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Militant Leadership Monitor Is by Andrew Mcgregor VOLUME 2 u ISSUE 5 u MAY 2011 IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS.........................................................................................................................................1 A PROFILE OF TARKHAN GAZIEV: THE THIRD MAN IN CHECHNYA’s REBEL TROIKA By Mairbek Vatchagaev..............................................................................................................3 ABU MUHAMMAD AL-taHAWI: THE LEADER OF JORDAn’s jIHADI PROTESTORS By Murad Batal al-Shishani.......................................................................................................5 SMM Leader Nasser al-Nuba GENERAL gabrieL taNG: SOUTH SUDAn’s PRODigaL SON OR KHartOUM’s ageNT OF CHAOS? Militant Leadership Monitor is By Andrew McGregor.................................................................................................................7 a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. It is designed to be read by policy-makers and other SOUTH YEMEN’S PACIFIST GENERAL: A PORTRAIT OF BRIGADIER NASSER AL-NUBA specialists yet also be accessible By Michael Horton...................................................................................................................11 to the general public. In order to purchase a subscription, visit http://www.jamestown.org/ programs/mlm0/ and click on YEMENI TRIBAL CHIEF READY FOR “WAR” AGAINST PRESIDENT log-in. SALEH The opinions expressed within On May 23, forces loyal to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh mounted an are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect assault on the home of Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the leader of the Banu Hashid those of The Jamestown tribe. Sheikh al-Ahmar has sided with Yemen’s growing protest movement in Foundation. calling for the ouster of President Saleh, 65, who has been in power continuously since 1978, first as the president of the Yemen Arab Republic and then as the Unauthorized reproduction or president of the unified Republic of Yemen. The assault on Ahmar’s compound redistribution of this or any succeeded Saleh’s ominous warning that the country was on the brink of civil war Jamestown publication is strictly if prominent opposition members refused to come to the presidential palace and prohibited by law. sign onto a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-sponsored negotiation that would create a framework for his transition from power (AFP, May 22). Loyalist forces reportedly hit al-Ahmar’s residence with tanks and heavy artillery in an effort to break the will of Hashid tribesman that ended in failure (Yemen Times, May 24). The tribal reaction to the Saleh-ordered actions temporarily closed the US Embassy as tribesmen blockaded its entrance. Al-Ahmar made a statement that For comments or questions about “these attacks will not dissuade them from their national roles and continued our publications, please send an advocacy of the people’s peaceful revolution until its objectives are achieved” email to [email protected], or (News Yemen, May 24). Between six and nine people were killed in the clashes, contact us at: which wounded dozens. Al-Ahmar issued a statement slamming Saleh for his 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 Washington, DC • 20036 actions. Saleh was attempting to “ignite discord and civil war between Yemenis” Tel: (202) 483-8888 said al-Ahmar (al-Jazeera, May 26). Fax: (202) 483-8337 Copyright ©2010 TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org Militant Leadership Monitor Volume II u Issue 5 u May 2011 As the GCC-led deal that included a future amnesty of 2000, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah implored the people for President Saleh collapsed—a condition that was of Lebanon and Syria to unequivocally back the regime an anathema to many in the opposition camp—an of Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad, which has been opposition statement described the incident as “a slaughtering protestors in the hundreds in recent weeks. symptom of the hysteria experienced by President Saleh Nasrallah told his intended audience that the besieged and his entourage and their insistence on engulfing the Syrian populace should be patient with al-Assad’s country in a civil war” (Reuters, May 24). While the planned fixes for Syria’s massive human and economic fighting escalated, parts of downtown Sana’a took on the deficits. “We call on all Syrians to preserve their country air of a war zone, with plumes of black smoke billowing as well as the ruling regime, a regime of resistance, and from government buildings occupied by tribesmen. The to give their leaders a chance to cooperate with all of notion that al-Ahmar, 54, and other Hashid leaders Syria’s communities in order to implement the necessary have abandoned Saleh, a Hashid himself, may sound the reforms” (AFP, May 25). Nasrallah, not wanting to death knell for the regime. The backlash of the violence appear completely deaf to reality in light of events in may well reverberate beyond an inter-Hashid feud. As a Syria, had this to say: “No one denies that Syria has leader of the northern Bakeel tribe called Faisal Manaa committed mistakes, but no one can deny the historic stated in reaction to events in the Yemeni capital: “We achievement of Syria toward Lebanon, also Syria’s will not remain silent. We are warning the regime if stance on Israel and the Palestinian resistance” (The it doesn’t withdraw its troops, we will be launching a National [Abu Dhabi], May 26). Hezbollah’s leader comprehensive and fierce war against them” (AP, May appears deathly afraid of a significant change coming to 24). Syria, which would greatly alter the security calculus of the entire Levant region. If Alawite minority-ruled Syria Before the clashes erupted, talk circulated in Sana’a were to suddenly transform into a Sunni majority-ruled of weapons being suspiciously stored ahead of time state, creating a massive geographic wedge between the in schools and government buildings in the city’s Shia areas of South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley where al-Hasaba district where Sheikh al-Ahmar’s villa is the group has free reign to run its own affairs, Hezbollah located, indicating that Saleh may have been preparing would be cut off from its logistical bridgehead next door. for the GCC negotiations to fall apart, thereby quickly If the al-Assad government falls, Nasrallah may indeed engulfing the area in crossfire (al-Sahwa, May 24). A be the biggest loser following over a decade of on-again, group of men arrived on the scene to try and mediate off-again military successes against Israeli forces. between Saleh’s forces and al-Ahmar’s armed guards. The situation quickly devolved into chaos as al-Ahmar’s In his televised address broadcast on Hezbollah’s al- villa was struck by ordinance with the mediators still Manar channel, Hassan Nasrallah cobbled together inside. A spokesman defiantly bashed Saleh after his a convoluted logical argument to invoke support for colleagues suffered in the attack: “The mediation his long time allies in Damascus: “Overthrowing the committee blames Saleh for the attacks and killings; no regime in Syria is in the American and Israeli interest… one else will be held accountable. For this, we step aside They want to overthrow the regime and replace it from our mediation and stand on the side of Sadeq [al-] with a moderate regime” (AP, May 26). A Sunni-run Ahmar against Ali Abdullah Saleh” (Yemen Post, May government, with Sunnis making up the overwhelming 24). After days of bloody battles, which left scores dead majority of religiously heterogeneous Syria, [1] may on the streets of the Yemeni capital, Saleh and al-Ahmar have little interest in supporting a heavily armed Shia reached a shaky truce Yet, al-Ahmar emphasized he milita steeped in a philosophy of permanent warfare would not personally guarantee that the lull would last, on its border. A Sunni Syria may prefer to prop up a stating: “If the Saleh regime wants a peaceful revolution, Sunni proxy force, creating a natural internal rival for we are ready for that. If he chooses war, we will fight Hezbollah, instead. Turning his trepidation and fear him” (al-Arabiya, May 27). outward on the perennial ‘other’ in the Levant rather than dare adjust to changing sectarian power dynamics in the region, Nasrallah comes off as laughably hypocritical. HEZBOLLAH LEADER BACKS TOTTERING While championing the protestors in Tunis and Cairo SYRIAN REGIME at 2011’s dramatic outset, Nasrallah has been forced to do a transparent volte-face to garner support for In a grandiose speech commemorating the withdrawal Bashar al-Assad who has supported him since he came of the Israel Defence Forces from South Lebanon in May to power concomitantly with the 2000 withdrawal of 2 Militant Leadership Monitor Volume II u Issue 5 u May 2011 Israeli forces from Lebanon. Rather than as less pliable A Profile of Tarkhan Gaziev: The state, Nasrallah insists that a new power in Syria would be more amenable to American and Jewish interests. Third Man in Chechnya’s Rebel Nasrallah frets that a new Damascene power structure would be “ready to sign any peace, meaning surrender, Troika with Israel” (Reuters, May 26). By Mairbek Vatchagaev Undoubtedly, Nasrallah’s words were met with rage from arkhan Gaziev is one of the most notable field Syrian protestors, who view the Hezbollah Secretary- commanders in Chechya’s interminable rebellion General as an unwelcome interloper in their desperate against the Russian state. At various times during revolution. In Deir ez-Zor Governorate, protestors T the second military campaign since 1999, he held a burned images of Nasrallah in the town of al-Bukamal, number of top military positions within the Chechen which borders Iraq’s al-Anbar Governorate (Reuters, armed underground resistance. Gaziev commanded a May 27). President al-Assad appears to be following squad numbering several dozens of militants during the a two-track policy of promising reforms that cannot second Chechen campaign. For the most part he operated materialize quickly enough while ordering his security in the Achkhoi-Martan district, which is home to forces to repeatedly gun down hordes of demonstrators concentrated numbers of natives from the mountainous in a wide array of cities across the Syrian Arab Republic.
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