Con'icting Priorities
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ikZWd>kcWdI[Ykh_jo8Wi[b_d[7ii[iic[dj _iik[ Xh_[\ IcWbb7hciIkhl[o DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ 9edÔ_Yj_d]fh_eh_j_[i =eIIi[Ykh_joY^Wbb[d][i WdZh[Y[djh[ifedi[i our years after the signing of the left unresolved, and there has been The international community needs Comprehensive Peace Agree- associated violence in a number to refocus on the fragile North–South F ment (CPA), Southern Sudan of areas in Southern Sudan and ceasefire and a southern govern- is facing a profound set of problems. border regions. ment that is struggling to cope with The Government of Southern Sudan The GoSS’s security planning con- mounting internal and external (GoSS) has yet to establish security tinues to be largely based on the pressures. In particular, the UN throughout the South and to address perception that the North is actively Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) could internal challenges to its authority, working to undermine the CPA and more effectively operationalize its including various militia groups and that a future war is likely. core mandate to monitor the cease- 2008 inter-communal conflicts. Within the The GoSS civilian disarmament fire and security arrangements of campaign had limited impact, in context of faltering implementation of the CPA and could establish a more terms of both removing weapons the CPA and its perceived obstruction dynamic presence on the ground, from circulation and stemming vio- by the North, a potentially destabiliz- as it has begun to do in Jonglei. ing financial crisis, and elections slated lence. The campaign was conducted Donors and others involved in secu- for February 2010, the GoSS is strug- selectively, took place alongside re- rity policy and programming have gling on multiple fronts. Looming over armament, and failed to address an opportunity to engage decision- these issues is the prospect of the ref- internal conflicts and gaps in civil makers both to plan for possible erendum on self-determination, which securityprovision, which continue scenarios following the referendum the GoSS is resolved should take place to motivate weapons possession. in 2011 and to develop strategies to by 2011, as stipulated by the CPA. Disarmament in the current con- address and mitigate internal threats The GoSS continues to be driven by text is unlikely to contribute to the to stability for the remainder of the belief that a confrontation with the broader goals of peace and security. North is likely. This stance has shaped The 2008 disarmament campaign the interim period. This calls for a its current security strategy, which and subsequent violence in Jonglei sequenced approach that takes secu- focuses on defending the border with and Upper Nile in 2009 are indica- rity—rather than disarmament—as the North and other strategic posi- tive of divisions within the GoSS, the necessary starting point. tions, as well as containing potential between those empowered by the spoilers, including possible allies of CPA and other southern groups, as Khartoum. The consequence is a lim- well as ongoing inter-communal ;nj[hdWbj^h[Wji conflicts. The issue of how to handle ited ability to address insecurity and Despite the continued effort to adhere militias—whether independent or conflicts emerging within the South. to the terms of the peace agreement,2 aligned with security forces in the This Issue Brief explores some of the the GoSS’s security decision-making North—is connected to these divi- internal and external challenges cur- continues to be driven by what it per- sions. A renewed focus on South– rently facing the GoSS, and its responses, ceives to be the unresolved conflict particularly the most recent civilian South dialogue and reconciliation is essential if the South is to remain with the North. Security continues to disarmament campaign, which took be understood in terms of the need to 1 unified. place in the second half of 2008. prepare for a possible future war, which Key findings are the following: In order to engage meaningfully with the GoSS on security issues, includes the need to address perceived The GoSS faces a combination of the UN and donors need to appre- proxy forces and other destabilizing internal divisions and external ciate the GoSS’s security dilemmas groups and individuals operating in 3 pressures from an increasingly and priorities, and allow these to the South. hostile National Congress Party inform their approach to support- The perspective of the Sudan (NCP) in the North; numerous ing the development of security People’s Liberation Movement/Army violations of the CPA have been policies and institutions. (SPLM and SPLA) that Southern Sudan mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd ' must be able to protect its sovereignty 8en'9ed\hedjWj_edm_j^_dj^[CWbWaWb#XWi[Z@?K in the event that the northern govern- ment reneges on the peace agreement J^[I7<Yecfed[dje\j^[CWbWaWb#XWi[Z@?KYedi_ijifh_cWh_boe\iebZ_[hifh[l_ekibokdZ[hj^[YeccWdZ has been clear since the outset of the e\=WXh_[bJWd]#=_doW"W\ehc[hc_b_j_Wb[WZ[h_dIekj^[hdIkZWdWdZWdI7<CW`eh#=[d[hWb$''J^_i@?KmWi CPA negotiations. The maintenance Wjj^[Y[djh[e\Wl_eb[djYed\hedjWj_eded(*Å(+<[XhkWho(&&/_dCWbWaWb"YWf_jWbe\Kff[hD_b[IjWj["Wi of the SPLA as the official army of m[bbWie\[Whb_[hYed\hedjWj_edi$ Southern Sudan is enshrined in the ?dW^_]^boYedj[dj_ekicel["JWd]#=_doWWhh_l[Z_dCWbWaWb"m^[h[^[^Wi\Wc_boWdZemdifhef[hjo"ed agreement4 and was seen by south- ()<[XhkWho"^Wl_d]eij[di_XboX[[d]_l[df[hc_ii_edjejWa[b[Wl[\ehWm[[a$>[cel[Z_djej^[I7<@?K erners as an essential guarantor of the XWhhWYai_dj^[jemdkfed^_iWhh_lWbWdZj^[\ebbem_d]cehd_d]m[dj\ehWmWbaWYYecfWd_[ZXoI7<XeZo# autonomous region’s security and ]kWhZi$7d[nY^Wd][e\Óh[Xhea[ekj[Whboj^Wjcehd_d]a_bb_d]ed[Y_l_b_WdWdZ_d`kh_d]jmeIFB7iebZ_[hi$ integrity. Yet the SPLA continues to KDe\ÓY_WbiWia[ZJWd]#=_doWjeb[Wl[j^[jemd"m^_Y^^[Z[Yb_d[ZjeZe"WdZj^[Kff[hD_b[IjWj[ I[Ykh_jo9ecc_jj[[j^h[Wj[d[ZjeWhh[ij^_c$7Zhkda[difh[[e\_dZ_iYh_c_dWj[Ó]^j_d]_dlebl_d]jWdai" see the SAF as the biggest threat to its Whj_bb[ho"WdZicWbbWhcij^[dXhea[ekjX[jm[[dj^[IFB7WdZI7<Yecfed[djie\j^[@?K"a_bb_d]Wjb[Wij security, as it did during the civil war.5 ,(f[efb[_dYbkZ_d]WXekj)&Y_l_b_WdiWdZ_d`kh_d]/*ej^[hi$'(J^[I7<@?KYedj_d][djmWiYecfei[Z It is extremely mistrustful of SAF forces bWh][boe\JWd]#=_doWÊi\ehc[hc_b_j_Wc[cX[hiWdZmWiX[jj[h[gk_ff[Zj^Wd_jiIFB7Yekdj[hfWhj$I[h_eki on or near its territory, both those ille- beej_d]\ebbem[ZWdZWdWZZ_j_edWbI7<iebZ_[hmWii^ejZ[WZj^[\ebbem_d]ZWo$=eIIL_Y[Fh[i_Z[djH_[a gally ‘guarding’ strategic assets such CWY^WhjhWl[bb[ZjeCWbWaWbWdZ"je][j^[hm_j^C_d_ij[h7^c[Z>Whkde\j^[=el[hdc[dje\DWj_edWbKd_jo" as the oil fields and SAF members of c[Z_Wj[ZWdW]h[[c[djX[jm[[dj^[jmei_Z[i$J^[j[hci_dYbkZ[Zj^[Z_i[d]W][c[dje\\ehY[i"Wij_fkbW# 6 the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). j_edj^WjXej^@?Kj[WcimekbZhejWj[ekje\CWbWaWbYecfb[j[bo"WdZj^[h[beYWj_ede\\kjkh[@?KijeW The problematic make-up of the beYWj_ed'&acekje\jemd$')J^[i[j[hci^Wl[o[jjeX[c[j$ JIUs has reinforced the SPLA’s con- J^[h[_iWm_Z[ifh[WZX[b_[\_dIekj^[hdIkZWdj^Wjj^[l_eb[dY[mWiehY^[ijhWj[Z$ÉM[X[b_[l[j^Wj cerns. Rather than building a model JWd]#=_doW_iX[_d]ki[ZXoI7<WiWYWjWboijjeijWhjWdej^[hY_l_bmWh_dIekj^[hdIkZWd"ÊiW_ZWijWj[# for a future unified army, the SAF c[dj\hecj^[=eIIC_d_ijhoe\?d\ehcWj_edWdZ8heWZYWij_d]$'*ÉI7<_idejm_bb_d]je^WdZel[hJWd]#=_doW strategy of deploying former SAF- je\WY[`kij_Y[Wih[f[Wj[ZboZ[cWdZ[ZXo=eII"Ê_jiW_Z$J^_iWdZej^[hl_eb[djYbWi^[iWh[l_ebWj_edie\ aligned southern militias to the JIUs j^[9ecfh[^[di_l[F[WY[7]h[[c[dj$ '+ has created insecurity and is seen by J^[I7<Yedj_d][djie\j^[@?Ki"_dfWhj_YkbWh_dCWbWaWbWdZFWbe_Y^"_dYbkZ[\ehc[hc_b_j_Wc[cX[hi many in the GoSS as a deliberate prov- m^eWh[X[b_[l[Zjeh[cW_dbeoWbjej^[_h\ehc[hYeccWdZ[hi$7iikY^"j^[I7<YeccWdZ[hZe[idej^Wl[ ocation. Tensions between the SAF [\\[Yj_l[Yedjhebel[hj^[i[\ehY[i$CWjj[hiWh[\khj^[hYecfb_YWj[ZXoh[fehj[Zj[di_edim_j^_dj^[I7< and SPLA components of the JIUs Yecfed[dje\j^[CWbWaWb#XWi[Z@?K$Ceh[if[Y_ÓYWbbo"JWd]#=_doWÊiikffehj[hiWh[_dYedÔ_Yjm_j^j^ei[ beoWbjeej^[hiekj^[hd"I7<#Wb_]d[Zc_b_j_Wb[WZ[hiikY^Wi=ehZedAed]WdZJ^ecWiCWXe_h"Wim[bbWim_j^ have led to several instances of heavy iec[Ckhb[]hekfi$7iikY^"j^[@?KiYWddej\kbÓbj^[_hcWdZWj[e\fhel_Z_d]Wkd_Ó[Zc_b_jWhoYWfWX_b_jo fighting, most recently in Malakal in Zkh_d]j^[_dj[h_cf[h_eZWdZ^Wl[_dij[WZX[Yec[WiekhY[e\_di[Ykh_jo$', February 2009 (see Box 1). The Southern Sudan Security Strategy (2009) identifies the failure to demarcate the North–South border Popular Defence Forces (the Islamist The failure by the NCP to respect as the most pressing challenge to the militia that supported the National the Abyei boundary as per the CPA, and confrontations along the Islamic Front’s rise to power and was findings of the Abyei Boundaries contested border as a primary threat to used to conduct the civil war in the Commission21 and to implement the South (see Box 2). These concerns South),17 also deploying them to South- the Abyei Protocol. Violent clashes are heightened by recent SAF and ern Kordofan. between the SAF and the SPLA SPLA troop build-ups along strategic Since the CPA was signed, the broke out in and around Abyei in border areas as well as significant North–South border and the so-called May 2008, which led to the signing 7 arming by both sides. The SPLA Three Areas of Abyei, Southern Kordo- of the Abyei Road Map,22 as part also moved 18 tanks from Ethiopia fan, and Blue Nile have been a major of which both parties agreed to to positions in Blue Nile during July focus of dispute; there is no shortage have the dispute resolved by the 2008.8 Several shipments of tanks, of related examples of violations of Abyei Arbitration Tribunal in The heavy weaponry, and small arms the agreement.