sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 11 May 2008 Allies and defectors An update on armed group integration and proxy force activity ribal groups, pastoralists, para- Groups (OAGs) into the SPLA1 and This is likely to continue at least militaries, and SPLA splinter post-CPA violence between armed until the referendum on South Suda- factions, among other armed groups and SPLA forces during civilian nese independence in 2011. T 2 entities, were key combatants in the disarmament campaigns. The current second Sudanese civil war as allies of Brief updates the state of knowledge the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or about the status of armed groups in ‘Other Armed Groups’ in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army South Sudan as of March 2008, and (SPLA). Under the terms of the Com- focuses on the lingering problems that context prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of they pose, the challenges remaining to The term ‘armed group’ is considerably 2005, these groups, many of which their dissolution and demobilization, elastic in the Sudanese context. Through- had deep roots in local political, ethnic, and their possible impact on CPA imple- out the second Sudanese civil war and economic conflicts in South Sudan, mentation. It finds that: (1983–2005), tribal groups, pastoralists, were suddenly required to disband paramilitaries, and other collectives and their members to join the SAF, the The South Sudan Defence Forces played a significant role; many acted SPLA, or one of a small number of (SSDF), by far the most threatening as proxy forces and waged much of the government institutions. Not surpris- South Sudanese collection of armed fighting, especially during the 1990s. ingly, this process has been neither groups during the civil war, has In the case of the SSDF, an SAF-aligned smooth nor rapid. largely shifted its allegiance to the umbrella group comprising more than Three years later, a wide range of SPLA, with far fewer remnant SSDF 40,000 men, the group engaged in fight- ex-combatants find themselves in a remaining unaligned or allied to ing throughout Upper Nile, Jonglei, kind of administrative limbo, at varying the SAF. Eastern Equatoria, and Northern Bahr levels of ‘integration’ and ‘demobili- The integration of these former el Ghazal. They fought the SPLA directly zation’. Some former armed group SSDF combatants into the SPLA, in rural areas and were an important members may be part of either the however, remains minimal or non- reinforcement for the SAF in the be- SAF or the SPLA only as a name on a existent. sieged garrison towns of South Sudan. roster, while continuing to answer to SAF-aligned Misseriya tribesmen Other, less developed local groups their former commanders. In many clashed violently with the SPLA in became involved in the wider conflict cases, tribal and personal loyalties carry the South Kordofan–Bahr el Ghazal only when it benefited their local aims, more weight than their new affiliations. border regions from December needs, or tribal concerns, as in the case Looming over the entire post-CPA 2007 until April 2008, threatening of the ‘white army’ in Jonglei.3 realignment process is the knowledge to destabilize the area. Worryingly, With the end of the civil war, these that for most former fighters, armed Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir groups were required to disband. The group membership is the only sustain- has remobilized paramilitary Pop- Comprehensive Peace Agreement of able way of life. ular Defence Forces in the area. January 2005—to which only the SPLA At the same time, the Government The SPLA-aligned Debab and Abu and the Government of Sudan (GoS) of National Unity (GNU) and the Matrig Forces (primarily Misseriya were party—declared that ‘no armed Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and Rizeigat armed forces, respec- groups allied to either party shall be continue to rely on armed groups as tively), as well as the continued allowed to operate outside the two proxy forces in contentious areas, result- presence of several SAF-aligned forces’.4 The CPA referred to all these ing in increased tensions, jockeying for SSDF remnant militias, are gener- collectives as Other Armed Groups the support of different groups, and ating significant tensions in Abyei. (OAGs) and required that they declare fighting. This is in direct violation of The competition for allied forces their allegiance to, and then incorpo- the peace agreement, and is part of an in the border ‘Transitional Areas’ rate into, either the SAF or the SPLA escalating crisis between the parties. suggests that both the SPLA and no later than 9 March 2006, or be de- Previous Sudan Issue Briefs have SAF are intent on keeping allied clared illegal. Technically, as far as the reviewed the process of integration armed groups in the field to support GoS and the SPLA are concerned, of important so-called Other Armed their efforts to control strategic areas. OAGs ceased to exist after that date— www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 any remnant unaligned groups were As of mid-2008, more than two years had capitulated and formally aligned to be labelled criminal and dealt with since the signing of the Juba Declara- with the SPLA: Ismael Konye (a Murle) accordingly.5 tion and three since the CPA, armed in Jonglei in October 2006 and Sultan Despite the CPA’s clear instruction group activity continues. The two Adbel Bagi (a Dinka) in Northern Bahr on the fate of the OAGs,6 the reality categories of armed groups that call for el Ghazal in August 2007.8 Konye’s on the ground has always been more examination in this Brief are the SAF- forces redeployed from Pibor to Juba complicated. Because of the important aligned remnants of the SSDF that in mid-April 2007,9 and he became a constituencies that some OAGs repre- continue to operate in South Sudan, ‘peace and reconciliation’ adviser to sented, it was subsequently recognized and tribal groups, some of whose GoSS president Salva Kiir. His troops that they could not simply be dealt with members are also operating as pro- are in the process of being incorporated 10 as criminal entities. As a consequence, government paramilitaries. Even into the SPLA or being demobilized. a special agreement was required to though, as far as the parties to the The troops of Sultan Abdel Bagi, while deal with the SSDF, many of whose CPA are concerned, ‘OAGs’ have all historically active in South Kordofan commanders wielded considerable been officially absorbed and therefore around Meiram, are now mostly located local authority. The Juba Declaration no longer exist, this is a technicality in SPLA bases in Aweil and Tonj, Bahr of January 2006 between the SPLA that should not obscure the more el Ghazal. No further major changes and the SSDF set the terms for the complicated reality on the ground. in realignment of remnant-SSDF mili- group’s official dissolution and absorp- tias have taken place since. tion, primarily into the SPLA; in the As the SSDF effectively collapsed, process, SSDF commander Paulino however, some SSDF militia members Matieb became the SPLA’s Deputy The SSDF: the final chapter? detached from their leadership and Commander-in-Chief. Some other Following Matieb’s transition to the became involved in local, informal SSDF commanders held their options SPLA, only a handful of SSDF com- tribal-based forces. Their former com- open for as long as possible, returned manders and their men refused to manders, unable to continue to sup- to the SAF, or remained uncommitted.7 follow him. By late 2006 two of these ply and motivate them, had little hold GEDAREF Selected Armed Groups of Concern in South Sudan WHITE SINNAR and Border Areas, March 2008 NILE SOUTH KORDOFAN el-Damazin SOUTH Renk DARFUR SUDANRenk faction Kadugli Abu Sofifa BLUE Abu Matrig NILE Abu Matrig Forces Debab Forces Kaka Kharasana Meiram PPeaceeace and DeDevvelopment DeDeffence Forccee (PDDF) Pariang El NasserNasser facactiontion Akoka Safaha Abyei Rom Abyeiyei Forccees NORTHERN UPPER Al Fursan Bentiu Malakal NILE Forces Raja BAHR EL GHAZAL Mading Forccees Division Mading Raja Aweil Fangak Fangak Forces NasNasseserr Quwat Al Fursan El NasserNasser factionaction PPeaceeace DeDeffence WARAB UNITY ETHIOPIA FFoorrceces (PDF) Warrap WESTERN BAHR Wau EL GHAZAL Tonj JONGLEI CENTRAL PPeaceeace DeDeffence Forccees (PDF) AFRICAN RRumbekumbek REPUBLIC LAKES Bor International boundary North–South boundary WESTERN State boundary EQUATORIA EASTERN Juba EQUATORIA State capital Yambio CENTRCENTRALAL Renk Armed group aligned with: EQEQUUAATORIA Torit SPLA DEMOCRA TIC KENYA SAF REPUBLIC OF THE Former SSDF groups C ONGO Other armed groups 0km200 UGANDA 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 11 May 2008 on them. This is the case with a cadre of Murle officers under Ismael Konye, The vast majority of the former SSDF have defected who declined to follow him into the SPLA, choosing instead to remain in from the SAF into the SPLA camp. their home area of Pibor County in Jonglei State. Similarly, in Bahr el Ghazal a number of Sultan Bagi’s former forces remained There is circumstantial evidence SAF redeployment from the South to in the Meriam area, seemingly inde- 19 11 that this is not the case, however. At the North, but they could still be used pendent of him. Furthermore, at least least one former powerful ex-SSDF as proxy forces in the future.20 one of his sons has refused to align with commander, Gabriel Tang-Ginya, As mentioned above, a few remnant the SPLA. Another example of this trend claimed in November 2007 that he SSDF militias have already been demo- is the break-up of Atom Al-Nour’s maintained personal control over forces bilized and disarmed by SAF, such as SSDF-affiliated Peace Defence Forces in South Sudan.17 Problematically, the the Dolieb Forces of Thomas Mabior.21 (PDF, not to be confused with the para- SAF has also engaged in unilateral In practice this means that the forces military Popular Defence Forces or the ‘demobilization’ of former SSDF troops have been sent back to their home areas, Pibor Defense Force of Ismael Konye) aligned with it, which has had no UN and official ties with them have been into four major groupings in three monitoring.