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Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy

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Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy 0/-*/&4637&: *ODPMMBCPSBUJPOXJUI6OHMVFJU XFIBWFTFUVQBTVSWFZ POMZUFORVFTUJPOT UP MFBSONPSFBCPVUIPXPQFOBDDFTTFCPPLTBSFEJTDPWFSFEBOEVTFE 8FSFBMMZWBMVFZPVSQBSUJDJQBUJPOQMFBTFUBLFQBSU $-*$,)&3& "OFMFDUSPOJDWFSTJPOPGUIJTCPPLJTGSFFMZBWBJMBCMF UIBOLTUP UIFTVQQPSUPGMJCSBSJFTXPSLJOHXJUI,OPXMFEHF6OMBUDIFE ,6JTBDPMMBCPSBUJWFJOJUJBUJWFEFTJHOFEUPNBLFIJHIRVBMJUZ CPPLT0QFO"DDFTTGPSUIFQVCMJDHPPE Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy In Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy, Erik J. Engstrom offers an important, historically grounded perspective on the stakes of congressional redistricting by evaluating the impact of gerrymandering on elections and on party control of the U.S. national government from 1789 through the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. In this era before the courts supervised redistricting, state parties enjoyed wide discretion with regard to the timing and structure of their districting choices. Although Congress occasionally added language to federal- apportionment acts requiring equally populous districts, there is little evidence this legislation was enforced. Essentially, states could redistrict largely whenever and however they wanted, and so, not surpris- ingly, political considerations dominated the process. Engstrom employs the abundant cross- sectional and temporal varia- tion in redistricting plans and their electoral results from all the states— throughout U.S. history— in order to investigate the causes and con- sequences of partisan redistricting. His analysis reveals that districting practices across states and over time systematically affected the com- petitiveness of congressional elections, shaped the partisan composition of congressional delegations, and, on occasion, decided party control of the House of Representatives. In conclusion, Engstrom places recent developments in redistricting politics and scholarship within the larger historical context uncovered in this book. Erik J. Engstrom is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Uni- versity of California, Davis. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY Erik J. Engstrom The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2013 All rights reserved This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher. Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America c Printed on acid- free paper 2016 2015 2014 2013 4 3 2 1 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Engstrom, Erik J. Partisan gerrymandering and the construction of American democracy / Erik J. Engstrom. pages cm. — (Legislative politics and policy making) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978- 0- 472- 11901- 1 (hardback) — ISBN 978- 0- 472- 02952- 5 (e- book) 1. Gerrymandering— United States. 2. Apportionment (Election law)— United States. 3. Election districts— United States. 4. Voting— United States. 5. Representative government and representation— United States. 6. United States— Politics and government. I. Title. JK1341.E64 2013 328.73'073455— dc23 2013015656 Acknowledgments In writing this book, I have incurred many debts. At an early stage, Gary Cox, Mathew McCubbins, and, especially, Sam Kernell provided encour- agement and insight. Janet Box- Steffensmeier and David Canon, the series editors for Legislative Politics & Policy Making, as well as the two anony- mous scholars who reviewed the manuscript for the University of Michi- gan Press, offered careful readings and constructive advice. Jack Reilly and Matthew Pietryka conducted excellent research assistance. Georg Vanberg, Alan Wiseman, Chad Rector, Nathan Monroe, Chris Den Hartog, Charles Stewart, and Lee Sigelman provided helpful comments on various portions of the manuscript. In addition to commenting on aspects of the manu- script, Jamie Carson and Jason Roberts also shared in some of the research that forms the basis of chapter 7. Finally, I dedicate this book to my wife Mary and my daughter Emma for their love and support. Contents ONE Gerrymandering and the Evolution of American Politics 1 PART I: THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789– 1840 TWO Districting and the Construction of Early American Democracy 21 THREE The Origins of Single- Member Districts 43 PART II: THE PARTISAN ERA, 1840– 1900 FOUR The Strategic Timing of Congressional Redistricting 59 FIVE Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting 80 SIX Electoral Competition and Critical Elections 100 SEVEN A Congress of Strangers: Gerrymandering and Legislative Turnover 130 EIGHT The Partisan Impact of Malapportionment 148 PART III: REDISTRICTING IN THE CANDIDATE- CENTERED ERA, 1900– PRESENT NINE From Turbulence to Stasis, 1900– 1964 167 TEN Gerrymandering and the Future of American Politics 191 Notes 207 References 213 Index 223 ONE Gerrymandering and the Evolution of American Politics This book evaluates the impact of congressional redistricting on elections and control of U.S. national government from 1789 to the reapportion- ment revolution of the 1960s. The motivating question is one that scholars seldom ask: what was redistricting like in the past? It turns out that the answer to this question is essential for understanding both the past and present of American politics. Almost all previous research on congressional redistricting concentrates on the period after the 1960s. In the mid-1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed malapportioned electoral districts for both state legislatures and the U.S. House of Representatives. This transformative legal revolution produced a massive wave of redistricting across the nation that shifted the partisan landscape in state legislatures across the country and funda- mentally redistributed power in American politics. In addition, this reap- portionment revolution led to the creation of a large scholarly literature devoted to studying the causes and consequences of the modern decennial- redistricting process. In this now- vast literature, redistricting prior to the 1960s receives brief treatment, although the years before 1964 constitute nearly 75 percent of the United States’ nearly 225- year history. Such narrowly focused accounts suffer from two principal disadvan- tages. First, it has led political scientists and historians to radically under- estimate the power of gerrymandering in shaping the development of American politics. Throughout the 19th century, partisan gerrymandering systematically structured the competitiveness of congressional elections, 2 Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy the partisan composition of congressional delegations, and, on occasion, decided party control of the House of Representatives. Gerrymandering roiled state legislatures across the country, and profoundly shaped the tumult of 19th- century politics and policy. The outcomes of these colli- sions continue to cast long shadows over modern American politics. Second, the failure to examine the history of redistricting has led stu- dents of contemporary American politics to misunderstand the context in which modern redistricting takes place. Modern research has argued that redistricting produces, at best, only a minimal impact on the partisan bal- ance of power in Congress. However, no consensus has emerged about why gerrymandering has had such little impact. Some scholars have argued that constraints on gerrymandering in the modern period— including court oversight, “one- person, one- vote” mandates, and demands by congres- sional incumbents for secure seats— have made it virtually impossible to engage in a full- blown partisan gerrymander. Others contend that the par- tisan gains to be had from gerrymandering are limited, regardless of the institutional configuration under which redistricting takes place. Moving beyond the relatively fixed institutional and political context of modern redistricting provides a powerful opportunity to assess these competing explanations. Some of the most interesting questions in the study of American poli- tics, therefore, concern the differences between the past and the present. Understanding the causes and consequences of these differences prove essential for understanding both the historical development and contem- porary practice of American democracy. The Electoral Development of Congress Although the basic constitutional architecture of the federal government has remained largely constant since 1789, the day- to- day conduct of Amer- ican politics has changed dramatically over time. Nowhere are these differ- ences more visible, and more consequential, than in the House of Represen- tatives. Nowadays, elections to the House are characterized by extremely low levels of competition. Incumbents dominate election outcomes. Most incumbents who run for reelection win, and win big. One consequence of low competition is that membership in Congress is relatively stable from one year to the next. Another consequence is that the partisan seat distri- bution in the House tends to respond slowly to changes in public prefer- ences. Indeed, a large and influential literature on congressional elections Gerrymandering and the Evolution of American Politics
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