sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 10 March 2008 Neither ‘joint’ nor ‘integrated’ The Joint Integrated Units and the future of the CPA
he formation and functioning operating procedures, limited joint ambiguities associated with the inte- of Sudan’s Joint Integrated patrols and training, and attempts to gration of Other Armed Groups T Units (JIUs), mandated by the create a ‘weapon-free zone’ in Wau. (OAGs), poor command and con- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) The units continue to suffer from a trol, and a desperate shortage of of January 2005, has proved a major range of problems, however, includ- comprehensive, joint, integrated sticking- point in the implementation ing serious delays in deployment, training. of the peace agreement. The JIUs are military units composed of members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Box 1 The JIU mandate, composition, and funding the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army The CPA required that the JIUs be fully deployed and functional during the interim period, and specified (SPLA), and are designed to serve both objectives, functions, command and control, and other operational details.1 The JIU mandate is found in functional and symbolic purposes. the Joint Integrated Units Bill of 2005,2 which identifies the following objectives for the units: Functionally, the JIUs are intended to To be a symbol of national unity during the interim period. fill security vacuums and to provide a To preserve the constitutional and democratic system and to respect the supremacy of rule of law, civil unified military capability to meet rule, human rights, and the will of the people. internal security needs during the six- To undertake the responsibility of the defence of Sudan and its sovereignty against internal and external year interim period prior to the south- threats, alongside the SAF and the SPLA. ern referendum on secession in 2011. To assist in the development of their area of deployment with a view to achieving social cohesion and peace. Symbolically, the JIUs are supposed to The functions of the JIUs are as follows: demonstrate national unity during the To secure the safety of the territories and boundaries of Sudan in areas where the units are deployed, interim period and to serve both as a and to participate in the development of these areas alongside the SAF and the SPLA. key confidence-builder between the To enforce a state of emergency where necessary and as provided for by the Constitution. parties and as a foundation for a future To assist civil authorities in non-military functions. national army, should the referendum To assist civil authorities in dealing with catastrophic events and emergencies. result in a vote for unity. Any other functions as stipulated by the Joint Defense Council.3 Despite the importance placed on The total target size of the JIUs is 39,600 troops (divided equally between SPLA and SAF):4 24,000 based in the JIUs in the CPA, and the fact that South Sudan, 600 in Abyei, 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains, 6,000 in Blue Nile, and 3,000 in Khartoum.5 There they provide a gauge of the parties’ are five divisions—in Juba, Wau, Malakal, Kadugli, and Damazin—as well as a unit headquarters in Juba, an commitment to the agreement, their ‘Independent Brigade’ in Khartoum, and an ‘Abyei Area Independent Battalion’.6 UNMIS monitors deployment purpose and status are not well under- from each of its six sectors (see Map and Figure 2). stood by the international community. The units come under the direct command and control of the Joint Defence Board (JDB),7 a CPA-mandated This Issue Brief reviews the JIUs’ current body comprised of the respective Chiefs of Staff of the SPLA and the SAF, their deputies, and senior officers status, discusses challenges to their from both armies.8 The chairmanship of the JDB rotates between the SAF and SPLA. The leader and deputy deployment and functionality, and leader of the JIUs are directly appointed by the Chiefs of Staff through consensus and also alternate between SPLA and SAF officers. explores the consequences of these challenges for the overall implemen- Funding is provided directly by the Ministry of the Presidency of the Republic and bypasses both the SPLA and SAF in order to avoid the pay irregularities that continue to plague those services and to avoid poten- tation of the CPA. tial charges of favouritism. The rate of pay for JIU officers and soldiers is mandated to be equal in terms The Brief finds that: of welfare, salaries, pension rights, supplies, armaments, and equipment.9 The specific staffing of the JIUs The creation of the JIUs has yielded a is left to the discretion of each party to the CPA; the stipulations for staffing dictate only that JIU personnel be ‘employed by the Armed Forces or the People’s Army’, as well as other routine requirements such as number of modest successes includ- meeting age thresholds, having no criminal record, and being physically fit.10 ing the development of standard
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 More significantly, the failure to The significance of the JIUs trolled and defended the oil areas deploy functioning units is delay- through proxy forces, police, and SAF The JIUs are designed to meet a number ing implementation of other key troops. The SPLA is naturally eager to of purposes. Functionally, they are to provisions of the CPA, notably the see its own presence in these areas provide an interim unified military redeployment of SPLA forces from strengthened, and the JIUs provide a capability for the defence of both the disputed border areas and of SAF mechanism for doing so. At the same state’s sovereignty from external threats troops from oil-producing areas in time, the JIUs are also supposed to fill and its internal needs for security pro- South Sudan. vision. As the CPA stipulated the with- the security vacuum left by the with- If the obstacles facing full deploy- drawal of the SAF from the South and drawal of SPLA troops from Blue Nile ment and functioning of the JIUs are the SPLA from the North, the JIUs and South Kordofan States, and to sup- not unblocked, they could threaten the provide a de facto national army for ply security in major southern Sudanese entire CPA. Failed JIU deployment is both regions during the interim period. towns following the SPLA’s withdrawal already serving as a pretext for parties More specifically, the JIUs are expected from major urban centres, as stipulated to roll back and violate key CPA pro- to replace the so-called ‘oil police’11 in by the CPA. visions. The active and immediate Unity and Upper Nile States. These Symbolically, the purpose of the assistance of the international commu- troops have been contentious because JIUs is to provide a ‘symbol of national nity—through the JIU Support Group of the strategic value of the oil fields unity during the interim period’.12 The or otherwise—is required to resolve and the efforts of both sides to control burden placed on the Government of these issues. them. During the war, Khartoum con- National Unity (GNU), specifically the
Verified Joint Integrated Unit deployments as of 11 March 2008 RED SEA NILE JIU total strength 33,698 Ed Damer Presently deployed 86.0% (SPLA 82.3% SAF 89.7%)
NORTH KHARTOUM KHARTOUM KAKASSSSALA DARFUR Indep JIU Bde 3,000 Khartoum KKaasssalasala ERITREA Wadi Medani CHAD KORDOFAN GEZIRA Gedaref El Geneina Al Fashir GEDAREF El Obeid Rabak WEST Singa DARFUR WHITE SINNAR NILE KADUGLI 4 Nyala SUDAN 5th JIU Div 4,382 el-Damazin DAMAZIN 5 SOUTH 4th JIU Div 4,807 SOUTH Kadugli KORDOFAN BLUE ABYEI 6 DARFUR NILE Indep Bn 594 UPPER NILE Abyei Malakal ETHIOPIA
NORTHERN Aweil Bentiu WAU 2 BAHR MALAKAL 3 3rd JIU Div 5,930 EL-GHAZAL 2nd JIU Div 7,450 Warrap UNITY Wau WARAB JONGLEI WESTERN BAHR 2 UNMIS sector EL-GHAZAL JIU headquarters CENTRAL Rumbek LAKES JIU Division AFRICAN Bor JIU Brigade REPUBLIC WESTERN JUBA 1 JIU Independent Battalion EQUATORIA 1st JIU Div 7,590 Juba International boundary Yambio EASTERN DEMOCRATIC BAHR EL EQUATORIA State boundary JEBEL REPUBLIC KENYA Capital city OF THE CONGO State capital 0km 100 Source: UNMIS 2008 UGANDA
2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 10 March 2008 National Congress Party (NCP) and the have begun conducting joint patrols has provided English-language train- Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement in their areas of responsibility. While ing, and over the past year the British (SPLM), is to ‘make unity attractive’ to this has not yet been extensive, and government has trained 30 JIU officers, the people of South Sudan prior to the has consisted mainly of JIU patrols on including by providing instruction on referendum on independence. After the Land Cruisers around Malakal, it has peace support operations and defence long and bloody civil war (1983–2005), ensured at least some public exposure. management. It expects to continue the it was believed that a unified army In Wau, the local JIU has reportedly training, and to provide an expanded would demonstrate the potential for assisted the governor’s office in devel- programme of in-country training. renewed amity and cooperation. A oping the city as a ‘weapon-free zone’.15 These are significant successes given prominent and effective national force In the same region, 140 mixed JIU the immensity of the task of creating was also seen as a prerequisite for troops have been trained in demining joint integrated units between bitter security and a desired ‘peace dividend’. and subsequently participated in the enemies and the scale of doing so in a The strategic significance of the JIUs demining of the Babanusa–Wau rail- country as large and as underdeveloped for the NCP is that they also allow it to way line.16 In addition, a UK company as Sudan. maintain a SAF presence in the South for the duration of the interim period. For the SPLA, the JIUs provide an Figure 1 Total JIU Deployment Progress, January 2006—March 2008 opportunity to keep forces in the dis- puted areas of South Kordofan (includ- SPLA Verified SPLA Target SAF Verified SAF Target ing the region of Abyei13) and Blue Nile 19,800 States. For the international community, the units provide a means for encour- aging tangible cooperation between 15,000 the parties.
Present status of the JIUs: 10,000 some notable successes
The JIUs have had a number of suc- 5,000 cesses, although they remain modest. First, a Joint Doctrine has been agreed outlining modalities for routine opera- 0 tions, including standard operating January 2006 July 2006 January 2007 July 2007 March 2008 14 procedures and codes of conduct. Source: UNMIS Although it is rudimentary and builds off both SAF and SPLA doctrines, it pro- vides a starting point for defining the Figure 2 JIU Deployment by UNMIS Sector, 11 March 2008 specific protocols for JIU operations. SPLA Verified SPLA Target SAF Verified SAF Target Second, in contrast to the SPLA, JIU members are routinely paid their sala- 4,500 ries. They have also enjoyed better 4,000 provisioning than the SPLA, although 3,500 overall they, too, remain woefully under- 3,000 supplied. Third, the early and complete segregation of the JIU troops from the 2,500
SAF and SPLA appears to be slowly 2,000 changing, with co-location of their 1,500 contingents becoming more common. The first co-location of troops 1,000 occurred in Wau and Juba in 2006 and 500 then in Malakal, a highly contentious 0 location, where the SAF had long Sector I Sector II Sector III Sector IV Sector V Sector VI Khartoum delayed relinquishing its base to joint Juba Wau Malakal Kadugli Damazin Abyei control. Operationally, mixed JIUs Source: UNMIS
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 3 Roadblocks to full must be ‘considered a member/com- remain in the South. Many of his officers ponent of that force and assume all of were subsequently sent to the North implementation the benefits, rights, and responsibilities with the SAF while the remainder of his Despite these important developments, associated’.21 This has caused problems forces was subsequently demobilized.28 a number of significant challenges have given that OAGs in South Sudan have The practice of allowing OAG mem- prevented the JIUs from reaching their often been informally ‘aligned’ rather bers to enter directly into JIUs negates full potential. Aside from the obvious than fully ‘incorporated’ into one or the units’ ability to function cohesively bureaucratic and logistical obstacles, other army.22 The ambiguity of this and undermines their selling power as there are five specific areas where deep requirement has caused major tensions a symbol for national unity. Integration and thorny problems present major on the ground as each side accuses the between the SAF and SPLA is in itself roadblocks to JIU formation and other of using the JIUs as dumping an extremely challenging task; adding functionality. grounds for their aligned OAGs with- armed elements that fall outside the out fully integrating them first.23 control of these forces’ command mech- Deployment delays. The JIUs are still The most prominent case is that of anisms adds almost insurmountable not fully deployed, despite the original the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), problems.29 Khartoum now insists that CPA deployment deadline of 9 October an umbrella group that was a signifi- all its previously aligned OAGs have 2006 (see Figures 1 and 2).17 To address cant ally of the SAF against the SPLA been incorporated into SAF structures this, and in response to the SPLM’s during the civil war.24 The SPLA has or have been demobilized. Officially, temporary withdrawal from the GNU frequently complained through UNMIS it stopped acknowledging claims of in October 2007 in protest at the lack that SSDF militias, notably those based alignment in mid-2006. Yet serious of CPA implementation, the Ceasefire in Malakal under the command of doubts persist as to the degree of incor- Political Commission (CPC) (the highest Major General Gabriel Tang-Ginya, poration of these armed groups and Sudanese political body governing have become JIU members without any the nature of their demobilization.30 the CPA’s implementation) met in significant integration into the SAF early November 2007 and fixed a new Ethnic tensions. The SPLA continues proper. The issue assumed national deployment date of 9 January 2008.18 to select JIU members from areas where and international prominence during a But by 11 March 2008, the JIUs had only ethnic tensions are acute. This stems November 2006 incident when fighting achieved 86.0 per cent deployment (see partly from a broader SPLA effort to erupted in Malakal and JIU members Map).19 The United Nations Mission in loosen local and ethnic lines of loyalty from both forces turned on each Sudan (UNMIS) has now verified33 ,698 and build a unified army with strong another.25 The UN Secretary-General’s JIU members,20 which means that 5,902 command and control. But the process envoy at the time, Jan Pronk, com- JIU troops remain undeployed. The has created its own challenges. In some mented that the ‘JIUs, instead of func- JIU Independent Brigade in Khartoum cases, SPLA JIU components composed tioning as a binding element . . . tend is the only unit that is currently oper- of different ethnic groups to those in to become a splitting force’.26 The inci- ating at full strength. their deployment areas have provoked dent served to confirm the ambiguities significant local strife. OAG alignment and JIU membership. surrounding distinctions between SAF, Tensions in Malakal are a clear ex- The second significant challenge has SSDF, and JIU membership as individ- ample of this. The local JIU contingent been the selection and screening of uals claimed to be participants in all is primarily Dinka, while the town JIU troops, as many of them are former three. itself is Nuer—as is the bulk of the members of Other Armed Groups Following the fighting, the defence SSDF and of Upper Nile State more (OAGs). The CPA clearly states that minister, General Abdelrahim Mohamed broadly.31 Animosity between Nuer and the staffing of JIU personnel must con- Hussein, publicly demanded that all Dinka has long simmered in South sist of individuals directly ‘employed’ southern OAGs join either the SPLA Sudan, and the JIUs have also proven by either the SAF or SPLA prior to or the SAF.27 For his part, Tang-Ginya susceptible to them, as seen in Malakal. their inclusion in a JIU. In subsequent explained that his soldiers feared they Another example is in Yambio, Western discussions, this has come to mean that would be moved to northern Sudan as Equatoria, where Dinka JIU contin- they have to have been ‘incorporated’ part of the SAF, and so he included them gents detained local police who were into either force first, and that they in the Malakal JIU to allow them to Azande, later killing two of them.32 In Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria, where the local population is predominantly Toposa, the SAF's JIU contingent is Each side accuses the other of using the JIUs as also Toposa. This provoked a reorgani- zation of the local Didinga militias to dumping grounds for their aligned OAGs counter what they perceived as a heavy presence of Toposa, now ‘privileged’
4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 10 March 2008 with JIU membership.33 These tensions have sparked occasional violent clashes The politics of redeployment are the most between Toposa JIU troops and local Didinga armed groups.34 contentious of all post-CPA issues Command and control issues. The fourth major challenge has been to create a unified chain of command for undertaken by either the SAF or SPLA CPA issues. By late August 2007, the the JIUs. Despite the CPA stipulation of —such as demining. SAF had claimed to have withdrawn a dedicated chain of command emanat- Underfunding is one reason for the 87 per cent of its forces from the South, ing from a JIU Commander supported absence of a joint training programme. which was verified by UNMIS. By con- by a Deputy Commander appointed As the AEC has noted: ‘the flow of trast, the SPLA claimed to have with- by the JDB, to date there remain two operating funds has all but stopped drawn only 32 per cent of its forces parallel chains of command—that of and no significant funding has yet been from the North, of which UNMIS was the JIUs on the one hand, and of the made available by the Government of only able to verify that 7 per cent had SAF or SPLA on the other. In October National Unity’s Ministry of Finance actually been redeployed.41 The bulk 2007, the Assessment and Evaluation from the Presidency agreed budget of the remaining SAF troops in the Commission (AEC), a body of inter- for JIU training.’36 At the same time, South are located around the oil fields national and Sudanese officials man- both the SAF and the SPLA insist on in Unity and Upper Nile States, while dated by the CPA to produce status undertaking their own unilateral pro- the bulk of the SPLA remaining in the reports on the agreement’s implemen- 37 grammes. In light of this, it is hard to North are located in Blue Nile and tation, noted that the two commands see how the units can be transformed South Kordofan (including Abyei). The ‘have generally remained separate, into a skilled, disciplined, and unified continued presence of the SAF and with separate administrations, and to force. SPLA on each other’s territory, espe- date, limited professional interaction’.35 cially in the contested areas of Abyei As already noted, there were persist- and Blue Nile, significantly increased ent tensions in Malakal over the delay Broader ramifications for GoS–GoSS tensions in the latter half of by the SAF in vacating its headquarters CPA implementation 2007. The SPLM justified its withdrawal there. As a result, the Malakal JIU forces from the GNU by citing the failure of were barracked on either side of the The fact that the JIUs are not yet fully the SAF to meet its July 2007 redeploy- city and only top officers occasionally deployed, face ambiguities over their ment deadline, along with the NCP’s interacted. Lack of effective command force composition, suffer from com- dismissal of the Abyei Boundary and control has also had negative effects mand and control issues, and have Commission’s report.42 on local security. Despite the creation yet to undergo systematic and coordi- Following the withdrawal, the of a Joint Doctrine and a Code of Con- nated training means that they remain CPC decreed on 1 November 2007 duct, documentation exists of JIU mem- little more than co-located units of that all JIUs be fully deployed by 9 bers engaging in extortion, sexual SAF and SPLA troops. Furthermore, January 2008, and that all additional harassment, and stealing from local the time frames for JIU deployment have been renegotiated repeatedly SPLA and SAF forces be withdrawn communities. Deadly violence is not 43 and subsequently ignored. The impli- by the same date. But the SAF and uncommon: the Yambio incident in cations for the CPA are enormous. SPLA could not agree on the question which the SPLA JIU contingent shot The peace agreement does not allow of concurrent redeployment, and the members of the local police force pro- 44 for any qualifications on the withdrawal decision was not implemented. At vides the highest-profile example. of SAF forces from South Sudan. They a subsequent CPC meeting on 29 Lack of training. The CPA called for were required to fully redeploy by 9 November, the SPLA argued that it consolidated training of JIUs by 9 July 2007, aside from the SAF compo- would not withdraw forces until two October 2006, but this has still not taken nents of the JIUs.38 Conversely, the conditions were met: the full formation place. Until comprehensive bottom- withdrawal of SPLA forces from the of the JIUs and the final determination up training to encourage discipline North is to be completed only after the by the Presidency of the numbers of and professionalism is provided, the JIUs are ‘formed and deployed under SAF in South Kordofan and Blue Nile JIUs cannot be fully functional. Train- international monitoring and assist- States.45 Both the GoS and UNMIS ing is a prerequisite for acting as joint ance’.39 Thus, SPLA forces have a justi- found the setting of preconditions to integrated units as well as for being fication for remaining in Blue Nile and be in violation of the spirit of the CPA operationally competent to perform South Kordofan States.40 and the CPC called, once again, for a the specific tasks assigned to them, The politics of redeployment are withdrawal and full JIU deployment which include activities not routinely the most contentious of all the post- by 9 January 2008.
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 5 On that date, UNMIS verified that 92 the full establishment of JIUs as soon deployment of the JIUs to justify their per cent of SAF troops had redeployed as possible’.48 ongoing violations of the agreement. from the South, and only 12 per cent In response to the new resolution, This, in turn, has slowed implementa- of SPLA forces from the North.46 The a JIU Support Group was established tion of the CPA overall, ultimately slow withdrawal of SPLA forces is in November 2007 to act as a vehicle jeopardizing Sudan’s future. It is high especially problematic in the Abyei to coordinate international support. time that the international community region where major clashes have taken The group is a committee chaired by stepped up its engagement on this place between SPLA forces, SAF forces the UNMIS Force Commander and issue. Facilitation of and insistence on and SAF-aligned Misseriya since comprised of the JIU Commander and full, effective, and integrated deploy- December 2007. A JDB meeting on 5 representatives from UNMIS and from ment and training is one of the best January 2008 affirmed the need for donor countries including the UK, ways for donor countries and the UN the SPLA and its local militia allies to USA, Egypt, Norway, and the Nether- to push both sides to adhere to their withdraw from Abyei in order to reduce lands. The SPLM and the NCP are not commitments. The GoS and GoSS, in tensions in the region, yet this has not included as committee members in turn, must demonstrate a clear will- been achieved. The JDB also empha- order to prevent the politicization of ingness to work together to produce sized the need to agree on an expedited international support for the JIUs. effective units. Without the necessary JIU deployment to the oil-producing Various issues, notably resourcing and will to eliminate the stumbling blocks areas given the withdrawal of SAF training needs, are discussed at the outlined in this Brief, the fate of Sudan’s troops there.47 committee meetings and the JIU Com- CPA will hang in the balance. The deployment and functionality mander subsequently makes specific of the JIUs are central to furthering the requests to donor countries and to CPA’s implementation because they UNMIS for assistance. Donor coun- Notes respond to one of the major challenges tries have also used the JIU Support This Sudan Issue Brief was based on of achieving peace in Sudan. The sta- Group as a forum to encourage the research by Matthew Arnold and Matthew tus of South Kordofan and Blue Nile GoS to improve its accounting practices LeRiche. Matthew Arnold is a Ph.D. can- States, as well as the oil-producing in order to allow for more direct sup- didate at the London School of Economics areas of Unity and Upper Nile, were port to the units. This stems from donor and Matthew LeRiche is a Ph.D. candidate central sticking points in the CPA nego- concerns that relatively little of the 2007 at King’s College London. tiations. The JIUs provided the means budget for the units was actually spent. to compromise, by allowing both the Due to its recent formation, the JIU 1 CPA, Chapter 6, Section 2, p. 88. The full SPLA and SAF to maintain some forces Support Group is still at a preliminary text of the CPA is available at
6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 10 March 2008 are paid more than their SAF counterparts. 27 Sudan Tribune (2006). 48 UNSC (2007), Section 8. Prior to Resolution The SPLA often unilaterally provides its 28 Interview with Major General (SAF) Gabriel 1784, UNMIS had no mandate to intervene JIU members with an additional allowance Tang-Ginya, Khartoum, 19 November 2007. in the management and deployment of to increase their pay to that of the SPLA 29 For more information, see Arnold (2007). the JIUs. regular forces. This allowance is not always 30 Gabriel Tang-Ginya declared that he was in cash but can take the form of food or still in command of the men from his SSDF supplies. This arrangement has caused militia who had officially joined the SAF Bibliography much tension between the SAF and SPLA and then the Malakal JIU. A further con- Abyei Boundary Commission. 2005. ‘Abyei elements within the JIUs. Nevertheless, cern is that officially demobilized SSDF Boundary Commission Report.’ 14 July. despite these controversies and ambigui- members have merely returned to their
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 7 HSBA publications Number 7 July 2007 Number 6 July 2007 Arms, oil, and Darfur: the evolution of relations Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Sudan Issue Briefs between China and Sudan Rebel Groups, by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana Number 1 September 2006 Number 8 September 2007 Persistent threats: widespread human insecurity Responses to pastoralist wars: a review of violence Number 7 July 2007 in Lakes State, South Sudan, since the Compre- reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya Emerging North–South Tensions and the Prospects hensive Peace Agreement (also available in for a Return to War, by John Young Number 9 February 2008 Arabic) Echo effects: Chadian instability and the Darfur Number 8 September 2007 Number 2 October 2006 conflict The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History Armed groups in Sudan: the South Sudan Defence and Overview, by Mareike Schomerus Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration Number 9 November 2007 (also available in Arabic) Sudan Working Papers Armed Groups Along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier: Number 1 November 2006 Number 3 (2nd edition) An Overview and Analysis, by John Young The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of November 2006–February 2007 the Juba Declaration, by John Young Number 10 December 2007 Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defense recent experiences and implications (also available Number 2 February 2007 Forces, by Jago Salmon in Arabic) Violence and Victimization in South Sudan: Lakes State in the Post-CPA Period, by Richard Garfield Number 11 December 2007 Number 4 December 2006 Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarma- No dialogue, no commitment: the perils of dead- Number 3 May 2007 ment: The Case of Jonglei, by Richard Garfield line diplomacy for Darfur (also available in The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Mar- Arabic) ginalization, by John Young
Number 5 January 2007 Number 4 May 2007 A widening war around Sudan: the proliferation Border in Name Only: Arms Trafficking and of armed groups in the Central African Republic Armed Groups at the DRC–Sudan Border, by (also available in Arabic and French) Joshua Marks
Number 6 April 2007 Number 5 June 2007 The militarization of Sudan: a preliminary review The White Army: An Introduction and Overview, of arms flows and holdings by John Young
HSBA project summary The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment The HSBA project is supported by Canada, the UK (HSBA) is a three-year research programme Government Conflict Prevention Pool, the Danish Interna- (2005–08) administered by the Small Arms Survey, tional Development Agency (Danida), and the Norwegian an independent research project of the Graduate Institute Ministry of Foreign Affairs. of International Studies in Geneva. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNMIS, the UN Development Credits Programme, and a wide array of international and Suda- Design and layout: Richard Jones ([email protected]) nese NGO partners. Through the active generation and Cartography: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafix dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, security sector reform Contact details (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. For more information or to provide feedback, contact The assessment is being carried out by a multi-disciplinary Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA project coordinator, at team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It [email protected] reviews the spatial distribution of armed violence through- out Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment insecurity. Small Arms Survey Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva snapshots of baseline information. Future issues will focus Switzerland on a variety of issues, including armed groups and victimi- Tel.: +41 22 908 5777 zation rates. The HSBA also generates a series of timely Fax: +41 22 732 2738 and user-friendly working papers in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan. Visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan
8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 610 April March 2007 2008