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Threats to Russian Democracy and US-Russian Relations

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Threats to Russian Democracy and US-Russian Relations After Chechnya: Threats to Russian Democracy and U.S.-Russian Relations ARIEL COHEN Introduction : All Politics Is Local , Al¡ Foreign Policy Is Domestic Half a year alter Russian tanks rolled into Chechnya, the future of Russian democracy and free markets is under threat. The internal situation in Russia bears a direct influence on Russia's relations with the outside world and the United States. While the world's leaders gather in Moscow to celebrate the victory over Nazism, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is calling for the use of force to "protect" Russian co-ethnics living outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Kozyrev's declarations go beyond mere rhetoric. Russia is introducing its new 58th field army in the Northern Caucasus, in clear and conscious violation of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty, a centerpiece of post-Cold War European security. If Russia is not planning an agressive action either against Ukraine or its Transcaucasus neighbors, why does it need to revise upwards the CFE limitations of 164 tanks and 414 artillery systems? Why was General Alexander Lebed, a self-proclaimed restorer of the old Soviet Union and Commander of the l4th Army in Moldova, applauding Kozyrev? Chechnya became the testing ground for the new Russian policy, both foreign and domestic. The people who engineered it, the so-called Party of War in Moscow, are watching for reactions at honre and abroad to this version of the "last thrust South." The West is facing its greatest challenge since the collapse of communism: how to deal with the Russia that is emerging from under the rubble. How to ensure freedom and democracy for all the peoples of the former Soviet Union. How to foster security and cooperation in Europe. Democracy at Risk The inability of contemporary Russia to reinvent itself as a modern free market, dernocratic nation-state is at the root of the current crisis. The dangers to the democratic development of the Russian Federation include: Bureaucratic Empowerment and the Threat of Communist Restoration. Ten years alter the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika remnants of the Communist Party elite still control the levers of power in the Moscow government as well as in the provinces. They are also in charge of the vast property and natural resources of Russia. Only now this control is not only de facto, but it is also de jure, through privatization.' The old Soviet bureaucracy, with some additions from the lower levels of society, including criminals, is now controlling economic life in Russia. This extends to foreign trade, privatization, and the issuing of business licenses. Russians often say that government bureaucrats, not entrepreneurs, are the richest people in the land. This ex-Communist, bureaucratic elite Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is the Salvatori Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. This article is adapted from his testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on 1 May 1995. 404 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA may have given up Marxist slogans, but it remains deeply committed to state intervention, government regulation, and the unbridled exercise of power. More often then not, Russian nationalism is being touted in place of Marxist internationalism as a cover-up for the same old thing: personal greed. Unsurprisingly, ordinary Russians are deeply disenchanted with the direction the reforms have taken. The majority of the population has lost interest in the political process, as evidenced by the low turnout in the most recent local and regional elections (less than 25 percent). "The old Soviet bureaucracy, Support for political extremista on with some additions from the both the left and right is growing. lower levels of society, Moreover, an increasing number of voters have cast their ballots for including criminals, is now Russian Communist Party (RCP) life in controlling economic candidates in recent elections. The Russia. orthodox communists are running on an anti-government, anti-establishment and anti-corruption platform. The RCP is a favorite for the elections to the Duma, the lower house of the Parliament, upcorning in December of 1995. The Military Wild Card. The Russian military is also disenchanted with the reform process. It strongly opposes a Western-style democracy for Russia and yearns for a ruler with a "strong hand." Military troops voted heavily for ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in December 1993. Today, the military is polarized between the majority of the officer corps and a small (and resented) group of generals around Defense Minister Pavel Grachev who are seen as unprofessional and self-serving. The Russian military feels defeated, and nostalgic for the Soviet period when it enjoyed high status and large budgets. This has been made worse by the war in Chechnya. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have participated in killing and marauding citizens of their own country. In the 1980s, veterans of the Afghan war contributed to the swelling ranks of Russian organized crime. They flooded the extremist nationalist move- ments. This could well be repeated after Chechnya, further destabilizing the feehle Russian democracy.' Authoritarian Renaissance. The Yeltsin administration has done very little to promote the rule of law in Russia. It pushed through the 1993 Constitution establishing an "imperial" presidency, with little but an advisory role for the parliament.' Democratic reformers, such as former Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, Finance Minister Boris Federov, Vice Prime Minister Gennadii Burbulis, Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalev, Ethnic Policy Advisor Galina Starovoitova and many others have been pushed out of the government.' Today, the most influential group in the Kremlin includes Yeltsin's chief of bodyguards, General Alexander Korzhakov, and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, in charge of the military-industrial complex. Even Yeltsin's Chief of Staff, Sergei Filatov, has complained that Helsinki Commission Hearings on Chechnya 405 presidential aides are torced to communicate by writing notes to each other, as their phones and rooms are wire-tapped.5 The political role and powers of Russia's historically strong spy agencies are growing. In September 1994, the External Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki, or SVR), headed by KGB veteran General Evgenii Primakov, published its own policy statement, advocating strengthened Russian domination of the whole area of the former Soviet Union, the so-called "near abroad." According to Primakov's agency, Russia must re-consolidate al] the Newly Independent States under its tutelage regardless of the West's position on this issue. On 6 April 1995, President Yeltsin signed the State Duma law reorganizing " the secret police (then called the Federal The political role and Counterintelligence Service and known powers of Russia's by its Russian acronym, FSK-Federal- historically strong spy nava Sluzhba Kontrazvedki). This agency , agencies are growing." successor to the Second Chief Direc- torate of the KGB, is now called the Fe- deral Security Service (Federalnava Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or FSB). It has heen granted wide powers to conduct investigations and perforen surveillance in total secrecy. The scope of its activities has been broadened to cover a wide range of internal security threats from organized crime to political extremism and corruption. Threats to the Free Media. Veteran analyst Julia Wishnevsky has pointed out the Yeltsin admi- nistration 's success in controlling the electronic media, especially central television. The provincial media is also under heavy pressure from the local chiefs of administration appointed by Yeltsin to toe the line. In late 1993, a former Pravda journalist, Boris Mironov, was appointed chairman of the State Committee on the Press. Before he was fired in the fall of 1994, Mironov funneled huge subsidies to hard -line ultranationalist newspapers. "If to be a Russian nationalist means to be a fascist, then I am a fascist," said Mironov.6 VIad Listyev, Director General of the largest Russian TV network and a popular talk show host, was gunned down in the entrance to his apartment building on 1 March 1995. On 17 October 1994, investigative reporter Dmitrii Kholodov of Moskovskii Koinsomolets was murdered with an exploding briefcase. Kholodov was in the midst of investigating corruption in the military at the time. Others have been slain while investigating organized crime. Journalists in the regions have been tortured and killed. The print media is coming under increasing pressure, as the Moscow government owns the printing presses and manipulates the prices of newsprint and subsidies to newspapers. The Russian government is continuing to play a dubious role in the media scene. It refuses to fully privatize TV stations and printing plants. The official Rossiyska' va Gazeta publishes anonymous attacks on Yeltsin's opponents, such as media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, who has been accused of organizing a "putsch" against Yeltsin. The State Duma has thus far failed to eliminate the right of the government to establish its own media outlets, 406 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, while expanding the list of circumstances under which the government is empowered to shut down independent outlets.7 The Criminalization of Politics. Criminal ties were evident in the recent gangland-style murder of three Duma deputies. Moreover, Russian Interior Ministry experts warn against the ever-growing influence of Russian mafiosi: among law enforcement organs and other organs of power. After [civilian] dispute settlements by criminals, they are befriended by local leaders of the executive and judiciary powers.... For example in the Far East and South of Russia, prominent criminals managed to negatively influence the the majority of organs of interna] affairs, the DA's offices, and the local administration apparatus.8 Thus, whole arcas of Russia are becoming the domain of organized crime. But the Yeltsin administration is notoriously ineffective in fighting crime and corruption. Despite draconian decrees, known criminal figures remain unpunished and free to promote their incendiary political causes.
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