, political, and societal factors that have led to wars in the region. Students will also learn that these conflicts have led to migration out of Sudan, exploring cultural and artistic production of Sudanese people in the diaspora. Students will learn that the effects of decolonization and ethnic conflict have been a push factor for African migration in the new wave of diaspora. Essential/Compelling Question(s) How has the legacy of colonization and imperialism impacted Sudan? How has conflict in Sudan affected the country’s politics, economy, and society? How are human rights affected in times of conflict? Grade(s) 9-12 Subject(s) World History North Carolina Essential Standards WH.8: Analyze global interdependence and shifts in power in terms of political, economic, social and environmental changes and conflicts since the last half of the twentieth century. WH.H.8.3: Analyze the "new" balance of power and the search for peace and stability in terms of how each has influenced global interactions since the last half of the twentieth century (e.g., post WWII, Post Cold War, 1990s Globalization, New World Order, Global Achievements and Innovations). WH.8.6: Explain how liberal democracy, private enterprise and human rights movements have reshaped political, economic and social life in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States (e.g., U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, end of Cold War, apartheid, perestroika, glasnost, etc.).
    [Show full text]
  • Download UA In
    UA: 100/19 Index: AFR 65/0679/2019 South Sudan Date: 10 July 2019 URGENT ACTION SECURITY AGENT ILL-TREATED IN DETENTION Ding Ding Mou, a South Sudanese security agent, is detained at the Riverside detention centre – notorious for its extremely poor conditions and incidents of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. He was arbitrarily arrested by the National Security Service (NSS) in Juba on 31 May. He was first detained at the NSS headquarters, known as ‘Blue House’ for eight days. TAKE ACTION: WRITE AN APPEAL IN YOUR OWN WORDS OR USE THIS MODEL LETTER President of the Republic of South Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit Juba, South Sudan Twitter: @RepSouthSudan and @PresSalva Your Excellency President Salva Kiir, Ding Ding Mou, a South Sudanese staff member of the National Security Service (NSS), was arbitrarily arrested by the NSS in Juba on 31 May. He was first detained at the NSS headquarters, known as ‘Blue House’ for eight days before being transferred to the Riverside detention centre – notorious for its extremely poor conditions and incidents of torture and other forms of ill-treatment – on 8 June. Ding Ding Mou has been denied family visits and access to a lawyer. He has also not been informed of any charges against him. Amnesty International has received credible reports that he is detained at Riverside detention centre where he is being held in a small room described as a mosquito infested “cage” where he sleeps leaning on the wall and is forced to drink water from the toilet. Amnesty International is concerned that his health condition has deteriorated over the past month due to conditions of detention and there are concerns that he is not receiving the medical treatment he needs.
    [Show full text]
  • National Education Statistics
    2016 NATIONAL EDUCATION STATISTICS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN FEBRUARY 2017 www.goss.org © Ministry of General Education & Instruction 2017 Photo Courtesy of UNICEF This publication may be used as a part or as a whole, provided that the MoGEI is acknowledged as the source of information. The map used in this document is not the official maps of the Republic of South Sudan and are for illustrative purposes only. This publication has been produced with financial assistance from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and technical assistance from Altai Consulting. Soft copies of the complete National and State Education Statistic Booklets, along with the EMIS baseline list of schools and related documents, can be accessed and downloaded at: www.southsudanemis.org. For inquiries or requests, please use the following contact information: George Mogga / Director of Planning and Budgeting / MoGEI [email protected] Giir Mabior Cyerdit / EMIS Manager / MoGEI [email protected] Data & Statistics Unit / MoGEI [email protected] Nor Shirin Md. Mokhtar / Chief of Education / UNICEF [email protected] Akshay Sinha / Education Officer / UNICEF [email protected] Daniel Skillings / Project Director / Altai Consulting [email protected] Philibert de Mercey / Senior Methodologist / Altai Consulting [email protected] FOREWORD On behalf of the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), I am delighted to present The National Education Statistics Booklet, 2016, of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS). It is the 9th in a series of publications initiated in 2006, with only one interruption in 2014, a significant achievement for a new nation like South Sudan. The purpose of the booklet is to provide a detailed compilation of statistical information covering key indicators of South Sudan’s education sector, from ECDE to Higher Education.
    [Show full text]
  • Making a Killing
    Making a Killing South Sudanese Military Leaders’ Wealth, Explained May 2020 Revised December 2020 Taking of South Sudan Series Making a Killing South Sudanese Military Leaders’ Wealth, Explained May 2020 Revised December 2020 Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Impunity at the Top 4 From Mass Killing to Mass Profit 18 The Revolving Door 29 Consequences of High-Level Corruption 35 Recommendations 38 Endnotes 43 MAKING A KILLING TheSentry.org Executive Summary South Sudan’s last four army chiefs of staff, four high-ranking military leaders, and three opposition militia leaders have engaged in business activities indicative of money laundering and corruption, The Sentry has found. Many of these men share personal or commercial ties with President Salva Kiir, who regularly inter- venes in legal proceedings targeting his staunchest friends and allies.1 All but two have led troops who com- mitted grave human rights violations, starting with the December 2013 mass atrocities in Juba that launched a long and bloody civil war. This report examines the commercial and financial activities of former Army chiefs of staff Gabriel Jok Riak, James Hoth Mai, Paul Malong Awan, and Oyay Deng Ajak, along with senior military officers Salva Mathok Gengdit, Bol Akot Bol, Garang Mabil, and Marial Chanuong.2 Militia leaders linked to major instances of violence both before and during the civil war that ended in February 2020—Gathoth Gatkuoth Hothnyang, Johnson Olony, and David Yau Yau—are also profiled here. Except for Hoth Mai and Ajak, these men have committed egregious human rights violations with near total impunity since the country’s independence, according to the United Nations and the African Union.
    [Show full text]
  • MSF South Sudan Activity Update Medical Aid Where It Is Needed Most January 2017 Independent - Impartial - Neutral
    MSF South Sudan Activity Update Medical aid where it is needed most January 2017 Independent - Impartial - Neutral White Nile State Oct-Dec 2016 MSF MEDICAL PROJECTS IN SOUTH SUDAN MSF IN NUMBERS 126Almost 873 consultations 257,000 outpatient consultations, médicales en 2013 SUDAN Melut of which 67,000 for children under 5 years old Abyei AA Yida Wau Shilluk Doro Agok Malakal Mayom Bentiu New Fangak ETHIOPIA 16013,500 lits patients hospitalised, including Old Fangak almost 4,800 children under 5 years old Aweil Leer Lankien Pagak Kule Thonyor Tierkidi Greater Greater Wau Bahr Pugnido 1861,394 interventions surgical operations and Upper Nile El Ghazal Region chirurgicales en 2012 Region 1,115 violence-related injured patients CENTRAL Pibor AFRICAN Bor REPUBLIC More than 80,000 patients treated for Greater malaria Equatoria Region Yambio Juba MSF projects 2,225 patients treated for malnutrition, of Yei MSF projects for DEMOCRATIC which 612 admitted for intensive treatment South Sudanese refugees KENYA REPUBLIC Adi Yumbe Refugee Camps UGANDA OF CONGO 0 100 200 km 2,319 babies delivered 0 100 mi MSF OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL In Aweil, MSF teams faced a particularly high malaria NEEDS IN SOUTH SUDAN AND ABYEI peak, treating more than 10,000 people from June to December. More than half of the children with malaria MALARIA required inpatient treatment. MSF supported five primary healthcare centres in the counties surrounding Aweil by Between October and December 2016, MSF treated providing lifesaving drugs, training for the management more than 80,000 people suffering from malaria across of severe malaria, referrals to the hospital in Aweil etc.
    [Show full text]
  • Tracking the Flow of Government Transfers Financing Local Government Service Delivery in South Sudan
    Tracking the flow of Government transfers Financing local government service delivery in South Sudan 1.0 Introduction The Government of South Sudan through its Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) makes transfers of funds to states and local governments on a monthly basis to finance service delivery. Broadly speaking, the government makes five types of transfers to the local government level: a) Conditional salary transfers: these funds are transferred to be used by the county departments of education, health and water to pay for the salaries of primary school teachers, health workers and water sector workers respectively. b) Operation transfers for county service departments: these funds are transferred to the counties for the departments of education, health and water to cater for the operation costs of these county departments. c) County block transfer: each county receives a discretionary amount which it can spend as it wishes on activities of the county. d) Operation transfer to service delivery units (SDUs): these funds are transferred to primary schools and primary health care facilities under the jurisdiction of each county to cater for operation costs of these units. e) County development grant (CDG): the national annual budget includes an item to be transferred to each county to enable the county conduct development activities such as construction of schools and office blocks; in practice however this money has not been released to the counties since 2011 mainly due to a lack of funds. 2.0 Transfer and spending modalities/guidelines Funds are transferred by the national Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning from the government accounts at Bank of South Sudan to the respective state’s bank accounts through the state ministries of Finance (SMoF).
    [Show full text]
  • Risk Assessment of the Mining Industry in South Sudan: Towards a Framework for Transparency and Accountability
    RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE MINING INDUSTRY IN SOUTH SUDAN: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Peter Adwok Nyaba July 2019 Appreciation and acknowledgement This study, “Risk Assessment of the Mining Industry in South Sudan: Towards a ​ Framework for Transparency and Accountability”, was commissioned by Ebony Center ​ for Strategic Studies. It commenced in the second week of May 2019 and was completed by the first week of June. Mr. Azaria Gillo, a geologist working in the Ministry of Mining was my research assistant and his contribution led to the success of the research work. I thank him very much. The preliminary report of this study was discussed in an Ebony Centre’s function DPF/TF on Saturday 20 July 2019 attended by more than a hundred participants. The Under-Secretaries of the Ministries of Mining, Forestry and Environment as well as the Director of Environmental and Natural Resources Program in the Sudd Institute were the main discussants. Their technical and professional views were incorporated into the final report. I want to avail myself of this opportunity to appreciate and acknowledge the assistance rendered to us by the Under-Secretary, Dr. Andu Ezbon Adde, in granting permission to collect information and data from the Ministry of Mining data base and writing letters to the State Governments of Kapoeta and Juba to assist us in the research. Last but not least, my thanks and appreciation go to Ebony Center for Strategic Studies, for availing me the opportunity to undertake an exercise that is likely to contribute towards strengthening the institutions and instruments of the mining industry in the Republic of South Sudan.
    [Show full text]
  • CPA Monitor April 2011
    Vol. 7, Issue 65 HIGHLI GHTS April 2011 • On 4 April, the National Assembly convened its first session for the year in the absence of Southern Sudan MPs. President Al-Bashir inaugurated the session and delivered a speech on recent developments. Status of the implementation of the CPA • On 4 and 7 April, the NCP and the SPLM launched their electoral campaigns respectively, and continued their campaigns throughout the month. • On 9 April, the data entry process of the popular consultation public hearings Power -Sharing……………. 2 began at the Data Entry Centre of the Popular Consultation Parliamentary Commission in Ed-Damazin, and was completed on 27 April. Wealth -Sharing … ……… 20 • On 13 April, the Abyei Standing Committee agreed to form a Joint Technical Committee in order to monitor and verify the withdrawal of all unauthorised The Three Areas…………2 5 security forces from the Abyei Area in accordance with the Kadugli agreements of 13 and 17 January and the Abyei agreement of 4 March. • Se curity Arrangements.. 33 On 27 April, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the Constitutional Court Act 2005. The amendment changed the quorum required for court decisions from seven to five members (Article 8 of the Act) Dissemination of CPA…. 43 due to the absence of two Southern Sudanese judges. The National Assembly also passed the National Elections Act Amendment Bill 2011, which abolished all provisions relating to Southern Sudan and reduced the number Glossary of Acr onyms…. 44 of the Assembly’s seats from 450 to 354. • A total of 2,699 DDR ex-combatants and members of the Special Needs Groups were demobilised in three demobilisation operations (Khartoum, Wau and Kadugli), including 810 women and 124 disabled participants.
    [Show full text]