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Darfur COI Compilation September 2017

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Darfur COI Compilation September 2017 BEREICH | EVENTL. ABTEILUNG | WWW.ROTESKREUZ.AT ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation Darfur COI Compilation September 2017 This report serves the specific purpose of collating legally relevant information on conditions in countries of origin pertinent to the assessment of claims for asylum. It is not intended to be a general report on human rights conditions. The report is prepared within a specified time frame on the basis of publicly available documents as well as information provided by experts. All sources are cited and fully referenced. This report is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Every effort has been made to compile information from reliable sources; users should refer to the full text of documents cited and assess the credibility, relevance and timeliness of source material with reference to the specific research concerns arising from individual applications. © Austrian Red Cross/ACCORD An electronic version of this report is available on www.ecoi.net. Austrian Red Cross/ACCORD Wiedner Hauptstraße 32 A- 1040 Vienna, Austria Phone: +43 1 58 900 – 582 E-Mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.redcross.at/accord This report was commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Division of International Protection. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it endorse, its content. TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 4 1 Security situation in Darfur since 2016 .................................................................................. 5 1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements ....................... 7 1.2 Inter-communal clashes .................................................................................................... 24 1.3 Safe/blocked routes ........................................................................................................... 30 2 Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia ... 34 2.1 Arab ethnic groups ............................................................................................................. 35 2.1.1 Rizeigat ........................................................................................................................ 35 2.1.2 Beni Hussayn ............................................................................................................... 40 2.1.3 Ma’aliya ....................................................................................................................... 41 2.1.4 Beni Halba ................................................................................................................... 42 2.1.5 Misseriya ..................................................................................................................... 42 2.1.6 Ta’aisha ....................................................................................................................... 44 2.1.7 Salamat ....................................................................................................................... 44 2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups .................................................................................................... 46 2.2.1 Berti ............................................................................................................................. 46 2.2.2 Fur ............................................................................................................................... 49 2.2.3 Masalit ......................................................................................................................... 49 2.2.4 Zaghawa/Beri .............................................................................................................. 50 2.3 Conflict between tribes since August 2015 ...................................................................... 52 2.3.1 North Darfur ............................................................................................................... 53 2.3.2 East Darfur .................................................................................................................. 54 2.3.3 South Darfur ............................................................................................................... 57 2.3.4 Central Darfur ............................................................................................................. 60 2.3.5 West Darfur ................................................................................................................ 62 2.3.6 Village defence committees ...................................................................................... 63 2.3.7 Blood feuds and state protection .............................................................................. 64 2.3.8 Possibility for a Darfuri to move to another village/region and being identified/found by none-state actors from their previous place of residence ............................................ 67 2.4 Treatment of Arab ethnic groups ...................................................................................... 67 2.5 Treatment of non-Arab ethnic groups .............................................................................. 68 2.5.1 Treatment by state actors .......................................................................................... 68 2.5.2 Treatment by non-state actors .................................................................................. 71 3 Civil and Political Rights ........................................................................................................ 72 3.1 Freedom of expression, association, and assembly ......................................................... 72 3.1.1 Treatment of Darfuris who demonstrate or protest against the government ....... 73 3.1.2 Treatment of critical journalists, citizen-journalists, bloggers, etc. ......................... 81 3.2 Political opposition parties and activists ........................................................................... 83 3.2.1 Treatment of members of political opposition parties, as well as (perceived) supporters of such parties, political activists, students, and lawyers who are perceived to oppose the government ....................................................................................................... 83 3.2.2 Treatment of family members of (perceived) political opponents ......................... 86 2 3.2.3 Treatment of individuals (perceived to be) associated with or supportive of armed opposition groups ................................................................................................................. 87 3.2.4 Information about other (profiles of) individuals who are perceived to be opposed to the government ................................................................................................................ 90 3.2.5 Treatment of civil society organisations and civil society activists, including women’s rights activists, humanitarian workers as well as peacekeepers ........................................ 92 3.2.6 Attacks on schools and teachers ............................................................................... 95 3.3 Freedom of movement ...................................................................................................... 96 3.3.1 Freedom of movement in Darfur ............................................................................ 100 3.3.2 Ability for Darfuris to relocate and integrate into areas outside Darfur ............... 101 4 Forced recruitment and conscription ................................................................................ 103 4.1 Incidents of forced recruitment by state and non-state actors .................................... 103 4.2 Recruitment and use of children by government forces and armed groups................ 103 5 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) .................................................................................... 107 5.1 Security ............................................................................................................................. 108 5.2 Access to basic services ................................................................................................... 115 6 Returnees ............................................................................................................................ 123 6.1 Security ............................................................................................................................. 124 6.1.1 Treatment of Darfuri individuals upon arrival to Khartoum Airport and after, including those in possession of Al-Umma Party ID cards ................................................ 125 6.2 Access to documentation ................................................................................................ 129 6.3 Access to basic services ................................................................................................... 131 6.4 Reintegration .................................................................................................................... 134 7 Women ...............................................................................................................................
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