Air Power Australia

Submission No 20 Part 4 Sub Divided & Low Resolution Annex A – F-22A Data Annex B – Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs Industry 2001 Proposal Annex C – Analysis Predictions Provided to Defence (Since May 1998) Annex D – Adverse Effects of Early F-111 Retirement Annex E – Sources and Bibliography

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority

Organisation: AIR POWER AUSTRALIA

Authors: Dr Carlo Kopp, MIEEE, MAIAA, PEng Mr Peter A Goon, BEng, FTE (USNTPS)

Address: www.ausairpower.net

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 119

5 Annex A - F-22A Data

Figure 44: The F-22A is uniquely the only ﬁghter in production, or planned, which combines supersonic cruise capability and top tier stealth performance. (US Air Force).

This Annex provides a series of charts and diagrams which illustrate basic F-22A capabilities and provides some comparisons against the Joint Strike Fighter.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 120

Figure 45: An early production F-22A Raptor releasing a GBU-32 JDAM satellite aided guided bomb (upper). The F-22A is a true multirole ﬁghter, intended to excel in the air superiority role, but also to attack the most heavily defended surface targets with precision guided munitions. With unchallenged survivability it will also be used for electronic and imaging radar reconnaissance. The F-22A is designed to carry internal weapons where stealth is required, but can also carry signiﬁcant external payloads where stealth is not required (lower) (US Air Force).

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 121

Top ten reasons why the F-22A Raptor is the best choice to replace Australia’s F/A-18A Hornets:

1. GREATER CAPABILITY BETTER SUITED TO AUSTRALIA’S NEEDS. The F-22A is over twice as capable compared to what is being planned as the Joint Strike Fighter.

2. MORE COST EFFECTIVE. Buying the F-22A and upgrading the F-111s will be a cheaper yet more capable solution to the current plans.

3. BETTER DEFINED AND EARLIER SCHEDULE (NO RISK OF CAPABILITY GAP). Buying the F-22 toward the end of the currently planned full rate production would put the buy in the 2010-2012 timeframe.

4. LESS TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL RISK. The F-22A is a known commodity that is ﬂying today. The Joint Strike Fighter has yet to ﬂy let alone complete development and demonstrate its capability.

5. MAINTAINING STRATEGIC POSITION AND RELEVANCE IN THE REGION. The survivability of the Joint Strike Fighter against post 2010 Sukhoi Su-30 derivative aircraft is highly problematic.

6. DEVELOPING AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY. By targeting return on investment already made in F-111 support capabilities.

7. LESS EFFECT ON BALANCE OF TRADE. Fewer tax payer dollars have to be spent oﬀ shore.

8. BETTER LIFE CYCLE GROWTH CAPABILITY. The F-22A and F-111 are larger aircraft with greater system growth potential.

9. BETTER LONGEVITY AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT. The F-22A and F-111 are more robust airframe designs that have not been subject to the ’Cost As an Independent Variable’ (CAIV) driven cost and capability reductions as is the case with the Joint Strike Fighter.

10. INDEPENDENCE, SELF RELIANCE AND VALUED CONTRIBUTION TO DE- FENCE OF THE REGION.

With the F-22A in service as a replacement for the F/A-18A, it provides the capability to defeat the most capable regional systems, creating a more permissive operational environment for the F-111.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 122

A33−54

A33−24

A33−08

Figure 46: This diagram illustrates the F-22A in RAAF colours (C. Kopp). Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 123 (c) 2005, Carlo Kopp Block 10 Ferry Configuration (4 x 592 USG Ext Tanks) Block 10 Bomber / Cruise Missile Intercept Configuration REDUCED STEALTH − EXTERNAL STORES Strike Growth Potential − Ext JDAM SDB JASSM F−22A Stores Configuration Block 10 Strike Configuration (2005) Block 20−30 Strike Configuration (2007) Block 10 Air Superiority / Intercept Configuration STEALTHY − INTERNAL WEAPONS The F-22A exceeds the internal Air-Air Missile carriage capability of the Joint Strike Fighter, and matches the stealthy internal Figure 47: weapons carriage capability usingexternal weapons the and Small fuel Diametermore carriage weapons Bomb, capability than of and the the GBU-32 Joint Joint Strike satellite Strike Fighter, aided Fighter and bomb. by do 50%. so The in Used F-22A situations as where a exceeds the bomber, the Joint the non-stealthy Strike F-22A Fighter can could carry not as survive as (C. many Kopp). or

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 124 (c) 2005, Carlo Kopp Block 30 Sidelooking AESA Array Enhancement of APG−77 Radar System F−22A Systems Growth Block 30 − Satellite Comms Terminal Block 30 − Enhanced ISR Capability Block 30 − SEAD Capability The production F-22A will undergo a series of block upgrade enhancements over coming years. The strike and Intelligence Block 40 − Advanced NCW Block 40 − ISR Integration Block 40 − Advanced HMD Block 20 − GBU−39/B Small Diameter Bomb Block 20 − APG−77 Hi Res SAR Groundmapping Block 20 − 2−Way MIDS/Link−16 Block 20 − JSF Common Radar Modules and Processor Block 20 − COTS Superscalar Processors Figure 48: Surveillance Reconnaissance capabilities itmore provides survivable will in match combat or than exceed those the of smaller the Joint Joint Strike Strike Fighter Fighter, (C. while Kopp). the F-22A will always be

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 125 US Air Force Chart F−15C Afterburning Envelope vs Mach Number [−] F−22A Dry Thrust Envelope F−22A Military Thrust Performance Envelope F−15C Afterburning Thrust Performance Envelope

The F-22A will provide unprecedented gains in energy performance and supersonic persistence over established ﬁghters, and Altitude [−] Altitude Figure 49: the Joint Strike Fighter.afterburner, against This the chart performance compares envelope(US the of Air performance the Force). envelope F-22A without of the the use F-15C of at afterburner. maximum Afterburner attainable use engine increases fuel performance burn using severalfold

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority

5 Annex A - F-22A Data 126

Reduced O&S Costs O&S Reduced F−22A US Air Force Chart Fewer Workforce Skills On−Aircraft Fault Isolation Self Sufficiency Lower Deployment Requirements No Base Level ATE Fewer Modifications No Scheduled Depot Airframe Maintenance F−22A Stealth Maintenance Compared to Legacy Fighters F−15

Spares, Support Equipment Aircrew, Maintenance and Support Personnel Depot Maintenance Fuel, Oil F−22A Operational and Support Costs O&S Costs O&S

The F-22A will be much cheaper to operate compared to established ﬁghters. This chart shows a comparison against the F-15, Legacy Fighter Legacy Reduced Failure Rates Fewer Spares Improved Reliability Diagnostic Capability Figure 50: which incurs similar operational andand support planned costs upgrade to programmes thethe (HUG RAAF’s F-15 2 F/A-18A. by The & some introduction 3 degree. of plus (US deeper Minor Air depot Item Force). level Submissions) maintenance will activities see the F/A-18A O&S Costs balloon above those for

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 127

Thrust, Wet, SL Wing Area Wing Sweep LE Sustained Cruise Speed (Alt) External Ext 4 x 5 klb 2 x 5 klb, 2.5 klb + 2 x AMRAAM Internal Internal + 2 x AMRAAM AIM−9X 36,515 lb / 15,866 Ext (4 x 592 USG) 20,650 Int 18,000 lb Int / 5,672 Ext (2 x 430 USG) 23,672 Total Total Fuel Capacity Internal Bombload External Payload Limit AESA Module Count T.O. 00−105E−9SS−6 8 x GBU−39/B SDB (4 Pylons) (APG−77, APG−81) JSF CTOL Provisional (Stealth Configuration) F−22A vs Joint Strike Fighter − Parametric Comparison (Provisional Data)

Figure 51: The F-22A outperforms the Joint Strike Fighter in all cardinal speciﬁcations (C. Kopp).

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 128 0.0001 0.001 NIIP N001 (Su−27SK) NG APG−68 (F−16C/50) NG APG−81 AESA (JSF) Phazotron Zhuk (MiG−29) 0.01 NG APG−77 AESA (F−22A) NG APG−80 AESA (F−16E/F) Raytheon APG−79 AESA (F−18E/F) NIIP N011M Passive ESA (Su−30/35) Raytheon APG−63(V)2 AESA (F−15C) 0.1 Target RCS [Square Metres] 1 Comparative Range vs Target RCS (AW&ST, NIIP, Rosvooruzheniye) 10 0

80 60 40 20

200 180 160 140 120 100

Detection/Track Range [NMI] Range Detection/Track APG−81 F−22A − Parametric Comparison of Multimode Radars The F-22A is equipped with the most powerful active array radar ever installed in a ﬁghter aircraft. This will provide it with

Radar APG−77 Footprint Surveillance Figure 52: unprecedented range performance, butelectronic also systems. opens US up sources the indicate option it of will using also it be as used a to jam microwave directed opposing energy X-band weapon radars (C. to Kopp). disrupt opposing

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 5 Annex A - F-22A Data 129 F-22A cutaway chart (GlobalSecurity.org). Figure 53:

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 130

6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal

This annex contains a detailed tabular breakdown of the comparative scoring performed between the current Defence NACC plan and the 2001 industry proposal. For convenience, the summary table in Table 2 is replicated here.

Proposal Metric Australian Industry Solution (2001) Current Defence Plan Score Score Combat Capability Subtotal +2 -10 Supersonic Cruise 0 -2 All Aspect Stealth -1 -1 Phased Array Radar 0 -1 Internal Weapons 2 klb 0 -2 Max External Payload +1 0 Int Weapons Payload +1 -1 Combat Radius (Int Fuel) 0 -2 Cost Metrics Subtotal +2 -6 Acquisition Cost +1 -2 Acquisition Model +1 -2 Life Cycle Costs +1 -1 Return on Investment 0 -1 Risk Metrics Subtotal +3 -13 Acquisition Risk 0 -2 Cost Risk 0 -2 Design Risk 0 -1 Strategic Risk 0 -1 Strike Capability Gap +1 -2 Air Sup Capability Gap +1 -2 Air Def Capability Gap +1 -2 Net Assessment +7 -29

Table 5: Summary table of assessment scoring for current defence NACC and interim planning against the 2001 Australian Industry solution.

Note on Analysis Method:

The analysis technique and scoring method used is based upon ordinal comparison which is a technique where parameters are ranked by relative magnitude. The scoring is thus based on comparing a large number of parameters against a target, and ranking each score as superior / equal / inferior. This method was chosen over cardinal comparison, in which the relative magnitudes of parameters are each expressed as a number, such as a percentage. For many of the metrics in this annex, this ordinal method in fact favours the Joint Strike Fighter and the F/A-18A HUG, by concealing the scale of advantage enjoyed by the F-22A and F-111 in comparison. This analysis is therefore unusually conservative.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 131 r c e o 0 S -1 +1 VS A A I I LANS L L P A A 4 R R T T S S 2018 U U (NACC) A A TO

EFENCE R R D O O F F

S S 2010 L 2018 Onwards L E E D D URRENT O O EFENCE C M M

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I F F E E ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - I I ROPOSED R R 2008 Onwards B B (P USTRALIAN 55 x F/A-22A : x F/A-22A 55 by 2010 IOC start full systems, 50 + 5 attrition aircraft by 2015 AND evolved progressively x F-111s, 36 Evolved to Industry Australian by F-111S configuration THROUGH Block of Incremental incorporation aircraft additional Upgrades PLUS and parts from the AMARC value. Initial 10% of book than extended) be 2025+ (could LOT = for: needs This model meets Capability - Defence – Manpower challenges of Payments – Economy/Balance Development – Industrial Base Risks Dependency – Minimising Australia’ a ‘Better – Leaving A OMPARISON C © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 S -1 +1

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 132 r c e o 0 0 S -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -10 5 Sub Total LANS P ’ and ‘Side’ aspect ’ and ‘Side’ 2018 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards URRENT C F/A-18A HUG : F/A-18A have. will never and None JSF : : HUG F/A-18A never will have. None and : JSF for ‘Forward Optimised X-Band, to limited Best performance from to LO KPP downgraded Target only. change. of magnitude VLO – an order : HUG F/A-18A None : JSF -1 : HUG F/A-18A None None JSF : AN/APG-81 only) (CV variant None None -1 S S g g C C I I k k

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u A A r r l l h h ROJECT S l S l S B B S e e C P P t t A M A M P n n O O I I C C 5 . Ψ OLUTION S 2001) 2 NDUSTRY NDUSTRY I via upgrade. Could be upgrade. Could via ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - 5 ROPOSED 2008 Onwards (P USTRALIAN F/A-22A : F/A-22A Evolved F-111S : Achieved via engine upgrade (F110F-14D ex or F119) : F/A-22A Standard F-111S : Not required. Evolved carrier missile Primarily stand-off Air interceptor. missile cruise and dominance fighter and strike F/A-22A provided by capabilities Standard : F/A-22A or : AN/APG-80 F-111S Evolved AN/APG-81 in support funded NRE with done AN/APG-77 on JSF Program risks mitigating of : F/A-22A F-111 due Not required, : R/F-111) (but All F-111 Standard A Sub Total Copyright © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S 2 -1 +1

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 133 r c e o 0 0 0 0 S -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 or 8 x 175 kg x 175 or 8 LANS P 2018 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards URRENT C F/A-18A HUG : HUG F/A-18A for generic Typical fighter small tactical : JSF for generic Typical fighter small tactical : HUG F/A-18A bay. weapons have a Does not kg 6,800 : JSF : HUG F/A-18A kg 6,800 achieve tanks to fuel external (Requires None any effectiveness) this range with : JSF kg 450 2 x be to yet Combat radius Note: NMI 450 and configuration clean in demonstrated stores. this will Expect external carrying 2006, most likely time after some occur in test program. 2008 NMI 650 d d d d n n a a a a o o l l l ) l ) , s s y e y e l l s s d d I I ) ) a a p

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o x x APABILITY C n C n ( ( o n o n d d C C E E ROJECT A r A r e e C ( ( e e t t i i t t P u u n n I I S S . Ψ OLUTION S or 8 x 175 kg x 175 or 8 2001) 2 NDUSTRY NDUSTRY I ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - ROPOSED 2008 Onwards (P USTRALIAN F/A-22A : F/A-22A : F-111 Standard : F/A-22A kg 13,600 kg 9,000 : F-111 F-111S: Evolved kg 450 2 x : F/A-22A 8 x 175 kg sub asymmetric range - PLUS long and ISR for strike, sonic cruise well as as roles electronic attack kg 900 2 x -ferry : F-111 Standard NMI 700+ NMI 1,000+ F-111S : Evolved cruise range long Asymmetric, >1,300 NMI ISR, cruise for strike, capability NMI > 1,000 and electronic missile intercept, as well attack ferry. roles A Copyright © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 0 0 0 0 S -1 +1 +1 +1

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 134 r c e o 0 S -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -6 +1 Sub Total in 2012+ LANS P 2018 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards URRENT C F/A-18A HUG : HUG F/A-18A Submission Item PLUS Minor Project costs, (MIS) (MIS) Estimate calls Defence what are figures These be appear to which would ‘cash dollars’ $A200m to $A100m dollars. ‘then year’ m $A3,000+ : JSF year’ ‘then (Assumed - NACC Budget $US45m per Stated Often dollars) Flyaway Recurring Unit Avg is aircraft 2002 dollars not Price Cost in and upgrades block : large HUG F/A-18A (MIS) Submission Item Minor multiple Projects. m+ $A15,000 PLUS large purchase partner 3 : Tier JSF Loss/Lead and high government Program Involvement overhead Industry guarantees. with no t t t t s s s s , l l o o o o t t e e C C C C s s S d S d ISK / / / /

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Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 135 r c e o 0 0 S -1 -1 +1 generation th LANS P ) 7 2018 vs 2020 for F-111S for vs 2020 4 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards . PRESENT VALUE $’s in 2004 : . PRESENT VALUE 6 URRENT C F/A-18A HUG: Legacy federated avionics; federated HUG: Legacy F/A-18A maintenance deeper undergoing aircraft with conjunction in first time the for and of modification large suite be to done in projects refurbishment derived Figures from analysis of parallel. 1999 to Reports 04, Annual Defence 2015, and Plan to Capability Defence previous al et HUG F/A-18A MIS) (DCP, Costs Capital 2015 (to HUG F/A-18A m >$A2,241.7 Costs Operating Total : Total m >$A3,002.7 4 2015 Note : Costs to avionics, Integrated JSF: and international CAIV engine, partnering. Operational in Initial be demonstrated To Test and Evaluation projected presently m >$A5,244.4 2012. circa to occur Presumed will meet achieve metric. and s s s s d d i r i r i i e e e e l s l s s s o r o r t t a t a t y y t t e m e m l l s s c c v v s s a h a h

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Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 136 r c e o 0 0 S -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -13 Sub Total LANS P 2018 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards URRENT C F/A-18A HUG : Planned to be to completed : Planned HUG F/A-18A 2010. Further after sometime be would to required upgrades/rebuilds 2015. go beyond of 30+ years subject JSF : Expected life production for full rate to approval 2012. sometime after HIGH Avionics; in : LOW in HUG F/A-18A (CBR); Replacement Barrel Centre since multiple schedule HIGH in overall close with project element part in turn, is which, interdependencies project CAPSTONE Programa which of 5 hasyet to be managedasa CAPSTONE. on aircraft HIGH risk exposure availability. : JSF in variations for Potential significant timelines schedule and cost capability, of risks current likelihood with high arising risks further and materialising leaving problems, partners eg. software intercession Congressional program, HIGH r r e e s s t e t e k k , f f d d n n s s A A i i a a o o

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R M R APABILITY s s 0 0 q q w w e ROJECT e c c 1 1 o C o v v A A L L P n n I I . Ψ OLUTION S 2001) 2 NDUSTRY NDUSTRY I ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - ROPOSED 2008 Onwards (P USTRALIAN F/A-22A : Expected of life 40+ : Expected F/A-22A years : F-111 (Couldbe extended, orreplaced JSF or build FB-22 or later with other capability). 2005-2025+ : F/A-22A LOW Evolved F-111S : extensive Due to research, on experience and knowledge in Industry, now resident aircraft lesser extent, and, to the DSTO downsizing due to (latter RAAF and deskilling). LOW A Sub Total Copyright © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 0 0 0 0 S 3 -1 +1

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 137 r c e o 0 0 S -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 LANS P 2018 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards URRENT C F/A-18A HUG : HUG F/A-18A of additional structural High probability more extensive costs, refurbishing time from first arising rectifications avionics/ and maintenance, deeper delays as further upgrades weapons arise in JSF development challenges program in total – uncertainties JSF : Very HIGH HIGH 2015 at least until persist numbers will : HUG F/A-18A : JSF with in development Remains difficulties and cooling weight in performance, and software significant capacity PLUS LOW MEDIUM challenges. system integration : HUG F/A-18A by Su-27/30/35 Sukhoi Outclassed and radar in aerodynamic fighters performance outclassed by 2 aircraft – Tier : HIGH JSF Su-27/30/35 1 Sukhoi Tier larger performance in aerodynamic fighters HIGH HIGH s s , k k k k s s s s s i s i ISK i i k k R R s s R

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w w Page 7 of 10 o o C M o o w APABILITY L w L L L o ROJECT o C L L P . Ψ OLUTION S 2001) 2 NDUSTRY NDUSTRY I ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - ROPOSED 2008 Onwards (P USTRALIAN F/A-22A : F/A-22A design mature, inproduction Since with buy at end of current production (low cost end when recurring and NRE recovery at are costs (RE) engineering Increase of USAF lowest levels). units 300+ buy to : F-111 LOW : F/A-22A : F-111 of legacy upgrades Incremental (cockpit, and avionics radar) PLUS Tack) (Pave legacy systems 2010 to in the upgrade engine an window. time 2020 LOW : F/A-22A Nil type exists No comparable LOW : F-111 platform strike 1 Proven Tier LOW LOW A Copyright © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S -1 +1

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 138 r c e o 0 S -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 LANS P 2018 TO EFENCE D 2010 2018 Onwards URRENT C F/A-18A HUG : HUG F/A-18A munitions Reduction of precision 62.5%. by up to capability delivery 3 of Figure Parliamentary Refer “Air Combat Capability”, by Submission, Gap Significant Defence 2004. 04 June A G Houston, decisionexclude toF-111 from Air 5418, and wider. has made deeper gap JSF : with compared 37.5% reduction Up to guidance. 2000 White Paper Defence agility, speed, : inferior HUG F/A-18A vs Su-27/30/35; range Sukhoi on AEW&C and dependency significant Ongoing Gap useful capability provide to tankers : JSF when range and agility, speed, Inferior Su-27/30/35 Sukhoi against compared 2010 post particularly of aircraft, family definitely post 2015 configurations; evolved growth variants p p p p a a a a , G G

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o o C o o P N N N N . Ψ OLUTION S 2001) out to 2025 and 2025 out to 9 2 NDUSTRY NDUSTRY I ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - ROPOSED 2008 Onwards (P USTRALIAN F/A-22A : F/A-22A None MIL-1760 has Already : F-111 weapons bus making smart FOSOW of Air 5418 integration andJDAM easy (and cheap). Is on refuelling not dependent tankers to provide long range 1,000 NMI. to strike capability : F/A-22A all to all respects Superior in aircraft opposing beyond. : F-111 air met by F/A-22A Requirement fighter dominance capabilities None A Copyright © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 0 0 S -1 +1 +1 +1

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 139 r c e o 0 S -1 -1 -1 +1 -16 -13 LANS P some self defence some self 2018 TO EFENCE D . 2010 2018 Onwards 11 URRENT C achieves all the defined metrics. achieves F/A-18A HUG : HUG F/A-18A missile cruise for bomber and Unsuited endurance, limited due to defence limited payload and limited missile Gap Considerable speed supersonic and cruise for bomber JSF: unsuited limited to due defence missile and payload missile limited endurance, speed. The limited supersonic be a JSF is intended to operational air / close interdiction strike battlefield support aircraft with capabilities INFERIOR OUTCOME-: 2010 TO 2018 : 2018 Onwards OUTCOME INFERIOR , p p T T a a N N S S G G ISK E E

stem fails to meet one or more of the metrics. of the more or one meet stem fails to

L L e e M M A A R exceeds the requirements of one or more of the metrics. of exceeds of one or more the the requirements c c S S T T n n , & S S O O e e E E f T f T

S S e e E E S S D D R

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r O i O i T T Page 9 of 10 C C A A C T T M

APABILITY S S E E o o ROJECT N N N N C P combat capability system meets or meets combat capability system TOTAL NUMBER OF METRICS = EIGHTEEN (18) METRICS OF TOTAL NUMBER . Ψ OLUTION S 2001) 2 . 10 NDUSTRY NDUSTRY I ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - 2008 Onwards 2008 ROPOSED 2008 Onwards A negative score means the air combat capability sy the air combat capability means score A negative (P SUPERIOR OUTCOME A score of zero (0) means the air means the (0) of zero A score USTRALIAN F/A-22A : F/A-22A “The F/A-22 will be the most ever built. aircraft outstanding pilot fighter in Every the Air Force it.” love to fly dearly would Angus Houston, Air Chief Marshall August 2004 None F-111 capability F-111 : Evolved suitable for bomber intercept, cruise missile defence and Attack in addition ISR/Electronic to established strike roles due to superior endurance, excellent advanced and high speed payload, radar capability A A positive score means the capability system significantly significantly system capability means the score A positive Copyright © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso 1 r c e o 0 0 S -1 +1 +1 +7

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 6 Annex B - Comparison of Current NACC Plan vs 2001 Industry Proposal 140 F- ’. Rationale ’, P A Goon. at AMARC. at planned to replace planned the to replace bmissionof 25 January2002 and st 2004; Air Power Australia - Air Power Australia 2004; st , packaging technology, and technology, packaging , de, December 2001, after meeting 2001, after December de, ’s APG-81 radar. While the F/A-22A’s the While ’s APG-81 radar. -111 Option for Stage 3 of Air 6000. Air of 3 Stage for -111 Option ed Present to dollars(2004) Valueusing forsupporting ground troops since 1995. The Evolved F-111S proposal exploits this exploits F-111S proposal Evolved The t directly or indirectly arise from the directly or indirectly arise from t ve means of comparison. Defence should Defence comparison. of ve means eet numberseet start to dropoffdue fatigue to r Force and an interceptor for the US Navy, US the for interceptor an and r Force only the bomberbuilt. variants were e the JSF’s APG-81 radar provides e the performed until1990s the SR-71A. the by such use, that the rights of the owners are owners the of rights the that use, such and bombers. By the early 1990s these aims these 1990s early the By bombers. and redictions ranging from 15 years to 50 years 50 to 15 years from ranging redictions vide battlefield supportground capabilities for ments Document (JORD) and CAIV. and (JORD) Document ments ces to a date in time. ces to a n US service, the JSF is the service, n US es which, if reduced, will effect preparedness).will effect es which, if reduced, hese capabilitiesbeen have further expanded to y for safe and effective autonomous operation of including analysis of activitiesdraft; in current ’, C Kopp and A Cobb, October 2003 and ‘ and 2003 October Kopp and A Cobb, ’, C ribution of these works,ribution particular in and of these specifically, to the Affordability and capability air combat new the Affordability computer processing technology processing computer ems Life Cycle Management Guiems embodies more than the stated metric; than more embodies Evolving Force Evolving e these works were produced tha e these works were and fatigue damage accrual rat accrual damage and fatigue ‘Is the JSF good JSF Augu enough’ ‘Is the – A Houston, to defeat opposing next generation fighters generation next opposing to defeat n AFB, Tucson, Arizona, USA. Over 200 F-111s remain mothballed F-111s remain Over 200 USA. Tucson, Arizona, n AFB, riate) in the analysis and comparison of both models. of and comparison analysis riate) in the powerful,detection providing footprint twice the JSF of the st capable air to air radar ever built. Conversely, whilbuilt. st capableto air radar ever air Defence Capability Plan 2001-10subsequent and Page 10 of s to the status quo at the tim quo at the status s to the with the Defence Capability Syst ired to provide defence against bombers and cruise missiles. cruise missiles. and against bombers defence to provide ired ansmit-receive module technology, module ansmit-receive situations – the F/A-22A will thus absorb thus situations – roleF/A-22A the of the much will sis of historical flying rate sis of historical that full that attribution for these works is stated and included in fighters, opposing fighters,bombersprovide and range strike. long I mised as a bomber radar to meet the JointOperational meet Requireradar to bomber as a mised e for thee for their non integrity to commit expert public and resour performance and avionics weighted capabilities are mostly pro to e artificial intelligencedomain)on when can’t agree the capabilit ceeds the requirement by some degree or degree by some requirement the ceeds 04 June 2004;ASPI Strategic Insight – , September 2005 - Permission is granted for the use and dist use and the for granted is - Permission 2005 , September origins to the authors and owners ofworks. these e F-111. Refer Parliamentary Submission entitledF-111. Refer Parliamentary ‘ e calation factors, where approp factors, where calation . , P A Goon.,P A January, 2005;ADA Defender -2005 Winter– ‘ Ψ defined in the 1980s, provided capabilities capabilities 1980s, provided the in defined inclusive, statutory financials; – Air Force Submission to Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade dated 04 June 2004. Refer Figure 2 – 2 Figure Refer 2004. June 04 dated Trade and Defence Affairs, on Foreign Committee Standing Joint to Submission Force – Air es shortly after 2014 (on the ba ciates, September 2005 -See End Note - Air Power Australia and Associates and Australia Power Air – Aerospace Maintenance and Re-generation Center at Davis-Montha Center at Re-generation Maintenance and Aerospace – 0 is not or the Subject applicable metric stated the metric meets model and, to model; that –1 metric. stated the or embody achieve not does model Subject +1 Subject significantly significantly model ex include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissancehigh in threat expandedhigh to includecapabilities, strike survivable years t last five Over the resultingredesignation to F/A-22A. the in with Air6000 Project Office personnel who sought further, detailed information to support their recommendation of the Evolved F Evolved the of recommendation their support to information detailed further, sought who personnel Office Project Air6000 with time to never, it would be fanciful and wasteful let alone naïv alone let wasteful and fanciful be would it never, to time multimode capabilities, however, the F/A-22A’s APG-77 more is much be invited in its ownusing submit keeping to scores, following system with the this guidance: supporting proprietary Industry Proposals submitted in accordance AMARC highrisk,demanding,hostile lethal environments assets in (such as experiencedgoingp with in is air combat) possible, to be APG-77 provides radar excellentbombing the capability, mo it remains respectable air radar air to capability, coverage it is beingopti DefenceAnnual Reports1999 to 2004 Capability Paper Combat RAAF Air RAAF Air Combat Capability Paper – A Houston, – Capability Paper A Combat RAAF Air discount are figures profile flow Cash Service. F-111 in Retaining of Cost Year – Ten 1 Table and (Cash) Ownership of Cost 111 provided Defence, of Department the and of Australia Parliament improvement and/or gains outcomes, results, any that and protected the same discount factors (having applied es applied (having factors discount same the provisionworks are attributed in of these their inherent capability to expandutility of the th Copyright © Copyright troops than capabilities rather opposingdefeat to superiority air mostly or exclusively used types aircraft all F/A-18s, model early and as F-16s as well II, Thunderbolt A-10 and Harrier AV-8B to protect naval forces from Soviet bombers and cruise missiles. As the F-111 proved too large for aircraft carrier deployment, carrier aircraft for large too F-111 proved As the missiles. cruise and bombers Soviet from forces naval protect to requ speed high and payload endurance, the retains thus F-111 The and maintenance related lifing issu and maintenance A FAREWELL TO ARMS - REVISITED TO ARMS A FAREWELL The earliest of design aims original the F-111 definedprogram, during early the 1960s,provide were a bomber to forAi the US often While its the JSF is ‘multi-role’, loosely as described objecti an establishing of way a as +1 and –1, 0 uses which System Scoring Analysis a Parametric on based of scores Allocation ResponseDefence to Request for Proposal–Air “Project 6000 Force Mix Option MarketSurvey”,6000 DTCAir Technology Group Su Since the(in particular, in computer in th science experts tr share radar APG-81 JSF’s the and radar APG-77 F/A-22A’s The Analysis and present value(2004) calculations of operating total expenses for the F/A-18Aonly taken out HUG 2015 to since fl F-22A, original of the design aims The Ψ ENDNOTES : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 © Air Power AustraliaCopyright and Asso

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 7 Annex C - Analysis Predictions Provided to Defence (Since May 1998) 141

7 Annex C - Analysis Predictions Provided to Defence (Since May 1998)

1. The impact of acquisitions of Su-27SK by China and Su-30MKI by India was accurately predicted. An unpredicted development was the acquisition of the Su-30MKM series by Malaysia.

2. Acquisitions of Su-30MKK by China were accurately predicted. An unpredicted development was the development and acquisition of the Su-30MK2 by the PLA Navy air arm.

3. Acquisitions of A-50 derivative AEW&C aircraft by China and India were accurately predicted. Unpredicted developments were the current intent by Malaysia to acquire AEW&C aircraft, US intervention to block Israel’s sale of the A-50I to China, and US approval of the sale of the A-50I to India.

4. Acquisitions of Il-78 Midas derivative tanker aircraft by China and India were accurately predicted. An unpredicted development was the deployment of several squadrons of indigenous Chinese H-6U/DU tanker aircraft.

5. Acquisitions of further S-300 variant long range Surface-to-Air Missile systems in the wider region were predicted. Indonesia’s interest in the S-300PMU series was not predicted.

6. Sukhoi Su-27/30 radar signature reduction measures were accurately predicted.

7. Sukhoi Su-30 N-011M BARS phased array radar capabilities were understated. The Su-27 NIIP Pero phased array block upgrade to the NIIP N-001 radar was not predicted.

8. The Su-27SKU digital glass cockpit upgrade was correctly predicted.

9. The regional proliferation of ‘counter-AWACS’ variants of the Kh-31R missile was correctly predicted.

10. The regional proliferation of ‘counter-AWACS’ variants of the KS-172 missile was correctly predicted. India’s intent for co-production of the KS-172 was not predicted.

11. The susceptibility of the Wedgetail AEW&C to long range ‘counter-AWACS’ missiles was accurately predicted.

12. The emergence of anti-radiation variants of the Russian R-77 (AA-12) BVR missile was correctly predicted, but the development of heat-seeking variants was not predicted.

13. The emergence of the improved OLS-30 Infra Red Search Track set on the Su-30MK was correctly predicted.

14. The emergence of third generation optical seeker technology for the Russian R-73/74 family of WVR missiles was not predicted.

15. Strike capability growth in the F-22A was correctly predicted, but did not predict the extent of this growth, or planning to make all intended 380 F-22A fully strike capable.

16. The emergence of the FB-22A strike aircraft was not predicted.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 7 Annex C - Analysis Predictions Provided to Defence (Since May 1998) 142

17. The limitations in air combat capability in the Joint Strike Fighter were accurately predicted, as were the underlying reasons for this being so. The emergence of the ‘Export Joint Strike Fighter’ variant with reduced stealth was not predicted.

18. The potential for the F-111 to be operated well beyond 2020 was not predicted. This was later determined as one of the results of the Sole Operator Program and is one of the cornerstones of the subsequent ‘Evolved F-111’ proposals.

19. The potential for the B-1B and F-111 to be retroﬁtted with supersonic cruise engines was not predicted. This was later presented in the ‘Evolved F-111’ proposal entitled ‘Super Cruise and the F-111’ and more recently for the B-1B in the Boeing response to the USAF RFI for Interim Long Range Strike Capabilities.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 8 Annex D - Adverse Eﬀects of Early F-111 Retirement 143

8 Annex D - Adverse Eﬀects of Early F-111 Retirement

Figure 54: RAAF F-111C departing Amberley for Red Flag exercise in the US, January, 2006 (Defence PR).

1. Adverse Capability Eﬀects.

(a) A ≈50% reduction in aggregate RAAF striking power available. (b) Loss of primary long range land strike capability. (c) Loss of primary long range maritime strike capability. 1 (d) Loss of high payload battlefield strike capability (Each F-111 ≈ 2 B-52H heavy bomber capability). (e) Loss of unrefuelled persistent battlefield strike capability. (f) Loss of unrefuelled persistent Combat Air Patrol capability for dealing with terrorist hijackings. (g) Loss of potential unrefuelled persistent Combat Air Patrol capability for cruise missile interception. (h) Significant increase in F/A-18A fatigue life consumption should regional contingency arise. (i) Significant increase in tanker fatigue life consumption should regional contingency arise. (j) Loss of primary airborne systems and weapons integration engineering capability at Am- berley WSBU. (k) Loss of primary engineering capability to execute ‘ageing aircraft program’ techniques on RAAF platforms.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 8 Annex D - Adverse Eﬀects of Early F-111 Retirement 144

2. Adverse Strategic Eﬀects.

(a) As regional Sukhoi Su-27/30 numbers and proﬁciency increase, a ‘strategic inversion’ of the deterrence relationship will arise - regional nations could challenge Australian regional intervention. (b) Loss of primary strategic deterrence tool for dealing with potentially hostile future regimes across wider region. (c) In scenario with high risk of terrorist hijackings, F/A-18 and B-707 ﬂeet too small to protect all capitals without F-111 support. (d) Likely perception in US strategic circles that Australia is emulating the behaviour of EU NATO nations which downsized critical defence capabilities and shifted that burden on to the US force structure. (e) Loss of single highest value combat contribution to US-led coalition air campaigns. (f) Loss of capability to rapidly integrate and test new weapons on RAAF aircraft - cf UK in Falklands and US in Afghanistan rapidly adding new weapon types in urgent contingencies.

3. Adverse Industrial Base Eﬀects.

(a) Reduced engineering capability to extend life of other RAAF platforms using ‘ageing aircraft program’ techniques - F-111 provides ‘critical mass’. (b) Loss of opportunities for domestic industry to eﬀect import replacement through in- country upgrades on F-111 thus impacting balance of payments. (c) Loss of opportunity to inoculate domestic aerospace industry sector and associated systems integration industry sector from post September, 2001, global downturn. (d) Loss of opportunities to further add value, and further leverage the vast materiel and intellectual investment the taxpayer has made in the F-111 and its support capabilities. (e) Signiﬁcant loss of employment in domestic systems integration and aerospace industry sector, including training positions.

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 9 Annex E - Sources and Bibliography 145

9 Annex E - Sources and Bibliography

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Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority 9 Annex E - Sources and Bibliography 150

Figure 55: RAAF F-111C aircraft during the February, 2006, Red Flag exercise in the United States (US Air Force)

End of Submission

Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority