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Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1995-January 1996

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Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, November 1995-January 1996 Missile Developments BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, NOVEMBER 1995-JANUARY 1996 CONTENTS OVERVIEW, 135 CHILE GERMANY ISRAEL with with Internal Developments, 145 AFGHANISTAN Argentina, 137 Eastern Europe, France and with with Canada, Malaysia, Iraq, 138 Italy, PRC, and Russia, 145 Tajikistan, 137 Mauritius, Philippines, and United Nations, 140 Russia, 145 ARGENTINA Vietnam, 138 South Korea, 146 INDIA with Switzerland, 146 CYPRUS Internal Developments, 140 Chile, 137 Syria, 146 with with United States, 146 AUSTRALIA Turkey and United States, 138 Pakistan, 141 with Pakistan and United ITALY EASTERN EUROPE Russia, 137 States, 141 with with Russia, 142 France and United France, Germany, and AUSTRIA Kingdom, 139 Iraq, 138 IRAN with Israel, PRC, and Russia, 145 Iraq, Jordan, and Internal Developments, 142 ECUADOR Pakistan, PRC, and Russia, 137 with with Russia, 147 PRC, 143 Peru, 139 BELARUS Russia, 143 JAPAN United Kingdom, 139 with Internal Developments, 147 Russia, 137 IRAQ EGYPT with Sudan, 137 Internal Developments, 143 with PRC, 147 with United States, 139 United States, 147 BELGIUM Austria, Jordan, and with FRANCE Russia, 137 JORDAN Iraq, South Africa, United with Belgium, South Africa, with Kingdom, and United Eastern Europe, Germany, United Kingdom and Austria, Iraq, and Russia, 137 States, 137 and Iraq, 139 United States, 137 Iraq, 144 BULGARIA Italy and United Kingdom, 139 Eastern Europe, France, Iraq and Russia, 144 Internal Developments, 138 Kuwait, 139 and Germany, 138 Iraq, Russia, and United with Malaysia, 139 Jordan, 144 States, 145 Russia, 139 Jordan and Russia, 144 Peru, 138 KAZAKSTAN Taiwan, 140 Jordan, Russia, and United with CANADA United Arab Emirates, 140 States, 145 Russia, 148 with Russia, 145 Chile, Malaysia, Mauritius, Russia and United States, 148 Philippines, and Vietnam, 138 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 133 Missile Developments KUWAIT RUSSIA TAIWAN Israel, 146 with Internal Developments, 154 Internal Developments, 158 Japan, 147 France, 139 with with Kazakstan and Russia, 148 Russia, 148 Australia, 137 France, 140 North Korea, 149 Austria, Iraq, and PRC, 152 PRC, 154 MALAYSIA Jordan, 137 PRC and United States, 153 PRC and Taiwan, 153 Internal Developments, 149 Belarus, 137 United States, 158 Russia, 156 with France, 139 South Korea, 157 Canada, Chile, Mauritius, THAILAND India, 142 Taiwan, 158 Philippines, and Vietnam, 138 with Iran, 143 Thailand, 159 France, 139 United States, 159 Iraq, 145 Turkey, 159 South Africa, 149 Iraq and Jordan, 144 TURKEY Ukraine, 160 United Kingdom, 149 Iraq, Jordan, and United with United Arab Emirates, 160 NORTH KOREA States, 145 Cyprus and United VIETNAM Internal Developments, 149 Israel, 145 States, 138 with with Israel, Italy, and PRC, 145 United States, 159 Canada, Chile, Malaysia, United States, 149 Italy, Pakistan, and Mauritius, and PRC, 147 UKRAINE Philippines, 138 OMAN Kazakstan, 148 Internal Developments, 159 with with Kazakstan and United YEMEN United Kingdom, 149 PRC, 153 States, 148 Internal Developments, 161 Russia, 155 PAKISTAN Kuwait, 148 United States, 160 Internal Developments, 149 PRC, 151 with South Korea, 155 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES India, 144 Ukraine, 155 Internal Developments, 160 India and United States, 144 United States, 156 with Italy, PRC, and Russia, 147 SOUTH AFRICA France, 140 United Kingdom, 160 PERU Internal Developments, 157 United States, 160 Internal Developments, 150 with with Belgium, Iraq, United UNITED KINGDOM Bulgaria, 138 Kingdom, and United Belgium, Iraq, South Ecuador, 139 States, 137 Africa, and United Malaysia, 149 States, 137 PRC Ecuador, 139 Internal Developments, 150 SOUTH KOREA France and Italy, 139 with with Malaysia, 149 Iran, 143 Israel, 146 Oman, 149 Israel, Italy, and Russia, 145 Russia, 155 United Arab Emirates, 160 Italy, Pakistan, and United States, 157 Russia, 147 SPAIN UNITED NATIONS Japan, 147 with with Russia, 151 PRC, 151 Germany, 140 Spain, 151 UNITED STATES Taiwan, 152 SWITZERLAND Internal Developments, 161 Taiwan and United with with States, 153 Israel, 146 Belgium, Iraq, South Ukraine, 153 SYRIA Africa, and United United States, 153 with Kingdom, 137 Israel, 146 Cyprus and Turkey, 138 Egypt, 139 India and Pakistan, 141 Iraq, Jordan, and Russia, 145 134 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Missile Developments OVERVIEW The acquisition, development, and deployment activities In reaction to the perceived missile threat from Iraq of India and Iraq dominated the missile proliferation head- and other states in the Middle East, the United States lines between November 1995 and January 1996. Specula- agreed to jointly fund Israel’s Arrow-2 ATBM system tion over India’s potential stationing of nuclear-capable for an additional five years; the United States and Israel missiles along its border with Pakistan intensified due to will contribute $200 and $300 million respectively. U.S.- reports that the 150 km-range Prithvi-1 SSM was nearing Israeli cooperation in the missile defense field is sched- deployment. This was sustained by India’s Bharatiya Janata uled to include a boost-phase-intercept (BPI) element in Party (BJP), which pressured Prime Minister Narasimha the near future, which envisages the use of interceptor Rao’s ruling Congress Party to establish a strong position on missiles mounted on board UAVs and/or manned air- defense issues—including the testing and deployment of the craft to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles in their boost Prithvi SSM—in the run-up to the country’s general elec- phase. Cyprus also announced that it was contemplating tions in April and May. The successful test-flight of a 250 the acquisition of ATBM and other missile systems in km-range Prithvi-2 SSM at the Defense Research and De- response to the Clinton administration’s decision to pro- velopment Organization’s (DRDO) Interim Test Range did vide Turkey with 160 km-range Army Tactical Missile little to quell this conjecture. Although Islamabad described Systems (ATACMS). The White House defended the the test of this “Pakistan-specific” missile as an ominous transfer by citing Turkey’s proximity to potentially hos- development that will contribute to instability in the region, tile states such as Iran and Iraq, while the U.S. State New Delhi claimed that Pakistani and international criti- Department claimed ATACMS would not be used against cism of the trial was an overreaction. India’s missile pro- Cyprus because the transfer included significant con- gram also progressed with the successful test-flight of a tractual constraints to restrict such usage. Trishul anti-aircraft SAM; the Trishul might also have an Developments elsewhere also illustrated the growing anti-missile capability because of its short reaction time be- saliency of missile defenses. Despite China’s publica- tween target detection and launch. tion of a “White Paper on Arms Control and Disarma- In the Middle East, Iraq persevered with its efforts to ment,” in which the nuclear powers were warned against acquire U.N.-proscribed, missile-related components and selling “guided missile defense systems” to China’s manufacturing technology from companies in Europe. neighbors, several East Asian nations demonstrated their Baghdad’s illicit procurement strategy was typified by the increasing commitment to the acquisition of missile de- interception in Jordan of an estimated $25 million shipment fenses. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) allocated of 115 Russian-made gyroscopes en route to Iraq. Although $2.85 million for concept studies on the research and the Russian government denied vehemently any involvement development of a theater missile defense (TMD) system in the shipment, U.S. Representative Curt Weldon requested with the United States. As a hedge against the perceived an investigation by the Clinton administration to determine missile threat from North Korea, South Korea was whether Moscow had violated its membership in the Missile eyeing the Russian S-300 air-defense system. Taiwan Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Inside Iraq, also forged ahead with its deployment of the indigenously- UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission in Iraq) re- produced Sky Bow-1 SAM system and the development ported that it could only account for 70 of the engines from of its successor, the Sky Bow-2. the 80 Scud-type propulsion systems that Iraq produced be- In the United States, the Republican-controlled Con- fore the Gulf War (53 of which are now inoperable). In light gress took issue with a CIA estimate that downplayed of these developments, UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus asserted the potential threat posed to North America by North that Iraq’s declarations regarding its missile program re- Korean and Iranian ballistic missile programs. Repub- main incomplete and inaccurate. Indeed, an Israel Defense lican critics characterized the estimate as a politically- Force (IDF) report asserted that Iraq’s arsenal will probably motivated ploy by the White House to undermine support include 10 Scud launchers and approximately 150 Scud mis- for a national missile defense system. Meanwhile, the siles by the year 2000. Clinton administration engaged Pyongyang in talks aimed The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 135 Missile Developments at ending North Korean missile exports. The administra- tion also continued in its dialogue with Seoul regarding South Korea’s desire to abrogate its agreement with the United States to refrain from developing missiles with ranges exceeding 180 km and its possible membership in the MTCR. Wyn Bowen and Holly Porteous NOTE: A date marked with an “*” indicates that an event was reported on that date; a date without an “*” is the date when an event actually occurred. The numbers listed in parentheses following the biblio- graphic references refer to the identification number of the document in the CNS Missile Database from which the news summaries are abstracted. Because of the rapidly changing nature of the subject matter, The Nonprolifera- tion Review is unable to guarantee that the information reported herein is complete or accurate, and disclaims li- ability to any party for any loss or damage caused by er- rors or omissions.
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