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The Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption

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The Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 65 | Issue 2 Article 1 1974 The nI vestigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption Herbert Beigel Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Herbert Beigel, The nI vestigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 135 (1974) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Tox JouwAx op Canaz AL LAW & CRnmLoaGy Copyright C 1974 by Northwestern University School of Vol. 65, No. 2 Law Printed in U.S.A. CRIMINAL LAW THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF POLICE CORRUPTION HERBERT BEIGEL* INTRODUCTION vestigation and prosecution of police corruption. Within the last few years there has been a This analysis will identify the specific methods marked proliferation of federal investigations and employed by federal prosecutors to subject local 2 prosecutions of state and local officials for official police officials to federal prosecution, thereby misconduct and corruption. So active has the offering insight into the intricacies of the investi- federal government become in investigating the gation of one governmental body by another. In local political arena that state and city politicians addition, the federal investigation of state and and police officers are being investigated, indicted local corruption has raised new questions about and often convicted for a wide variety of violations the proper role of federal law enforcement. By of federal criminal statutes. Because this intense analyzing the problems which arise in one par- interest in the affairs of local officials by federal ticular type of investigation, it will also be possible investigators is a relatively recent development, to point out new ways in which to improve the little attention has been given to the changes in relations between state and federal agencies. the application of federal law, federal jurisdiction and constitutional protections which have accom- TYPES or PouIcE CoxupmnozN panied these investigations. Questions concerning Essentially, police corruption falls into two political motivations behind such federal incur- major categories-external corruption, which con- sions into local affairs have also beclouded any cerns police contacts with the public, and internal real attempt to delineate objectively the legal and corruption, which involves the relationships practical effects of investigations of local corrup- among policemen within the workings of the tion.' police department. The external corruption gen- The purpose of this article is to focus on one erally consists of one or more of the following recent and controversial development-the in- activities: * B.A. 1966, Brandeis University; J.D. 1969, Uni- versity of Pennsylvania School of Law; Member of (1) Payoffs to police by essentially non-criminal District of Columbia and Illinois Bars. elements who fail to comply with stringent statutes Much of the factual material found in this article is or city ordinances; or, payoffs by those in parti- based on the author's tenure from September, 1970 to November, 1972 with the Organized Crime and Rack- cular need of police protection, who are willing eteering Section of the Criminal Division of the United to pass money to individual officers or groups of States Department of Justice. The views expressed in officers (for example, businessmen dispensing liq- this article are his own and do not necessarily coincide uor, businessmen located in high crime areas, in- with the views of officials of the Justice Department. In addition, much of his time was spent with the Chi- dividuals operating any type of business requiring cago Strike Force, one of eighteen field offices of the a license, automobile towing operations, attorneys Racketeering Section and nothing in this article is who represent those guilty of minor violations of intended to reflect on any government lawyers or the law where police testimony constitutes most personnel of agencies with whom he worked. IDuring my assignment with the Chicago Strike 2 Since the authority or jurisdiction of any single Force, I found little political influence in the investiga- police department is confined to a single jurisdiction tions which I conducted, the enormity of the federal within a state, it traditionally has been assumed that bureaucracy effectively blunting any overt political the investigation and elimination of police corruption bias that might affect a decision on whether or not to should be left to the state. That such enforcement investigate local corruption. More particularly, the rarely happens may be explained by any one of the experience of supervising an investigation of police following: (1) One cannot effectively investigate him- corruption led me to the conclusion that such investi- self; (2) Local government officials are themselves pay- gations were at least as much the product of "an idea ing the police for favors; and (3) The citizenry largely whose time has come" as they were the consequence of acqueses in and enjoys the favors and leniency granted any political bias. by the police who can be bought. '5 HERBERT BIGEL [Vol. 65 of the state's case, and individuals who repeatedly as those who pay are satisfied with the service, violate the traffic laws). exposure is unlikely. (2) Payoffs to police by individuals who con- Internal corruption exists as a result of a desire tinually violate the law as a method of making of individual officers to improve their working con- prostitutes, narcotics addicts money (for example, ditions or to achieve higher status in the police and pushers, and professional burglars). department. It may include: (3) "Clean Graft" where money is paid to police for services, or where courtesy discounts are given (1) Payment of money to join the police force. as a matter of course to the police. (2) Payment of money to higher ranking officers for better shifts or assignments. These manifestations of external corruption (3) Payment for choice vacation time. hierarchial structure often follow the established (4) Strict adherence to a code of silence con- of the police department. For example, a tavern cerning external police corruption. owner who wishes to avoid arrest by members of (5) Payment for promotions. a vice squad investigating violations of the liquor (6) Payment for an assignment which will yield laws must be assured that his payments to a single lucrative kick-backs. officer will guarantee that the recipient either has the power to direct other officers not to bother Most types of internal corruption seldom are the tavern owner or shares the money with those publicized and usually are not the subject of fed- who have command responsibilities. For this rea- eral prosecution. However, because they are often son, the payment of money to the police by busi- interdependent, the elimination of external corrup- nessmen, who are particularly vulnerable to arrest tion may have the effect of eliminating many for minor statutory violations, generally assumes forms of internal police corruption. Thus, wide- a highly organized structure of distribution. Where spread investigations and prosecutions of external the method of distributing the proceeds of collec- police corruption may have a potentially signifi- tion becomes too burdensome, a more sophisticated cant impact on all aspects of police corruption. method may develop. A commander of a district, FEDERAL AumHORITY FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND who knows that collections can easily be extracted PROSECUTION OF POLICE CORRUPTION from tavern owners, may simply charge an officer who wants to be assigned to the vice squad a fixed A. Tie Hobbs Act fee per month regardless of the amount actually Although Congress has recently passed legisla- collected. Similarly, those in charge of appointing tion which authorizes federal investigative and commanders of districts may extract a monthly prosecutorial efforts against police corruption in charge in exchange for awarding that position. the area of organized gambling,3 the most signifi- Sophisticated methods of corruption also exist 318 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970), enacted as part of the Or- where the police receive money from organized ganized Crime and Control Act of 1970. This statute crime. Because large scale bookmaking, narcotics expanded federal jurisdiction over gambling activities peddling and other forms of organized criminal by proscribing the conduct of an illegal gambling busi- ness under state law by five or more persons and which activity are highly structured, payments to the grossed $2000 in any single day, or remained in sub- police tend to be highly organized. Thus, protec- stantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days, whether or not the business involved any tion for a syndicate's numerous wire rooms in a interstate activity. At the same time, and as part of the district might require payments to the commander same Organized Crime Act of 1970, Congress enacted who will direct his subordinates not to harass another statute which incorporates within the illegal gambling business ambit of section 1955 state officials certain establishments. The commander will either who either through official acquiescence or active par- have to pay his officers or allow them to keep a ticipation facilitate the gambling business, although portion of the proceeds which they collect. only the enforcement of state laws may thus be ob- structed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970). In all cases of external police corruption, pro- Although couched in terms of obstruction of justice, tection is the service bestowed, either in overlook- section 1511 was a congressional response to the con- siderable amount of evidence that intrastate gambling ing violations of the law or in providing some addi- flourishes inpart because of protection payments made tional police aid or assistance.
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