Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990S

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990S Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Professor Daniel Tarschys, Chairman (Sweden) Dr Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica) Sir Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom) Dr Ryukichi Imai (Japan) Dr Catherine Kelleher (United States) Dr Marjatta Rautio (Finland) Dr Lothar Rühl (Germany) Dr Abdullah Toukan (Jordan) The Director Director Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Signalistgatan 9, S-169 70 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00 Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33 E-mail: [email protected] Internet URL: http://www.sipri.se Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s SIPRI Research Report No. 15 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1999 Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © SIPRI 1999 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. Enquiries concerning reproduction in other countries should be sent to SIPRI. The paperback edition of this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0–19–829576–6 ISBN 0–19–829577–4 (pbk.) Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn Contents Preface vii Acknowledgements viii Acronyms x 1. Introduction 1 I. Russian policy towards East Asia 1 II. The research agenda 3 III. Sources 6 IV. Structure of the book 9 2. The determinants of Russian arms trade policy 12 I. Introduction 12 II. The domestic environment 13 III. The international environment 39 Table 2.1. Indicators of economic decline in the Russian 14 defence industry, 1992–94 3. The management of Russian arms transfers 44 I. Introduction 44 II. The decision-making system 45 III. Arms deals with countries in East Asia 61 IV. Management: production and finance 63 V. Management: problems and solutions 64 Figure 3.1. The Russian arms export decision-making system, 46 1992 Figure 3.2. The Russian arms export decision-making system, 54 1994 Figure 3.3. The Russian arms export decision-making system, 58 April 1997 Figure 3.4. The Russian arms export decision-making system, 60 August 1997 4. China 70 I. Introduction 70 II. Land forces 72 III. The air force 73 IV. The navy 78 V. Military technology transfer 83 vi RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO EAST ASIA VI. Defence industry conversion 89 VII. Other programmes 90 VIII. Conclusions 92 Table 4.1. Value of the transfers of major conventional weapons 72 to China by the leading suppliers, 1990–97 5. South-East Asia 93 I. Introduction 93 II. Myanmar 94 III. Laos 96 IV. Malaysia 96 V. Indonesia 101 VI. Singapore 103 VII. Thailand 104 VIII. Viet Nam 105 6. North and South Korea 107 I. Introduction 107 II. North Korea 107 III. South Korea 111 7. The security implications of Russian arms transfers to 116 East Asia I. Introduction 116 II. Bilateral relations 117 III. Regional relations 121 IV. Global relations 124 V. Conclusions 128 Table 7.1. Russian armed forces and equipment in the Far 118 Eastern Strategic Theatre, 1986 and 1996 Table 7.2. Chinese armed forces in the regions adjacent to 120 Russia, 1986 and 1996 Appendix. Register of transfers of major conventional 132 weapons from Russia to countries in East Asia, 1992–98 Index 137 Preface In 1994–96 Alexander A. Sergounin carried out a research project entitled Arms Transfers and Security in East and Southeast Asia, sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and administered by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). A key role in the execution of this project was played by Dr Ian Anthony, then Leader of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project, who provided useful advice for the preparation of earlier drafts of this research report. The report is both the end-product and a continuation of this project, with emphasis on Russia’s role in the arms trade with countries of East Asia. Arms and military technology transfers are one of the main instruments of Russia’s security strategy in East Asia. Why does Russia lay emphasis on arms exports? What is its motivation? Is it an attempt to help the troubled domestic defence industry, a vehicle for alliance politics, a tool in the regional power struggle or something else? How are decisions on arms transfers taken in Russia? What are the legal and institutional frameworks? What are the programmes of military–technical cooperation with the East Asian nations? How do they affect the balance of power in the region? What are the security implications? This book addresses these questions. There are some grounds for assuming that Russia relies on the arms trade not only because of domestic problems but also because of the lack of other effective instruments of policy towards East Asia. For this reason, it is important to make Russia, as well as China, an equal participant in regional multilateral institutions, thus eliminating the grounds for temptation to use destabilizing measures for self-affirmation in the area. Inclusive rather than exclusive policies and multilateralism rather than power politics can help to ensure that Russia and other regional actors are constructive and help to pave the way to establishing a cooperative security regime in East Asia. It should be noted that this book was written in the mid-1990s, before the major economic crisis hit many of the East Asian economies. This, as well as the continuing crises and changes in Russia, will undoubtedly have an impact on some of the trends described here. While it could not document the dramatic developments of the last years of this decade, the book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the early phases of arms transfer policy in the new Russian Federation. Adam Daniel Rotfeld Director of SIPRI October 1998 Acknowledgements This volume is the result of several projects carried out in close cooperation and consultation with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The work on this project was truly collegial: this report also reflects the results of previous studies conducted by Sergey V. Subbotin. SIPRI, under its Director, Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld, has provided invalu- able help to the authors in many ways. The authors are indebted to Dr Ian Anthony, former Leader of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Project, who played a key role in execution of the project with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) by being its principal consultant. The authors extend special thanks to Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman for their extensive and insightful comments and suggestions as well for sharing SIPRI Arms Trans- fers Project data with us. It is a pleasant duty to mention here our gratitude to some colleagues who have helped us with especially useful advice or materials for this report. They include: Ambassador Michael Armacost, President, the Brookings Institution; Dr Frank Fischer, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers Uni- versity; Dr Bates Gill, former Leader of the SIPRI Project on Security and Arms Control in East Asia; Dr Bjørn Møller, Leader of the Military Restruc- turing Project, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI); Dr Jerry Segal, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); Dr Dmitry Trenin, Research Fellow, Moscow Carnegie Centre; Digby Waller, Defence Economist, IISS; Dr Howard J. Wiarda, Professor of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Massachusetts; Håkan Wiberg, Director, COPRI; Susan Willett, former Research Fellow, COPRI; and Ruan Zongze, Deputy Director, World Politics Studies, China Institute of International Studies. We would like to thank Eve Johansson for her sharp eye and outstanding editorial assistance. Our fruitful cooperation has lasted for several years and resulted in a number of successful book projects. Her kind assistance was especially valuable as neither author is a native English-speaker. Connie Wall edited the book in the last phase of the project.
Recommended publications
  • Nproliferation Review Is Unable to Russia & Republics Nuclear Industry, 5/25/94, P
    Nuclear Developments 15 NEWLY-INDEPENDENT ST ATES 3/17/94 ARMENIA WITH THE FORMER A secondary agreement is signed in Mos- SOVIET UNION ARMENIA cow between Russian First Deputy Minis- ter Oleg Soskovets and Armenian Prime 4/4/94 Minister Grant Bagratyan regarding the The Romanian newspaper Romania Libera renovations and reactivation of the Metsamor publishes allegations that the former Soviet INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS nuclear power plant. The agreement will Union may have used a seismic weapon create an intergovernmental committee for called the Elipton to trigger a major earth- 2/94 the renovation project. Minatom and quake in Armenia. According to the article, Armenia’s Minister of Energy and Fuel Re- Gosatomnadzor will represent Russia on the U.S. military intelligence experts noted that sources Miron Sheshmanali reports that it committee, while the Armenian Energy the earthquake occurred at a time when the is essential for the rebuilding of Armenia’s Ministry and the Armenian State Director- Soviet authorities would have wanted to power generating industry to restart the ate for the Supervision of Nuclear Energy destroy Armenia's nuclear industry in or- nuclear power plant. will represent Armenia. Russia will pro- der to ensure the republic's continued de- Novosti, 5/2/94; in Russia & CIS Today, 5/2/94, vide nuclear fuel, engineering services, as- No. 0315, p. 9 (11154). pendence on the USSR. sistance in the development of a nuclear Oana Stanciulescu, Romania Libera (Bucharest), 4/ power management structure in Armenia, 4/94, p.1; in FBIS-SOV-94-068, 4/8/94, pp. 25-26 and technical servicing of the power station.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russia You Never Met
    The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Helicopters Experience and Innovation
    RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS EXPERIENCE AND INNOVATION © 2013 Russian Helicopters, JSC All rights reserved RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS AT A GLANCE Russian Helicopters, JSC is the sole manufacturer of “Mil” and “Kamov” civil and military helicopters. The company’s structure incorporates design bureaus, final assembly plants, components and parts manufacturers and service providers. Russian Helicopters consolidated the entire helicopter-building industry of Russia. We offer complete helicopter lifecycle from development to disposal. Russian Helicopters was founded in 2007 as a subsidiary of Oboronprom Corporation © 2013 Russian Helicopters, JSC All rights reserved FULLY INTEGRATED STRUCTURE Oboronprom TOTAL STAFF – 41,000 EMPLOYEES Russian Helicopters (98.5%) Mil Moscow Kazan Helicopters SMPP Helicopter Service Helicopter Plant (80.22%) (59.99%) Company (72.38%) (100.0%) Kamov Rostvertol Reduktor-PM (99.79%) (92.01%) (80.84%) Moscow and region NARP (9,000 employees) Kazan (95.1%) (6,500 employees) Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant (84.82%) Perm Progress Arsenyev (1,800 employees) Aviation Company Rostov-on-Don (93.14%) (7,900 employees) Kumertau Kumertau (4,000 employees) Novosibirsk Aviation PE (500 employees) (100.0%) Arsenyev (6,000 employees) Ulan-Ude (6,000 employees) © 2013 Russian Helicopters, JSC All rights reserved RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS AROUND THE WORLD Civil Total 37,530 Military Total 22,800 9% 91% 78% Civil Military Russian-made helicopters Key regions: account for nearly 14% of the Russia, CIS, India, China, Latin global fleet and are operated America,
    [Show full text]
  • The Siloviki in Russian Politics
    The Siloviki in Russian Politics Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz Who holds power and makes political decisions in contemporary Russia? A brief survey of available literature in any well-stocked bookshop in the US or Europe will quickly lead one to the answer: Putin and the “siloviki” (see e.g. LeVine 2009; Soldatov and Borogan 2010; Harding 2011; Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky 2012; Lucas 2012, 2014 or Dawisha 2014). Sila in Russian means force, and the siloviki are the members of Russia’s so called “force ministries”—those state agencies that are authorized to use violence to respond to threats to national security. These armed agents are often portrayed—by journalists and scholars alike—as Russia’s true rulers. A conventional wisdom has emerged about their rise to dominance, which goes roughly as follows. After taking office in 2000, Putin reconsolidated the security services and then gradually placed his former associates from the KGB and FSB in key positions across the country (Petrov 2002; Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, 2009). Over the years, this group managed to disable almost all competing sources of power and control. United by a common identity, a shared worldview, and a deep personal loyalty to Putin, the siloviki constitute a cohesive corporation, which has entrenched itself at the heart of Russian politics. Accountable to no one but the president himself, they are the driving force behind increasingly authoritarian policies at home (Illarionov 2009; Roxburgh 2013; Kasparov 2015), an aggressive foreign policy (Lucas 2014), and high levels of state predation and corruption (Dawisha 2014). While this interpretation contains elements of truth, we argue that it provides only a partial and sometimes misleading and exaggerated picture of the siloviki’s actual role.
    [Show full text]
  • Threats to Russian Democracy and US-Russian Relations
    After Chechnya: Threats to Russian Democracy and U.S.-Russian Relations ARIEL COHEN Introduction : All Politics Is Local , Al¡ Foreign Policy Is Domestic Half a year alter Russian tanks rolled into Chechnya, the future of Russian democracy and free markets is under threat. The internal situation in Russia bears a direct influence on Russia's relations with the outside world and the United States. While the world's leaders gather in Moscow to celebrate the victory over Nazism, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is calling for the use of force to "protect" Russian co-ethnics living outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Kozyrev's declarations go beyond mere rhetoric. Russia is introducing its new 58th field army in the Northern Caucasus, in clear and conscious violation of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty, a centerpiece of post-Cold War European security. If Russia is not planning an agressive action either against Ukraine or its Transcaucasus neighbors, why does it need to revise upwards the CFE limitations of 164 tanks and 414 artillery systems? Why was General Alexander Lebed, a self-proclaimed restorer of the old Soviet Union and Commander of the l4th Army in Moldova, applauding Kozyrev? Chechnya became the testing ground for the new Russian policy, both foreign and domestic. The people who engineered it, the so-called Party of War in Moscow, are watching for reactions at honre and abroad to this version of the "last thrust South." The West is facing its greatest challenge since the collapse of communism: how to deal with the Russia that is emerging from under the rubble.
    [Show full text]
  • Rotorcraft (2011)
    Rotorcraft Overview The rotorcraft industry produces aircraft, powered by either turboshaft or reciprocating engines, capable of performing vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) operations. The rotorcraft sector includes helicopters, gyrocopters, and tiltrotor aircraft. Helicopters, which employ a horizontal rotor for both lift and propulsion, are the mainstay of the industry. Gyrocopters are produced in much smaller quantities, primarily for use in recreational flying. Tiltrotor aircraft, such as the V-22 Osprey1, can take off vertically and then fly horizontally as a fixed-wing aircraft. Rotorcraft are manufactured in most industrialized countries, based on indigenous design or in collaboration with, or under license from, other manufacturers. Manufacturers in the United States of civilian helicopters include American Eurocopter, Bell, Enstrom, Kaman, MD Helicopters, Robinson, Schweizer (now a subsidiary of Sikorsky), and Sikorsky. Bell moved its civilian helicopter production to Canada, with the last U.S. product completed in 1993.2 American Eurocopter—a subsidiary of the European manufacturer and subsidiary of EADS NV—has manufacturing and assembly facilities in Grand Prairie, Texas and Columbus, Missouri. European producers include AgustaWestland, Eurocopter, NHIndustries, and PZL Swidnik. Russian manufacturers including Mil Moscow, Kamov and Kazan helicopters, as well as a number of other rotorcraft related companies, have been consolidated under the Russian government majority-owned OAO OPK Oboronprom.3 (See this report’s Russia
    [Show full text]
  • Romanian Military Attachés in London and Their Diplomatic Value (1919-1939)
    Romanian Military Attachés in London and their Diplomatic Value (1919-1939) Marusia Cîrstea* ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Available Online June 2014 The article emphasizes the fact that the military represented an important Key words: component of the connections between Romania and England in the Romania; interwar period. Military attachés played an important role in maintaining Great Britain; military connections between the two countries: Nicolae Arion, Matila Military attachés; Military objectives; The Romanian General Gheorghiu.Costiescu Ghika,In their Radu diplomatic R. Rosetti, activity Ion theyAntonescu, supported Nicolae the following:Rădescu, Staff. RomaConstantinnia being Sănătescu, recognized Gheorghe in England Niculescu, in actual Gheorghe fact; providing Dumitrescu, good reports Ermil for English businessmen; developing Great Britain’s economic interests in Romania; acquainting Romania with the organization and fighting technique of the British army; closer cooperation between the two armies (British and Romanian); building common military objectives (such as the Ta șaul military port), and others. 1. Introduction The military represented an important component of the connections between London and Bucharest in the interwar period, Romania being interested in developing its military potential with a view to defending its national borders. Examining the political and military circumstances in the area, the Romanian army’s General Staff reached the following conclusion: “Reunited Romania is in a much more difficult situation than in the past, as all its frontiers are threatened by the surrounding states. This threat comes from either a desire for retaliation on the part of Hungary or Bulgaria, who cannot accept being dispossessed of certain territories they owned, or from the propaganda tendencies of the Bolshevik regime, eager to expand its influence as far west as possible”.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Military Thinking and Threat Perception: a Finnish View
    CERI STRATEGY PAPERS N° 5 – Séminaire Stratégique du 13 novembre 2009 Russian Military Thinking and Threat Perception: A Finnish View Dr. Stefan FORSS The author is a Finnish physicist working as Senior Researcher at the Unit of Policy Planning and Research at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and as Adjunct Professor at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University in Helsinki. The views expressed are his own. Introduction “The three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia. And not only for Finland, but for all of us.”1 This quote is from a speech by Finnish Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies in Washington in September 2007. His remarks were immediately strongly criticised as inappropriate and it was pointed out that his view didn’t represent the official position of the Finnish Government. Mr. Häkämies seemed, however, to gain in credibility a month later, when a senior Russian diplomat gave a strongly worded presentation about the security threats in the Baltic Sea area in a seminar organised by the Finnish National Defence University and later appeared several times on Finnish television.2 The message sent was that Finnish membership in NATO would be perceived as a military threat to Russia. This peculiar episode caused cold shivers, as it reminded us of unpleasant experiences during the post-war period. The Russian military force build-up and the war in Georgia in August 2008 was the ultimate confirmation for all of Russia’s neighbours, that the Soviet-style mindset is not a thing of the past.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies
    September 14, 2020 Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies Russia has an extensive internal security system, with Competition frequently leads to arrests and prosecutions, multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies often for real or imagined corruption allegations to undercut vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. targeted organizations and senior leadership both Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s leadership, these institutionally and politically. agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have become integral to the security and stability of the Russian Law Enforcement and Internal government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is Security Agencies and Heads now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in (as of September 2020) the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members Ministry of Interior (MVD): Vladimir Kolokoltsev of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security National Guard (Rosgvardiya, FSVNG): Viktor Zolotov agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the x Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition x Special Rapid Response Detachment (SOBR) after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. x Interior Troops (VV) sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses. x Kadyrovtsy Overview and Context Federal Security Service (FSB): Alexander Bortnikov
    [Show full text]
  • Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 6 November 2018 | OSCE
    11/7/2018 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 November 2018 | OSCE Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 November 2018 KYIV 7 November 2018 This report is for the media and the general public. The SMM recorded more ceasere violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It observed recent damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in residential areas of Staromykhailivka. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasere violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk - close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as near Oleksandrivske, Bezimenne, Zaichenko and Troitske.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasere to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of searches at apartments and oces of two activists. In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasere violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 220), compared with the previous reporting period (about 235 explosions).[2] On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions and 70 projectiles in ight (from west to east), all at an assessed range of 0.5-4km south and south-south-west.
    [Show full text]
  • Polish Battles and Campaigns in 13Th–19Th Centuries
    POLISH BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA 2016 POLISH BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA 2016 Scientific editors: Ph. D. Grzegorz Jasiński, Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz Reviewers: Ph. D. hab. Marek Dutkiewicz, Ph. D. hab. Halina Łach Scientific Council: Prof. Piotr Matusak – chairman Prof. Tadeusz Panecki – vice-chairman Prof. Adam Dobroński Ph. D. Janusz Gmitruk Prof. Danuta Kisielewicz Prof. Antoni Komorowski Col. Prof. Dariusz S. Kozerawski Prof. Mirosław Nagielski Prof. Zbigniew Pilarczyk Ph. D. hab. Dariusz Radziwiłłowicz Prof. Waldemar Rezmer Ph. D. hab. Aleksandra Skrabacz Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz Prof. Lech Wyszczelski Sketch maps: Jan Rutkowski Design and layout: Janusz Świnarski Front cover: Battle against Theutonic Knights, XVI century drawing from Marcin Bielski’s Kronika Polski Translation: Summalinguæ © Copyright by Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita, 2016 © Copyright by Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości, 2016 ISBN 978-83-65409-12-6 Publisher: Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości Contents 7 Introduction Karol Olejnik 9 The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241 and the battle of Legnica Karol Olejnik 17 ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald Zbigniew Grabowski 29 The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 Marek Plewczyński 41 The
    [Show full text]
  • University of Florida Thesis Or Dissertation Formatting
    ETHNIC WAR AND PEACE IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA By SCOTT GRANT FEINSTEIN A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2016 © 2016 Scott Grant Feinstein To my Mom and Dad ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the course of completing this monograph I benefited enormously from the generosity of others. To my committee chair, Benjamin B. Smith, I express my sincere appreciation for his encouragement and guidance. Ben not only taught me to systematically research political phenomena, but also the importance of pursuing a complete and parsimonious explanation. Throughout my doctoral studies Ben remained dedicated to me and my research, and with his incredible patience he tolerated and motivated my winding intellectual path. I thank my committee co-chair, Michael Bernhard, for his hours spent reading early manuscript drafts, support in pursuing a multi-country project, and detailed attention to clear writing. Michael’s appreciation of my dissertation vision and capacity gave this research project its legs. Ben and Michael provided me exceptionally valuable advice. I am also indebted to the help provided by my other committee members – Conor O’Dwyer, Ingrid Kleespies and Beth Rosenson – who inspired creativity and scientific rigor, always provided thoughtful and useful comments, and kept me searching for the big picture. Among institutions, I wish to gratefully acknowledge the support of the Center of European Studies at the University of Florida, IIE Fulbright Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, IREX, the American Councils, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida.
    [Show full text]