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Fighting for Spoils Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile

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Fighting for Spoils Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 18 November 2011 Fighting for spoils Armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile Introduction ances of the communities that joined Despite claims by rebel leaders, the insurgent leaders in taking up arms the insurgencies have remained Beginning in the aftermath of state against the government and the army. almost completely operationally and national elections in April 2010, Key findings include: independent of one another, and South Sudan has faced an eruption of the self­interested motivations of armed insurgencies, the majority of As of late October 2011 the major the commanders make a future them led by former Sudan People’s insurgents in Greater Upper Nile unified rebellion unlikely. Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders have not made significant headway There is strong circumstantial evi­ in the Greater Upper Nile region. The in achieving their purported political dence that the forces of Peter Gadet conflicts sparked by these insurgent objectives. Commanders formerly and George Athor have received commanders, and SPLA counter­ loyal to Peter Gadet, as well as two logistical and materiel support, measures, have directly or indirectly Shilluk commanders, continue to including small arms and ammu­ caused the deaths of thousands of South pose active military threats. nition, from Khartoum and other Sudanese, provoked mass displacement With the arguable exception of the external sources. of communities in Greater Upper Nile, Shilluk groups, the main insurgen­ The SPLA’s at times indiscriminate and challenged the government’s cies are not authentic expressions of attempts to crush the insurgencies ability to secure this strategic and discontent in marginalized commu­ have increased the deep­seated volatile region. nities. Instead, the commanders anger among many of the disen­ In a number of cases, the rebellions have manipulated legitimate local franchised minority communities are closely connected to state and grievances, mobilizing supporters— most affected by the violence. national politics and governance chal­ particularly idle young men—to The repeated outbreaks of violence lenges, and the often­contradictory fight on their behalf for their own during the integration of former responses to them have exposed deep objectives. militias into the SPLA reveal a sharp rifts both within and between the SPLA and the government. At a time when the Republic of South Sudan faces multiple other threats along its border with Sudan, its authorities have made some short­term gains in counter­ ing the insurgencies, but have ultimately failed to contain the rebel threat. This current stalemate leaves the new coun­ try vulnerable and unstable. This Issue Brief reviews the roots of the armed insurgencies led by George Athor, Peter Gadet, and other Southern commanders—all of whom have claimed to seek systemic changes to the Juba­based government or to overthrow it. It assesses the current approach of the SPLA and the government of the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) to con­ taining them, concluding that it is both ad hoc and unsustainable. Furthermore, Fighters loyal to Gatluak Gai awaiting integration into the SPLA at an assembly area outside Bentiu, Unity state, August 2011. the response fails to address the griev­ © Maggie Fick www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 Table 1 South Sudanese insurgent commanders as of November 20111 Commander Force name/ Location Status Notes affiliation Peter Gadet Formerly South Sudan Mayom county (Unity) Dormant; signed a ceasefire deal with the Some of Gadet’s forces moved from a rear base Liberation Movement/ and the Unity–South government in early August 2011 in South Kordofan to Mayom after the cease- Army (SSLM/A) Kordofan border area fire was signed; Gadet approved the relocation of these forces to the Mapel area in Western Bahr al Ghazal state in early September so that the integration process with the SPLA could begin; since then, neither side has pub- licly released details regarding this pending process. There are 980 soldiers awaiting inte- gration near Mapel. Gadet breakaways SSLM/A Koch, Mayom, and Active These rebels, who at various points have fought (James Gai Yoach, Rubkona counties together and/or under Gadet’s command, act Kol Chara Nyang, (Unity); Unity–South independently from one another for the most Bapiny Monituel, and Kordofan border areas, part. Yoach launched an attack on Mayom Matthew Puljang) including Nyama and town on 29 October and is believed to have Timsah in South laid new landmines near Bentiu in August. Kordofan state George Athor South Sudan Ayod, Fangak, and Dormant, but at large; a January 20113 cease- Precise whereabouts unknown since last Democratic Pigi2 counties, and fire agreement collapsed clashes with the SPLA in March–April 2011 Movement / South possibly Akobo reportedly dislodged him from northern Sudan Army (Jonglei) Jonglei. Given a series of recent minor inci- dents, forces loyal to Athor are believed to pose a continued threat to stability in this area. Gatluak Gai n/a Koch county (Unity) Killed in July 2011 in disputed circumstances His forces have yet to begin integrating with and Unity–South immediately after he signed a ceasefire the SPLA; immediately following Gai’s death, Kordofan border area brokered by the Unity state government they were relocated to an assembly point near Bentiu, and then on to the Mapel area in Western Bahr al Ghazal where Gadet’s forces were transferred in early September. There are 350 soldiers awaiting integration near Mapel. Shilluk rebels (Robert n/a Western bank of the Gwang: inactive (signed a peace deal with the Ogot’s and Olonyi’s forces attacked the village Gwang, Alyuak Ogot, River Nile in Upper government in August 2010 and was integrated of Kaka in Fashoda county in August; the SPLA and Johnson Olonyi) Nile state, including into the SPLA with the rank of major general); has recently said that it believes Ogot, Olonyi, Fashoda, Malakal, Ogot and Olonyi: active and at large and their forces are hiding out in rear bases Manyo, Melut, and in South Kordofan and/or White Nile states. Panyikang counties; and Akoka county (Upper Nile) David Yau Yau n/a Pibor county (Jonglei) Inactive; signed a ceasefire deal with the Like Gatluak Gai’s troops, Yau Yau’s forces are government in June 2011 awaiting integration, but neither Yau Yau nor the government has announced a firm plan for this process. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) airlifted the majority of the forces Yau Yau claimed to command from Pibor to the village of Owinykibol in Eastern Equatoria to await integration. They are estimated to number 200 fighters. Gabriel Tang-Ginye n/a Fangak county Inactive; since April 2011, Tang-Ginye has Holds Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) major gen- (Jonglei); rumoured remained under house arrest in Juba and the eral rank, but expressed intent to rejoin SPLA troop movements SPLA has not released details about his precise in October 2010. Was rumoured to be allied from White Nile state whereabouts or the conditions of his detention. with Athor, and was active in the same area into Upper Nile state His forces, meanwhile, suffered heavy casual- where Athor’s forces clashed heavily with along the western ties in the village of Kaldak in northern Jonglei SPLA troops in February–April following the bank of the River Nile in an April clash with SPLA commando forces breakdown of Athor’s ceasefire with the SPLA. into northern Jonglei that resulted in the capture of Tang-Ginye and several of his top commanders. Integration of these forces into the SPLA has not yet occurred, but nearly 500 of Tang-Ginye’s men are receiv- ing monthly salaries from the SPLA as they await integration in Mapel. Sources: Small Arms Survey (2011c–h); field research August–October 2011 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 18 November 2011 disconnect between the govern­ Southern government does not fully April 2010 elections ment’s accommodation policy and control. Small arms stocks are wide­ The CPA enshrined national elections the deep animosity of some key spread in the region, despite numerous as a milestone to be held before South players in the army towards the civilian disarmament campaigns, Sudan’s January 2011 referendum on armed groups. which continue.4 self­determination. They were includ­ The current approach of integrat­ Home to a number of sub­clans ed primarily at the behest of the inter­ ing insurgent commanders—with from the Dinka and Nuer tribes, among inflated ranks—and their men is not others, the region was the site of brutal national community as a means of sustainable and may act as an incen­ Southern infighting during the civil consolidating the peace­building 9 tive for potential future rebels. war that resulted from the 1991 split in process. But by April 2010, more the SPLA.5 The division eventually led than five years after the agreement to the formation of a host of militias was signed, other than the Juba Dec­ Roots of rebellion under the umbrella of the South Sudan laration virtually no substantive Defence Forces (SSDF), a loose coalition efforts had been made to reconcile By September 2011 at least a dozen of Khartoum­supported commanders former enemies in the South. The dis­ individuals had launched or coordi­ who stoked much of the deadly South­ puted 2009 national census moved nated at least seven insurgencies against ern infighting. Intra­Southern conflict local tensions to the political forefront the Southern government since the split largely along ethnic lines, with the and the disputed state elections proved April 2010 elections (see Table 1). At Dinka­dominated SPLA fighting dozens its peak, rebel militia activity stretched to be the flashpoint that reactivated of SSDF­affiliated tribal militias. intra­Southern conflict. from near the South’s border with After the official end of the civil Ethiopia to multiple points along its The conduct of the state elections war, President Salva Kiir opened the was a bitter disappointment for many border with Sudan, including Darfur.
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