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The Military and United States Indian Policy 1865-1903 ROBERT WOOSTER

Yale University P ress New H aven and London

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....--:­ Introduction

In 1893, FrederickJackson Turner proclaimed the close of the Amer­ ican frontier to his colleagues at the American HistOrical Association meeting. This speech, which offered a fresh view of American his­ tory, established Turner's reputation, and he went on to become the preeminent American histOrian of the early twentieth century. In addition to arguing that the frontier explained the uniqueness of the American character and acted as a "safety valve" for American liberty, Turner maintained in a series of books, articles, and speeches that sectionalism was fundamental to American development and life. Eager students and disciples, mOst nOtably Ray Allen Billing­ ton, refined and added to Turner's frontier thesis and sought in particular to examine the W est as a distinct, identifiable region of the United States.' Critics, however, launched a series of counterattacks against the Turnerians in the 1930s, assailing Turner's overgeneraliza­ tions, his "safety valve" concept, and his tendency tOward over­ statement. Earl Pomeroy in particular pointed to the significance of imported cultural traits rather than geography in affecting frontier life . Pomeroy also rebuked western histOrians for limit-

l. A good selection of Turner's essays may be foun d in Turner, Frontier and SeeliGII. For BillingtOn, see Billington, America'!, Frontier Heritage. 2 Introduction Introduction 3 ing their interests and examinations to things purely western and Countless books and articles have documented the western conflict for failing to recognize the enormous importance of outside influ­ between whites and Indians after the Civil W ar. To adequately ences. Stressing the need to integrate the W est into a wider COn­ understand these clashes, however, it is necessary to analyze the (ext, Pomeroy noted the federal government's importance in roblem within the larger context of the politics of the Gilded Age, western affairs. Seizing the initiative, scholars like Howard La­ ~he role of the federal government, and the American military tra­ mar conducted a series of studies that examined this federal in­ dition. As such, this book is divided into tWO parts, the first Out­ 2 fluence on the western states and territOries. lining in a thematic fashion the major problems and issues facing Not only the American West but the United States as a whole the army, the second describing the army's western experiences between 1865 and 1900 has been the subject of intense study. between 1865 and 1903.5 Anacking the tendency of earlier scholars to dismiss the Gilded Age The first chapter describes the American military after 1865, as a "great barbecue" marked by scandals and unabashed profiteering, concentrating on administrative problems, the army's varied re­ histOrians like H. Wayne Morgan have attempted to point Out the sponsibilities, and the special difficulties posed by western Indians. political and economic growth experienced during the period. Others Chapter 2 gives brief portraits of the army's senior Indian fighters have reevaluated the presidents of this era, arguing that these men after 1865, stressing the cultural constraints within which they were more than simply political buffoons or puppets manipulated worked. The third chapter focuses on the regional and national by cagey, unscrupulous underlings and people with wealth and political problems which further hindered the development of con­ power. 3 sistent policy. Using the framework established in ehe first three Related to discussions of both the Gilded Age and the West are chapters, Chapters 4 through 6 analyze the western campaigns. The the issues of Indian policy and the army. Again, histOrians have conclusion explores America's post-Civil War Indian conflicts in the recognized that these affairs rarely fit neat stereotypes . As Francis light of broader military experience, paying special emphasis to the Paul Prucha and Robert Utley have explained, the Indian-chasing connections between these wars and the colonial wars ofother nations cavalry of popular myth represents only a small portion of the army's during the latter third of the nineteenth century. role in the West. They have also noted that the army's trea.tment Throughout this work, I will concentrate on the military'S futile of Indians was too complex to be explained by the sole motive of attempts to construct a consistent policy aimed at controlling the extermination. On a strategic level, Russell Weigley and others have conllicrs with western Indians . Focusing on the War Department's dealt with post- 1865 military practices largely in terms of the Civil overall military efforts in the post-Civil W ar period, and more War. Weigley argues that generals, conditioned by their Civil War to experiences, sought apply doctrines of tOtal war against hostile 5· For extensive bibliog raphies of the Indian-white co nflicts, see Urley, Indian 4 Indians. Frontier, 295-306; and Hutron, " Indians' Lasr Srand." On overall sr raregy: Mar­ shall. Crimsoned Prairie . is inadequare. Much berrer is Ueley. Frontier Regulars, 2. Taylor, ed., Turner Thesis; Pomeroy, "Reorienrarion of W esrern Hisrory"; although Urley is more concerned wirh rhe army's experience and performance in Lamar, Dakota T erritory. rhe Wesr rhan in srraregy . Among rhe more general srudies of milirary srraregy, 3. Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley. See also Gould, William McKinley, and Weigley. AlIle>'ican IVay of War. 153-63. is nor as srrong on rhe Indian wars as Doenecke, Garfield and Arthur. on other eras of America's milirary hisrory; Huntingron. Soldier and the State, is 4 . Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet; Udey, Frontimmen in Blue; Weigley , American good but now somewhar dated; Williams. Hiflory of American Wars. 30 3- J 6 , is Way o/War. solid but brief. as is Millerr and Maslowski, Common Defmse, 23 2 -49. 4 introduction Introduction 5 particularly on high-ranking government and army officials, this The United States Army was truly a "child of the frontier. .. 6 The book will discuss specific weapons, treaties, and battles only as they arm,Y organized in the early days of the republic to protect pioneer pertain to the larger picture. To a lesser extent, I will assess the senlers from Indian attack, was called upon to perform increasingly army's role in the near extermination of the buffalo , as well as the diftiL ult tasks throughout the nineteenth century. Yet the regular connections between the nation's experiences with its own indige­ military establishment grew slowly and proved unable to maintain nous cultures and its later strategy toward guerillas and insurrec­ ,\ consistent presence along the nation's vast fro[ui ers . H igh-level tionists during the occupation of the Philippines. military officials rarely focused their full attentio n on Indian warfare, W hile noting the importance of the frontier environment to army an omission that further compounded the difficulties of the frontier policy-makers, I would like to stress the influence of the federal regulars. And although many Americans voiced their opi ni ons on government on western affa irs. The importance of post-1865 politics Indian relations , comparatively few studied the issue with any par­ in the formulation of the army's Indian policy is also clear. Although ticular intensity. Consequently, the army, composed of poorly-paid the politic ians and issues of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age enlistees and officers of uneven abilities, was often the federal gov­ deserve serious attention, few individuals of national prominence ernment's sole agent in the trans-Mississippi \X'est. cared a great deal about Indian affairs. And while acknowledging The small regular for ce faced many difficulties in the pre-Civil that the strategies employed in the Civil W ar have some similarity War West. Its primary objectives included protecting settlers, de­ with large-scale operations against the Indians, the vastly different fending emigrant routes, and occ upying new territory. The army political, environmental, cultural, and tactical co nditions found in also tried to shield smaller Indian tribes against attacks by more these conflicts make sweeping generalizations about their direct con­ powerful tribes or, in a few cases, from threats by whites. Its chief nections extremely tenuous . problems stemmed from the wide disparity of Indian groups it dealt The army's Indian policies after 1865 should not be considered with, the vast distances and expanding boundaries it was supposed entirely in light of Civil W ar experiences, and labels of tcrror, to guard, and a Congress and ci tizenry reluctant to increase military annihilation and extermination, though applicable in certain in­ spending. 7 stances, do not adequately describe military actions agai nst Indians The military had made some progress in the W est prior to 1865­ in the latter nineteenth century. The elements affecting military The army gained at least superficial knowledge of western Indians, policy during the period were much more complex than is generally many of whom differed g reatly fro m the more sedentary groups acknowledged. A wide variety of issues, including politics, percep­ previously encountered in the East. In addition, it established the tions of the western environment, railroad building, international basic organizational and ad ministrative Structure that would func­ rclations , clashes between the W ar and Interi or departments, per­ tion in the West after 1865 . A number of forts were constructed, sonal disputes, and misconceptions among whites about Native but only rarely were they consciously designed as part of a compre­ Americans all influenced the military'S operations against Indians hensive defense system . Finally, whereas offensives against certain after 1865. W hile the goals of subjugation, removal, and accultur­ ation remained constant, the means by which they were to be 6. Prucha, Sword of the Repllblic , 394. achieved differed markedly throughout the last half of the century. 7· To i1!usrrare the effect of intertribal disputes on Indian-white warfare, see This interplay of factors sheds new light on the much-debated subject Ewers, "Intertribal Warfare." For a more comp[cte study of pre-1860 strategy, see of Indian-white relations. WOOster , "Military Strategy in the American W est, 1815-1860," 25 6- 62 . 6 Introduction Introduction 7

tribes were recognized as necessary, experience had largely discred_ JIne,. which he envisioned to be near the 98th meridian. The next ited the idea that roving columns should replace stationary POSts as secretary of war, John B. Floyd (1857-61), reac hed a similar the basis for frontier defense. 8 conclusion, though he pressed for a larger number of smaller-sized Government and military planners had proposed a variety of l o garrisons . . . means through which the army might control hostile indians. Perceptions of the Amencan W est played a large part In these The creation of a geographic barrier was a commonly voiced solu­ developments . Secretary of W ar John C. Calhoun (r817-25), an tion. While still dominant in North America, England had tried avowed expansionist , had envisioned the terrirory gained in the to create such a permanent frontier line along the Appalachian Louisiana Purchase as a region of future prosperity. H e believed the Mountains in the Proclamation of 1763. Secretaries of W ar Hen­ potentially most productive areas needed ro be occupied by whites

ry Knox (1789-95) and Timothy Pickering (1795-96), General and thus pushed for more military appropriations. II By contrast, James W ilkinson, and soldier-exploret William Clark hoped to Secretary of War Charles Conrad (r 850-5 3) deemed the N ew Mexico establish a line of forts JUSt ahead of western settlement. In the Terrirory a barren desert not worth the cost of defense. Following early r 800s, President Thomas Jefferson thought the Mississippi the reports ofLt. Col. Edwin V. Sumner, Conrad urged that settlers River a suitable border 9 Some years later, Secretary of War be moved our of the worthless area to regions where cheaper, more

Lewis Cass (r 831- 3 7) wanted ro construct a military road sup­ effective protection might be provided. 02 ported by a series of fortifications from Fort Towson along the A number of people proposed plans for western defense. Noting Red River ro Fort Snelling, on the Mississippi River-what he that the federal government's weak line of forts had fa iled to prevent believed was the permanent line of division between whites and In­ Indian intrusions, many officials believed that military offensives dians. His successor, Joel R . Poinsett (1837- 41), proposed a dou­ were necessary to overawe hostile tribes . Such punitive expeditions ble line of fixed posts along a similar position. As settlers moved achieved only mixed success. Columns led by Josiah Harmar and further west, some military officials believed the "Great Ameri­ Arthur St. Clair suffered shocking losses in a series of fights along can Desert" was inhospitable to whites and presumed that a per­ the Maumee and Wabash rivers in I790 bur were somewhat avenged manent Indian frontier might be created along the edges of arable by Anthony Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers four years later. land. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis (1853-57) was certain William Henry Harrison and Andrew Jackson infliCted further de­ that white settlement had reached its limits in western North feats upon Indians during the War of 18 r 2. William Clark con­ America; he suggested that several permanent forts defend this cluded that Indians must be set against each other: "encouraging {sic] of War among the Indian Tribes, is cruel," he wrote, "but the

8. Utley , FmntielJme1i in Blue, 341-46. For Smith's views , see Smith to Freeman, July 19, 1853, in Crimmins, ed., "Freeman's Repon ," 215. 10. W Oos ter, "Military Strategy in the Southwest, 1848-[860"; RepOrt of 9· Knox to W ashi ngton, Dec. 29 , £784, America'} State Papers: Indian Affairs Davis , Dec. [ , U.S. Secretary of War, Annual Reports (hereafter ci ted as SW, AR), [856. 5-8. 1:534-35 ; Pickering to Comminee on the Military Establishment, Feb. 3, [796 , U.S. Congress, America ,} State Papers: Military A//airs (hereafter cited as ASP: MAl 1 r. Calhoun to Jackson, Mar. 6. 1819, Jameson, ed .• Calho",} Con. 15 3-54; J 12-[3; Wilkinson to Hamilton, Sept. 6, 1799, Syren, ed. , Hamilton Papers Calhou n to Smyth, Dec. 29. [819. ASP: MA 2:33-34. 23:377-93; Osgood, cd., Field Notes 0/ Clark, [88; Prucha, Sword 0/ the Republic, 12. Repon of Sumner. May 27, SW. AR. 1852. 23-25; Report of Conrad. Dec . 4. ibid. , 5. 84-85. 8 Introduction Introduction 9 situation of chis Country has been such, chac I found myself com­ frontier postS be abandoned in favor of larger forts along the edges pelled co promoce a War amongst the Indians. " 13 of civilization. Although these advocates of concenttation presented Several secrecaries of war agreed chat offensive operations were strong theoretical cases, in actual practice the army remained widely ·necessary. Calhoun and Cass strongly favored these expeditions, as scattered during the pre-Civil War era. , 6 did cheir successors of the early I840s. They hoped that Strong Recognizing the nation's opposition CO a large standing army, military columns dispatched into Indian lands might intimidace the most policymakers soughc to increase the efficiency of existing forces . tribes and bring them to che peace table. Yet as warfare continued Secretary of War W illiam H . Crawford (1815-17) spent most of co plague America's frontiers , accive campaigning west of che Mis­ his twO years in office reorganizing the high command in an effort sissi ppi became increasingly violent. Charles Conrad wanted to "to rid the army of old women and blockheads, ac least on the launch offensives intended not merely co intimidate but to srrike general staff." 17 John C. Calhoun, also wary of the streng ch of directly ac the Indians' homelands. The scarcity of trOOps hampered opinion opposed co a large permanent establishment, advocated an Conrad's efforts, but an 1855 increase in army manpower made "expansible" army with a high ratio of officers in the standing units. offensives more practical. Dav is and Floyd organized several powerful Volunteers could flesh our the skeletal force of trained officers in campaigns, che latter eventually recognizing che value of infantry case of emergency . Calhoun hoped, as did Cass in a later period , as well as cavalry raids. 14 that a more proficient force might mask the deficiencies stemming The disposition of available manpower was an ever-present ques­ from its small size. 18 tion for military authorities. General Alexander Hamilcon wanted Virtually everyone associated wich strategic policy recognized the to concentrate the frontline garrisons as circumstances permitted but need co reduce transportation costs. Advance frontiet OutpOSts were stressed che importance of maintaining a scrong force in reserve. often built at the heads of navigation of major rivers, and army

President George WashingtOn supported this proposed reserve, al­ expeditions followed water routes whenever possible. '9 But most chough he disagreed on its proper location. 15 Arguing that the army war secretaries also strove co improve land transportacion and allowed was tOO dispersed, Secretaries of War James Barbout (1825-28) and troops co be used in building roads and bridges . Going a step further , Poinsett sought co collect a strong reserve at St. Louis. Davis agreed Lewis Cass envisaged a major military road built parallel to the thac che trOOps were coo spread Out; he proposed that many tiny frontier. The road , as the centerpiece of Cass's proposed western strategy, was intended co deter Indian attacks. Yet Cass's successot, 13. Clark co Graham, Aug. 28, 1817 , Carrer and POHer, eds . , Terr. Papen Joel Poinsett, wanted the transportation arteries to run petpendiculat 10:301 -3. 14. Calhoun (0 Arkinson, Mar. 27 , 181 9, Jameson, ed. , Calhoun Carr., 159 ; Calhoun ro Long, Mar. 8,1819, Hemphill er aI. , eds., Calhoun Papm 3:639-40; 16 . Reporr of Barbour, Nov. 28, 1826, ASP: MA Y330; Reporr of Poinsere, Ca lhoun co Cass, Jan. 14 , Feb . 25, 1820, ibid., 4:573-74 , 684; Calhoun co Dec. 30, 18 37, ibid. , 7:777- 78; Poinserr ro Linn, Jan. I I, 18 39, N ar ional Arkinson, Dec. 19, 1820, Carrer and POHer, eds ., Ten'. Papers 1s:684-85; Reporr Archives, Lereers Sene by rhe Secrerary of War Relari ng co Milirary Affairs (hereafrer ofCass, Nov . 29, 18 .B, ASP. MA 5:170; Reporr ofCass, Nov. 30, 1835, ibid. , cired as LS, SW), 20; Reporr of Davis, Dec. I, SW, AR, 18 53, 5- 6. 627; Conrad co Sumner, Apr. I , SW, AR , 185 1, 125-26; Conrad ro Smirh, ibid., 17· Crawford ro Gallarin, Sept. 22, 18 I 3, Adams, ed., Gattatin Writings 1:5 83. I 17 - 18; Reporr of Harney, Sept. 5, SW, AR, 1855 , 49-5 I; Reporr of Floyd , 18. Reporr of Calhoun, Dec. 12, 1820, ASP: MA 2: 188-9 I; Spiller, "Calhoun's Oct. 5, ibid., 1857, 3-5; Floyd ro Nichols, July 9, ibid., 1860,60. Expansible Army." 15. Hamilron co Washingcon, Sept. 9, 1799, Syrerr , ed., Hamilton Papen 19· Woosrer , "Milirary Srraregy in rhe Trans-Miss iss ippi Wesr," 258-59. See 2Y404; W ashingron co H amilcon, Sepr. IS , 1799, ibid., 417-20. also Hill, Roads, Rails, and Waterways. 10 Introduction Introduction 11 to the frontier, connecting western outposts with supply bases to benefits of Christianity to the Indians. The central government under the East. Later military leaders saw railroads as the army's ansWer the Articles of Confederation and the new constitution hoped to to the transportation and communication problems. Jefferson Davis's convince Indians to follow standards of behavior acceptable to whi te 'role in securing one million dollars for a series of railroad surveys Americans. To most leaders these altruistic motives did not seem is well documented; less publicized were the earlier efforts of Gen. inconsistent with the more tangible goal of securing title ro tribal 2 0 Edmund p. Gaines and the subsequent work of John Floyd. lands. While seeking on the one hand to "civilize" the so-called Despite such schemes, pre-Civil War leaders never developed a savages, they sought at the same time ro exploit the Native American consistent, long-range military strategy against Indians. Admit­ for his land and resources . Few recognized the contradictions in­ tedly, changing frontier conditions made such planning difficult. herent in this position or admitted that racism would prevent the The continual turnover of personnel in the War Deparrment also proper execurion of all but the most careful plans. Still fewer were contributed to the lack of clear policy. But the secretaries of war, willing to give the subjeCt their full attention. To those in power, with the exceptions of Calhoun, Davis, and perhaps Poinsett, were other questions of government, economics, and society appeared themselves men of indifferent abilities. Often selected for overtly much more pressing than the Indian iss ue. 22 political reasons, they betrayed a critical lack of imagination and In the absence of alternative solutions, Thomas Jefferson's plan originality. Their advisors frequently had similar shortcomings. for removal became a cornersrone of federal Indian policy. Claiming Even such able generals as Winfield SCOtt found power struggles that the process would benefit both whites and Indians, he and other and personality clashes within the army more absorbing than the leaders argued that the nation's frontiers could best be protected by elaboration and execution of Indian policy. The army's difficulties removing Indians from settled areas. While some whites sought to in the Second Seminole War, during which a few thousand Indians ease the displacement process, this policy, conducted poorly and tied up stronger regular and volunteer forces in Florida for seven wirhout proper appropriations or foresight, inevitably led to enor­ years (r835-42), were almost predictable in light of such internal mous suffering. Even removal became subject to divided government controversies. 21 jurisdiction; in r 849 the Office of Indian Affairs was transferred The nation's overall Indian policy suffered from similar problems. from the War Department to the newly created Department of the British and colonial American officials had wanted to bring the Interior. Because the War Department retained control over military removal of Indians to reservations, this transfer divided authority 20. Nelso n, "Military Roads for W ar and Peace"; Prucha, Sword ofthe Republic, over the Indian problem into twO departments, making each even 185; Crawford to J ackson, Mar. 6,1816, Bassett, ed ., j ackson Carr. 2:235; Report more susceptible to the claims of special interest g roups and further of Calhoun , Jan. 7,1819 , Hemphill et aI., eds. , Calhoun Papm 3A61-72; Cass 23 to Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Feb. 19 , 1836, ASP: MA 6:15°-5 2 ; hampering attempts to develop a consistent policy . Report of Poinsett, Dec. 30, 1837, ibid., J:777-78; Gaines, "A Plan for rhe The same year, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown Defe nce of the Wesrern Fronrier," Feb. 28, r838, House Doc. No. 311, 25 th proposed that Plains Ind ians should live on clearly defined reser­ Cong., 2nd sess. , ser. 329, 1-12; Reporr of Davis, Dec. 1, SW, AR, 1853,23; varions free of unauthorized white intrusions. Some tribes were to Davis to Sandridge, J an. 29, 18 56, LS, SW, 37:347-49; Floyd to Pope, May 5, be removed to these designated areas, thus continuing earlier policy. 1857, ibid., 39A9-52; Floyd to Shields, Mar. 16, 18 58 , ibid. , 40:96-97; Floyd to Brown , June 9, 1858, ibid. : 25 1. 21. Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civiliam, 136-44, has a good acco unr of rhese 22. Berkhofer. V(lhite Man's Indian, 134- 66. dispures. 23· Ibid.; Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction. 12 introduction Chapter One T he army was to police reservation boundaries. Mili tary officials of ·the 1850S warmly embraced the reservation system, although the The Military after 1865 extent of the army's legal and moral jurisdiction in reservation affairs remained unsettled for decades. 24 The option of using force to deal with Indians in the United States was seldom questioned. It was generally conceded that those tribes that chall enged the government's authority had to be crushed before they could be taught the vi rtues of Anglo-American civili­ zation. Yet the changing shape of the frontier, the instability and dearth of creativity in W ar Department leadership, and the absence After the mighty Union armies defe ated the eleven rebellious Con­ of interested, competent advisors prevented the development of last­ federate states, most of the weary veterans soon began readjusting ing military strategy or policy in the trans-Mississippi W est before to civilian life , but a few soldiers remained in a reg ular army that the Civil War. Few prominent officials found this particularly trou­ faced a military situation far different from that of the Civil W ar.' blesome; mos t real ized that Indians posed no real threat to national For the next four decades , scattered in more than tWO hundred small securi ty. As no emergency existed, nei ther army officers nor gov­ posts throughout the co untry, America's armed forces struggled to ernment officials found it necessary ro work out comprehensive doc­ define and implement a general policy applicable in vastly differing trines to be used in dealing with Indians. environments and against widely diss imilar Indian tribes. The m il­ itary'S primary task was to cope with Indians, but other develop­ ments-Reconstruction, civil disputes, international problems, and

I. Glatrhaar, March to the Sea, 180-82; Weig1ey, H istory of the Uniled Siaies /\"'1/), 262.

24. Trennerr, Allemative to Extinction.

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