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Neither 'Joint' Nor 'Integrated' sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 10 March 2008 Neither ‘joint’ nor ‘integrated’ The Joint Integrated Units and the future of the CPA he formation and functioning operating procedures, limited joint ambiguities associated with the inte- of Sudan’s Joint Integrated patrols and training, and attempts to gration of Other Armed Groups T Units (JIUs), mandated by the create a ‘weapon-free zone’ in Wau. (OAGs), poor command and con- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) The units continue to suffer from a trol, and a desperate shortage of of January 2005, has proved a major range of problems, however, includ- comprehensive, joint, integrated sticking- point in the implementation ing serious delays in deployment, training. of the peace agreement. The JIUs are military units composed of members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Box 1 The JIU mandate, composition, and funding the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army The CPA required that the JIUs be fully deployed and functional during the interim period, and specified (SPLA), and are designed to serve both objectives, functions, command and control, and other operational details.1 The JIU mandate is found in functional and symbolic purposes. the Joint Integrated Units Bill of 2005,2 which identifies the following objectives for the units: Functionally, the JIUs are intended to To be a symbol of national unity during the interim period. fill security vacuums and to provide a To preserve the constitutional and democratic system and to respect the supremacy of rule of law, civil unified military capability to meet rule, human rights, and the will of the people. internal security needs during the six- To undertake the responsibility of the defence of Sudan and its sovereignty against internal and external year interim period prior to the south- threats, alongside the SAF and the SPLA. ern referendum on secession in 2011. To assist in the development of their area of deployment with a view to achieving social cohesion and peace. Symbolically, the JIUs are supposed to The functions of the JIUs are as follows: demonstrate national unity during the To secure the safety of the territories and boundaries of Sudan in areas where the units are deployed, interim period and to serve both as a and to participate in the development of these areas alongside the SAF and the SPLA. key confidence-builder between the To enforce a state of emergency where necessary and as provided for by the Constitution. parties and as a foundation for a future To assist civil authorities in non-military functions. national army, should the referendum To assist civil authorities in dealing with catastrophic events and emergencies. result in a vote for unity. Any other functions as stipulated by the Joint Defense Council.3 Despite the importance placed on The total target size of the JIUs is 39,600 troops (divided equally between SPLA and SAF):4 24,000 based in the JIUs in the CPA, and the fact that South Sudan, 600 in Abyei, 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains, 6,000 in Blue Nile, and 3,000 in Khartoum.5 There they provide a gauge of the parties’ are five divisions—in Juba, Wau, Malakal, Kadugli, and Damazin—as well as a unit headquarters in Juba, an commitment to the agreement, their ‘Independent Brigade’ in Khartoum, and an ‘Abyei Area Independent Battalion’.6 UNMIS monitors deployment purpose and status are not well under- from each of its six sectors (see Map and Figure 2). stood by the international community. The units come under the direct command and control of the Joint Defence Board (JDB),7 a CPA-mandated This Issue Brief reviews the JIUs’ current body comprised of the respective Chiefs of Staff of the SPLA and the SAF, their deputies, and senior officers status, discusses challenges to their from both armies.8 The chairmanship of the JDB rotates between the SAF and SPLA. The leader and deputy deployment and functionality, and leader of the JIUs are directly appointed by the Chiefs of Staff through consensus and also alternate between SPLA and SAF officers. explores the consequences of these challenges for the overall implemen- Funding is provided directly by the Ministry of the Presidency of the Republic and bypasses both the SPLA and SAF in order to avoid the pay irregularities that continue to plague those services and to avoid poten- tation of the CPA. tial charges of favouritism. The rate of pay for JIU officers and soldiers is mandated to be equal in terms The Brief finds that: of welfare, salaries, pension rights, supplies, armaments, and equipment.9 The specific staffing of the JIUs The creation of the JIUs has yielded a is left to the discretion of each party to the CPA; the stipulations for staffing dictate only that JIU personnel be ‘employed by the Armed Forces or the People’s Army’, as well as other routine requirements such as number of modest successes includ- meeting age thresholds, having no criminal record, and being physically fit.10 ing the development of standard www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 More significantly, the failure to The significance of the JIUs trolled and defended the oil areas deploy functioning units is delay- through proxy forces, police, and SAF The JIUs are designed to meet a number ing implementation of other key troops. The SPLA is naturally eager to of purposes. Functionally, they are to provisions of the CPA, notably the see its own presence in these areas provide an interim unified military redeployment of SPLA forces from strengthened, and the JIUs provide a capability for the defence of both the disputed border areas and of SAF mechanism for doing so. At the same state’s sovereignty from external threats troops from oil-producing areas in time, the JIUs are also supposed to fill and its internal needs for security pro- South Sudan. vision. As the CPA stipulated the with- the security vacuum left by the with- If the obstacles facing full deploy- drawal of the SAF from the South and drawal of SPLA troops from Blue Nile ment and functioning of the JIUs are the SPLA from the North, the JIUs and South Kordofan States, and to sup- not unblocked, they could threaten the provide a de facto national army for ply security in major southern Sudanese entire CPA. Failed JIU deployment is both regions during the interim period. towns following the SPLA’s withdrawal already serving as a pretext for parties More specifically, the JIUs are expected from major urban centres, as stipulated to roll back and violate key CPA pro- to replace the so-called ‘oil police’11 in by the CPA. visions. The active and immediate Unity and Upper Nile States. These Symbolically, the purpose of the assistance of the international commu- troops have been contentious because JIUs is to provide a ‘symbol of national nity—through the JIU Support Group of the strategic value of the oil fields unity during the interim period’.12 The or otherwise—is required to resolve and the efforts of both sides to control burden placed on the Government of these issues. them. During the war, Khartoum con- National Unity (GNU), specifically the Verified Joint Integrated Unit deployments as of 11 March 2008 RED SEA NILE JIU total strength 33,698 Ed Damer Presently deployed 86.0% (SPLA 82.3% SAF 89.7%) NORTH KHARTOUM KHARTOUM KAKASSSSALA DARFUR Indep JIU Bde 3,000 Khartoum KKaasssalasala ERITREA Wadi Medani CHAD KORDOFAN GEZIRA Gedaref El Geneina Al Fashir GEDAREF El Obeid Rabak WEST Singa DARFUR WHITE SINNAR NILE KADUGLI 4 Nyala SUDAN 5th JIU Div 4,382 el-Damazin DAMAZIN 5 SOUTH 4th JIU Div 4,807 SOUTH Kadugli KORDOFAN BLUE ABYEI 6 DARFUR NILE Indep Bn 594 UPPER NILE Abyei Malakal ETHIOPIA NORTHERN Aweil Bentiu WAU 2 BAHR MALAKAL 3 3rd JIU Div 5,930 EL-GHAZAL 2nd JIU Div 7,450 Warrap UNITY Wau WARAB JONGLEI WESTERN BAHR 2 UNMIS sector EL-GHAZAL JIU headquarters CENTRAL Rumbek LAKES JIU Division AFRICAN Bor JIU Brigade REPUBLIC WESTERN JUBA 1 JIU Independent Battalion EQUATORIA 1st JIU Div 7,590 Juba International boundary Yambio EASTERN DEMOCRATIC BAHR EL EQUATORIA State boundary JEBEL REPUBLIC KENYA Capital city OF THE CONGO State capital 0km 100 Source: UNMIS 2008 UGANDA 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 10 March 2008 National Congress Party (NCP) and the have begun conducting joint patrols has provided English-language train- Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement in their areas of responsibility. While ing, and over the past year the British (SPLM), is to ‘make unity attractive’ to this has not yet been extensive, and government has trained 30 JIU officers, the people of South Sudan prior to the has consisted mainly of JIU patrols on including by providing instruction on referendum on independence. After the Land Cruisers around Malakal, it has peace support operations and defence long and bloody civil war (1983–2005), ensured at least some public exposure. management. It expects to continue the it was believed that a unified army In Wau, the local JIU has reportedly training, and to provide an expanded would demonstrate the potential for assisted the governor’s office in devel- programme of in-country training. renewed amity and cooperation. A oping the city as a ‘weapon-free zone’.15 These are significant successes given prominent and effective national force In the same region, 140 mixed JIU the immensity of the task of creating was also seen as a prerequisite for troops have been trained in demining joint integrated units between bitter security and a desired ‘peace dividend’. and subsequently participated in the enemies and the scale of doing so in a The strategic significance of the JIUs demining of the Babanusa–Wau rail- country as large and as underdeveloped for the NCP is that they also allow it to way line.16 In addition, a UK company as Sudan.
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