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The Peril's of Yemen's Cunning State September 2012 NOREF Report The perils of Yemen’s cunning state Elham Manea Executive summary Under the influence of the Arab Spring, Yemen The country’s politics, before and after reunification last year embarked on a political transition after of north and south in 1990, have been dominated decades of autocratic rule under President Ali by elite factions manipulating shifting groups of Abdullah Saleh. The extreme fragility of the Yemeni clients based on tribal or sectarian loyalties. In state, however, stems from numerous sources of the process, deep grievances and disaffection instability and discontent, which the upheavals with the state have festered. While political in palace politics in the capital seem unable to transition and the accompanying Gulf Initiative resolve. With its strategic location, various zones are welcome, they are likely to generate further of internal armed conflict, an Islamist terrorist pressures towards secession and armed rebellion threat, ongoing humanitarian crises, scarcity of unless they address the deep structural sources key resources such as water, and the world’s of state weakness, namely the strategic political worst gender imbalance, the country remains a use of difference, as well as the manipulation of source of acute international concern. conflict and fragility before donors so as to favour the interests of the country’s leadership. However, the apparent fragility of the Yemeni state should not be understood merely as the product of a fragmented, tribal population living in poverty. Dr Elham Manea has dual nationality, Yemeni and Swiss. She is an associate professor at the Institute of Political Science, Zurich University, Switzerland, and specialises in the Middle East, with a focus on Yemen. She is also a writer and human rights activist. This report is part of a series that analyses the future of the state in eight cases. The series is coordinated and co- published by NOREF and the Dutch Institute of International Relations Clingendael. It is coordinated by Clingendael senior researcher Ivan Briscoe. The perils of Yemen’s cunning state Introduction: four areas resentment towards the encroachment and spread of Sunni Salafism. Today, this sectarian of conflict rivalry expresses itself in continued armed clashes between Houthi supporters and Salafi The Republic Of Yemen was created in May 1990 fighters. News reports indicate that the Houthi when the two national territories were united: movement has turned northern Saada into a the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), and state within a state, and that its troops have been the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen successfully fighting their way into neighbouring (South Yemen). The country is ranked 13th northern provinces. among the countries most at risk of failure in 20111 and is widely regarded as the embodiment Third, a further area of conflict is located in the of a failed state. However, the label failed state south. Although the Yemen Republic resulted has often concealed the roots of the country’s from the unification of two former states, a civil problems, and hindered efforts to address them war erupted in 1994, leading to the victory of the appropriately. It has also given the Yemeni northern leadership headed by former president leadership ample opportunities to exploit the Saleh. A peaceful civil movement that protested international community’s growing concern over against the mass dismissal of southern army its fragile status, and in the process resist real personnel and land confiscation in the south reform and change. turned into a strong movement calling for an end to northern hegemony. The movement is However, there is no doubt that the country’s divided between two main factions, one calling stability and governance are threatened by a for secession and the creation of a separate variety of acute and immediate challenges, South Yemen, and the other seeking a federal including four areas of conflict. The first of these is system, within which South Yemen would enjoy a power struggle at the centre of the state, within an autonomous status. the core elites that have controlled Yemen over the past three decades. The struggle dates back The fourth conflict is located within some southern to 2000 when the former president, Ali Abdullah provinces, specifically Abien and Shabwa, where Saleh, began to groom his son as successor and al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups are fighting the staunch support of his immediate clan and army units, and have succeeded in controlling tribal allies started to falter. Today, the political some areas in Abien. landscape, as well as the military and security forces, is divided between the two rival factions The peaceful youth revolt of February 2011 took of one sectarian tribal group. One is the family place within this context of multiple conflicts. Its of former president Saleh, his son and nephews. call for President Saleh to step down after 33 The other is based around Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, years in power (12 of those as head of North the commander of the First Armoured Division, Yemen), was met with support from his rival and Hamid al-Hamar and his brother Sadeq, the faction, which positioned itself as patron of this heads of Yemen’s biggest tribal confederation. movement. But the situation escalated into a military confrontation between the two factions. The second area of conflict is located in the The Gulf Cooperation Council, backed by the northern region of Saada. The Houthi rebellion, United States, the EU and the United Nations, which has led to repeated civil wars since 2002, responded through the Gulf Initiative of May takes its name from its Zaydi Hashemite leader, 2011. Based on its provisions, Saleh stepped Hussein Badraddin al-Houthi, who was killed in down in 2012, and ceded power to his deputy. September 2004 and succeeded by his brother, The new president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The rebellion originated was elected after standing as the sole candidate because of perceived regional marginalization in an election on 21 February 2012. on the economic, social and political level. Significantly, the region has expressed deep 1 Failed States Index 2011. Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy. com/failedstates, accessed 13 August 2012. - 2 - The perils of Yemen’s cunning state Immediate challenges: during 2012 as a result of severe famine and malnutrition, the United Nations Office for the the humanitarian dilemma Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has warned. The number of malnourished children A number of immediate, outstanding challenges under the age of five nearly doubled during 2011, derive from the levels of internal displacement and now stands at 750,000.4 within Yemen, and urgent humanitarian needs for food, health and education. A wave of Yemeni civilians has fled tribal clashes Medium-term challenges: in the north of the country, as well as fighting poverty, scarcity and gender between government troops and militant groups in the south. UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, imbalances reported in March that sporadic tribal clashes in The medium-term challenges Yemen faces are the north had displaced 52,000 people over the multiple. These include widespread poverty, previous three months. This new exodus will rapid demographic growth, lack of alternatives add to an estimated 314,000 Yemenis already to the dwindling oil economy, limited institutional displaced in the north, and unable to return to capacity and outreach of the state, poor their homes in Saada. infrastructure, rapidly-depleting water reserves and acute gender imbalances. Moreover, in the south, at least 1,800 people were displaced in March due to fighting between One of the main problems is demographic growth, government troops and militants in Abyan which is alarmingly high. Around 50% of the governorate. This group, displaced from the town population is below 15. Yemen’s total fertility rate of Ja’ar, now joins more than 150,000 similarly remains among the highest in the world, at 6.2 displaced people in the south. In fact, UNHCR births per woman (a demographic growth rate of estimates that virtually the entire populations of over 3% a year). At this pace, Yemen’s population the towns of Zinjibar, Khanfar and al-Kud have could grow from 22 million today to 50 million by been displaced since the beginning of the conflict 2035. In an environment of limited and depleting last May.2 natural resources, this demographic rate and its consequent youth bulge is extremely perilous.5 Meanwhile, inflows of migrants from the Horn of Africa, fleeing war or seeking economic Meanwhile, Yemen’s economic structure is set opportunities in the Gulf or Europe, have to face a major shock. Over the past 20 years, continued unabated. UNHCR has reported that, Yemen’s economy has been based on oil, turning in spite of rising instability in Yemen, “a record it into a rentier state that redistributes rents 103,000 refugees, asylum seekers and migrants through civil service salaries and a generous from the Horn of Africa made the perilous journey subsidy system. Oil and gas output amount to across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in 2011.3 about one third of GDP, 70% of state revenues and 90% of exports. Yet Yemen’s oil reserves are In addition, conflict, political unrest and economic rapidly depleting. Based on current exploitation decline during 2011 have resulted in severe famine rates (about 300,000 barrels per day), crude oil and malnutrition, as well as disruption of health reserves are expected to be exhausted in the programmes and education. The malnutrition rate next 10 to 12 years. in Yemen remains a source of particular concern. Half a million Yemeni children are at risk of dying 4 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen Hu- manitarian Emergency Situation”, Situation Report No.
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