Risk Analysis of Corruption Within Law Enforcement

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RISK ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Strengthening the accountability of law enforcement institutions is of critical importance to eﬀectively combat corruption and break the circle of impunity.”

Strengthening the Capacities of Law Enforcement and Judiciary in the Fight against Corruption in Serbia (PACS)

RISK ANALYSIS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITIES AND ACTUAL EXTENT OF CORRUPTION WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Joint European Union – Council of Europe Project “Strengthening the Capacities of Law Enforcement and Judiciary in the Fight against Corruption in Serbia” (PACS) www.coe.int/pacs

Belgrade • 2015 Publisher Council of Europe, Office in Belgrade Španskih boraca 3, 11070 Belgrade www.coe.int

This publication has been prepared within the framework of the project “Strengthening the Capacities of Law Enforcement and Judiciary in the Fight against Corruption in Serbia” (PACS), funded by the European Union and Council of Europe, and implemented by Council of Europe. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official position of the European Union and/or Council of Europe.

Authors Robert Šumi, Council of Europe expert Lado Laličić, Council of Europe Secretariat

Circulation 200 copies Preparation and printing Kuća Štampe plus www.stampanje.com

ISBN 978-86-84437-70-1

All rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet etc.) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without prior permission in writing from the Directorate of Communication (F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex or [email protected]).

For more information on the subject of the publication, please contact: Economic Crime and Cooperation Unit Action against Crime Department DG I – Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law Council of Europe Email: [email protected] Internet: www.coe.int/corruption Table of Contents

SUMMARY...... 7

STATE OF PLAY...... 9

Introduction...... 9

TYPES OF CORRUPTION WITHIN POLICE STRUCTURES...... 9

‘Petty corruption’...... 10

Criminal corruption...... 10

High level/political corruption...... 11

Types of misconduct by police officers...... 11

INTERVIEWS AND FINDINGS...... 12

Findings...... 13

Human Resources Department...... 13

Internal Control Sector (ICS)...... 14

Service for Fighting Organised Crime (SBPOK)...... 18

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... 23

Integrity testing...... 24

Recommendations...... 25

Employment (recruitment), career development and mentorship...... 26

Recommendations...... 28

Prevention, education and training versus repression...... 29

The importance of integrity...... 31

Police professionalism...... 32

Leading by example...... 33

Social responsibility...... 34

Code of ethics...... 35

Conclusions...... 37

REFERENCES...... 38

ANNEX I...... 39

SUMMARY

number of studies conducted in Serbia have shown that corruption A within law enforcement persists as a serious challenge. Given the findings of a number of studies and surveys, substantial anti-corruption reforms have been given political priority. Recent adoption of strategic documents such as Anti-Corruption Strategy and its Action Plan (2013-2017) and subsequent commitments by different authorities to apply these reforms seem to be first response to this challenge.

Police structures have been commonly viewed as one of the public entities most exposed to the risk of corruption. Since considerable powers are entrusted to police officers, it is generally assumed that these powers can easily be manipulated for private benefit or even political purposes. Reduction of corruption in law enforcement is a necessary precondition for pursuing tangible reforms. Progress in achieving this long term goal also depends on the introduction of sets of anti-corruption mechanisms applied not only within law enforcement but also across the entire public administration.

Strengthening the accountability of law enforcement institutions, therefore, is of critical importance to effectively combating corruption and breaking the circle of impunity.

The Council of Europe, through its technical assistance project PACS1, has carried out an empiric research – a risk analysis which aims at assessing the current situation with regard to the possibilities and actual extent of corruption within law enforcement. This activity has been carried out over a five month period (October 2013-February 2014) and resulted in the present report which intends to identify the current state of play concerning the risks of corruption and its forms. The analysis, however, was not limited to the existence and risks of a simple, one-sided case of bribery but to corruption in a much broader context. Consequently, issues such as ethics and integrity, the existence of nepotism (e.g. advancing interests of family members in recruitment processes etc.), cronyism (advancing interests of other types of associate, such as friends, business associates, political allies etc.) and any other similar practices were analysed. The present report also sets out a number of recommendations for the attention not only of the Serbian Ministry of Interior and Police but also for the attention of other policy makers who could foster the implementation of these recommendations.

1 www.coe.int/pacs

7 8 words criminal infiltration of the state. Each STATE OF PLAY of the afore-mentioned corruption types requires different anti-corruption measures. Introduction Experience of police reform from South-East- ern European countries advocates that these measures and reform policies - to be successful - also need to be embedded in the ddressing police corruption is essen- broader framework of competence building tial to building public trust in institu- A that promotes good governance and integ- tions and creating an atmosphere where the rity of state authorities. Aside from the need rule of law principle could be applied. The to suppress corruption within the organs of fight against corruption in state institutions the state, the long-term strategies successful and strong control of public funds expendi- in reducing corruption were those that inte- tures are keystones in restoring public trust grated and gave priority to preventative ap- in the democratic process. All public institu- proaches aimed at the application of ethical tions are at risk, therefore, of being seen as rules and standards, building institutional in- non-transparent and prone to corruption. It tegrity, raising awareness of the role and im- is not difficult to conclude that law enforce- portance of police in society, performing reg- ment organisations are at the top of this list ular corruption risk analysis and subsequent- given the nature of their work and the chal- ly identifying and applying appropriate pre- lenges they are exposed to. ventive measures, etc. The experience of many democratic soci- As already noted, the first step in design- eties suggests that strengthening the capa- ing effective anti-corruption strategies with- bilities of law enforcement institutions to re- in police is to develop a solid understanding sist corruption is of critical importance to ef- of the various manifestations of police cor- fectively combating corruption. ruption, in order to be able to target anti-cor- Police corruption can be manifested in a ruption approaches accordingly. variety of ways, including petty corruption cases (usually associated with traffic police), bureaucratic corruption (manifest as a lack of response to individual requests of citizens for TYPES OF CORRUPTION different permissions and licences or a lack WITHIN POLICE of response to citizen’s complaints against police officers and their alleged abuse of STRUCTURES power, etc.), corruption linked with criminal groups (when police officers inform crimi- s noted above, police corruption refers nals of SIMs applied against them, hide ev- Ato acts of misconduct by police officers idence against individual criminals or crimi- aimed at obtaining financial benefits or other nal groups, intentionally mislead investiga- personal gains in exchange for selectively tions, provide relevant information to crim- enforcing or manipulating rules, as well as inals during the investigation, etc.) and, of interfering with the conduct of investigations course, so called ‘high level’ or ‘political cor- and arrests. There are different levels of police ruption’ where high level police officials corruption that can manifest themselves abuse their power for personal gain or for through a wide variety of practices, ranging the benefit of political groups to which they from petty corruption and small scale bribery are formally or informally affiliated – in other to collusion with criminals and infiltration of

9 law enforcement institutions by organised tion related issues consider the area of hu- crime groups. man resources management as part of so An overview of the different types of po- called ‘petty corruption’. This includes re- lice corruption: cruitment, promotion and task assignment, internal disciplinary and investigation processes, and preferential shift, holiday and lo- ‘Petty corruption’ cation assignment. This also includes situ- The first level of police corruption involves ations when police officers make illegal -ar acts of bribery in everyday interactions with rangements between themselves in order to citizens whereby police officers use their be assigned to specific activities that provide power to obtain money from members of opportunities for corrupt income. However, the public in exchange for not reporting mis- bearing in mind the effects of acts of corrup- demeanours or expediting bureaucratic pro- tion in these areas, their nature and conse- cedures. This is typical for traffic police. Po- quences, this form of corruption belongs en- lice officers are usually given powers and dis- tirely in the so called ‘criminal corruption’ cat- cretion to punish and/or report such misde- egory described in the following paragraph. meanours. Given that these powers can be easily abused for personal benefits, there are strong risks of police officers being engaged Criminal corruption in corrupt practices. The same applies to so More serious, and consequently more called ‘administrative’ of ‘bureaucratic’ corruption when citizens submit requests for dangerous police corruption can be mani- certain permissions or licences. Bureaucrat- fested either through the development of ic corruption in the police force refers to mis- ‘insider’ criminal enterprises, or through the use of internal procedures and administra- ’sponsorship’ of illegal activities, protect- tive processes and resources for private gain. ing or hiding them from law enforcement. A A large number of internal procedures can typical form of collusion between the police be subject to abuse, involving a considerable and criminals (commonly linked with drugs number of staff. The ‘silence of administra- distribution/dealing) is when police officers tions’ that occurs from time to time can also protect the criminals during their illegal ac- sometimes be a signal that some employ- tivities, and the assets gained by the crimi- ees possibly ‘need’ additional ‘commitments’ nals are then shared with the officers. from those who submit a request – in other words a bribe to facilitate the procedures. However, this is maybe only a simplified Existence of such corruption has also been a modus operandi in such cases. This type of subject of the analysis of the EU funded proj- corruption often involves paying police offi- ect ‘Police Reform – Internal Control Sector’ cers to abuse their powers to favour certain and its report ‘Strategic Intelligence Assess- criminals or criminal groups when they are ment on Corruption’ which stated that ‘the in competition with other groups - for exam- notion that “petty” corruption prevails in the ple by harassing/arresting/threatening/in- police, is confirmed by statements from the timidating one group for the benefit of oth- respondents that they gave to police offi- er drug dealers. Experience in many coun- cers and employees drink, cigarettes, flowers tries showed that a number of police offi- and other small gifts (162) and less expensive cers were placed on the ‘pay roll’ of criminal gifts of up to 1000 Dinars (58).’ organisations for supporting their illegal activities, leaking information, or for securing A number of academic papers on corrup-

10 them protection from police investigations Types of misconduct on a regular basis. by police officers2 Possibly the most common knowledge of police corruption among investigators is re- Corruption of authority ferred to as ‘insider’ corruption. It occurs that hh Officers benefit by virtue of their position without violating the law (e.g. free drinks, when criminals or criminal groups manage meals, services). to infiltrate the operational/decision making level within the law enforcement. Usually Bribery this concerns infiltration at the level of senior hh Taking a bribe for non-enforcement of a investigators/decision makers. violation. When such forms of corruption become hh Bribery for the obstruction of the criminal institutionalised they can lead to a wholesale justice process. criminalisation of the state that poses a real hh Bribery for direct intervention in the crim- risk for the stability of any country. inal justice process. hh Benefits from awarding procurement con- tracts to specific companies. High level / political corruption hh Extortion It has been the practice in a number of hh Limited protection payments for criminal transitional societies to manipulate police operations. forces for political purposes. This can be hh Regular protection payments for criminal done through political interference in police operations. investigations, the initiation of false investigations, the “framing” of political opponents, Kickbacks the leaking of confidential information to hh Paying for favouritism regarding the dele- politicians, etc. In a number of cases, such gation of legitimate tasks. practices involved false investigations of political activists and functionaries on corrup- hh Payment (among police officers) in return tion allegations. for the awarding of work-related opportunities for corrupt incomes. The key feature of such corruption is that h it is usually committed by the individuals h Payment regarding delivery or favourable treatment in delivery of legitimate ser- who hold political positions (ministers and vices. their deputies, heads and deputy heads of state agencies, directors and deputy direc- hh Payment for delivery of illegitimate ser- tors of powerful enterprises, etc.). Anoth- vices. er characteristic of such corruption is that financial benefits are not the only motive for Diversion of police resources such conduct – most commonly it is motivat- hh Officers or commanders selling, or pro- ed by a need to discredit political or interest viding disproportionate police ser- groups for the benefit of others and also to vices, during or after working hours. favour certain groups versus their competitors in the political or business arena. 2 Taken from Centre for the Study of Democracy: ‘Countering Police Corruption: European Perspectives’

11 hh Officers or commanders selling legitimate police services to criminals. INTERVIEWS AND hh Targeting (using police powers illegiti- FINDINGS mately to help or victimise certain groups).

Sabotaging investigations rior to commencing this research, the project prepared a general methodology Sabotaging investigations or trials, destruc- P guide3 . An outline of the proposed method- tion of evidence, etc. ology is to be used in identifying, analysing hh Covering up or adding to evidence to ‘set and assessing the key risks associated with someone up’, to ensure a conviction or a the existence of corruption in law enforce- longer sentence for a criminal. ment. The methodology was shared and discussed with representatives of the Serbian Theft and other offences police. It summaries major activities needed hh Stealing from a crime scene and other ar- for carrying out risk analysis, with emphasis eas of legitimate police presence. on surveys, reviews of legal framework and institutional set up, interviews with police hh Stealing from stored goods, such as evi- officers and officials and interviews with- ex dence and recovered property. perts, NGOs and IGOs representatives. hh Pre-meditated criminal acts for personal Prior to its execution, the project held a gain. number of meetings with Ministry of Interi- or (hereinafter referred as ‘MoI’) representa- h h Extension of corruption, such as sharing tives in order to better understand such ac- corrupt money among officers or selling tivity. Bearing in mind the complex struc- stolen goods. ture of the Ministry of Interior and the limit- hh The present exercise has tried to identify ed timeframe and resources available for the the possibilities and existing risks of occur- implementation of this activity, the project rence of those types of corruption. The fol- and the ministry jointly decided that the In- lowing chapters of this report will give an ternal Control Sector (hereinafter referred as overview of the findings and a set of rec- ‘ICS’) of the Ministry of Interior and the Police ommendations aimed at mitigating these Service for Suppression of Organised Crime risks. It also should be noted that the exer- (hereinafter referred as ‘SBPOK’) would par- cise didn’t examine individual cases or the ticipate in the risk analysis. Naturally, these responsibility of individuals given that such two entities were selected on the basis of things were outside its mandate. their jurisdictions and experience in the fight against corruption. In light of this, a questionnaire for the risk analysis was prepared and distributed to the afore-mentioned MoI departments. It served as a basis for interviews held during the on- site visits organised in Belgrade and Novi Sad (from 28th October to 1st November 2013) and Nis and Kragujevac (9th to 13th De- cember 2013). Detail about these visits and their findings are elaborated in the following chapters of this report. Prior to these visits PACS experts team studied the Serbian

3 http://www.coe.int/pacs

12 Law on Police and bylaws that supplement this Law, National Anti-Corruption Strate- Findings gy, Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, Human Resources Department Ministry of Interior Development Strategy (2011-2016), regulation concerning employ- The first interview was held with repre- ment, regulation on whistle-blowers, ethics sentatives of the human resources depart- codes, ‘Strategic Intelligence Assessment on ment of the MoI. It is needless to say that the Corruption’ report (2012), ‘Police Corruption first pre-condition for the proper functioning Control’ report (prepared by Belgrade Cen- of the organs of the state is that employment tre for Security Policy) and a number of ques- procedures are transparent and fair. This as- tionnaires with responses prepared by the sumes transparent processes of selection, MoI Internal Control Sector. competition, training, deployment, evalua- tion/appraisal, promotion, secondment and It is against this background that recogni- dismissal. The Law on Police does not pre- tion and special thanks must be paid to our cisely regulate any of these matters. Stud- partners from ICS who made these reports ies carried out so far suggest that ‘The sys- and responses to the questionnaires avail- tem of external advertising of vacancies in the able. Furthermore, support provided by the MoI is underdeveloped and this opens up op- ICS and SBPOK leadership was indispens- portunities for corrupt practices involving re- able for organising interviews during the on- ceiving and negotiating bribes or services in- site visits as requested by the project. With- volving recruitment. By the end of 2012, the out their support and commitment the PACS MoI has publicly announced 12 vacancy notic- team would not have succeeded in complet- es in the Ministry’s headquarters and 17 vacan- ing this complex activity and it would have cy notices in police departments (Response to been limited to publicly available informa- BCSP Questionnaire 2012). However, these 29 tion only. vacancy notices were not announced for job positions where employees have the status of During the aforementioned visits inter- a police officer, but for positions involving tech- views were held not only with the relevant nical duties (hygiene, administrative work)’4. representatives of the MoI departments un- These findings were also confirmed during der scrutiny, but also with the human re- the team of expert’ meeting with the human sources management of the MoI. Overall, the resources department. In simple words the interviews included the staff from the Bel- employment process largely depends on ei- grade headquarters and their peers from the ther the chief of the department where the regional centres – Novi Sad, Nis and Kragu- position is available, or in some cases on his/ jevac. Apart from meeting and interviewing her hierarchy/high management. This means police officers and officials, the expert team that the decision making powers lie with the also had a chance to discuss the risk of cor- leaders of a unit and/or their management ruption with the representatives of the An- while the HRD department just provides ti-Corruption Agency, Police Academy, DCAF technical support. This support only con- (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control cerns the verification of whether certain for- of Armed Forces), Belgrade Centre for Secu- malities are fulfilled – e.g. if the candidate has rity Policy (an independent research centre) a clear record (no criminal charges have been and OSCE. pressed against him/her; if his/her education level is in accordance with the position’s requirement, etc.). They don’t supervise the employment procedure. There are no com- missions for interviews with the candidates

4 Belgrade Centre for Security Policy: ‘Police Corruption Control’

13 and employment is usually made without of- Other international project findings in ficial consultation or assessment by relevant this matter bodies. Other concerns lie with the fact that As already noted, while conducting this the regulations for employment within the risk analysis the project reviewed ‘Base-Line police, read in conjunction with the Law on Analysis of the Human Resources Manage- Higher Education, enable all those who grad- ment Function in The Ministry of Interior of uated from either a private or state Universi- the Republic of Serbia’ prepared by DCAF ty, regardless of which faculty or studies they (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control completed, to be treated equally for job po- of Armed Forces), where an overview of the sitions within the police force which require human resources management of the MoI a higher education diploma. was made including a set of recommendations aimed at bringing the human resourc- Furthermore, the internal organigram es management of the ministry in line with (job organisation) rulebook is considered international standards and good practic- classified and there is no obligation to pub- es. Given the complexity and quality of this licly announce the competition for vacancies study, and taking into account the relevant within the organisation. Although there is an findings and recommendations made there, Intranet portal in place, it seems that the in- this risk analysis strongly suggests that one formation exchanged through it doesn’t in- of the first steps in diminishing the risk of clude the announcement of job vacancies. corruption within MoI would be to translate Such Intranet portals in almost all Europe- these recommendations into concrete re- an police, inter alia, are used for announcing form policies. Further references to this re- open positions, enabling those employed port and recommendations concerning em- there to have direct access to them. ployment procedures will be made in follow- The interviewees from the MoI Human Re- ing chapters of this report. sources also said that legislation guarantees all those who received scholarships from the Internal Control Sector (ICS) MoI during their studies at the Police Acade- General information: my to be employed in the police afterwards. Internal Control Sector is an organisation- However, such provision is neither part of al unit of the Ministry of Interior. It provides the Law on Police or the Law on Academy internal oversight and monitors the legality for Criminalistics and Police Studies. The dis- of work carried out by MoI law-enforcement crepancy between available positions in the officers. Also in the range of its responsibili- police versus the number of graduates each ties is the control/protection of human rights year is considerable. This means that prop- whenever police powers are executed. Inter- er human resources ‘needs analysis’ must be nal Control Sector officers have powers sim- undertaken so that certain strategic steps ilar to those of police officers which can also can be taken to address this problem. be enforced when they oversee or investi- Finally, the PACS experts team was in- gate any abuse or misconduct performed by formed that MoI Human Resources Depart- a police officer(s). ment employees have the lowest salaries in Internal Control Sector also acts upon sug- the ministry which could also be a subject to gestions, existing complaints about police review in parallel to the reform of employ- work, and upon findings resulting from their ment procedures. initiatives and investigations initiated upon receiving information gathered through intelligence. In these processes the police departments, their officers and other employees are obliged

14 to provide the Internal Control Sector investi- tion cases. Approximately 30-40% of cor- gators with information required or enable ruption cases within the police are a result them access to information and to offer them of Internal Control work. Annually, there are necessary expert assistance if needed. While around 150 criminal complaints against po- these investigations are carried out, the Inter- lice officers lodged by the Internal Control. nal Control Sector officers are entitled to: Interviews: 1) Have access to files, documentation and databases of the police; Interviews were held with the Head of the Sector, who is also Deputy Minister of Interi- 2) Take statements from police officers and or and his staff, representatives of theDepart - employees, injured persons and witness- ment for criminalistics-operative work, Depart- es; ment for the coordination of regional centres, 3) Request from the police officers and em- Department for preventive actions and analyt- ployees to provide files and information ical work and Regional coordination Centres necessary for conducting the investiga- in Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad and Kragujevac. Is- tion; sues discussed with the ICS representatives mostly reflect the questions formulated in 4) Have insight into police premises; the questionnaire prepared and distributed to the ICS prior to these interviews. In gen- 5) Request evidence and data on technical sources used by police. eral the questions deal with several areas: employment procedures; prevention of cor- The Head of Sector ex officio informs the ruption; ethics and integrity; investigation of Minister of Interior and the Director of Police corruption within the police; sources of infor- of the findings of the investigation and ad- mation and evidence gathering; investiga- vises the Minister how to eliminate alleged il- tion of corruption – investigative techniques legalities. Further to that a recommendation and use of SIMs; intelligence; inter-agency is given for procedure to be initiated in order cooperation; whistle-blowers – their role and to determine personal responsibility for al- protection; abuse of power by police officers leged illegality or misconduct. for personal benefits – including the second- The ICS is directly accountable to the Min- ary activities (non-police work) of police offi- ister of Interior. Currently, the ICS sector has cers; and communication with media and in- 90 employees. formation leaks. Internal Control is not the only structure Below is the summary of findings follow- dealing with police misconduct. Each police ing the interviews held. administration has a legal officer – the person in charge of monitoring the legality of Source of information/intelligence the conduct of his colleagues. There is also Most investigations on internal corrup- a bureau for internal audit (at Directorate of tion cases are triggered by information gath- Police) – however, Internal Control believes ered during the regular, so called ‘operational that the bureau should be placed with them work’ of the ICS inspectors. In addition, com- and not with the Police Directorate. plaints submitted by citizens also present an indispensable source of information on pos- Generally speaking, ICS statistics indicate sible abuses. ICS has a rulebook on citizens’ that the most corrupt units in the Serbian complaints where the procedures of han- Police are Traffic Police, Border Control Police dling and processing such complaints are and Economic Crime Investigation Units. precisely described. This rulebook was pre- These findings also show that approxi- pared with expert assistance and is very sim- mately 30% of all criminal cases are corrup- ilar to the model applied in Slovenia.

15 Large numbers of citizen’s complaints, Another area where improvements are de- however, are submitted on a daily basis to sirable is protection for whistleblowers. As a the ICS, while around 70% of them are usual- matter of fact the cases mentioned during the ly found to be groundless. This presents a big interviews indicate that not only police offi- problem to the ICS as each complaint must cers but also ordinary citizens are sometimes be properly investigated and enacted upon, afraid to report corruption. This is due to the while the large proportion of unfounded fact that most of them believe that when complaints occupies too much of the ICS they complain against an officer or manager employees’ time. the system is rather weak in protecting them from potential ‘revenge’ by the accused. However, one of the key problems of ini- tiating and conducting investigations against The ICS does not have a training strategy police officers is a code of silence in the police. for its employees. After they have become in- Although this could be a cultural phenome- vestigators they usually do not undergo fur- non, it, nevertheless, also indicates a lack of ther training. An exception is when interna- awareness among police officers of their role tional projects are involved in the organisa- in society in which they need to prove that tion and conducting of such training. the police institution is founded on integrity principles. In light of this the Internal Control Special Investigative Means (SIMs) finds it difficult to get information from police The Unit within ICS responsible for the ap- on possible disciplinary or criminal acts. Po- plication of SIMs has 16 inspectors (investiga- lice units prefer to deal with and resolve prob- tive/intelligence officers) while 9 of the Unit’s lems internally, within their own ranks. staff members are in charge of the technical Further to that, the experts team was told application of SIMs. So far they have not ex- that some individual cases (e.g. an example perienced any significant problem in the ap- where one of the police administration chiefs plication of SIMs, nor that these measures are was still performing his duties despite the fact subject to abuse. As they noted, this is a re- an indictment had been filed against him) sult of transparent procedures dictated by also indicate a possible lack of responsibility mandatory guidelines. They were also confi- which can certainly damage the overall image dent that information leaks weren’t possible of the police and its reputation in society. again because the number of those with access to sensitive information is limited and it Two possible tools that would, in the would not be difficult to find out who it was ICS’s management opinion, be of key impor- that had send information either to a suspect, tance to preventing corruption are integri- the media or a third party. Although such ty tests and ‘lifestyle analysis’ – i.e. introduc- cases happen within the police, according ing property registers for police officials and to the ICS staff that were interviewed, these functionaries. As the legislation stands now cases were not part of ICS practice. However, integrity tests are not be used as valid evi- technical infrastructure for the application of dence for disciplinary and criminal proceed- SIMs is not yet good enough, therefore the ings and the ICS sees this as one of the major ICS Unit sometimes needs assistance from problems in preventing corruption. the Criminal Police. This can, to a certain extent, be considered as a conflict of interests As for the ‘lifestyle analysis’ – there are no and a potential risk of corruption given that legal regulations on this matter and the ICS sometimes the measures are to be enforced believes that property registers should be against a colleague who works at the Crimi- introduced through bylaws and the model nal Police. However, no concrete case which could be similar to the one already set at the would indicate lack of cooperation from the Anti-Corruption Agency which is in charge of Criminal Police was mentioned. property registers for all public functionaries.

16 Preventative Supervisions police entity to do something about them. Internal Control performs preventative What is more, he is not obliged to inform supervision of the police administrations (in the ICS whether these recommendations total there are 27 police administrations in were enforced, either. Almost all interview- Serbia). These controls serve to establish the ees from the Internal Control – from its lead- ‘state of play’ in different administrations, to ership to medium level managers and those examine allegations of possible abuses and working in their regional offices – underlined to give directions in which manner certain the necessity to amend the Law on Police shortcomings should be overcome. The pre- which would, inter alia, oblige the office of ventative control is composed of 4 phases: the Director of Police and any units/departments under scrutiny to inform the Internal Phase 1. Analytical work completed by the Control of the follow up measures undertak- ICS headquarters based on data re- en subsequent to submission of the reports ceived and intelligence; from the preventative supervision. As noted, examples of good practice in certain po- Phase 2. Decision of which police adminis- lice administrations are also the subjects of tration to control and preparation these supervisions. Changes in the law shall for the plan of execution of the con- also enable better transfer of these practices trol. This plan includes reasoning, to other administrations with instructions on subjects to be controlled, aim of the how to apply them. It is in the opinion of the control and questionnaire for those ICS and its staff that if the initiatives of the to be interviewed; Internal Control remain unanswered and not Phase 3. Execution of the control – concrete properly followed by concrete action, the In- action in the chosen police adminis- ternal Control will continue to lose its power tration; and reputation in the police and in society. Phase 4. Preparation of the report on state of Furthermore the ICS does not have ac- play in the administration and follow cess ex officio, nor is he informed of the out- up recommendations; comes of disciplinary procedures within the police. A number of such proceedings is ini- It is important to note that through these tiated based on ICS findings and subsequent controls the ICS not only informs of miscon- initiatives. The experts team considers it nec- duct but also of good practices in different essary that the ICS, especially in cases where police administrations. These controls are disciplinary procedures were the result of not necessarily pre-announced to the po- their initiatives, should be informed ex offi- lice department under scrutiny. However, cio of their final results. these controls are rather ad hoc and police administrations are chosen on the basis of Prevention random data and intelligence information Prevention other than that mentioned that indicates that their conduct might have above - which would include integrity and had been problematic. As of yet, there is no ethics training even if there were no indica- systematic approach for these controls that tion of violation of these principles - is not would include all police administrations and yet fully applied in police institutions in Ser- have clear terms of reference. bia. The primary prevention (basic - first level The reports prepared following each of prevention) is partially reflected in the Police these operations are regularly sent to the Di- Academy programme since ethics and integ- rector of Police. However, the recommenda- rity are, to a limited extent, examined during tions set in these reports are of an advisory the first year of the studies. The secondary nature only – in other words the director is prevention (second level – focused on all po- not obliged to enforce them nor to ask any lice officers in the field) isn’t present in Serbi-

17 an Police, at least not in any systematic way. leagues. On the other hand sharing the same Internal Control Sector leadership still be- building also means that ICS officers can lieves that there is a need to strengthen the have daily ‘insight’ into police work and this investigative work/combative means to bet- can facilitate their inquiries and intelligence ter detect and investigate corruption and gathering. Thus far, the information gathered other crimes committed by police officers. In by their inspectors on police officers’ miscon- light of this, prevention is not yet prioritised duct is still the most important source of in- to the same extent as repressive means. formation for their investigations. However, there are plans to enhance pre- It also must be noted that working con- vention. As such, a manual on ethics was de- ditions for ICS officers from different regions veloped and prepared together with the vary. This can create a risk of feeling less im- OSCE. Further plans in this area concern es- portant and probably affects the results of tablishment of a ‘commissioner for ethics’ in their work. ICS leadership should try to con- each police department. It is not yet clear sider this problem and to address it. when this initiative is to be executed. It is also worth noting that ICS officers When the principle of ‘leading by example’ from the regions pointed out the very same was discussed with ICS interviewees, most of problems as their colleagues from the cen- them were of the opinion that this principle tral branch – such as non-transparent recruit- is hardly applied by the Serbian police. ment, inexistent integrity tests, no follow up to their preventative supervisions, the code Regional vs Central of silence within the police, inadequate legal During two different missions the team of framework (i.e. the Law on Police), lack of ac- experts met with staff of the ICS regional of- cess to police databases, etc. fices in Nis, Novi Sad and Kragujevac. Novi Sad Internal Control Office has 7 inspectors and is responsible for each police Service for Fighting administration in Vojvodina except Pance- Organised Crime (SBPOK) vo. In Nis, the number of investigators is the The Service for Fighting Organised Crime same as in Novi Sad while in Kragujevac 5 in- is an organisational unit within the Director- vestigators are in place. As an example, the ate of Criminal Police under the General Po- Nis office brings about 30 criminal com- lice Directorate of the Ministry of Interior of plaints against police officers per year. Nev- the Republic of Serbia. ertheless, these figures may vary and de- pend on many factors. During its ten-year existence, its organisation and structure have been subject to The fact that most of the ICS regional of- change. However, its basic mission has re- fices are in the same buildings with police mained the same - to counter organised can be an advantage and disadvantage at crime in Serbia in partnership with other the same time. Certainly, it may have neg- state organs and institutions in the country ative effects in situations where someone and, when needed, in cooperation with for- (who could be a citizen) comes often to the eign law enforcement agencies. ICS office and can be seen there by the police officer(s) against whom he/she submitted a SBPOK staff have gained expertise in complaint(s). As noted by almost all inter- fighting organised crime through regular viewees a strong ‘Blue Code of Silence’ is still training provided both in Serbia and abroad, present in police institutions and it is unlikely mostly through technical assistance projects. that police officers in the regions where they In addition, priority is given to the improve- share a building with the ICS would regular- ment of technical equipment needed for the ly go to ICS to report the misconduct of col- day-to-day work of the service.

18 Through its specialised units, SBPOK deals hh to improve techniques and investigative with the suppression of all forms of organ- skills; and, ised crime: drug smuggling, human traffick- hh set priorities in the fight against organ- ing and illegal migration, smuggling of arms ised crime at the national level; and explosives, international smuggling of stolen motor vehicles, kidnapping, extortion, During the on-site visits the PACS team blackmail connected to organised crime, of experts met a number of SBPOK repre- money laundering, corruption, counterfeit sentatives – the managers from the central banknotes, credit card fraud and cyber-crime and local branches as well as the investiga- (criminal offenses related to abuse of com- tors responsible for corruption and econom- puter systems, abuse and violations of intel- ic crime. Almost all of them confirmed that lectual property rights, child pornography). corruption persisted as a problem in Serbia and also emphasised several common diffi- One of the organisational units of SBPOK culties that police faced in uncovering facts is the Financial Organised Crime Unit and the and gathering evidence against perpetrators. Division for Suppression of Corruption. At the central level, the team of experts When performing tasks SBPOK acts pri- met the Deputy Head of SBPOK, as well as marily in accordance with the Law on the investigators from the Department for Sup- Organisation and Jurisdiction of State Bod- pression of Narcotics Smuggling, the Depart- ies in Fighting Organised Crime and Corrup- ment for Suppression of Organized Finan- tion, Law on Police, Criminal Procedure Code cial Crime, staff working on the implementa- of the Republic of Serbia, as well as Criminal tion of Special Investigative Means, and the Code and the Law on Seizure of Assets De- Financial Investigation Unit, while at the re- rived from Criminal Acts. gional level, meetings were held with SBPOK representatives of the police administrations In its investigations, the Service for Fight- in Novi Sad, Kragujevac and Nis. ing Organised Crime cooperates closely with the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime Following the interviews the findings can and the Special Department for Organised be summarised as follows: Crime of the Higher Court in Belgrade, under whose coordination it acts in accordance The idea behind the establishment of the with its police powers. SPBOK was that such a body should present an elite unit within the police responsible SBPOK strives to apply the principle that for combating organised crime. As a conse- investigations are initiated by intelligence in- quence, the status but also the salaries of the formation, through the gradual incorpora- investigators and other employees were bet- tion of a method known as Intelligence-Led ter than in other police departments. Never- Policing in their daily police work. theless, it should be noted that in other anti-organised crime state authorities (i.e. Or- SBPOK is a pioneer of using modern meth- ganised Crime Prosecutor’s Office and Spe- ods to investigate organised crime in Serbia cial Department of the Higher Court for Sup- such as: special investigative measures, un- pression of Organised Crime) the employees’ dercover agents, controlled deliveries and salaries are double that of their colleagues analysis of crime intelligence. It also acts from general jurisdictions (i.e. basic, higher upon requests for assistance in cross-border and appellate courts and prosecutors). Once criminal acts. this decision was reached (to double the sal- SBPOK’s strategic development goals are: aries of prosecutors, judges and law enforcement agents dealing with organised crime), hh to further develop intelligence led polic- SBPOK officers were supposed to be including; ed in it, but their salary scale remained the

19 same. It has not been explained, howev- problems as they usually inform the suspect er, why this change was not applied in their of actions being undertaken thus enabling case. him/her to influence witnesses, move assets out of the country, look for support from cer- Although their privileges have been grad- tain political circles, etc. On the other hand ually reduced, the SBPOK employees still be- there is no strategy for cooperation with the lieve that their unit is the most elite and has media (different to ‘communication strategy’ the highest integrity in the entire Serbian Po- which exists at a special bureau for coopera- lice. tion with the media) nor any specific internal Even though the possibility of the exis- procedures to follow the appearance of clas- tence of corruption within their own ranks sified police information in the media. was estimated differently by individual inter- Concerning investigations, the SBPOK viewees, almost all the interviewees stated representatives said that it was very import- that such incidents are rather a consequence ant to have a clear and strict division of op- 5 of individual – i.e. isolated – actions and erational work among them. Nonetheless, that the corruption within their own ranks it remained unclear if this principle was ap- has none of the characteristics of systemat- plied in practice. Also, most of them con- ic practice. sidered prosecutorial investigation intro- Discussing the problem of information duced by the new Criminal Procedure Code leaks and their subsequent coverage in the to contribute to the transparency of inves- media, the SBPOK officials and investigators tigative work. In relation to this, they said are of the opinion that politicians and politi- that the joint training of police and prosecu- cal appointees in the Ministry of Interior, be- tors would be an appropriate way forward in cause of their personal and/or their party’s strengthening their investigative capacities. political interests, are most often the ones Discussing the issue of ethics, SBPOK rep- responsible for revealing classified informa- resentatives noted that when the Unit was es- tion. In this sense the leaking of information tablished (12 years ago), they had their own to the media was linked to quite a long list Code of Ethics. Each and every employee had of MoI officials granted for access to informa- to sign it. Later this practice stopped with- tion that investigators gathered and wished out a specific reason why. An interesting de- to share with prosecutors. The access to such tail was that this code had a regulation that information granted to those who are polit- SBPOK employees could be tested by poly- ical appointees at the ministry, sometimes graph in cases where they were suspected is at risk to be abused – mostly for political to be involved in a crime. Nowadays, howev- reasons these appointees allegedly provide er, awareness of ethics and the Code of Ethics classified information to the media in order is very limited – there are no awareness pro- to discredit their political competitors. Ac- grammes or regular training on ethics. cording to interviewees SBPOK did not suf- fer from an ‘information leaking’ problem Work with informants is delineated by among its investigators. Again, the problem mandatory regulations. Although it was stat- of high management being informed about ed by the investigators that this area of po- any and all information related to investiga- lice work is very sensitive/prone to corrup- tions possibly creates additional risks for the tion no concrete case of such practice was successful completion of investigations. Me- presented to the team of experts. dia reports, in this sense, have created huge The role of the SBPOK officers was also very important for the well-known 24 Pri- 5 As an example of such an incident, a case of the disclosure of classified data by a SBPOK vatisations Cases, when an ad-hoc Working officer, uncovered and investigated in 2012, was group was created to investigate allegations brought to the experts’ attention.

20 of corruption and other crimes committed joint investigative teams to conduct investi- during the privatisation of state owned en- gations on corruption and organised crime, terprises.6 This group was composed of 120 it would be recommendable that the Serbi- investigators divided into 14 teams. By the an authorities think of institutionalising such end of 2013 the investigators were dedicat- teams. This step would certainly ensure that ed full-time to just these cases, but once the the expertise and good practice are not lost investigations were completed they went after the closure of the investigations run by back to their previous positions. Investiga- the ad-hoc Working group, and that the ca- tions initiated in 12 of those cases resulted in pabilities and skills developed so far are fully 5 indictments where criminal charges were utilised by the police and/or SBPOK. pressed against 78 persons for 69 criminal offences. The damage caused by these offenc- A number of interviewees from SBPOK es is estimated to be 88 million euro – the ex- confirmed the opinion of its management act amount was assessed through the joint that Serbian society and the police still need efforts of the investigators, Financial Police time to improve its resistance to and zero tol- and forensics experts. erance of corruption and this would coin- cide with efforts of other state authorities in The work on these cases has also trig- achieving a ‘corruption free Serbia’. gered new investigations - at present the ad-hoc Working group is dealing with 28 SBPOK officials also supported further re- new cases. However, the ad-hoc Working forms of human resources policy and its reg- group is currently composed of 30 investiga- ulations requiring a more transparent system tors who are granted access to police data- of employment, appraisals and promotions. bases but not to other institution’s databas- Discretion of police leaders to hire people es. Significant contributions to the conduct- on their own is indeed a corruption risk for ing of these investigations were also provid- SBPOK as well as for any other police depart- ed by the officers of the Financial Investiga- ment. Finally, they believe that education tions Unit (which is also part of SBPOK) who and training on ethics and integrity for po- provided necessary financial expertise. Their lice officers, officials and all other employees representatives were also interviewed by the from all hierarchical levels is needed. experts ream during the field visit. SBPOK also suggests that it should once Given the structure and work done so again become an independent police unit as far by the afore-mentioned Working group, it was when it was established – the old sys- it became apparent that this group is trans- tem did not allow information to be shared forming itself into a semi-permanent struc- outside of the unit and leaks were almost ture outside the formal organisational struc- non-existent. ture of the police and/or SBPOK. In light of this and given the tendency to structure Negative media campaigns towards police are a continuous presence and not of- 6 The privatisation of 24 public companies was ten supported by the real facts. As such, it is the subject of an analysis prepared by the Anti- deemed important to raise awareness of the Corruption Council, an advisory body to the complexity of police work and the signifi- Serbian Government. This analysis concluded that cant achievements made in a number of cas- in these cases there were a number of violations of the law and abuse of power by public officials. es. This would help in building public trust of Moreover, the Resolution on the European the police and would also affect cooperation Integration Process of Serbia (2011/2886(RSP)), between citizens and the police. adopted by the European Parliament, noted serious doubts concerning the legality of Overall the conclusions of almost all SB- these cases. Subsequently, investigations were POK interviewees were that too many peo- launched and an ad-hoc group was created to ple within police hierarchy had access to conduct these investigations.

21 classified information before they are sent to thermore, the opinion of the PACS experts prosecutors or in some cases to other agen- team is that the Academy is the only institu- cies (Financial Intelligence Unit, Anti-cor- tion which fully understands what primary ruption Agency, etc.). Therefore they were prevention signifies. For that reason the ex- unanimous in proposing better regulation perts team believes that the Academy could (through obligatory guidelines or through be the best at raising awareness of primary MoU) of the communication they have with prevention and carrying out training. Such prosecutors and other relevant agencies, training and education (as further elaborat- and also to introduce a system of ‘sealed en- ed under the chapter ‘Recommendations’) velopes’ when sending classified data. should be obligatory and systematic. Other than that, interviewees also sup- Although interviewees did not consid- ported the suggestions, put forward by the er corruption to be a wide spread practice team of experts, concerning the establish- among the police, certain serious incidents ment of joint investigative teams – that well- were reported in the media during the pe- known models and European best practice riod when this risk analysis was carried out. should be applied in Serbia. These incidents were mostly linked to the activities of certain leaders in SBPOK and their Whistleblowing and breaching the ‘code alleged abuse of power, misconduct in their of silence’ within police is certainly the goal, work and political influence that directed the but given the constrains mentioned during investigations they were in charge of. More the interviews (rejection of this behaviour by than that, serious incidents involving officers police officers in general – there is a need for of the Gendarmerie (a special uniformed po- a cultural change in the perception of such lice force directly subordinated to the Direc- actions) it will require time to become effec- tor of Police) including murders, racketeer- tive in practice. This long term goal cannot ing and drug dealing took place as well. Al- be attained simply through legal reform and though the Gendarmerie was not a subject adoption of the appropriate legal and insti- to this assessment, they cannot be detached tutional framework. from the overall picture that the police cre- Another important point relates to regu- ates in public. The incidents took place while lar risk analysis to be done by police struc- Gendarmerie officers were not on duty or tures themselves. Almost all interviewees while they performed ‘secondary activities’ – agreed that such analysis should be regular- usually taking the form of performing secu- ly conducted, regardless of the findings of rity services to night clubs. As such, it is im- routine investigations into internal corrup- portant to note several observations that tion. As such, PACS Risk Analysis Methodol- some of the interviewees made when asked ogy Guide could be a useful tool in the fu- about their opinion of why such things hap- ture for SBPOK and other police institutions pened: the problem with Gendarmerie lies for conducting these assessments regularly. with the fact that the unit itself is partly isolated from the rest of the police infrastruc- Meetings held with representatives of the ture; thus a kind of ‘unit subculture’ was creat- Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies, ed which makes them feel more worthy than NGOs and International Organisations also other police employees. On the other hand, it confirmed the concerns raised by ICS and SB- is worth noting that one gendarme ‘costs’ the POK – emphasis was placed on the link be- state 3 times more than a police officer/inves- tween the risk of corruption and non-trans- tigator. With that in mind, certain recommen- parent employment procedures, poorly reg- dations (especially those related to police in- ulated career development, lack of institu- tegrity and professionalism) that are set in tional integrity and lack of awareness and this report shall also be applicable to all po- practical application of ethical norms. Fur- lice structures including, e.g. Gendarmerie.

22 twin project ‘Police Reform – Internal Control CONCLUSIONS AND Sector’ and its report ‘Strategic Intelligence RECOMMENDATIONS Assessment on Corruption’: ‘The research clearly demonstrates that the ased on the interviews and opinions majority of activity surrounding corruption Bheard during their research, the team of does not get reported in official statistics. It is a experts was confronted with little evidence safe assumption that the official records of po- of systematic and widespread corruption lice corruption represent the “tip of the Iceberg“ within the police. On the other hand, during The “grey figure“ of corruption can only be the assessment a number of serious allega- guessed at. From the survey 800 citizens expe- tions of high level corruption were report- rienced corruption and 21 reported it. Indicat- ed in the media. Some of these articles con- ing that a more accurate picture would require cerned high level officials in the police and the official Ministry figures to be increased by their alleged involvement in corruption and a factor of 38. 2584 police officers witnessed, cooperation with the criminal groups, in- but did nothing about a colleagues corruption cluding various allegations of political influ- a further 395 reported it to a manager. A factor ence of investigations in high profile cases of increase of 6.5. What can be safely assumed is corruption and organised crime. Although that the official figures represent a small part this assessment did not examine individu- of the real level of corruption within the police. al cases, it became apparent that problems When comparing this with the official records within police structures are possibly much in grievances and charges against corrupt of- deeper than one might assume when these ficers we can see that these figures represent a issues are discussed with the officials of minor part of the larger corruption picture.’ the MoI. Media reports and interviews with Therefore, in order to achieve sustainable NGOs and international organisations also results not only in combating but also in pre- confirmed that Serbian police still needed venting corruption within its own structures, serious reform in order to become more pro- police would need to undertake certain stra- fessional, transparent and at a higher level of tegic steps. In the opinion of the experts institutional integrity. In light of this, the rec- team, and regardless of whether the corrup- ommendations of this assessment will focus tion occurs as an individual incident or as a on the necessary development of the insti- systematic problem (as noted above, individ- tutional structure and foundation that the ual interviewees interpreted this matter dif- modern police force is based on, as the in- ferently – some of them were convinced that sight of this study indicates key gaps in the the corruption appears as an individual in- preventive and moderative mechanisms de- cident only, while others see it as a system- signed to minimise the risk of corruption. atic practice), the steps and measures that First and foremost, while many mecha- need to be undertaken would be primari- nisms for detecting and investigating cor- ly aimed at building institutional integrity. ruption within the police are in place, their It is also important to note that this conclu- proper implementation requires pro-active sion is not only the result of this assessment, and credible actions by police officers. In this but is also a prevailing strategy in most EU respect, it is important to reiterate here the police institutions, where sustainable results findings of the surveys done under the EU were reached only after preventive measures

23 were fully implemented. These recommen- poses of one of its regional projects 7, that dations, their long-term goals, explanations summarises the effects of integrity tests in and applicability to the Serbian system are the New York City Police Department: further elaborated in the following chapters. Since 1994, the New York City Police De- Additionally, the Serbian Anti-Corruption partment has conducted integrity tests with- Strategy 2013-2018 contains a large num- in the following framework: ber of objectives and measures to be imple- hh Any ethical violation can be an objective of mented by the police. This assessment has the testing: bribery, service mentality, police provided recommendations that are formu- brutality, discrimination, etc.; lated in the context of some of these objec- hh Realistic scenarios such as the offering tives and measures, but in a number of cases of cash from an arrested drug dealer, but go further or are more specific. played by officers of the integrity unit;

hh Integrity tests are recorded using audio and Integrity testing video electronic surveillance as well as the During the interviews with ICS represen- placement of witnesses at the scene; tatives an issue of integrity testing was fre- hh Targeted tests: these aim at specific offi- quently mentioned. ICS management be- cers who are suspected of corruption, based lieves that integrity tests (which according upon previous allegations by citizens, crimi- to Serbian legislation cannot be taken as evi- nals or colleagues; dence before the court or in disciplinary proceedings), if introduced, would be the best hh Random tests: aimed at a random selection tool to prevent corruption and to enable of officers; identification of those who are prone to cor- hh All officers are aware that such a program ruption and unethical behaviour. exists, but are not told about the frequency or occurrence of such tests; Integrity tests have been subject to regular use in some environments with little in- hh No police officer can now know whether or tegrity. Police institutions in general and es- not a corrupt offer is an integrity test. pecially some sectors which are in daily con- The integrity tests have had the following tact with citizens (such as traffic police) are impact so far: probably more prone to corruption. As such, integrity testing would certainly help in min- hh Officers believe that it is better to be safe imising the risk of corruption. However, the and to report the incident, instead of over- real impact of integrity testing can only be looking it or accepting the bribe offer; measured once it is put into practice in the hh About 20% of the officers who were tested institution. It is needless to say that a num- based on previous suspicions failed the test, ber of safeguards need to be in place in order and were prosecuted and removed from the to guarantee that such tests are not abused force; against employees for reasons other than hh Only 1% of the officers who are subjected to those mentioned above. random tests fail. Below is an extract from the Council of Eu- rope Technical Paper, prepared for the pur-

7 http://www.coe.int

24 The objectives of integrity testing are: tion within police are still underdeveloped, would not have the desired effect and would hh Identifying public officials, agencies and cit- also jeopardise implementation of this tool izens prone to corrupt practices. at a later stage and once primary and secondary prevention are strengthened. hh Collecting evidence for prosecution; hh Increasing the perceived risk of detection and thus deter corruption among officials and citizens; Recommendations hh Encouraging officials to follow on their ob- The consolidated recommendations of ligation of reporting bribe offerings (as any the assessment are as follows: offer could be an integrity test); Finding: Employment (recruitment) pro- hh Identifying public officials who are honest cedure and promotion procedure (career de- and trustworthy, which can be credited for velopment) are neither transparent nor in promotions; accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards in this area. hh Identifying the training needs of public officials, i.e. patterns of misconduct which Recommendation: The experts team rec- could go back on a lack of awareness for ommends that the Serbian Police empower ethical challenges; their human resources departments, prepare clear criteria for employment and promotion h h Showing to the public that government is of employees and strive for transparent pro- serious about prosecuting corruption. cedures on all hierarchical levels within the Overall, integrity testing is an extremely organisation. effective and cost efficient deterrent to -cor Finding: There is a lack of mentorship, ruption. training and education on ethics and integ- However, any real crackdown on bribery rity for all police officers, officials and other as well as on other ethical violations would police employees from all hierarchical lev- dry out sources of income that normally run els. In practice, the matters of ethics and in- from ordinary policemen up to the highest tegrity are not discussed. Therefore, primary officials. and secondary prevention are not adequate- Application of integrity testing is in this ly developed. regard a litmus test for the willingness to se- Recommendation: The experts team rec- riously change the course. ommends that the Serbian Police prepare a In order to avoid abuse for personal gain specially tailored and mandatory training or against political opponents, the unit car- programme on strengthening the integri- rying out the tests must be of the highest in- ty of police officers and consider setting up tegrity itself.‘ a special consultative body within the police In conclusion of this particular issue, it is in with responsibility for the field of ethics and the opinion of the authors of this paper that integrity (e.g. ethical committee). integrity testing could be beneficial for Ser- Finding: There is a lack of raising of bian police but only upon implementation of awareness with regards to police profession- other recommendations as stated in the following chapter. Introducing integrity tests alism, ethics and the principle of ‘leading by now, while primary and secondary preven- example’.

25 Recommendation: The experts team rec- As stated in the Handbook8 of Best Practic- ommends that the Serbian Police start with es for the Self-Assessment of Law-Enforcement raising employees’ awareness of police pro- Forces to Prevent Corruption and Enhance In- fessionalism, which is built upon integrity tegrity (2014), the recruitment process has to and reflected through legality, expert knowl- be fair and impartial, while career develop- edge and ethical behaviour (attitudes). It is ment is assured by means of transparent pro- strongly recommended that they raise po- cedures that enable promotion by merit. lice leaders’ awareness of the application of Furthermore, fundamental questions for the principle of ’leading by example’ as a key the police or any other professional organisa- stone for sustainable development of police tion focused on sustainable development are: professionalism. hh Who becomes a police officer? Finding: The ‘Blue Code of Silence’ is still hh Who is a mentor? widespread in Serbian Police. hh Who becomes a leader? Recommendation: The experts team hh Who becomes a teacher/a trainer? recommends that the Serbian Police be- The above-mentioned roles could be also gin ongoing discussions, focused on rais- understood as four fundamental pillars for ing awareness among police employees that police professionalism. Their importance loyalty to personal and organisational integ- could be illustrated with an image 1. rity is more important than loyalty to a false sense of solidarity with colleagues. These dis- Firstly, it is very important who becomes cussions could be a part of the training pro- a police officer or who is employed in the gramme for strengthening the integrity of police service. Anyone who is not in favour the police officers and, more importantly, it of ethical behaviour and working with people will surely have a hard time pursuing the should be an obligation for police leaders to organisation’s mission. Secondly, it is im- talk about and discuss this issue with their portant who is a mentor to new employees police officers on a daily basis (with relation and from whom he/she learns how to pro- to real cases and police procedures – e.g. be- ceed. The fact is that people prefer to ob- fore or after the working day or certain oper- serve how someone acts in practice than ational activities). read how things should be done in theory. At the same time, other questions could also Justification, elaboration and applicability be raised, such as how the police arrange of those recommendations in Serbian Police mentorship, who is responsible for choos- are presented below. ing mentors, who trains them and how, etc. The third pillar represents police leaders, un- Employment (recruitment), career derlining the importance of who becomes a development and mentorship leader. This also triggers a whole range of is- Human resource management has to be sues and challenges faced by any modern or- fully responsible and engaged in the em- ganisation, namely how does the career sys- ployment and career development of em- tem operate in the police, what are the criteria for promotion and career develop- ployees. This includes arranging, recruiting ment, is moral development taken into ac- and selecting employees, designing com- pensation and benefits systems and a per- 8 This handbook, which is a prevention tool based formance appraisal system, and discharging on a pedagogical approach, is currently under low-performing and problematic employees. preparation by a group of EU experts and is expected to be disseminated to EU member states’ police services soon.

26 CULTURAL SOCIAL FACTORS FACTORS

ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR REPUTATION OF POLICE IN PUBLIC PROFESSIONALISM

ORGANISATIONAL EXPERTISE CLIMATE

LEGALITY

INTEGRITY

Who Who Who Who is the SITUATION IN ECONOMIC SOCIETY becomes police becomes becomes teacher lecturer or officer? mentor? leader ? trainer? FACTORS Image 1: Factors that influence police professionalism: Source: (Šumi 2013b) count when selecting an appropriate lead- who at the beginning of his/her education or er, are candidates for leadership roles aware training in the police profession encounters that the higher they are at a career level the a teacher or trainer who is, perhaps, unpre- greater responsibility they have towards the pared to fulfil this task and role. In practice organisation and society. The last important this occurs when the candidates for police pillar represents the issue of who trains em- officers are exposed to various personal frus- ployees within the organisation or who is a trations of their teachers and training provid- teacher, a coach and/or a facilitator. Without ers, their subjective cynicism or unfounded good and motivated teachers or trainers an criticism of the system. Unfortunately, such organisation (e.g. the police) cannot, in the kind of behaviour hinders the ability of the long-term, be effective and efficient. candidates’ objective criticism and their own assessment of the facts. Moreover, it is very important that all four The findings of this assessment clearly factors (pillars) are interrelated. In practice, indicate that the proper application of the it means that if a person is not suited to be measures referred to above is not put into a police officer, the efforts made by his/her practice by the Serbian Police. The findings mentors, chiefs and trainers cannot achieve also signal that one of the major risks of cor- the desirable effect. On the other hand, ruption is the current employment system. when a good candidate has an inappropriate Non-transparent recruitment and promotion mentor, the efforts of the employee’s boss of employees, with no clear criteria and stan- and trainer will also not bring the desired re- dards, lead to nepotism and cronyism which sults. In the third case the problem occurs are forms of corruption with an extremely when a good candidate and a good mentor negative impact on police institutions and their professionalism. Therefore, it is highly get a bad leader. Again, the expected result recommended that the Serbian Police em- will be questionable, regardless of wheth- power the human resources department, er the training and mentorship were prop- prepare clear criteria for the employment erly conducted. In the last case, the prob- and promotion of employees and strive for lem occurs when a good leader and a good transparent procedures on all hierarchical mentor await the arrival of a good candidate, levels of the organisation.

27 Furthermore, the experts team also dis- and brought into conformity with European cussed this matter with the DCAF Project “In- standards. troduction of a modern Human Resources hh Development of the HRM Reform Strategy Management Concept to the Ministry of Inte- aligned with the strategy of the MoI. 9 rior of the Republic of Serbia” which provides hh Strengthening the professional capacity of technical assistance to the Ministry of Inte- a new strategic HR organisational unit by rior on this particular issue. As such, thanks to the DECAF Project team, PACS team of ex- changing the current structure of HR staff perts was given a report that provides analy- towards creation of HR specialists (through sis on MoI’s recruitment system. The team of employment of professionals other than experts agrees with the findings of this anal- lawyers and through extensive training of ysis. The recommendations set by DECAF are current HR staff) and HR managers, and by fully compliant with the results of PACS as- decreasing the number of administrative sessment and are copied below: staff through the introduction of HRIS and the creation of a centralised HR Adminis- Recommendations tration centre with clear standardised and The analysis of the HRM function in the MoI transparent processes that is used by all de- suggests that there is room for further improve- partments of the MoI. To achieve this, there ments in this area. An evolutionary approach should be a clear distinction between po- to change is recommended, that will need lice officers and civil servants and informa- significant support of both the top manage- tion about the number of both staff catego- ment of the MoI and the employees. In or- ries should be regularly published. The Law der to change the administrative focus of the on Police should be a key framework for this current HRM function in the MoI towards more purpose, although until now there were a strategic HRM orientation the following actions lot of very liberal interpretations attempted seem to be necessary: to provide benefits aimed at police officers to all employees in the MoI. 10 h h DHR should become a strategic organisa- hh Reviewing and simplifying the myriad tional unit directly linked to the Minister of laws that currently exist that give rise with a clear and formalised authority for all to thousands of litigation cases because HRM issues. All HRM issues should be con- they are not clear, simple and transpar- centrated within this unit and the internal ent. Whenever a new law is introduced, re- structure of the unit should adequately re- voke ‘old’ laws, so that there can be no con- flect its basic functions. fusion.11 h h The HRM practices in the MoI should include hh Provision of management information all key HRM activities (such as: HR planning, on key HR measures (for example staff job analysis and design, recruitment and se- cost, headcount, absence, litigation costs) lection, performance appraisal, compensa- through the introduction of an HR information, training and development, career man- tion system.12 agement, health and safety management, hh The HRM function in the MOI needs to rec- labour relations and collective bargaining) ognize the right of trade unions to partici- and should reflect principles of the merit system and the best European practices. 9 Drafting the HRM Reform Strategy of the MOI is h h The HRM system in the MoI should become an important part of this Project and would be more transparent and accountable by mak- conducted through the Activity 4, where the ing all HRM procedures and appropriate main result should be development of an HRM HRM documents (acts) both formalised and policy framework for future HRM reform. open and clear for end-users. The right of 10 This will be considered by an EU IPA project on revision of the Law on Police. employees to participate in the preparation 11 Ibid. of matters regarding HRM must be clarified 12 Introduction of an appropriate HR information system would be provided by an EU IPA project.

28 pate in the preparation of key matters relat- As the first step in introducing second- ed to human resources management, such ary prevention, the team of experts propos- as the adoption of normative acts affecting es a permanent and obligatory training pro- working conditions. The trade unions are gramme for strengthening the integrity of becoming more powerful, and trade union police officers, where the content of the relations need to be carefully managed by training would be adjustable depending on the HRM function. the needs of a particular police service. The To support effectively all the above-recom- fundamental principles of such a programme mended changes, the MoI should consider are: the strengthening of the integrity of po- making additional efforts (beyond the scope lice officers as a key tool in fighting corrup- of this Project) to gradually develop a culture tion effectively 13; the raising of awareness within the Human Resource Management among police officers of the importance of function of taking ownership of HR problems. personal and organisational integrity; the strengthening of well-intentioned solidarity Prevention, education in the police force; the discussion and foster- and training versus repression ing of the need for the police to act fairly and As already noted, there is a prevailing be- equitably; and the conducting of a training lief, at least among the EU Member States, programme which is in accordance with day- that prevention is more efficient than repres- to-day police duties. sion. The same is true with the fight against The programme duration depends on corruption. Three-level prevention (prima- its content and methodology (lecture, ry, secondary and tertiary) is a well-known workshop, group work, etc.), however up to criminological grouping (Meško 2000). Pri- 5 days should be enough for one group of up mary and secondary prevention include a to 25 participants. For long-term efficiency number of actions taken before something (raising awareness of the importance of wrong has happened. Primary prevention in integrity, ethical behaviour, leading by the Serbian Police is a part of the education- example, etc.) it is necessary that all police al system (delivered only at the Police Acad- officers attend the training. One may also emy in Belgrade), while tertiary prevention is attend the training more than once, when for focused on the treatment of offenders (un- example he/she changes job position, but it ethical behaviour having already occurred). is up to a particular police service to make a decision on methodology (to attend the The Serbian Police mostly perform actions training once or more times). Differences in focused on tertiary prevention. Secondary the programme, when we want to emphasize prevention has been lacking, however. Sec- particular content, should be made only with ondary prevention is very important for each different target groups (e.g. police chiefs and every organisation, and especially for the need to be more aware of the importance police, which is entrusted with a number of of leading by example, while police officers powers and responsibilities. Secondary prevention is focused on raising the awareness 13 The argument that strengthening integrity is of police officers in the field through educa- more important and efficient than just fighting tion via practical work and via discussions and against corruption is supported by CEPOL’s workshops focused on studying of the real life Common Curriculum on Police Ethics and cases. It is a temporary process where trainers Integrity (2012). The same curriculum argues for a new paradigm in European Police Services, discuss contemporary ethical dilemmas with namely: ‘instead of fighting against corruption, police officers, as well as debating the same even though this is equally relevant, personal/ issues and real cases daily with leaders and organisational integrity must be emphasised mentors. Such procedures raise the aware- and strengthened in the first place. Besides the ness of police officers on these issues and re- fact that it is more efficient, it is also a positive inforce desired practice. approach, friendlier to employees (subordinates) and focused on the long term’ (ibid 74-75).

29 need more discussion about the dark side of opinion, including the feeling of safety, trust false solidarity – the code of silence). and satisfaction with police; the number of As an example, the police services of oth- complaints and criminal charges against po- er EU countries, when implementing such lice officers; amount of absenteeism; stabil- programmes, include the following themes: ity; organisational atmosphere, etc.). Finally, it is important to know that this approach is hh Ethics and moral quite laborious since it requires a lot of com- hh Integrity (personal and organisational) munication and work with people. hh Leading by example (role models) This kind of training programme and methodology reflects the practical appli- hh Leadership obligations cation of ethics (its usefulness in everyday hh Social responsibility – accountability practice) and therefore belongs to secondary prevention. hh Indifference to integrity – consequences The other example of secondary preven- hh Code of silence – the blue curtain tion, which could also be effective in practice hh Code of ethics in Serbia, is to establish a special consultative body in the police responsible for ethics hh Case studies and workshops. 14 and integrity (e.g. an ethical committee). The When preparing and conducting such Committee should deal with strategic pro- a training programme one must be aware posals, innovations, questions and dilemmas that progress in preventing corruption and in the field of integrity and ethics, the code of poor conduct does not come overnight. The ethics, conflict resolution, internal relations, training programme has to be prepared with organisational atmosphere, etc. The commit- a step-by-step methodology, where each tee members should carry out their tasks by and every step is important and irreplace- assuming opinions, making recommenda- able. It means that each and every topic in- tions or proposals, preparing, designing, im- cluded in the programme must be fully ad- plementing and managing technical assis- dressed (e.g. it is not enough to lead a dis- tance projects15 aimed at enhancing the ef- cussion about integrity without having a dis- fectiveness and the implementation of these cussion on leading by example and without principles within the police. defining who the leader is with regards to in- The Committee should also prepare an- tegrity). The same goes for raising awareness nual or bi-annual reports summarising their of the importance of the code of ethics on findings and recommendations for the at- the one hand and raising awareness about tention of police leadership. the toxicity of the code of silence on the other. Furthermore, it is important to be aware The experiences of different countries that measuring the efficiency of such a train- show that the activities of a body (committee) ing programme is very difficult given that in- such as this significantly contribute to the im- dicators of success are quite diffuse (public provement of the organisational culture and public image of the police. Therefore, the ex- 14 This kind of model or training programme has perts team recommends that the Serbian Po- been applied in Slovenia and is proven to be lice consider establishing such a consultative very effective. There is also some intention from body with strategic and operational authori- certain western European states to copy this ty. Its members should be police employees model because it effectively links theory and with a high professional and personal repu- practice. The programme enables reduction of tation in their organisations, appointed and the gap between education and training at the Police Academy and day-to-day behaviour and attitudes of police officers in practice. 15 Such a committee has been working very effectively in the Slovenian police since 2011.

30 discharged by the chief of police (director Furthermore, Bracher (2014) is persuad- general). Their work should not be paid ex- ed that integrity is the keystone of leader- tra but honourable. They must be empow- ship and the most important factor when ered to carry out tasks at all levels within po- customers come into contact with the ideas, lice, regardless of hierarchical or regional di- products and services of an organisation or visions. It is very important that the repre- company. The author has also illustrated the sentatives of all police services or director- importance of integrity with an image 2. ates (e.g. uniformed police directorate, Integrity criminal police direc- Tactics Diagnostics torate, police academy, police headquarters, regional police Strategy Directives directorates and police stations) are members of such committee. Members of this body should be inde- Mission Vision Decisions pendent in their work and free from supervisory activity, com- Input Discussions plaints procedure and internal-security pro- Character cedures within the police. They must be ac- Leadership countable directly to LISTENING the chief of police (di- Image 2: Integrity and Leadership rector general) in their work. Source: http://brachercenter.com/integrityarch The importance of integrity html (25. 1. 2014)

Personal integrity is a multifaceted phe- As stated in CEPOL’s Common Curricu- nomenon and so far there is no universal def- lum on Police Ethics and Integrity (2012), the inition of it. Various authors and researchers general educational targets for the whole understand it either as a consistency between training programme on ethics, integrity and words and deeds, as moral behaviour, as the prevention of corruption should be integri- absence of unethical conduct, or as a set of ty and the incorruptibility of police officers, different virtues (e.g. honesty, fairness, etc.). with respect to fundamental (human) rights. Quite a few theoretical and empirical Therefore, the focus in CEPOL’s curriculum findings of several scholars and researchers is on strengthening personal integrity and show the very important role of integrity in leading by example, which, in the end, leads the context of successful management (Bass to a high level of organisational integrity and 1990, Kirkpatrick and Locke 1991, Badarac- better public satisfaction with the police. co and Ellsworth 1992, Craig and Gustafson The Handbook of Best Practices for the 1998, Bass and Steidlmeier 1999, Parry and Self-Assessment of Law-Enforcement Forces Proctor-Thomson 2002, Peterson 2004, Rave to Prevent Corruption and Enhance Integri- 2005, Palanski and Yammarino 2007 and ty (2014) states that corruption destroys de- 2011, Carroll 2009, Burns 2010, Palanski and mocracy, the role of police in society and Vogelgesang 2011). community trust, while combating corruption could not be achieved only through

31 detecting individual misbehaviour but also crease the actions for the strengthening of through identifying organisational and pro- police officers’ integrity in the context of sec- cedural weaknesses. For this reason, each ondary prevention. and every police organisation should have a clear vision regarding integrity and that vi- Besides, it is important to know that there sion must be accepted by police employees. are also various other important internal and external factors which influence police pro- The strengthening of integrity is consid- fessionalism (see Image 1). This leads to the ered, at least in Western European countries, conclusion that police professionalism de- as crucial for police professionalism and pends on a number of the abovementioned proper management of the institution as a factors16, which can be corrected by good, whole. It means that any internal organisa- efficient and effective leadership. Positive re- tional unit of the police has to have employ- sults shall be reflected in a better image and ees of the highest integrity. In this respect, reputation of the police with the public. no internal organisational unit is more important than another. This could be quite an important issue for Serbian Police given the findings of dif- In accordance with the findings of this as- ferent citizens’ surveys where the police sessment, it is recommended that the Serbi- were among those considered to be corrupt. an Police use a similar concept and plan sys- Changes in public perception would happen tematic actions aimed at strengthening the in parallel with the strengthening of person- personal integrity of all employees in all inal and organisational integrity and conse- ternal organisational units, no matter what quently with strengthening the profession- kind of duties or service they provide (by pre- alism of police work. Only upon fulfilment of paring and executing the above-mentioned these conditions can effective support from training programme). Once this is applied society be expected in fighting corruption. the awareness of the importance of integrity Besides, the effectiveness of this fight de- will be spread equally throughout the entire pends on the support of other governmen- police institution. It will have a positive im- tal and non-governmental institutions in the pact on organisational integrity, mutual re- country and without any doubt on genuine lations, the atmosphere of the organisation political support as well. and ultimately, increase the level of awareness of police leaders that their own mode of Furthermore, in order to enhance police behaviour has a significant influence on the professionalism, the experts team strongly behaviour of their employees. recommends that the Serbian Police adopt a rulebook which would regulate the incom- Police professionalism patibility of police duties with other duties. It should be a very useful tool in avoiding con- Despite the fact that integrity is the fun- flicts of interest and fighting against corrup- damental factor in police professionalism, practice shows that integrity itself is not suf- 16 It is necessary to point out the external factors that influence the development of society, ficient. In other words, police professional- the state and consequently on the public ism is built upon integrity and is reflected administration, state administration and the through legality, expert knowledge and eth- police. These include cultural factors (e.g. habits ical behaviour. It means that just legality and and customs of society), economic factors (e.g. expert knowledge are not enough, but ap- recession), social factors (e.g. unemployment and propriate behaviour and attitude, based on poverty) and the circumstances of a society (e.g. the emergence of violent protests) (see image 1). personal integrity, creates overall police pro- All these factors have a significant impact on the fessionalism. Therefore, taking into account ‘state of mind’ of the police. For this reason one the above-mentioned recommendations, country cannot be compared with another, or it is very important for Serbian Police to in- one police service with another, without taking these factors into account (Šumi 2013b).

32 tion within their own ranks. Such regulation, the lowest level. Otherwise, it is impossible which should be obligatory, with zero toler- to expect efficiency in raising awareness of ance for disobeying the rules and be public- the importance of leading by example, until ly accessible, shall prohibit police officers to it is an obligation of all leaders in the police i) work in the field of private security and de- to be aware of it. tective activity; ii) maintain order in catering establishments; iii) give expert opinion without permission of their management; iv) perform work in the field of internal control in the insurance sector; v) perform or accom- DPG pany extraordinary transport DPG and transport of dangerous goods; vi) serve drinks in bars Director and at public events, etc. Director

Leading by example Commander of High levels of integrity are Commander of Police Station of utmost important to ethi- Police Station cal leadership and leading by example, which indeed has a strong influence on desired or Police o cer undesired behaviour of em- Police officer ployees and their professionalism. Setting an example via the top-down principle is an extremely im- Image 3: Leadership by example: Role model portant factor in strengthening personal and (Source: Šumi 2009) organisational integrity. What is more, following the behaviour of management is also an important factor of organisational culture Regarding the fact that ethics and integri- within the police, which among other things ty begin at the top (Image 3) and as also stat- depends on leadership style, concern for ed in the Common Curriculum on Police Eth- employees and mutual relationships among ics and Integrity (2012), leaders have to be a employees. good example for their subordinates. They Based on the findings that there is no dis- need to have a high level of integrity which cussion of integrity, ethics or leading by ex- influences employees’ behaviour and final- ample in the Serbian Police (at any hierar- ly, through leading by example, on organisa- chical level of the organisation, with the ex- tional integrity. For that reason leaders have ception of the Police Academy as mentioned a specific responsibility in the field of im- above), it is strongly recommended that po- proving police ethics, integrity and prevent- lice leadership (management) starts with ing corruption. It means they are responsible this issue at the highest level (to start with for leading their subordinates in a direction the above-mentioned discussions, to ask for which is in accordance with ethical norms training to strengthen personal integrity, to and the values of the organisation. It also prepare strategic and operational plans with means that police leaders have to ensure the step-by-step actions, etc.). Then it is nec- right organisational culture, which provides essary to pass this kind of awareness on to a good atmosphere in which police officers leaders at lower hierarchical levels, down to want to work in a professional and ethical

33 way. Leading by example can also be used ly responsible and therefore valuable (not a as a powerful instrument for improving po- menace), while corruption is socially harm- lice ethics because if leaders behave correct- ful and destructive. The social responsibility ly and in accordance with the formal and in- of the police, which illustrates what society formal ethical rules, subordinates will follow expects from police, could also be seen as a this example and interpret it as accepted be- four-tiered pyramid17 . haviour in the group. It is also important to note that new employees first copy the leader’s behaviour and after that they reflect the behaviour of their colleagues (ibid). Furthermore, quality leadership (management) shall also become a prerequi- PHILANTOPIC site for the promo- desired tion of leaders at a hierarchical level. Oth- erwise, it is unrealistic EtHICAL to expect the fact that expected ‘the higher the leader is in a hierarchy, the greater responsibili- LEGAL ty he/she has and not required simply increased decision-making power’ will ever be workable ECONOMIC in practice. required Social responsibility

Social responsibility of the police is the Image 4: The pyramid of social responsibility widest term in understanding police profes- of the police (Made on the basis of: Carroll sionalism; without police professionalism, (1991) and Carroll & Buchholtz (2000)) social responsibility of the police is not suf- ficient. Ethical conduct of police officers on The first and second levels of responsi- the one hand and an uncompromising con- bility concern economic and legal responsi- cern for the people on the other undoubted- bility. They mean that the police have to use ly contribute to a better reputation of the po- the funds entrusted by the state transparent- lice with the public and to a higher level of ly. Likewise, police must always act in accor- public confidence in the police. At the same dance with relevant legislation, policies and time ethical behaviour is, as already stated, guidelines. The third level of responsibility is an antipode to corruption. For that reason a ethical responsibility. It is considered some- higher level of social responsibility in the po- thing the police are expected to abide by. lice is an important step towards complete This means that society expects police offi- understanding that integrity and ethics are cers to behave ethically, to act with fairness the foundation of police professionalism. It and honesty. The highest and, at the same also stands hand in hand with raising public awareness that whistleblowers are social- 17 Absolute social responsibility covers all four factors together.

34 time, desired level of social responsibility, rational’ (regulation can be formulated in the which builds upon ethical responsibility, is form of police rules). It is also recommend- so-called philanthropic social responsibility. ed the police put emphasis on ethical behav- This means that an individual, who lives or iour in the context of professional conduct acts in accordance with it, is aware of his or (Article 39), write the code in the first person her role in society. This results in one’s con- plural (it is easier for police officers to identi- scious care and contribution to improve the fy with such content) and include a section in principle of the rule of law in general. the code on integrity, leadership by example and mutual relations, which are not present There is no doubt that in each and ev- in the existing Code of Police Ethics. ery police service many police officers are fully socially responsible. They understand Regarding the intention of the Serbian the job of the police as their mission and as Police to have a ‘ethics commissioner’ in each a way of living. Therefore, they are usually police unit in Serbia, the experts team be- very upset with the presence of corruption lieves that it is very important that persons in police and are willing to support all activi- selected for this function enjoy a high profes- ties which efficiently reduce this destructive sional and personal reputation among their phenomenon. However, first of all they need colleagues. It is also very important that em- to be sure that their leaders at all hierarchi- ployees are properly informed about the role cal levels are on ‘their side’. They need to feel and the mission of the ‘ethics commissioner’, genuine support from their leaders, other- their responsibilities, powers and the man- wise they will rather do nothing about it. For ner of their availability (e-mail, phone, etc.). this reason it is very important that the effi- Moreover, it is very important to provide ad- cient ‘fight’ against corruption starts at the equate support for their activities. Support ‘top’, with strong and transparent support of means the support of the managers (leaders) the police leadership. It means that there is from all organisational levels on one hand a need of general support from police lead- and systemic or organisational support on ers in the dissemination of ethical principles, the other. Even the slightest doubt into their which in turn reflects a strong will and builds effectiveness (or their honesty or fairness) confidence that fighting against corruption may invalidate all the efforts and even pur- is considered a priority. pose of having such a mechanism.

Code of ethics Besides the above-mentioned recommendations the experts team also propose The Code of Police Ethics of Serbian Po- that the Serbian Police: lice (2006) is based on the philosophy of reg- ulation18 . Therefore, the experts team rec- hh implement the content of CEPOL’s Com- ommends that the Serbian Police consider a mon Curriculum on Police Ethics and In- change of approach from regulative to ‘inspi- tegrity (2012) into the process of education and training at the Police Academy in 18 The Code of Police Ethics should be focused Belgrade and at the Police Training Centre on raising police officers’ awareness of the in Sremska Kamenica. Common Curricu- importance of values, ethical principles and lum is based on four sections (the role of moral behaviour in daily police practice. police in society; police ethics and integ- The most efficient code of ethics is based on rity in the police organisation and in po- inspirational nature, while police legislation, lice work; managing police ethics, integ- including a considerable number of ethical codes from European countries, is normally based on rity and prevention of corruption – gen- regulation. An inspirational code of ethics stresses eral; managing police ethics, integrity and the police’s mission in society, integrity, good prevention of corruption – risk manage- mutual relations and organisational climate, ment). It can be seen as a ‘recipe-book’ etc. and includes only moral responsibility for with all kind of different subtopics from unethical behaviour (Šumi 2008b).

35 which trainers can choose the items that information distribution to the media best fit their own educational system and which would also dictate specific inquiries the special needs of their organisation and responsibilities of the departments and target groups. It is CEPOL’s wish that and officers in charge should classified the Common Curriculum on Police Eth- information appear in the media without ics and Integrity be linked with the pro- prior consent of the relevant police cess within each European police organ- institutions. isation and with each stage of the career h of police officers (employees). h Use good practice in establishing joint investigative teams (e.g. use the experience hh Consider introducing a supplementa- and the expertise of the ad-hoc Working ry control mechanism, as elaborated in group that was in charge of investigating the Handbook of Best Practices for the the 24 Privatisation Cases) and consid- Self-Assessment of Law-Enforcement er the institutionalisation of such teams Forces to Prevent Corruption and En- within the police. hance Integrity (2014), once a year. In this way it is possible to effectively moni- The team of experts also supports the pro- tor the progress and elimination of iden- posals and needs, emphasised by the Inter- tified systemic deficiencies. The purpose nal Control Sector of MoI, aimed at increas- of the handbook is to provide an evalua- ing their powers and capabilities. This would tion framework through the prism of in- include: tegrity. It consists of eight separate fields, hh further strengthening their human re- namely: recruitment; status and career sources capabilities; development; training; organisation of law-enforcement authority; hierarchical hh consideration of strengthening their ca- supervision; upper level internal control; pabilities in respect to the Internal Con- possible conflict of interests for law-en- trol being proficient for other sectors of forcement agents in second jobs, elec- the MoI and not only for the police; tive mandates; resolution procedures for hh the reports resulting from preventative the general public. controls (previously elaborated in this re- hh Carry out independent research on the port) being reviewed ex officio by MoI organisational climate within the po- high management, and based on their lice on a yearly basis, or every two years. findings MoI high management setting There are various factors which can be in- forth concrete mandatory measures to tegrated into the testing means (a ques- relevant police departments/administra- tionnaire), such as assessment of the con- tions. MoI high management, with sup- tent of work; autonomy at work; manage- port from the Internal Control Sector, ment and organisation of work; integ- would also need to follow up the proper rity and ethical behaviour; mutual rela- implementation of these measures; tions in the organisation; concern for em- hh Internal Control Sector covering all employees and their personal development; ployees of the MoI. working conditions; salary, etc. The find-

ings of such a survey could be very helpful to police management for planning Conclusions different long-term and short-term stra- The above recommendations include the tegic and operational action in the field latest knowledge and findings in the field of of management, leadership and social management, leadership and business eth- skills (e.g. mutual relations). ics. They are practical in nature and are in- hh Adopt a strategy on communication and cluded in the development strategies and vi-

36 sions of the most developed European police lice officers and all other employees on the services. In light of the fact that their imple- one hand, and decrease the level of corrup- mentation and realisation in practice bring a tion and other types of unethical behaviour lot of benefits for police employees at all hi- on the other, is that they should focus on erarchical (organisational) levels, police ser- strengthening the mutual relations inside of vice as a whole and in the end to all mem- the organisation (among police employees). bers of society, the experts team strongly This goes hand in hand with increasing the recommends the Serbian Police takes them public’s level of trust in and satisfaction with into consideration and includes them in the the police, since it is very important to have, future strategy of development and perfor- first of all, good mutual relations in the po- mance of police service. Improvement in em- lice and after this one can also expect better ployment (recruitment) and promotion (ca- public opinion about police (including sat- reer development) procedures, mentorship, isfaction and trust). It is a kind of precondi- training and education on ethics and integ- tion for that. For this reason it is very useful rity (with the most emphasis on strengthen- to carry out a permanent qualitative research ing the integrity of police officers through on the organisational atmosphere. It can be secondary prevention) and leading by ex- very helpful to police management to plan ample will definitely have a positive impact proper strategic and operational action for the improvement of identified weaknesses. on police professionalism, ethical behaviour and the integrity of police leaders and oth- The experts team believes that the rec- er employees, and a reductive effect on lev- ommendations set, if applied appropriately, els of corruption and the presence of the could have a positive influence on the pro- blue code of silence among police employ- cess of modernisation of the Serbian Police ees. They will increase awareness of the so- in the field of management, leadership, eth- cial responsibility of the police, and ultimate- ics, integrity and, above all, on the preven- ly increase public trust in the police and pub- tion of corruption in the long-term. lic satisfaction with police service.

As already stated, results of the above-mentioned activities unfortunately cannot come ‘overnight’. It is a long-term project, which has to be prepared and performed with a step-by-step philosophy, using a top-down approach and with strong and active support from all leaders from all hierarchical levels within the police organisation. For that reason, setting up a special consultative body, which would be responsible for the field of ethics and integrity in police (e.g. an ethical committee), should be very helpful and efficient in the planning, organising and implementing of all kinds of strategic and operational activities in this fundamental field of police work.

The final step, after Serbian Police manage to increase a level of integrity of po-

37 REFERENCES Palanski, E. Michael and Francis J. Yammarino. 2007. Integrity and Leadership: Clearing the GBadaracco, Joseph L. and Richard R. Ellsworth. Conceptual Confusion. European Manage- 1992. Leadership, integrity and conflict. Manage- ment Journal 25 (3): 171–184. ment Decision 30 (6): 29–34. Palanski, E. Michael and Francis J. Yammarino. Bass, M. Bernard. 1990. Bass and Stogdill’s hand- 2011. Impact of behavioural integrity on fol- book of leadership: Theory, research, and mana- lower job performance: A three-study exam- gerial applications (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press. ination. The Leadership Quarterly 22: 765– 786. Bass, M. Bernard and Paul Steidlmeier. 1999. Eth- ics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Palanski, E. Michael and Gretchen R. Vogelge- Leadership Behaviour. Leadership Quarterly 10 sang. 2011. Virtuous Creativity: The Effects (2): 181–217. of Leader Behavioural Integrity on Follower Creative Thinking and Risk Taking. Canadi- Bracher, James F. 2008. Integrity Arch. Available at: an Journal of Administrative Sciences 28: 259– http://www.brachercenter.com/integrityarch. 269. html (25. 1. 2014). Parry, W. Ken and Sarah B. Proctor–Thomson. Burns, James MacGregor. 2010. Leadership. New 2002. Perceived Integrity of Transformation- York: HarperCollins Publishers. al Leaders in Organizational Settings. Journal of Business Ethics 35: 75–96. Carroll, Archie B. 2009. Business Ethics. New York: Routledge. Peterson, Dane. 2004. Perceived leader integrity and ethical intentions of subordinates. The Carroll, Archie B. & Ann K. Buchholtz. (2000). Busi- Leadership & Organization Development Jour- ness & Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Manage- nal 25 (1): 7–23. ment – 4th edition. South-Western College Pub- lishing. Reave, Laura. 2005. Spiritual values and practices related to leadership effectiveness. The Carroll, Archie B. 1991. The amid of Corporate Social Leadership Quarterly 16: 655–687. Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. Business Horizons. Šumi, R. (2013a). Impact of Integrity on Servant Common Curriculum on Police Ethics and Integ- Leadership Style in Profit and Non-profit -Or rity. (2012). Trainer’s Manual. European Police Col- ganisation. Doctoral dissertation. Ljubljana: lege (CEPOL). Faculty of Social Sciences. Šumi, R. (2013b). Factors, that influence on Craig, S. Bartholomew and Sigrid B. Gustafson. Police Professionalism. Varnost, LXI (2): 18-21. 1998. Perceived leader integrity scale: an instrument for assessing employee perceptions of Šumi, R. (2009). Applied Ethics and Social Re- leader integrity. Leadership Quarterly 9 (2): 127– sponsibility of Police. Varnost, LVII (1): 23-25. 145. Šumi, R. (2008a). The strategic plan of strength- Griffin, Ricky W. 2002. Management. Boston: ening the integrity of police officers. Varnost, Houghton Mifflin Company. LVI (2): 1-3. Šumi, R. (2008b). Draft of New Code of Police Kirkpatrick, Shelley A. and Edwin A. Locke. 1991. Ethics. Varnost, LVI (3): 35-36. Leadership: do traits matter? Academy of Man- agement Executive 5 (2): 48–60. Centre for the Study of Democracy: ‘Counter- ing Police Corruption: European Perspectives’ Handbook of best practices for the self-assessment of law-enforcement forces to prevent cor- DCAF Project “Introduction of a modern Hu- ruption and enhance integrity - Draft of French man Resources Management Concept to the Min- delegation. Council of The European Union, N. istry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia” 12865/13, Brussels, 28. January 2014. EU twin project ‘Police Reform – Internal Con- Meško, G. (2000). Pogledi na preprečevanje krim- trol Sector’ and its report ‘Strategic Intelligence As- inalitete v pozno modernih družbah. Teorija in sessment on Corruption’ praksa, 37 (4): 716-727.

38 APPENDIX I Responses and Comme nts of the Internal Control Sector on Recommendations made within the framework of the EU Twin Project Police Reform and its report ‘‘Strategic Intelligence Assessment on Corruption’ prepared in 2012 Note: This document was made available to the team of experts by the Internal Control Sector of the MoI

ICS response comment

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. The Further independent research should be conducted to minister’s approval is needed for conducting an independent rese- establish the true extent of corruption within the Min- arch by the Police Internal Control Sector (hereinafter ‘PICS’) with REC 1 istry of Interior. NGO assistance.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. A fully developed Strategic Intelligence Assessment The PICS can conduct the assessment based on the model of the with supporting Risk Assessment and control measures 2012 Assessment and define the trends through the comparison of REC 2 should be conducted bi-annually. results.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is unrealistic. The PICS recommendations related to amendments to the Law on The Police Internal Control Sector should be established Police should be adopted in order to clearly define the capabilities as the national centre with responsibility for fighting of PICS over MoI staff. In that case, the Police Internal Control Sector corruption. It will prioritise investigations and coordi- (PICS) would change its title to INTERNAL CONTROL SECTOR. In the

REC 3 nate all anti- and counter-corruption activity within MoI, the Criminal Investigation Directorate is responsible for dete- the MoI. cting and supressing corruption in society. The PICS has neither the legal, institutional, nor the human resources capacity to implement this recommendation.

The Police Internal Control sector should be appropri- ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. To ately staffed with skilled and experienced officers. Ful- prepare the new internal organisational structure of the PICS, to ly equipped, and able to operate independently in both keep the existing staff, to fill in the posts with staff selected throu- REC 4 covert and overt investigation. gh internal competition and to adopt transitional measures.

To fully staff and equip a specialist Intelligence and ICS response/comment - The recommendation is partially ju- Analytics department within the Police Internal Con- stified. Concerning the establishment of the Operative Analytics trol Sector. To lead the intelligence drive against po- Department through new internal organisational structure. The De- lice corruption, conducting appropriate research and partment would have to have resources to process all data relating REC 5 complying with all EU conventions on ECHR and data to corruption committed by MoI staff. It is not realistic that PICS can handling. lead the fight against corruption – see comment relating to Rec 3.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. It requires correction and upgrading of the legal framework of PICS. It would assume adoption of the PICS proposal for amending the To introduce a clear set of performance figures for ICS, Law on Police and then issue Instructions on Methods of Internal with visible accountability to be enshrined in practise. Oversight of the Police, which will list the criminal offences priori- REC 6 tised in the PICS work, for the cases in which MoI staff are involved. All other criminal offences remain within the capability of other organisational units.

39 ICS response comment ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. PICS currently does not have the capacity to control the application of professional standards in employees’ work, in inspection work etc. – this is within the jurisdiction of other MoI directorates. It is proposed, through the new PICS internal organisation structure, that a department (service) for controlling the implementation of professional standards and for controlling work on citizens’ complaints is to be established. The human resources capacity for this should be enabled To develop and introduce a comprehensive Inspection through the transfer of police officers from the Police Directorate to and Review regime in all key aspects of Ministry of PICS. These employees will perform the duty of regulating legality in REC 7 Interior policing. PICS work and they should keep their office space and equipment in Police Districts. In this case, apart from its Regional Centres, PICS would ensure its presence in all Police Administrations and other MoI organisational units (Unifor- med Police, Gendarmerie). This would ensure a unique, efficient, objective and operatively independent system of internal control, directly accountable to the Minister of Interior. ICS response/comment - The recommendation is partially justi- The establishment of a central corruption intelligence fied. Through the implementation of previous recommendations, database within the Internal Control Sector, should be considered, securely managed and audited to EU PICS could provide resources for establishing a central intelligence REC 8 standards by ICS. database, but in line with its capabilities – only for police or other MoI staff, no more than that.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified.Thro - The ICS Intelligence and Analytics department to ugh the implementation of previous recommendations, PICS would produce an annual progress report, risk assessment and action plan on the fight against police corruption provide the leading position within MoI in the fight against corrup- REC 9 within the Ministry of Interior. tion in MoI. Thus, PICS would be the focal point for cooperation with other state organs and agencies.

All corruption allegations and intelligence should be ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. It assu- subject to mandatory referral to the Internal Control Sector within 24 hours of discovery. This should be mes defining the obligation through the Instructions on Methods of REC 10 enshrined in Ministry regulations. Internal Oversight of Police.

A full IT security analysis should be undertaken to firewall and protect all corruption intelligence from ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. Needs unauthorised or unnecessary access. A need-to- to be implemented jointly with other MoI organisational units. REC 11 know security structure should be implemented.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. In ac- Operational independence should be established and cordance with the new CPC, PICS is operatively independent when all investigations accountable through the courts by a working within the MoI. Its independence will grow with the new

REC 12 dedicated special prosecutor. prosecutorial capabilities.

Non-reporting of Corruption The reason why citizens fail to report corruption is that some consider corruption a common practice and culturally acceptable, primarily in the work of state administration and as a way to get a job done more promptly and successfully. A small gift helps to speed up the process. A clear lack of public trust that corruption allegations will be investigated objectively, or that the responsible person(s) will be prosecuted are also key factors, in non-reporting. The citizens survey clearly demonstrates a mistrust of the state when it comes to protecting citizens’ human rights. Recently published research funded by the Dutch Embassy again corroborates this finding and confirmed that “Corruption is a seriously under-reported crime....“ it added that reporting to the police was pointless, “who cares?“

40 ICS response comment

To introduce a positive action plan for the receipt of all ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. PICS corruption complainants. With the requirement to imme- can propose amendments to the Law on Police (concerning procedu- diately seek and preserve evidence as the primary task of re of citizens’ complaints and disciplinary liability) and new forms of

REC 13 the receiving officer. Failure to comply should be a disciplinary offence, subject to dismissal. controlling the procedure concerning citizens’ complaints.

Anonymous grievances and reports seems to indicate that citizens exhibit a fear of the consequences if they are discovered reporting corruption. Public confidence and partnerships must be established and developed if democratic policing is to progress to EU standards.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. The police responsibility to the public is defined by the Law on Police, A Citizens charter should be considered, outlining Code of Police Ethics and in the act of taking oath of Office. It is po- minimum standards of service the public can expect, ssible to adopt, for example, the Declaration of the MoI Staff, which

REC 14 and made publicly accountable for performance. would encompass the minimal standards of services that citizens can expect. The Code of Silence Within the Police, corruption is not reported for slightly different reasons. A well documented “Code of Silence“ operates across police behavioural boundaries. This phenomenon is widely accepted within the international policing community. It would be foolish to think it did not apply to Serbian law enforcement. A significant cause for concern deriving from the police officer survey is their passive behaviour towards corruption. A quarter of the police officers who participated in the survey said that they did nothing after receiving information about corrupt colleagues. This may reflect a mentality of “learnt helplessness” or a locus of control that is perceived to be outside the influence of the officers. In other words it is someone else’s problem. The high failure rate of internal corruption investigations seems to support this notion of helplessness ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. Zero To introduce a ZERO tolerance strategy making the tolerance is the ultimate goal to strive for and possible to achieve, non-reporting or ignoring of corruption activity a with the parallel development of mechanisms for encouraging re-

REC 15 disciplinary offence subject to dismissal. porting of corruption, for protection of persons who report and for objective control. Professional corruption investigations? The survey suggests an investigative failure rate of some 92%. The Dutch research referred to above reported that “The public prosecution dismissed 49% of the reports. Complaining citizens had the lowest chance of seeing their complaint end in an indictment (10%). This poor success rate is worthy of further research which will need to include methods of reporting, value of information received, first response behaviours, policy decision recording etc. All these and more, influence, at an early stage, the success or failure of a complaint or report of corruption. Initial response is also a clear statement of how seriously the M of I take corruption allegations.”

Consideration should be given to introducing stan- ICS response/comment - The recommendation is unclear. The dard Investigation Plans. Together with mandatory Law on Police, other laws and bylaws clearly define the position of

REC 16 reporting and internal oversight to the Head of ICS. the PICS Head.

It is evident that everyone (police and public) should be encouraged to report corruption. Mistrust that the public expresses towards the police and their ability to treat corruption reports professionally is something the Ministry must address. For the purpose of gaining public trust and encouraging citizens and officers to report corruption to the relevant authority, affirmative action needs to be designed. This would demonstrate to the public that the Ministry is willing and committed to combat any form of corruption and support rigorous investigations against corrupt police officers, irrespective of rank or status. Independent oversight? The purpose of any investigation must be to establish the truth. When allegations are made it is vital to thoroughly investigate all aspects of the circumstances. It may be that the officer is completely innocent, in which case his or her reputation (and that of the Ministry) must be protected. It may also be that the allegation is accurate and the officer is engaged in corruption. A thorough and professional investigation will establish these facts and go some way to restoring the reputation of the Ministry. Transparent and professional investigation of all allegations is essential to building and restoring public confidence. One way to ensure that the Internal Control Sector do their job correctly is to have an independent oversight mechanism to ensure that the police take corruption allegations seriously, react to them appropriately, record activity accurately and are accountable to the public. Such an oversight body must have powers and authority to inspect and direct investigations as they see fit. They should be the guardians of the “public interest”. The notion of “zero tolerance” must mean something. Zero tolerance is a dynamic activity.

41 ICS response comment

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is partially justified. The comment on Rec 13 opens up the possibility of promoting An independent oversight body with appropriate appellate procedure. This presents the MoI framework for enforcing powers should be available to guard the public in- this monitoring, while all the other issues related to corruption will terest and ensure impartiality, professionalism and be within prosecutorial jurisdiction. E.g. this would suppose the REC 17 accountability in all corruption related matters. establishment of the MoI Council for Professional Standards Control, instead of the person authorised for the oversight of the Commission for Complaints.

Concepts of corruption Despite the official definition of corruption in which it is most often understood as accepting a bribe (usually money but not exclusively), the largest number of respondents among both citizens and police officers understand corruption to be “any form of benefit achieved from conducting a prohibited favour”. The research indicates that the most prevailing deviance is often referred to as “petty corruption”. It is evident that some police officers and citizens think that this is not corrupt behaviour, but a way of expressing kindness or gratitude for successful and efficient work done. This is confirmed by the fact that some police officers acknowledged that the citizens, on their own initiative, gave “symbolic gifts” to them (coffee, cigarettes, alcohol, chocolate, etc.), even though they were not requested to do so. This is confirmed by some citizens who also said that they gave gifts to police officers even though they had not been requested. It appears to be culturally acceptable for many to give small value gifts to the police for doing their job. This is unacceptable in a modern police service. Both citizens and police officers should be educated about the necessity of abandoning this practice, which damages the reputation of police officers and the Ministry as a whole. Such forms of corruption are not to be ignored, because they lead to a distortion of authority and taint the image of the police as an agency of public service and integrity. It is commonly understood that such favours can hide an unspoken request or expectation of favourable treatment. Providing gifts to police officers should be actively discouraged and subject to strict and enforceable ICS response/comment - The recommendation is partially justi- guidelines. Introducing a gifts and gratuities policy is recommended. Those who wish to donate or fied. The Law on Civil Servants contains clear regulations related to REC 18 thank Ministry staff could be encouraged to make a receiving presents and is applicable to MoI. donation to a national charity.

It is of a high priority to introduce MoI staff property cards as an anti-corruption measure, with the obligation to update annually. Vulnerable Posts The corruption survey, together with recorded grievances and criminal charges suggests that traffic police are the most susceptible to corruption. In these instances, corruption is more prevalent among operational police officers, and less so amongst managers. Opera- tional officers are more susceptible to “lower level corruption”. Managers are mentioned usually because of their perceived connection or relationship with known criminals. There is very little evidence that middle management or senior police leadership are ever subject to corruption investigations. Successful investigations or the prosecution of senior staff is virtually unheard of within the Ministry of Interior. Administrative affair is a high vulnerability post. There is a clear susceptibility to corruption of receiving small value gifts in exchange for more favourable or prompt treatment. This is widely reported in the findings. The common practice of citizens “remunerating Ministry employees” needs to be addressed.

Consideration should be given to devolving the administrative functions of the Ministry to a separate ICS response/comment - The recommendation is not within the business area to avoid tainting policing activity with jurisdiction of ICS. REC 19 procedural malpractices.

It can be concluded that the citizens should be educated to abandon such practices, while such behaviour of police officers and employees should be checked periodically and sanctioned by disciplinary measures. Cultural tolerance of corruption should be challenged and changed. ICS response/comment - The recommendation is partially justi- Ethical training should be introduced to influence fied.MoI has the Professional Education Plan which is being approved cultural changes that are necessary to eradicate annually by the Minister and contains a large chapter on police ethics. corrupt behaviours and attitudes of ministry em- Two manuals on police ethics are being prepared by MoI and OSCE, REC 20 ployees. and the Basic Police Training Centre is developing new programmes in the area of police ethics implementation in practice.

42 Corruptors Corruptors represent very diverse categories of individuals. From those who seek swift administrative responses to those criminals who seek to avoid justice. Each leaves its own taint on police reputation. Both organised and disorganised criminals represent the most significant threat category when examining police corruption. They actively seek police intelligence, and protection from prosecution. Consequently the harm to public safety is ever increasing. There is also the perception of being untouchable, which significantly damages police reputation. At a lower level citizens claimed that they gave bribes to police officers they did not know, or those they were recently acquainted to. Fewer citizens claimed that the police officers were known to them through friends, or that they were friends or relatives. The police officers who admitted receiving a bribe, or small value gift, stated they helped their friends, relatives and acquaintances.

ICS response comment

Certain roles are more susceptible to corruption than ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. The others. Strong and intrusive local supervision must implementation of the proposed anti-corruption measure (e.g. obli- be developed to protect Ministry employees from gatory rotation of staff) would be a significant step in creating a re- REC 21 corrupt behaviours. liable and long-term prevention mechanism.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. A leadership culture of management accountabili- The management team work should be favoured in the process of ty should be developed. Employees continue to be corrupt because there is no fear of discovery or man- analysis and decision making, as the strengthening of control of all REC 22 agement interventions from department heads. immediate supervisors’ work – an important precondition for enforcing confidence and success.

ICS response/comment - The recommendation is justified. Besi- Supervisory and management failures should be des the annual staff appraisal, there is a need to introduce criteria subject to strict accountability with strong disciplinary action including dismissal, against ineffec- for determining a manager’s responsibility for misconduct of his/her REC 23 tive leadership. employees (transfer to another position). Conditions for dismissal are regulated by Law.

Visible signs of corruption of police officers Citizens responded by saying that the signs of corruption were Police officers who own property of significant value, primarily high value real estate or expensive cars. Especially in small towns where people know each other well. The conclusion to be drawn that police officers cannot obtain expensive property from their regular income and that possession of high value property or luxury items is an indicator of corruption. Further signs may include, expensive trips, frequenting expensive restaurants, excessive spending on clothes and holidays. In short living a life above the income of a serving police officer. Whilst there are many fallacies that support this public perception It is difficult to change public opinion. Any education strategy should include factors of how officers should conduct themselves at work and when not on duty. Professional behaviours are required at all times from a serving officer.

A comprehensive education strategy should be developed that includes advice and guidance on pro- The recommendation is not within PICS jurisdiction.

REC 24 fessional behaviours both on and off duty.

43 Measures taken by the Ministry of Interior? The Ministry of Interior has expressed a clear and unequivocal will to combat corruption within its own structure. Whilst this is strong language the survey demonstrates that firm, decisive and continuous action is needed if concrete results are to be achieved. The culture of policing must be changed and public confidence improved. The effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts by the Ministry of Interior in suppressing and investigating corruption were divided in the responses of the surveys of citizens and police officers. Almost 43.7% expressed positive impressions about the efforts of the police in fighting corruption internally, while 38.7% believe that the MoI measures are inadequate and the remaining survey participants (17.5%) did not express their views on this issue. One thing that both police and citizens appear agree upon is that the poor salaries of police officers influence the levels of corruption. Some citizens expressed the view that with such low wages it is highly likely that officers will engage in corruption and seek to make extra money in order to survive. The trade union also make this point with some emphasis. There can be little doubt that employment conditions, salaries and role satisfaction will be a significant influence on an officer’s choice of ethical or unethical behaviour. Much is dependent upon his or her personal circumstances.

ICS response comment

Adequate salaries and professional working conditions and practices are essential to establishing and ICS response/comment - The recommendation is not within PICS maintaining an ethical police service in a modern jurisdiction.

REC 25 democracy, one that achieves and maintains EU standards

A fully developed corruption prevention strategy ICS response/comment - The recommendation is good. It requires needs to be designed and published with action joint activities with other MoI organisational units.

REC 26 plans and accountable processes included.

A fully integrated education strategy should be designed to incorporate Ministry and Police leadership, senior management, supervisory roles, and opera- CS response/comment - The recommendation is good. It requires tional and administrative staff. This should include joint activities with other MoI organisational units. REC 27 a public education process to raise the profile of anti-corruption activity.

The citizen’s corruption survey should be conducted ICS response/comment - The recommendation is good. PICS sho- bi-annually to gauge the actual effect of Ministry uld be responsible for the activity and should be assisted by NGOs, to

REC 28 strategies against police corruption. ensure objectivity.

A ZERO tolerance strategy should be developed and ICS response/comment - The recommendation is good. PICS sho- implemented with the support of the public and uld be responsible for the activity and should be assisted by other MoI

REC 29 trade unions. organisational units, trade unions and NGOs.