ikZWd>kcWdI[Ykh_jo8Wi[b_d[7ii[iic[dj _iik[ Xh_[\ IcWbb7hciIkhl[o DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ 9edÔ_Yj_d]fh_eh_j_[i =eIIi[Ykh_joY^Wbb[d][i WdZh[Y[djh[ifedi[i
our years after the signing of the left unresolved, and there has been The international community needs Comprehensive Peace Agree- associated violence in a number to refocus on the fragile North–South F ment (CPA), Southern Sudan of areas in Southern Sudan and ceasefire and a southern govern- is facing a profound set of problems. border regions. ment that is struggling to cope with The Government of Southern Sudan The GoSS’s security planning con- mounting internal and external (GoSS) has yet to establish security tinues to be largely based on the pressures. In particular, the UN throughout the South and to address perception that the North is actively Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) could internal challenges to its authority, working to undermine the CPA and more effectively operationalize its including various militia groups and that a future war is likely. core mandate to monitor the cease- 2008 inter-communal conflicts. Within the The GoSS civilian disarmament fire and security arrangements of campaign had limited impact, in context of faltering implementation of the CPA and could establish a more terms of both removing weapons the CPA and its perceived obstruction dynamic presence on the ground, from circulation and stemming vio- by the North, a potentially destabiliz- as it has begun to do in Jonglei. ing financial crisis, and elections slated lence. The campaign was conducted Donors and others involved in secu- for February 2010, the GoSS is strug- selectively, took place alongside re- rity policy and programming have gling on multiple fronts. Looming over armament, and failed to address an opportunity to engage decision- these issues is the prospect of the ref- internal conflicts and gaps in civil makers both to plan for possible erendum on self-determination, which securityprovision, which continue scenarios following the referendum the GoSS is resolved should take place to motivate weapons possession. in 2011 and to develop strategies to by 2011, as stipulated by the CPA. Disarmament in the current con- address and mitigate internal threats The GoSS continues to be driven by text is unlikely to contribute to the to stability for the remainder of the belief that a confrontation with the broader goals of peace and security. North is likely. This stance has shaped The 2008 disarmament campaign the interim period. This calls for a its current security strategy, which and subsequent violence in Jonglei sequenced approach that takes secu- focuses on defending the border with and Upper Nile in 2009 are indica- rity—rather than disarmament—as the North and other strategic posi- tive of divisions within the GoSS, the necessary starting point. tions, as well as containing potential between those empowered by the spoilers, including possible allies of CPA and other southern groups, as Khartoum. The consequence is a lim- well as ongoing inter-communal ;nj[hdWbj^h[Wji conflicts. The issue of how to handle ited ability to address insecurity and Despite the continued effort to adhere militias—whether independent or conflicts emerging within the South. to the terms of the peace agreement,2 aligned with security forces in the This Issue Brief explores some of the the GoSS’s security decision-making North—is connected to these divi- internal and external challenges cur- continues to be driven by what it per- sions. A renewed focus on South– rently facing the GoSS, and its responses, ceives to be the unresolved conflict particularly the most recent civilian South dialogue and reconciliation is essential if the South is to remain with the North. Security continues to disarmament campaign, which took be understood in terms of the need to 1 unified. place in the second half of 2008. prepare for a possible future war, which Key findings are the following: In order to engage meaningfully with the GoSS on security issues, includes the need to address perceived The GoSS faces a combination of the UN and donors need to appre- proxy forces and other destabilizing internal divisions and external ciate the GoSS’s security dilemmas groups and individuals operating in 3 pressures from an increasingly and priorities, and allow these to the South. hostile National Congress Party inform their approach to support- The perspective of the Sudan (NCP) in the North; numerous ing the development of security People’s Liberation Movement/Army violations of the CPA have been policies and institutions. (SPLM and SPLA) that Southern Sudan
mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd ' must be able to protect its sovereignty 8en'9ed\hedjWj_edm_j^_dj^[CWbWaWb#XWi[Z@?K in the event that the northern govern- ment reneges on the peace agreement J^[I7<Yecfed[dje\j^[CWbWaWb#XWi[Z@?KYedi_ijifh_cWh_boe\iebZ_[hifh[l_ekibokdZ[hj^[YeccWdZ has been clear since the outset of the e\=WXh_[bJWd]#=_doW"W \ehc[h c_b_j_Wb[WZ[h_dIekj^[hdIkZWdWdZWdI7<CW`eh#=[d[hWb$''J^_i@?KmWi CPA negotiations. The maintenance Wjj^[Y[djh[e\Wl_eb[djYed\hedjWj_eded(*Å(+<[XhkWho(&&/_dCWbWaWb"YWf_jWbe\Kff[hD_b[IjWj["Wi of the SPLA as the official army of m[bbWie\[Whb_[hYed\hedjWj_edi$ Southern Sudan is enshrined in the ?dW^_]^boYedj[dj_ekicel["JWd]#=_doWWhh_l[Z_dCWbWaWb"m^[h[^[^Wi\Wc_boWdZemdifhef[hjo"ed agreement4 and was seen by south- ()<[XhkWho"^Wl_d]eij[di_XboX[[d]_l[df[hc_ii_edjejWa[b[Wl[\ehWm[[a$>[cel[Z_djej^[I7<@?K erners as an essential guarantor of the XWhhWYai_dj^[jemdkfed^_iWhh_lWbWdZj^[\ebbem_d]cehd_d]m[dj\ehWmWbaWYYecfWd_[ZXoI7<XeZo# autonomous region’s security and ]kWhZi$7d[nY^Wd][e\Óh[Xhea[ekj[Whboj^Wjcehd_d]a_bb_d]ed[Y_l_b_WdWdZ_d`kh_d]jmeIFB7iebZ_[hi$ integrity. Yet the SPLA continues to KDe\ÓY_WbiWia[ZJWd]#=_doWjeb[Wl[j^[jemd"m^_Y^^[Z[Yb_d[ZjeZe"WdZj^[Kff[hD_b[IjWj[ I[Ykh_jo9ecc_jj[[j^h[Wj[d[ZjeWhh[ij^_c$7Zhkda[difh[[e\_dZ_iYh_c_dWj[Ó]^j_d]_dlebl_d]jWdai" see the SAF as the biggest threat to its Whj_bb[ho"WdZicWbbWhcij^[dXhea[ekjX[jm[[dj^[IFB7WdZI7<Yecfed[djie\j^[@?K"a_bb_d]Wjb[Wij security, as it did during the civil war.5 ,(f[efb[ _dYbkZ_d]WXekj)&Y_l_b_Wdi WdZ_d`kh_d]/*ej^[hi$'(J^[I7<@?KYedj_d][djmWiYecfei[Z It is extremely mistrustful of SAF forces bWh][boe\JWd]#=_doWÊi \ehc[h c_b_j_Wc[cX[hiWdZmWiX[jj[h[gk_ff[Zj^Wd_jiIFB7Yekdj[hfWhj$I[h_eki on or near its territory, both those ille- beej_d]\ebbem[ZWdZWdWZZ_j_edWbI7<iebZ_[hmWii^ejZ[WZj^[\ebbem_d]ZWo$=eIIL_Y[Fh[i_Z[djH_[a gally ‘guarding’ strategic assets such CWY^WhjhWl[bb[ZjeCWbWaWbWdZ"je][j^[hm_j^C_d_ij[h7^c[Z>Whkde\j^[=el[hdc[dje\DWj_edWbKd_jo" as the oil fields and SAF members of c[Z_Wj[ZWdW]h[[c[djX[jm[[dj^[jmei_Z[i$J^[j[hci_dYbkZ[Zj^[Z_i[d]W][c[dje\\ehY[i"Wij_fkbW# 6 the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). j_edj^WjXej^@?Kj[WcimekbZhejWj[ekje\CWbWaWbYecfb[j[bo"WdZj^[h[beYWj_ede\\kjkh[@?KijeW The problematic make-up of the beYWj_ed'&acekje\jemd$')J^[i[j[hci^Wl[o[jjeX[c[j$ JIUs has reinforced the SPLA’s con- J^[h[_iWm_Z[ifh[WZX[b_[\_dIekj^[hdIkZWdj^Wjj^[l_eb[dY[mWiehY^[ijhWj[Z$ÉM[X[b_[l[j^Wj cerns. Rather than building a model JWd]#=_doW_iX[_d]ki[ZXoI7<WiWYWjWboijjeijWhjWdej^[hY_l_bmWh_dIekj^[hdIkZWd"ÊiW_ZWijWj[# for a future unified army, the SAF c[dj\hecj^[=eIIC_d_ijhoe\?d\ehcWj_edWdZ8heWZYWij_d]$'*ÉI7<_idejm_bb_d]je^WdZel[hJWd]#=_doW strategy of deploying former SAF- je\WY[`kij_Y[Wih[f[Wj[ZboZ[cWdZ[ZXo=eII"Ê_jiW_Z$J^_iWdZej^[hl_eb[djYbWi^[iWh[l_ebWj_edie\ aligned southern militias to the JIUs j^[9ecfh[^[di_l[F[WY[7]h[[c[dj$ '+ has created insecurity and is seen by J^[I7<Yedj_d][djie\j^[@?Ki"_dfWhj_YkbWh_dCWbWaWbWdZFWbe_Y^"_dYbkZ[\ehc[hc_b_j_Wc[cX[hi many in the GoSS as a deliberate prov- m^eWh[X[b_[l[Zjeh[cW_dbeoWbjej^[_h\ehc[hYeccWdZ[hi$7iikY^"j^[I7<YeccWdZ[hZe[idej^Wl[ ocation. Tensions between the SAF [\\[Yj_l[Yedjhebel[hj^[i[\ehY[i$CWjj[hiWh[\khj^[hYecfb_YWj[ZXoh[fehj[Zj[di_edim_j^_dj^[I7< and SPLA components of the JIUs Yecfed[dje\j^[CWbWaWb#XWi[Z@?K$Ceh[if[Y_ÓYWbbo"JWd]#=_doWÊiikffehj[hiWh[_dYedÔ_Yjm_j^j^ei[ beoWbjeej^[hiekj^[hd"I7<#Wb_]d[Zc_b_j_Wb[WZ[hiikY^Wi=ehZedAed]WdZJ^ecWiCWXe_h"Wim[bbWim_j^ have led to several instances of heavy iec[Ckhb[]hekfi$7iikY^"j^[@?KiYWddej\kbÓbj^[_hcWdZWj[e\fhel_Z_d]Wkd_Ó[Zc_b_jWhoYWfWX_b_jo fighting, most recently in Malakal in Zkh_d]j^[_dj[h_cf[h_eZWdZ^Wl[_dij[WZX[Yec[WiekhY[e\_di[Ykh_jo$', February 2009 (see Box 1). The Southern Sudan Security Strategy (2009) identifies the failure to demarcate the North–South border Popular Defence Forces (the Islamist The failure by the NCP to respect as the most pressing challenge to the militia that supported the National the Abyei boundary as per the CPA, and confrontations along the Islamic Front’s rise to power and was findings of the Abyei Boundaries contested border as a primary threat to used to conduct the civil war in the Commission21 and to implement the South (see Box 2). These concerns South),17 also deploying them to South- the Abyei Protocol. Violent clashes are heightened by recent SAF and ern Kordofan. between the SAF and the SPLA SPLA troop build-ups along strategic Since the CPA was signed, the broke out in and around Abyei in border areas as well as significant North–South border and the so-called May 2008, which led to the signing 7 arming by both sides. The SPLA Three Areas of Abyei, Southern Kordo- of the Abyei Road Map,22 as part also moved 18 tanks from Ethiopia fan, and Blue Nile have been a major of which both parties agreed to to positions in Blue Nile during July focus of dispute; there is no shortage have the dispute resolved by the 2008.8 Several shipments of tanks, of related examples of violations of Abyei Arbitration Tribunal in The heavy weaponry, and small arms the agreement. These include: Hague. The court is expected to from Ukraine landed in Mombassa in reach a final decision on the bound- neighbouring Kenya and reportedly Resistance by the NCP to the demar- ary in mid-2009, but whether the moved towards the Sudanese border cation of the boundary between the 9 findings will be respected remains during late 2007 and 2008. North and South as per the agreed 18 Most recently, several brigades of formula. doubtful. Among other current SAF forces were reportedly moved The failure to redeploy forces, as problems, Abyei has no budget to 23 into Southern Kordofan under the per the agreed formula, and the implement the road map. pretext of preparing to defend the ongoing recruitment of proxies.19 Violent sporadic clashes between area from rebel Justice and Equality The failure of both parties to meet the SPLA and SAF, most recently Movement attacks from Darfur, though troop strength commitments for in Kharasana (March 2008), Abyei this claim has been disputed.10 The JIUs, and the refusal of the SAF to (May 2008), and Malakal (Febru- NCP has further remobilized the accept mandated training efforts.20 ary 2009).
( IkZWd?iik[8h_[\ DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ In addition to these violations, and unilateral declaration of independence and in the absence of locally visible other delays in implementing key sec- prior to the referendum.33 peace-building and development, the tions of the CPA, a conflict is brewing GoSS will be unable to meet the South’s over the findings of the 2008 census, greatest challenge, which is to unify which will have an impact on both the ?dj[hdWbfh[iikh[i its people. The GoSS needs to build upcoming elections and power-sharing In addition to the perceived threat from cohesion among a mix of ethnic groups 24 arrangements. Salva Kiir had already the North, the GoSS faces internal and political interests—for whom the warned that he would not accept a challenges to its authority, which under- common fight against the North has result showing the southern population mine its ability to provide security to been perhaps the only unifying factor— to be less than one-third the national communities throughout Southern as well as southern factions that fought 25 figure. After a long delay, the results Sudan. The GoSS understands these against the SPLA during the war. This were announced in May 2009 and internal security threats, which have a strength of common purpose has been showed southerners to comprise 21 per negative impact on peace-building waning in the interim period. cent of the national population; they and development, primarily in terms As of mid-2009, the GoSS faces a 26 were promptly rejected by the SPLM. of their links with ‘external’ threats to range of internal pressures, including SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum Southern Sudanese sovereignty and persistent inter-communal violence has also cautioned that the SPLM integrity. This position is illustrated linked to the history of the war and would boycott the elections if the cen- in key recent security documents (see resulting displacement, and exacer- sus results were perceived as having 38 Box 2). bated by high levels of criminality. been manipulated by the NCP.27 The basic infrastructure and In addition, armed insurgent groups The NCP continues to be suspected enforcement capacity necessary for such as the Lord’s Resistance Army of manipulating finances, particularly the provision of civil security services (LRA) continue to operate on Southern since the GoSS has not been receiving are embryonic and the involvement of Sudanese soil, where they are recruit- its share of oil revenues as stipulated 39 civil institutions in security policy and ing locals. in the CPA.28 As of December 2008, decision-making structures is limited. Meanwhile, a deepening budgetary USD 256.66 million was due to the Without this infrastructure and input, crisis is exacerbating security challenges GoSS in oil arrears.29 Complicating matters, while Khartoum receives oil revenue in US dollars, transfers are 8en(I[Ykh_jofeb_Yo_dIekj^[hdIkZWd made to the GoSS in Sudanese pounds. The GoSS is thus precluded from accu- 7dkcX[he\h[Y[djfeb_YoWdZijhWj[]oZeYkc[djiYWfjkh[Yh_j_YWb[b[c[djie\=eIIi[Ykh_jofeb_Yo$J^[ mulating foreign exchange, which is Iekj^[hdIkZWdI[Ykh_joIjhWj[]o"m^_Y^mWiZ[l[bef[Zm_j^_dj^[IFB7)*WdZWffhel[ZXoj^[=eII9ekd# crucial to purchasing goods and serv- Y_be\C_d_ij[hi_d<[XhkWho(&&/"i[jiekjIekj^[hdIkZWdÊifkXb_Yi[Ykh_joijhWj[]o$?jiiYef[_iXheWZ0j^[ ices from abroad. As a result, the GoSS ZeYkc[djZ[Wbim_j^Xej^[nj[hdWbWdZ_dj[hdWbY^Wbb[d][ijej^[i[Ykh_joWdZiel[h[_]djoe\j^[f[efb[ e\Iekj^[hdIkZWd"Yel[h_d]_iik[iikY^Wij^[Z[\[dY[e\j[hh_jeho"j^[fhej[Yj_ede\j^[h_]^ji"Z_]d_jo" is unable to pay foreign contractors WdZZ_l[hi_joe\j^[f[efb[e\j^[Iekj^"WdZj^[Z[l[befc[dje\_d\hWijhkYjkh[WdZWd[Yedec_YXWi[$)+?j without the knowledge and effective Yedi_Z[hicW`ehc_b_jWhoj^h[Wjij^Wjh[bWj[jeWfej[dj_Wb9F7YebbWfi[WdZWh[jkhdjemWh$?jWbieijh[ii[i approval of the Central Bank of Sudan j^[d[[ZjeWZZh[ii_dj[h#YecckdWbYedÔ_Yji"m^_Y^YWd^Wl[Wi_]d_ÓYWdj_cfWYjed_dj[hdWbi[Ykh_joWdZ 30 (based in Khartoum). Considering m^_Y^Wh[_Z[dj_Ó[ZWiWj^h[Wj]_l[dj^Wjj^[oYWdX[_dÔk[dY[ZXoj^[I7<WdZDWj_edWbI[Ykh_joWdZ its current budgetary crisis (see page 4), ?dj[bb_][dY[I[hl_Y[iedX[^Wb\e\j^[D9F$ mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd ) (see Box 3). The inability to pay public 8en)Iekj^[hdIkZWdÊi\_dWdY_WbYh_i_i sector salaries, including payment of soldiers, is generating protests and J^[=eIIXkZ][j\eh(&&/_iI:=)$,X_bb_ed ehWffhen_cWj[boKI:'$+(X_bb_ed $*'J^_imWiYWbYkbWj[Zedj^[ violence.40 The failure to pay soldiers’ XWi_ie\Wd[nf[Yj[Ze_bfh_Y[e\KI:+&f[hXWhh[b"m^_Y^j^[dZheff[Zjeb[iij^WdKI:*&$?j_iYedi_Z[h# salaries, combined with the lack of WXbob[iij^Wdj^[(&&.XkZ][j"m^_Y^Wcekdj[ZjeI:=)$*X_bb_ed KI:'$**X_bb_ed "m_j^WdWZZ_j_edWbI:= alternative livelihoods, increases the )$&.X_bb_ed KI:'$)X_bbed fWii[ZXoj^[Iekj^[hdIkZWdB[]_ibWj_l[7ii[cXbo_dEYjeX[h(&&."*(WffWh[djbo risk of defection by former militia away \ehc_b_jWhoif[dZ_d]$ from the SPLA, lowers soldier morale, E_bh[l[dk[ijej^[=eIIZheff[ZXoWbceij-&f[hY[djX[jm[[d7k]kijWdZ:[Y[cX[h(&&.0\hec KI:)-&$,+c_bb_ed_d7k]kijjeKI:''.$.-_d:[Y[cX[h$*):edehidem[ij_cWj[j^Wjh[l[dk[i\eh(&&/m_bb and increases the likelihood of soldiers’ X[*&f[hY[djb[iij^Wd_dZ_YWj[Z_dj^[(&&/XkZ][j$**Ded#e_bh[l[dk[i_dIekj^[hdIkZWdWh[]Wj^[h[Z involvement in crime. Furthermore, cW_dbo\hecYkijeci"f[hiedWb_dYec[jWn"WdZWlWh_[joe\ej^[hiekhY[i L7J"YehfehWj[jWn"W_hfehj" the budget crisis is preventing the _cc_]hWj_ed"WdZjhW\ÓYZk[i Xkjh[cW_d[njh[c[boicWbb0X[jm[[d@WdkWhoWdZI[fj[cX[h(&&."edbo government from providing essential I:=(,$.c_bb_ed KI:''$))c_bb_ed mWih[fehj[ZboYebb[Yj[Z_dj^[Iekj^"e\m^_Y^^Wb\mWih[c_jj[Zjej^[ services that would build public con- =el[hdc[dje\DWj_edWbKd_jo =eDK kdZ[hj^[j[hcie\j^[9F7$*+ fidence in both it and the CPA. 7dkcX[he\a[o_iik[i^Wl[Yedjh_Xkj[Zjej^[Yh_i_i"_dYbkZ_d]0Wd_dÔWj[ZWdZbWh][bokdia_bb[Z meha\ehY[1*,el[h#if[dZ_d]edj^[i[Ykh_jo\ehY[i1*-el[h#if[dZ_d]ed]^eij#meha[hiWbWh_[i1WdWbceij jejWbZ[f[dZ[dYoede_bh[i[hl[i1WbWYae\jhWdifWh[dYo_dj^[e_bi[Yjeh1*.Wkd_bWj[hWbZ[Y_i_edXoj^[ :_iWhcWc[djWiWh[ifedi[ =eDKjeZ[ZkYjI:='+c_bb_ed KI:,$)*c_bb_ed f[hcedj^\hec=eIIe_bh[l[dk[ijeÓdWdY[kfYec_d] je_di[Ykh_jo [b[Yj_edi1*/m_Z[ifh[WZYehhkfj_edWdZ_d[\ÓY_[dYo1j^[Iekj^[hdIkZWdB[]_ibWj_l[7ii[cXbo IIB7 fWii_d] kdh[Wb_ij_YXkZ][ji1+&Wim[bbWij^[if[dZ_d]e\h[i[hl[ij^WjYekbZej^[hm_i[WYjWiWYki^_ed_db[Wd Beginning with its inclusion in the j_c[i$?dWZZ_j_ed"j^[@kXW#XWi[Z=eIIC_d_ijhoe\<_dWdY[WdZ[Yedec_YfbWdd_d]^WiX[[dkdWXb[je CPA, disarmament has been under- _Z[dj_\oel[h#if[dZ_d]Xo]el[hdc[dj[dj_j_[iWi_j^WieYYkhh[Zkd\[jj[h[Z"+'h[ikbj_d]_d[dehceki stood as an important component of i^ehj\Wbbi0É?ikif[Yjj^WjedY[j^[XkZ][j_ifWii[Z"cWdoc_d_ijh_[ifWode\khj^[hWjj[dj_edjej^[_h the peace- and security-building pro- fbWdd[ZWYj_l_j_[iWdZif[dZWbeje\ced[o[_j^[hedWZc_d_ijhWj_ed"ehedWYj_l_j_[ij^[oZ_ZdejfbWd\eh"Ê cess. Given the current state of other dej[ZAkeb7j^_WdCWm[_d"=eIIc_d_ij[he\ÓdWdY[WdZ[Yedec_YfbWdd_d]"_d^_i(&&/XkZ][jif[[Y^$+( peace-building and security sector 7iZ[Y[djhWb_pWj_edeYYkhi"j^_im_bbX[Wd_dYh[Wi_d]fheXb[cWjj^[ijWj[b[l[b$ transformation processes, however, it ?dCWhY^(&&/";b_`W^CWbea7b[d]"]el[hdehe\j^[8Wdae\Iekj^[hdIkZWd"dej[Zj^Wjj^[XWdaÊiYe\\[hi +) is unlikely to contribute to these goals. m[h[Wbceij[cfjo$ Ed[cW`ehXWda"j^[D_b[9ecc[hY[8Wda"^Wihkdekje\YWi^jec[[jeXb_]Wj_edi" +* The 2008 GoSS disarmament cam- h[fehj[ZboZk[je_cfhef[hXehhem_d]Xo=eIIe\ÓY_Wbi$ J^[=eII^Wii[jkfWjWia\ehY[jeWZZh[iij^[ YWi^#ÔemfheXb[cWdZ_idemiYhWcXb_d]jeh[_d_dif[dZ_d]++WdZWjjhWYj\kdZ_d]\hecekji_Z[iekhY[i$+, paign, as well as previous campaigns J^[h[ikbj_d]kdY[hjW_djo_ib[WZ_d]jefhe\ekdZ_dijWX_b_joWdZh[dZ[hij^[]el[hdc[djkdWXb[jeZ[b_l[h in 2005–06, have had limited positive c[Wd_d]\kbf[WY[Z_l_Z[dZijeiekj^[hdIkZWd[i[$ impacts on the critical security condi- tions facing the GoSS, and in some cases they have had a negative effect. The problem is twofold. First, some lation of Southern Sudan, which was the collection of all civilian weapons communities have perceived disarma- the most recent disarmament effort within a six-month period ending on ment as being targeted along ethnic since those carried out in 2005–06.57 30 November. The order called for the lines, which has exacerbated inter- The 2008 campaign was directed by an operation to be conducted jointly by communal divisions. Second, the operational order issued by President the state authorities and the SPLA.59 GoSS has been unable to provide Salva Kiir on 22 May. The stated objec- In the event, the directive was adequate protection to communities, tive was ‘to peacefully have all civilians selectively implemented. In five out which consequently perceive the in the ten states surrender any kind of of the ten southern states there is no maintenance of weapons as being cru- firearm in their possession to the State evidence that disarmament took place cial to their defence. These issues play authorities and the SPLA forces who as a result of the directive; some gov- out differently depending upon the conduct this operation’; the order ex- ernors ignored the order and elsewhere local security and conflict dynamics. plicitly condoned the threat of SPLA it did not lead to any practical activi- Campaigns in 2005–06 and more force in the event of non-compliance.58 ties. In Upper Nile, Western Bahr el recently in 2008 illustrate some of The interpretation and implementa- Ghazal, and Western Equatoria, for these problems. tion of the order was left largely to the example, no disarmament activity In mid-2008 the GoSS initiated a discretion of the state governors. The was reported. In Northern Bahr el campaign to disarm the civilian popu- governors were directed to organize Ghazal, a one-day operation was conducted, netting fewer than 300 weapons. Although the governor of Warrap suggested that 15,000 weapons J^[XkZ][jYh_i_ih[dZ[hij^[=eIIkdWXb[je had been collected there, this remains unverified. Z[b_l[hc[Wd_d]\kbf[WY[Z_l_Z[dZi$ However, there has also been a countervailing evolution towards arms * IkZWd?iik[8h_[\ DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ <_]kh['MehbZYhkZ[e_bfh_Y[i_d(&&. KI:%XWhh[b '*& '(& '&& .& ,& *& (& & @WdkWho <[XhkWho CWhY^ 7fh_b CWo @kd[ @kbo 7k]kij I[fj[cX[h EYjeX[h Del[cX[h :[Y[cX[h IekhY[i0KI;?7 (&&/ I_b^ek[jj[e\Wde\\i^eh[e_bh_]0Leba[hAh[_dWYa["_IjeYaf^eje$ control in some locations, with the seen as posing a local threat and by was raped, two people were killed, result that certain groups are authorized authorizing the use of arms by others. seven others wounded, and that prop- to hold weapons, partly in response In some cases, there were incidents erty was ransacked. In the process, the to community concerns about self- of abuse or violence, which may have deputy speaker of the state legislative defence. In Western Equatoria, the involved misconduct by soldiers acting assembly was beaten up.61 The gover- state has encouraged the formation of under the auspices of the disarmament nor reacted by suspending all disarm- ‘community defence forces’ by civilians campaign. In Lakes State, the first phase ament operations and withdrawing to fend off the LRA. In Lakes the ini- of the operation—conducted in July all SPLA soldiers from the state. In the tial attempt to use the order to disarm and August 2008—was organized by immediate wake of the SPLA’s depar- the Gelweng (cattle guards previously county-level disarmament commit- ture, inter-clan tensions flared and the armed by the SPLA) had the net effect tees, which reported to the governor. Yirol County commissioner and six of collecting, registering, and author- This initial voluntary collection was others were injured in an attack, pos- izing the use of firearms by a group of deemed insufficient, and the SPLA sibly by deserting soldiers.62 Gelweng leaders who have become was brought in to conduct a second In Unity State, Governor Taban more formally linked to the state’s round in September. Before it could Deng delegated responsibility for security forces.60 This suggests that get fully under way, however, three executing the president’s operational disarmament can usefully be seen as battalions of SPLA involved in a cordon- order to the SPLA, with little or no an effort to bring particular groups and-search operation in Rumbek consultation with community leaders. under the control of the state, both by became unruly. Accounts differ, but In practice, the disarmament process removing weapons from some groups some reports suggest that one woman was conducted as a discrete series of mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd + military operations. The SPLA divided 8en*?dj[h#[j^d_Y\_]^j_d]_d@ed]b[_IjWj[ the state into three zones and assigned a brigade from the 4th Division to each. ?dWdZWhekdZ@ed]b[_IjWj["h[iekhY[Yecf[j_j_edWdZYWjjb[hW_Z_d]X[jm[[d[j^d_Y]hekfiÆWced]j^[c The exercises were largely peaceful, j^[Bek"@_aWdo"WdZ=WmWWhDk[h"Ckhb["8eh:_daW"WdZ7dkWaÆ_iYecced$,,8kji_dY[CWhY^(&&/"j^[ except for a small clash in Leer, where dWjkh[e\_dj[h#YecckdWbl_eb[dY[^Wii^_\j[Z\hecj^[jWh][j_d]e\Whc[Zoekj^jof_YWbbo_dlebl[Z_d two civilians were wounded.63 It is hW_Z_d]"jeWjjWYaiedYecckd_j_[i"_dYbkZ_d]j^[[bZ[hbo"mec[d"WdZY^_bZh[d$ unclear how many weapons were J[di_ediX[jm[[dWhc[ZBekDk[hWdZCkhb[hei[Yedi_Z[hWXbo\ebbem_d]Wi[h_[ie\hW_Zi_d@WdkWho WdZ<[XhkWho$?ded[e\j^[i[WjjWYai"ed)&@WdkWho"(/f[efb[m[h[h[fehj[Zboa_bb[Z"'+_d`kh[Z"WdZ)"&&& collected in total, but the campaign YWjjb[ijeb[d\hecj^[BekDk[h$,-7bWh][]hekfe\Dk[hoekj^"Z[iYh_X[ZWiX[_d]fWhje\WdÉkdademd contributed to resentment among Whc[ZY_l_b_Wd]hekfÊ"h[jWb_Wj[Z_dWi[h_[ie\WjjWYaiX[jm[[d+WdZ')CWhY^",.ijWhj_d]m_j^YWjjb[YWcfi targeted communities rather than _d=kckhkafWoWc"F_Xeh9ekdjo"WdZcel_d]jej^[jemde\B[amWd]eb["m^_Y^j^[o^[bZ\ehjmeZWoi$Kf securing control of an economically je'"&&&f[efb[m[h[h[fehj[Zboa_bb[Z_dj^[Ó]^j_d]WdZj^[W\j[hcWj^"cWdoe\j^[cmec[d"Y^_bZh[d"WdZ 64 and strategically important area. [bZ[hboWiceije\j^[c[dm[h[m_j^j^[_hYWjjb[_dj^[je_Y ]hWiibWdZi $,/J^[Dk[hWbieWXZkYj[ZCkhb[ In Jonglei State, the 2008 campaign Y^_bZh[d"WffWh[djbo_dh[jWb_Wj_ed\ehj^[_hemdY^_bZh[dX[_d]WXZkYj[Z_dfh[l_ekiWjjWYai$IY^eebi"Yb_d_Yi" followed previous initiatives. In 2005– D=EYecfekdZi"WdZY^khY^[im[h[beej[Z_dj^[jemd"iec[e\j^[cZ[ijheo[Z_dj^[fheY[ii$ 06 the SPLA had conducted an opera- Ckhb[ikhl_lehiZ[iYh_X[Zj^[Dk[hWiX[_d]^[Wl_boWhc[Zm_j^7A#*-i"FACi"heYa[j#fhef[bb[Z]h[dWZ[ tion in northern Jonglei State that bWkdY^[hi"WdZ^WdZ]h[dWZ[i$J^[h[m[h[h[fehjij^Wjm[Wfedim[h[h[Z_ijh_Xkj[ZjeBekDk[h j^[m^_j[ targeted the Lou Nuer in the area, Whco"m^_Y^mWij^[jWh][je\j^[(&&+Å&,Z_iWhcWc[dj \hecIFB7ijeh[i_dj^[f[h_eZX[\eh[j^[WjjWYai$-& perceived to be linked with ‘white Iekj^[hdIkZWdFeb_Y[I[hl_Y[WdZIFB7kd_\ehcim[h[\ekdZediec[e\j^[Z[WZXeZ_[i$-'J^_iik]][iji army’ and South Sudan Defence Forces j^Wj[j^d_YBekDk[hm_j^_dj^[IFB7m[h[Z[i[hj_d]je`e_dj^[_ha_d_dj^[l_eb[dY["fe_dj_d]jefheXb[ci e\Z_iW\\[Yj_edWdZYeccWdZWdZYedjhebm_j^_dj^[Whco$ , IkZWd?iik[8h_[\ DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ :_ifbWY[ZCkhb[h[ijW\j[hWjjWYaiXoBekDk[hZhel[j^[c\hec^ec[_dF_Xeh9ekdjo"@ed]b[_"('CWhY^(&&/$J_cej^oCYAkbaW the 2008 campaign had very little the North has limited its ability to mission – through more direct inter- impact on the internal security dynam- address divisions and community action with local actors. Playing this ics within Southern Sudan. There were security concerns within the South, role calls for more dynamic patrolling instances of abuse committed under which are equally destabilizing. This by military and civilian observers, the auspices of civilian disarmament, dynamic has not been recognized by greater interaction and cooperation at but the effort did not lead to violence many outside observers. A better an operational level between the UN on the scale of the 2005–06 campaign. appreciation of the realities on the military, police, and their counterparts Indeed, its implementation was ground is crucial to assisting the at all levels, and improved information relatively peaceful, though largely southern government to reduce the sharing, analysis, and reporting. To due to its cautious and patchy imple- risk of further political, ethnic, and counteract the current perception that mentation, not as a result of a funda- social crisis. A number of important there is little recourse to address CPA mental change of strategy on the part steps should be considered. violations and the tendency of peace- of the GoSS. All indications are that First, UNMIS can make a significant keepers to respond only after outbreaks the government plans to continue contribution to building confidence in of violence have occurred, UNMIS civilian disarmament in 2009, by force the peace by more effectively monitor- could work more with local actors to if necessary. 82 ing the ceasefire and security arrange- address concerns before they escalate. ments of the CPA—arguably the most Part of UNMIS’s mandate falls under fundamental task of the peacekeeping Chapter VII of the UN Charter83 but it 9bei_d]h[Ô[Yj_edi As the CPA enters a critical period, Southern Sudan is under pressure from ceasefire violations as well as internal 7bb_dZ_YWj_ediWh[j^Wjj^[=eIIfbWdijeYedj_dk[ instability and security challenges. The GoSS’s focus on preparations for Y_l_b_WdZ_iWhcWc[dj_d(&&/$ a possible military confrontation with mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd - has yet to effectively operationalize enable the GoSS to plan for the refer- ernment and others have a capacity to this on the ground. This will require a endum and beyond, to create the influence policy due to their history substantial shift in the focus of current conditions for peaceful secession— of bilateral relations, as well as finan- assets and human resources.84 A first should this be the outcome of the cial support for programming. A dual step would be to patrol key areas more referendum—and to overcome the approach is needed that both engages proactively, as is currently beginning South’s internal divisions after 2011. decision-makers at a political level to take place through a deployment in In the interim, a short- to medium- and supports sectoral and community- Jonglei. It is from this starting point term strategy is also needed to realisti- based initiatives that contribute to that a discussion about more effective cally assess and manage internal threats stability. In the longer term, it is criti- response mechanisms and protection to security, mitigate the potentially cal to develop the infrastructure for could be developed. destabilizing impact of the financial state security, particularly the police, Second, donors and others inter- crisis and upcoming elections, and law, and justice institutions, and their ested in engaging with the GoSS on moderate the ongoing internal conflicts links to customary security and legal security sector reform issues can assist and criminality that impact on the daily systems. At the same time, it is impor- the government in planning to address lives of ordinary people. tant to enhance the capacity of the internal security challenges. This re- Bilateral donor arrangements may Southern Sudan Peace Commission quires greater recognition of current have an important role to play. The (SSPC) and relevant SSLA and State security dilemmas, and a focus on US and UK governments have had Legislative Assembly Committees and strengthening security policy and significant influence through their their members to work with commu- decision-making structures as well as support of the ongoing SPLA trans- nities and state authorities to mediate the government’s capacity for plan- formation process, which provides disputes in their constituencies. ning. A more realistic analysis and important entry points for dialogue As these steps suggest, re-empha- acknowledgement of possible future and leverage with key GoSS security sizing peace-building and both state scenarios and threats would help policy-makers.85 The Norwegian gov- and human security is essential. The Jh_XWbf[WY[WdZh[YedY_b_Wj_edYed\[h[dY["@ed]b[_"CWo(&&/J_cej^oCYAkbaW . IkZWd?iik[8h_[\ DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ current focus on civilian disarmament 6 See Small Arms Survey (2008a) for back- JIUs in these areas. See CPA Monitor is potentially damaging.86 A more ground on the role of the JIUs. (UNMIS, 2009b, paras. 199–204). Delays 7 A forthcoming HSBA publication will in deployment of the JIUs have given the appropriate focus would be on planning address recent armament by the SAF SPLA an excuse to remain in these areas. for internal security, within the context and SPLA. As of April 2009, only 10 per cent of of which a more gradual approach to 8 Thomas (2009, p. 19); interview with SPLA forces originally thought to have arms control could be developed in UNMIS official, Juba, April 2009; and been north of the North–South border sequence with other aspects of secu- UNSC (2008). had redeployed (UNSC, 2009, para. 19), rity sector transformation and peace- 9 Interviews with Kenyan government and while 95 per cent of SAF had redeployed. GoSS officials and other sources, Nairobi See Small Arms Survey (2008c) for back- building. Furthermore, mediation of and Juba, January–April 2009. ground on the recruitment of proxies. internal divisions and a renewed focus 10 See Small Arms Survey (2008c) for back- 20 As of April 2009, JIU force strength was at on South-South dialogue and peace- ground on tensions in Southern Kordofan. about 85 per cent (UNSC, 2009, para. 21). building could set the stage for the UNMIS claims the SAF reorganized but 21 The commission was mandated to define GoSS to plan for internal security, that this did not result in increased troop and demarcate the border of the ‘nine including by addressing unresolved strength. E-mail communication with Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to UN official, May 2009. Kordofan in 1905’. Its findings were sub- issues relating to militia. 11 See Small Arms Survey (2008b, pp. 3–4) mitted to the presidency in July 2005 and To the extent that steps such as for background information on Tang- rejected in a clear violation of the CPA. these could help improve security for Ginya. Following the signing of the CPA 22 See NCP and SPLA (2008). southerners, they would also serve to (January 2005) and the Juba Declaration 23 UNSC (2009, para. 14). foster greater southern unity. Local (January 2006), southern SAF-backed 24 Just before the census was to begin on 15 conflict mediation and peace-building militias (known as Other Armed Groups) April 2008, the SPLM announced its post- were given the option to either align with ponement in the South, citing a failure to efforts can lend further support to the the SPLA or align with the SAF and move resolve the Darfur crisis, non-completion GoSS’s aim of building an effective and to the North. Following negotiations, of the return of IDPs from North to South, stable state as well as building popu- Tang-Ginya chose to remain allied with non-inclusion of questions on ethnicity lar support for the CPA. To this end, the SAF. Many of his militia members and religion in the questionnaire, and the kind of grassroots peace-building were subsequently allowed to remain in delays in North–South border demarca- tion. It reversed its decision while reserv- work that played such a decisive role the South as part of the SAF component of the Malakal JIU. Many locals hold him ing the right to reject the results, and the in securing the CPA in 2005 has lost responsible for the heavy fighting that census was held on 22 April–6 May 2008. focus. The need for its return has never erupted in Malakal in November 2006, See UNMIS (2009b, para. 50). been greater. killing an estimated 150 people (Indig- 25 See Kiir Mayardit (2009). enous Organizations, 2006). 26 Clotty (2009). 12 On the number of killed and injured, see 27 Sudan Tribune (2009b). Dej[i UNSC (2009) and Sudan Tribune (2009a). 28 The GoSS and the GoNU agreed to equi- 13 The state government has allotted ground table sharing of oil revenues among oil- This Issue Brief is based on research for this purpose but neither side is willing producing states. At least two per cent of conducted by the Small Arms Survey to move until barracks and other infra- net oil revenue is transferred back to the and Saferworld. structure are ready. E-mail communication state in which the oil is produced. Remain- with UN official, May 2009. ing revenues from oil produced in Southern 1 This Issue Brief draws on research pub- 14 See GoSS (2009b). Sudan are divided equally between the lished by the HSBA in January 2009 15 E-mail communication with UN official, GoSS and the GoNU, while those from (O’Brien, 2009) and covers developments May 2009. oil produced in the North accrue only to through May 2009. 16 Heavy fighting that broke out in Abyei in the GoNU. See UNMIS (2009c, para. 115). 2 On the fourth anniversary of the signing May 2008 saw the town destroyed, tens 29 UNMIS (2009c, para. 119). of the CPA, President Salva Kiir said: of thousands displaced, and the local JIU 30 See GoSS (2008, para 29). ‘Four years after the signing of the CPA . . . splitting, with SAF and SPLA members 31 Interview with SPLA officer, Juba, March we have witnessed greater hope for a fighting each other. For background on 2009. just and lasting peace in the Sudan . . . I, Abyei fighting, see HRW (2008). 32 See ICC (2009). According to the UN therefore, call upon my brother President 17 See Salmon (2007) for background on Secretary-General, the ICC arrest warrant Bashir to join me in reaffirming our com- the PDF. has become the ‘primary political focus’ mitment to the people of the Sudan during 18 The Technical ad hoc Border Committee throughout Sudan. This issue is monopo- this 4th Anniversary that as leaders charged started work in January 2007 to map the lizing the leadership’s attention at the with the responsibility of implementing 1 January 1956 border between the North expense of the CPA (UNSC, 2009, para. 7). the CPA, we recommit ourselves that we and South. The process was supposed to 33 Interviews with GoSS leaders and UN shall never and never ever take this coun- have been completed by November 2008 officials, Juba, March and April 2009. try back to war!’ See Kiir Mayardit (2009). but the committee members have failed 34 The strategy was initially developed by a 3 Interviews with various GoSS officials, to reach agreement. group of SPLA officers referred to as the Juba, March 2009. 19 The CPA required the SAF to have rede- SPLA General Officers’ Strategic Studies 4 This was not the case in the 1972 Addis ployed out of Southern Sudan in full by 9 Group and presented to the president in Ababa agreement that ended the first July 2007 and the SPLA to have redeployed August 2008. A slightly revised version civil war. out of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile was approved by the Council of Ministers 5 Young (2007b, p. 11). six months after the full formation of the in February 2009. mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd / 35 Dak (2009a). The strategy states: ‘The 56 For example, the US Congress has report- 72 Generally, the SPLA does not intervene in Government of Southern Sudan exists edly pledged USD 275 million to meet tribal conflict for fear of being forced to take for the ultimate purpose of ensuring the the budget deficit. Three banks were also sides and also because these conflicts are security and sovereignty of the people of reportedly in ‘cut-throat’ competition to so numerous that it would be unfeasible. Southern Sudan . . . Though we have guarantee USD 140 million to the GoSS, 73 Governor Kuol Manyang, who has been limited resources, we will seek to minimize with oil reserves being used as a guaran- extremely vocal about the need to end risk while focusing our efforts on those tee. See Anyanzwa (2009). Murle attacks and insecurity in Jonglei, activities that are most vital to securing 57 This section is largely based on O’Brien was in Juba at the time of the fighting. our interests.’ (2009). 74 The SPLA reported that ammunition was 36 The Security Strategy built on discussions 58 Kiir Mayardit (2008). The order states: ‘In intercepted en route to Murle areas from initially held during the Defence White the event that any individual or group of the North in March 2009. Paper process, which was supported by individuals refuse(s), and exhibit resistance 75 The vast size of Jonglei State (more than the US and UK governments. that can be construed to endanger the 120,000 km2) would make it very difficult 37 The Bureau was given a mandate and live of the forces and/or the State officials for the force to provide a buffer zone was placed within the Ministry of Inter- conducting this exercise, appropriate between the warring groups. nal Affairs by a decision of the Council of force must be used to cause the collection 76 There is no proof that state authorities Ministers on 31 October 2008. of all arms from the resisting individual were behind the attack. Either way, the 38 According to statistics released by the or group of individuals.’ Murle believe that they are being victim- UN in January 2009, 187,000 people had 59 See Kiir Mayardit (2008). ized and that the attack was part of an been displaced by ‘tribal and armed con- 60 See O’Brien (2009). orchestrated effort backed by the state to flict’ since January 2008. See UN OCHA 61 O’Brien (2009, p. 32). exterminate the Murle and to unite Dinka (2009a). 62 Sudan Tribune (2008). and Nuer against them. 39 See Pax Christi (2009) and UNSC (2009) 63 Interview with disarmament, demobili- 77 Reuters (2009a). on the LRA’s recent attacks and impact zation, and reintegration (DDR) official 78 Interview with humanitarian worker, on security in Southern Sudan. in Bentiu, October 2008. Nairobi, March 2009. Reports of inter- 40 Disabled war veterans staged recent pro- 64 O’Brien (2009, pp. 42–48). ethnic violence, with large numbers of tests in Eastern and Central Equatoria 65 The white army, a loosely constituted deaths, continue, including recent Lou states, in response to non-payment of fighting force active during the civil war, Nuer–Jikany Nuer incidents that left up to salaries for seven months. See Aleu (2008). was disarmed by the SPLA in the bloody 50 people dead and more than 50 injured 41 UNMIS (2009a, para. 76). All conversions campaign of 2006. See Young (2007a) for (Reuters, 2009b). based on SDG 2.37 to USD 1. background on the white army; and Small 79 O’Brien (2009, p. 21). 42 The supplementary budget was approved Arms Survey (2007) for background on 80 See Small Arms Survey (2007, pp. 4–6) for in October 2008. See UNMIS (2008b, the Jonglei disarmament campaign; and background on the Akobo disarmament. para. 67). Young (2006) for a discussion of the South 81 Interview with DDR official, Juba, March 43 See UNMIS (2009a; 2009b). Sudan Defence Forces. 2009. In fact, ‘voluntary’ collections are 44 JDT (2009). 66 Other causes of conflict include child impossible to verify and arguably do not 45 UNMIS (2009a, para. 110). The GoSS abductions and the inability to trace exist in a context where the use of force is intends to double its non-oil revenues abductees, disagreements over county explicitly threatened. in 2009. and payam (county subdivision) borders 82 In January 2009, the GoSS Council of 46 For 2008, total government spending on (e.g. Duk and Uror Counties), and ineq- Ministers resolved that disarmament GoSS employees was projected at 55 per uitable disarmament campaigns. Inter- should continue and that the Ministry of cent. This covers 112,000 personnel ex- view with Lony Ruot, Standard Action the Interior should commit additional cluding the SPLA, 60 per cent of which Liaison Focus (SALF), a Sudanese NGO police to the initiative. See GoSS (2009a). are other ‘organized forces’ such as the working in Jonglei, March 2009. 83 The UNMIS mandate is available at police, prison, and wildlife services. See 67 UN OCHA (2009b, p. 2). '& IkZWd?iik[8h_[\ DkcX[h'* CWo(&&/ Sudan involves two streams of work Anniversary of the Signing of the CPA ——. 2009c. CPA Monitor: Monthly Report on funded by DfID: the SPLA Force Trans- in Malakal on Friday 9th January 2009.’ the Implementation of the CPA. Khartoum. formation initiative and a police reform 9 January. mmm$icWbbWhciikhl[o$eh]%ikZWd '' Number 8 September 2007 Number 3 May 2007 Number 11 December 2007 Responses to pastoral wars: a review of violence The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Mar- Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarma- reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya ginalization, by John Young ment: The Case of Jonglei, by Richard Garfield Number 9 February 2008 Number 4 May 2007 Number 12 April 2008 Echo effects: Chadian instability and the Darfur Border in Name Only: Arms Trafficking and The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfuriza- conflict Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border, by tion’ of Chad: Myths and Reality, by Jérôme Joshua Marks Tubiana Number 10 March 2008 Neither ‘joint’ nor ‘integrated’: the Joint Integrated Number 5 June 2007 Number 13 June 2008 Units and the future of the CPA The White Army: An Introduction and Overview, Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan’s Central by John Young and Eastern Equatoria, by Mareike Schomerus Number 11 May 2008 Allies and defectors: an update on armed group Number 6 July 2007 Number 14 July 2008 integration and proxy force activity Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Rebel Groups, by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana Number 12 August 2008 Tubiana North, by Claire Mc Evoy and Ryan Murray The drift back to war: insecurity and militariza- tion in the Nuba Mountains Number 7 July 2007 Number 15 September 2008 Emerging North–South Tensions and the Prospects Conflict, Arms, and Militarization: The Dynamics Number 13 September 2008 for a Return to War, by John Young of Darfur’s IDP Settlements, by Clea Khan No standing, few prospects: how peace is failing South Sudanese female combatants and WWAFG Number 8 September 2007 Number 16 January 2009 The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian IkZWdMeha_d]FWf[hi and Overview, by Mareike Schomerus Disarmament Campaign, by Adam O’Brien Number 1 November 2006 Number 9 November 2007 The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of Armed Groups Along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier: the Juba Declaration, by John Young An Overview and Analysis, by John Young Number 2 February 2007 Number 10 December 2007 Violence and Victimization in South Sudan: Lakes A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defense State in the Post-CPA Period, by Richard Garfield Forces, by Jago Salmon >I87fhe`[YjikccWho 9h[Z_ji The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Series editor: Emile LeBrun (HSBA) is a multi-year project administered by Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of 9edjWYjZ[jW_bi international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the For more information or to provide feedback, contact active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA Project Manager, at research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, [email protected]. including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, Small Arms Survey as well as security sector reform and arms control interven- 47 Avenue Blanc tions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant 1202 Geneva advice on redressing insecurity. Switzerland Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic snap- shots and analysis of emerging developments in a timely t +41 22 908 5777 and reader-friendly format. The HSBA also generates a series f +41 22 732 2738 of longer and more detailed Working Papers in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan. The HSBA receives direct financial support from the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project has also received support from the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida). '( IkZWd?iik[8h_[\ DkcX[h'*DkcX[h, 7fh_b(&&-CWo(&&/