sign in sign up
<<
Home , Noumenon

DICTIONARY

OF AND PSYCHOLOGY

INCLUDING

MANY OF THE PRINCIPAL CONCEPTIONS OP , , , PHILOSOPHY OP RELIGION, MENTAL PATHOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, BIOLOGY, NEUROLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL AND , PHILOLOGY, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, AND EDUCATION

AND GIVING

A TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN

WRITTEN BY MANY HANDS AND EDITED BY JAMES MARK BALDWIN Ph.D. (Princeton), Hon. DSo. (Oxon.), Hon. LLD. (Glasgow) STUART PROFESSOR IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

WITH THE CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF CONSULTING EDITORS

IN THREE VOLUMES

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXTENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHIES

VOL. I

jJ2eto gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY ILonHon MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited

1901 K

KAMES — KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

' Karnes, Lord: see Home, Henry. tality of the Soul —and in the theory of the Kant, Immannel. (17 24-1 804.) Born, or contradictions which reason lived, and died at Konigsberg. Studied falls into in applying the of infinity ; theology, philosophy, and mathematics in the (5) the recognition of the validity of the ideas University at Konigsberg. Engaged as of reason as postulates of the moral life (practi private tutor, 1746—55. Became doctor of cal reason). These features at least should be philosophy and Docent in the University in included in , though any one of them 1 755i »nd professor of logic and would justify the use of the adjective Kantian. Biblioq. in 1770. In 1797 his age compelled him to Literature: see Criticism, and ' ' retire. See the following topics ; also Ideal A, Kant ; in English, especially the works ism, , and Philosophy. by Stirling, Caird, and Watson; for German Kantian Philosophy : see Kant's Ter citations see Eisler, Wijrterb. d. philos. minology. Begriffe, in locis; a study of Kant's Psy Kantian Terminology: see Kant's chology has been made by Buchnbb, Terminology. Monog. Suppl. (No. 4) to the Psychol. Rev. ; Kantianism (or Kantism): Ger.Kantian- a Kant Bibliography is by Adickes, Monog. ismus; Fr. Kantianism* ; Ital. Kantismo, Suppl., i, to the Philos. Rev. (j.m.b.) Kantianiamo. The philosophy which holds to Kantism : see Kantianism. the distinctive doctrines of . Kant's Terminology (in relation to the See Kant's Terminology, and the principal Kantian Philosophy). philosophical topics generally. (1) At the outset of the history of philo The features of Kant's philosophy, which sophical terminology, amongst the Greeks, the have given name to later thought as Kantian, problem of the thinker was to adapt his are mainly (1) the critical method, which native language to the novel business of ex ' ' consists in a criticism of reason (Vernunfts- pressing philosophical ideas. The word and vermogen) with a view to discovering the the conception then often came into a priori elements in knowledge ; (2) the together. The power of mere tradition was doctrine of a priori mental forms, which, at its minimum. Creation was relatively as a theory of knowledge, is characterized as free. At the outset, however, of the efforts formalism; (3) the resulting antithesis between of modern philosophers to discuss their ' the phenomenal,' or that world of things or problems in the vernacular tongues, the appearances to which these forms are applied, situation was wholly different. An elaborate, ' and the noumenal,' or that world of things and in fact often extremely difficult ter in themselves, the transcendental thought- minology, the result of several successive postulates, to which the forms do not apply, great movements of human thought—the ter — and which (4) are consequently unknowable ; minology of stood in the way this is the agnostic element in Kantianism, of novelty in expression. The modern thinker especially as developed with reference to the sometimes, like Locke, endeavoured to escape ' ideas of reason — God, Freedom, and Immor altogether from this tradition, and was then 588 KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

' driven, by this very effort, into a certain Kant's works, e. g. in the Deduction of the ' disorganization of technical language, which, Categories in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, upon occasion, gave to his terms a capricious where the terminology alters in the course of seeming, without freeing them altogether from the same discussion. Such changes are doubt the influence of the past. Locke's struggles less often due to Kant's habit of making up with the term Substance furnish an instance his longer works out of fragments, which of the resulting inconveniences. Or again, were written down at various times, and like Meister Eckhart, or in another way and afterwards collected and ordered. But the time, like Wolff, one might make a systematic result, as we find it in Kant's printed text, effort to find translations for a great number is often baffling enough. His usage in such of terms of scholastic origin. The result cases seems to be in a sort of Heraclitean varied according to the genius of the thinker. flux, so that we do not twice step into the But in any such case this latter procedure same river of expression while we wander in was at least guided by a definite principle. search of the thought. New terms arose, to be sure, side by side with (3) A thorough history of Kant's termino the old. But the process attempted to win logy is still to be written. Much of im a certain unity and continuity. portance is already to be found in the (2) In the case of Kant, however, the authoritative, but too diffuse, Commenlar zu situation is still far more complex and pro Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, by Pro blematic than that present at the outset of fessor Hans Vaihinger, of which two volumes ii, ; . Comparable though he have so far appeared (i, Stuttgart, 1881 is, in originality of conception, with the great 1892). But the most important portions of thinkers of antiquity, Kant cannot, like a the Kritik and of its terminology still await or an , freely invent terms, in their treatment in Vaihinger's work. Paulsen, his own vernacular, to meet his new needs. in his admirable volume, fmmanuel Kant, He must appeal to tradition ; and in so far sein Leben und seine Lehre (Frommann's he is like his modern predecessors. On the Klassiker der Philosophic, Stuttgart, 1898), other hand, he is not content to translate has discussed (especially 144-55) a number scholastic, nor yet simply to accept Wolffian, of Kant's most characteristic and important terminology. Nor yet is he, like Locke, in concepts and expressions. Adickes, in his a conscious revolt against the traditions of edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft language which all the while bind him. He (Berlin, 1889), has introduced into his crisply wishes to reform without unnecessary trans written notes a large number of explanations formation. He intends to select and to adapt of Kantian expressions. The general his for his own purpose. But since he cannot torical relations of the Kantian terminology select and adapt with the freedom of an ancient are treated by Eucken, Oeschichte der philo- Greek, and since the originality of his ideas sophisr.hen Terminologie (139-50). The equally forbids him to remain content with psychological vocabulary of Kant, with especial what he finds, in the way of means of ex reference to its relations to the Ethics, is pression, he is led to efforts at reform which extensively and carefully expounded by Alfred follow no one principle, and which seldom Hegler, Die Psychologie in Kant's Ethik seem to even himself. His The fullest of all collec wholly satisfy (Freiburg, 189 1). training and his method often appear to us to tions of Kant's terms and expressions is savour of pedantry. Yet as a fact, he loves Mellin's Encyclopadisches Worterbuch der his meanings so much better than his words, kritischen Philosophie, oder Versuch einer that he is impatient with merely termino fasslichen und vollstdndigen Erkldrung der in logical researches ; and he has an imperfect Kant's kritischen und dogmatischen Schriften acquaintance with the history either of enthaltenen Begriffe und, Satze (Zilllichau thought or of usage. Moreover, while the and Leipzig, 1797). Mellin, who also pub terms used by his contemporaries and im lished other contributions to the termino mediate predecessors are known to him in logical comprehension of Kant, here under great masses, his thoughts are still far richer takes what is to be at once an encyclopedia than his vocabulary, and at the critical stages of Kant's doctrine, and an exposition of the of his mental evolution they develop much of his expressions and ideas. The result, is faster than his most elaborate displays of ter however, rather a thesaurus of Kantian minological skill can follow them. In con- statements than any thorough explanation is sequenc, there are extended passages in of their forms and meanings. Mellin a 589 KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

harmonizer, who smooths over difficulties as terms are merely expressions of a present skilfully as Vaihinger, in his commentary, and serious effort, which may or may not emphasizes or even magnifies them. Mellin's prove permanently efficacious, to use a par book is published in six volumes (having ticular device for clarifying and organizing eleven parts). Krug's Pkilosophisches Lexikon his ideas. In general, lie is a great lover of contains also the Kantian vocabulary, but analysis ; so that while, like Aristotle and without the modern effort at a philological the Scholastics, he makes systematic use of treatment of the Kantian usage. The recent the method of distinctions for the sake of ex Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe und plaining or removing the contradictions of Ausdriicke, by Eisler (Berlin, 1899), so far thought and opinion, he is much more radical as it has yet appeared, contains much than any of his predecessors in the dis valuable material for comparing Kant's tinctions that he draws, and his world usage with that of his predecessors. The largely consists of definable barriers and monographic literature upon Kant furnishes chasms. Kant loves, meanwhile, synthesis, an immense number of discussions of Kant's but is never as successful in this direction as — terms, discussions which are, however, gene in the other (see the excellent rally found only in subordination to some of Eucken, op. cit., 143—5). ^ne synthetic more general expository or critical interest. aspect of his systematic undertakings he No attempt can here be made at any biblio especially emphasizes, namely, the ideal of an graphical analysis of this literature with re exhaustive enumeration of all the provinces ference to its bearings upon Kantian ter of , and of all the problems of thought, minology. The original materials upon which which come within his scope. Many of the

Kant's own selection of his terms is based devices of his terminology have to do with are to be found in the Latin and German the pursuit of this ideal. Thus the table of works of Wolff; in the textbooks of Baum- categories is the outcome of an effort, whose garten, whose Metaphysial (which reached development occupied several years, to obtain its seventh edition in 1779) was long Kant's a complete table of the fundamental con favourite textbook in that subject; and ceptions of the understanding. Associated finally in the general literature, philosophical with this table is a list, equally intended to and psychological, of Kant's day. In following be complete, which enumerates the a priori the evolution of Kant's thought, upon the principles of the understanding; and so on. In basis of these contemporary influences, one order to obtain such formal completeness, has constantly to deal, of course, with ter Kant sometimes is led to arbitrary inventions, minological questions, which accordingly find whereby a scheme is filled out, in a way their place in the important monographic whose importance is clear only to himself. treatises of Benno Erdmann (Kant's Kriti- The methods of Kant's work while he was cismus in der ersten und in der zweiten engaged in the construction of his doctrine Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and of its various expressions can best be Leipzig, 1878), and of Adickes (Kant-Studien, studied in the Reflexionen, edited by Pro — Kiel and Leipzig, 1895) treatises which we fessor Benno Erdmann, and in the Lose may select from this whole literature for Blatter aus Kant's Nachlass, edited by Rudolf especial mention in this connection. The Reicke. The Reflexionen are notes made student of Kant's language should pay due by Kant in connection with his lectures upon attention to Jasche's edition of Kant's Logik Baumgarten's Metaphysik. The Lose Blatter (published in the eighth volume of the chrono contains a great variety of fragmentary notes, logical edition of Kant's works, by Hartenstein, made upon various occasions. The termino 1868, 1-141); and, in regard to Kant's logy used in these notes is by no means psychological terminology, should also con always in agreement with that known through sult his Anthropologic in pragmatisclier Kant's published works. Hinsicht, published in 1798. Kant's own (4) Kant never lived to write the sort of formal definitions of his terms are seldom to encyclopedic statement of a system of philo be accepted as final ; nor are his reports of sophy which he himself desired to produce. the historical or of the current usage of a His most important works, the Kritik der term, such for instance as a priori, to be reinen Vernunft, the Kritik der praktisehen regarded as authoritative. Kant was once Vernunft, and the Kritik der Urthfilskraft, for all no historian of thought or of usage ; constitute, in his own opinion, merely intro and his resolutions as to the use of his own ductory discussions, indispensable, but needing 59° KANTS TERMINOLOGY in their turn to be followed by a reconstruction der reinen Vernunft, Methodenlehre, 3tes of doctrine made in tbe light of these critical Uauptstiick. On the contrast between mathe researches. In general, Kant conceives philo matics and philosophy, see the Methodenlehre, sophy as the sum total of what he .terms ites Uauptstiick, 2nd ed. of the Kritik der — reine Vsrnunfterkenntniss aus Begriffen an reinen Vernunft, 751. [As is now customary expression most easily translated as 'conceptual in citations from Kant, the Kritik der reinen knowledge gained through pure reason alone.' Vernunft is here to be cited after the pages

The two antitheses which define philosophy of the second edition ; while in case of differ are (i) the contrast with mathematics, and ence between the editions, the paging of the

(2) the contrast with empirical science. first edition is to be cited for passages that Mathematics makes use of ideas of pure occur only in that edition. Other Kantian reason, but does so only by the intermediation works are to be cited after the Hartenstein of the process of construction, whereby Kant edition of 1868.] One may compare, upon means any process such as gets expressed in the same topic, Mellin's articles Encyclopadie,

a diagram or figure, when the diagram or Metaphysik, Transcendentalphilosophie ; and ff. figure is intended as the visible embodiment Paulsen, op. cit., 108 Kant is by no means of a rational conception. Philosophy is not quite uniform in his account of these main thus dependent upon a voluntary construction divisions of philosophy. of its objects in sensuous form. It conceives (5) All further classifications of Kant's them in their purity, and reflects upon their doctrines and conceptions are greatly in meanings and their connections. In contrast fluenced by his psychological conceptions. to empirical science, philosophy uses no 'We can,' he says (Werke, vi. 379), 'reduce — empirical data, as such, amongst its presup all the powers of the human mind to three : positions. This latter contrast in Kant's Intellect (Erkenntnissvermogen) ; Feeling {das definition of philosophy was, in its origin, Gefiild der Lust und Unlust, a power always Wolffian, and the whole tendency of Kant's to be defined in terms of this contrast of own thought is to deprive it of much of its pleasure and ) ; and Will (das Begehrungs- positive meaning ; since, as Kant in the end vernwgen, or the power whereby mental states discovers, there is no theoretical come to be viewed as the causes the existence knowledge of

aus rtiner the The itself is Vernunft except knowledge of objects).' Erkenntnissvermogen of the necessary structure which must belong first divided into a passive aspect, the Sensi to the whole realm of experience. In con bility (Sinnlichkeit), the lower portion of the

sequence, a better name for Kant's theoretical Erkenntnissvermogen ; and an active aspect, philosophy would be the Theory of Ex the intellectuelles Erkenntnissvermogen, whose perience; and this name, whose accuracy is general activity is called Dettken (Anthrojio- implied by many of Kant's expressions, has logie, Werke, vii. 451). For this latter, the been actually adopted by some modern higher portion of the Erkenntnissvermogen, or Kantians in the intellect the words Verstand and (e. g. Cohen). Philosophy general proper,

is divided into the two great divisions, Theo Vernunft are upon occasion used almost retical and Practical. Another, and co interchangeably, both of them in a broader or

ordinate, division of philosophy is that into more inclusive sense (e.g. Verstand in the its critical or preparatory portion, called Anthropologic, loc. cit. ; Vernunft in the title

Transcendentalphilosophie, and its systematic of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, where it portion, called Metaphysik. The Transcen also even includes the a priori aspect of the dentalphilosophie has to deal with the sources Sinnlichkeit). In more exact usage, however, and scope of our rational knowledge. Meta the Verstand is only one of three special physik has to set forth the sum total of our divisions of the oberes Erkenntnissvermogen.

purely rational, i. e. non-empirical knowledge, The three are Verstand, Urtlieilskraft, and concerning both the objects of theory (God, Vernunft. The Verstand, in this more special

Nature, the Soul) and the objects of rational sense, is the power that forms concepts choice as such, or of freedom (Duty, the Moral (Begriffe), or that knows, or furnishes, or

Law, the Absolute Good). It is the Transcen applies the rules of the formal constitution dentalphilosophie which Kant has most fully of conceptual objects. The Verstand also is developed. On Kant's division of philosophy, the power to apprehend the unity which gets one may consult his own essay Ueher Philo- expressed in our judgments. And in this tophie iiberhaupt (1794) in Hart en stein's sense the Verstand can even be called (Krit. edition (1868), vi. 373; also, the Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., 94) the Vermogen 59' KANT'S TERMINOLOGY zu ttrtheilen. But as distinct from the distinctions. Of considerable and very Verstand, the Urtheiltkraft proper is the baffling importance, in Kant's psychological power to find what cases fall under given vocabulary, is the term Gemiith, used on the concepts, or the power to 'subsume under whole very much as recent English writers rules.' And the Vernunft, in contrast with employ the term Mind. In general, this both of these powers, is the power to systema word is evidently felt by Kant to be relatively tize into unity, and by means of inclusive presuppositionless, and he so expresses himself, j,rinciples, the less inclusive rules of the Ver vi. 458. Thus the term seems not to imply stand (Krit. d. reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., 359). any decision as to the problems of rational Thus the Vernunft is the power which con psychology, or as to the various aspects of the

ceives God, the Universe, and the Moral Law. ego ; so that, as Hegler well points out Yet while Kant makes these distinctions, {Psychol, in Kant's Ethik, 52), this term or related ones, repeatedly, he remains in his takes the place of the more metaphysically usage consistent with no one of them (cf. coloured term Seele, where Kant has to speak Vaihinger, Commentar, i. 123, 166, 454 note, of the empirical processes wherein the various and in many other passages). Permanent mental powers co-operate, and so get their only is the tendency to define the Verstand concrete expression. Yet, as the Gemiith can ' as the power of thought in so far as it is ' affect itself and thereby produce the pheno expressed in single acts of judgment or of mena of the innerer Sinn, and has a life conception, and the Vernunft as the systema that evidently goes beyond what is directly tizing tendency of thought in its search for all revealed by consciousness (Eisler, s. v., seems embracing unities ; while the Urtkeilskraft, incorrectly to identify Bewusstsein and Gemiith standing between the two former powers, does in Kant's usage), the precise implications of excellent service to Kant in completing the the term become puzzling whenever we have schematism of his accounts of intellectual to deal with the problem as to the sense in processes, by taking charge of whatever the which the a priori principles are original, or two other powers may seem to have neglected. are innate (in so far as they are in any sense That the three powers of the higher Erkennt- innate) in the Gemiith. The manifold uses of nissvermogen have a peculiarly apt one-to-one the term Gemiith have been well collected by relation, in their turn, to the three general Hegler (loc. cit.). powers of the mind (in that our objective (7) There remain two psychological terms knowledge of reality is properly to be limited of Kant which cannot be passed over without to the field of the empirically applied some mention even in the most general sketch. Verstand, while the principles for the free These terms are innerer Sinn and Einbildungs- a self-determination of the Will belong to the kraft. The innerer Sinn is term in very Vernunft, and the Urtheilshraft is of especial general use in the psychology of the 18th service in expressing the definable aspect of century. In origin it dates back to the the values present to the Gefiihl), —all this is Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine of the sensus a characteristic thesis which Kant expounds communis; but its 18th-century form was in the essay on Philosoj)hie iiberhaupt, and largely due to Locke's well-known passage which enables him to explain the title of his upon ' the notice that the mind takes of its — Kritik der Urtheilshraft the treatise wherein own operations.' As the term had to compete, Kant's doctrine of the Beautiful, and his in its pre-Kantian history, with the Leibnitzian Teleology, are both contained (see the cited term Apperception (also used by Kant), and essay, Werke, vi. 402 f.). with still other teims for the general nature (6) In general, this psychological terminology of consciousness, its place remained indefinite. it of Kant, while of the most constant use as In Kant's usage is rendered perplexing a means of determining the divisions of his because of its relations, as a passive power, to work, and the trend of his various researches, the intimately associated active processes of

is of a bewildering complexity and change- consciousness with which it is bound up.

ableness. The bewildering effect is, however, In a very few passages (of which two are due not so much to the mere changes them given by Hegler, op. cit., 54), the inner sense selves, as to the fact that Kant repeatedly even appears as itself active— even as thinking

makes much of the importance and exactness and judging. In this sense it would assume of distinctions amongst the various mental the functions of the Verstand. In general, it is powers and processes, while he himself is the however, a capacity, within the mind or first soon to alter or to ignore these very the ego, to receive, passively, the influence 592 KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

of the active understanding or Evnbildungs- of the original synthetic processes of the kraft, and so to get presented the more or less Einbildungskraft. In our practical life the organized facts of the inner life. Like the same power has also its important place. outer sense, it presents to us phenomenal and The stress laid upon the Einbildungskraft in not ultimate reality, and does not show us the its distinction from the rest of the higher ego in itself, but only the self as empirical. Erkenntnissvermbgen thus threatens to destroy Its form is time, just as space is the form of the finality of the usual threefold division the outer sense. But the parallel between of the latter; but Kant is preserved from inner and outer sense proves to be hopelessly admitting this consequence because of the incomplete, and the term is an unhappy and intimate relations which the Einbildungskraft superfluous one despite its frequent use. all the while establishes with its neighbours. The Einbildungskraft plays a more important See upon this term Anthropologic, vii. 495—7 ; part. It occupies, in Kant's doctrine, the Krit. d. reinen Vernunft (1st ed.), 103 ff., place of an essentially mediating principle. especially 119, where the Einbildungskraft In all the history of philosophy (and also of is brought into relation to Verstand and

theology) the principles that may be called in Apperception (2nd ed.), 151 ff. One may also general the mediators have played an impor consult Hegler (op. cit., 143 ff.); Adickes in tant part. The Logos in Stoic and Alexan the notes to the deductions of the two editions A drine ; the Pneuma in later ancient of the Kritik ; and E. F. Buchner, philosophy Study of psychology and theology ; the and the Kant's Psychology (Monog. Suppl., No. 4, to 1 Soul in the doctrine of Plotinus ; the attributes the 1 See also Psychol. Rev.), 4-1 7. Paulsen, of the substance in Spinoza, and the infinite op. cit., 175. modes in the same system ; the so-called (8) Between Kant's psychological and his Platonic ideas as interpreted by Schopenhauer epistemological terminology stand the im for the purposes of his own system :—all these portant terms Apperception and E Intuit, der are examples of such mediating concepts. In Apperception, the general names for the active

the names of these mediators are consciousness, a whose terminology unity of principle

always confessedly more or less ambiguous. tendency is expressed by the fact that, in The ambiguity goes along with the synthetic view of the presence of this apperception, or tendency which gives rise to these conceptions, in view of the unity of apperception, every

and this constitutes at once the conscious state is viewed as ambiguity capable of convenience and the defect of such terms. mine, or as, in its form, the product of my In depth of implication they are superior to activity. In its most explicit form, Appercep

the more sharply defined and abstract terms tion is identical with self-consciousness, since I that name the opposed and extreme principles when know my states definitely, I know which the mediators are to bring into unity. them as my own. But one can speak of

But this depth is purchased by vagueness. apperception when the Ich denke is viewed The mediators suggest the actual life of things merely as the possible accompaniment of every better than do the comparatively dead ex conscious state. The idea of the self, the it I tremes ; but they have the disadvantages of consciousness that is who think this, may

their very concreteness. The Einbildungs be either clear or obscure at any moment ; ' kraft is such a mediator. It has many but, says Kant (1st ed., 117 note): The possi functions, reproductive and productive. The bility of the logical form of all knowledge former are the more familiar ; the latter are necessarily depends upon its relation to this '

the more important, since it is through them apperception as a capacity So ( Vermvgen). that the data of sense are brought into too, in the 2nd ed., 13 1-2, he uses the often ' synthesis, and the Verstandesbegriffe or forms quoted expression : Das Ich denke muss alle of the understanding —the categories —get meine Vorstellungen begleiten konnen.' This applied to experience. The Einbildungskraft, Ich denke, however, must be an act of spon as productive, is at once sensuous and intelli taneity, opposed in nature to the passivity of gent. It is the minister of the Verstand, and sense. Through the work of the Einbildungs is in fact the Verstand in action, so that in kraft, which applies the forms of the Verstand

places it seems to make the very concept of to the data of sense, I come to be thus able to the Verstand itself superfluous. Its functions say, Ich denke. The one original act of re are more or less antecedent to, and apart from, ferring all to the self is at the basis of the our actual consciousness. We are aware, from entire process, and the result expresses the moment to moment, rather of the results than meaning of this act, which is at first a 1. 593 Qq KANT'S TERMINOLOGY latent or subconscious act, in conscious form. the first division of the critical analysis of The term Apperception comes to Kant from our knowledge in the Kritik. This division

Leibnitz. Descartes had earlier employed the is called the Aesthetik, as being the doctrine of corresponding verb. sense. The forms of the Verstand are studied in (9) The special terminology of the theory the Analytik,vrhoBe name Kant derives from the of knowledge in the Krit. d. reinen Vernunft known terminology of the Aristotelian Logic. is so complex, and the interdependence of the (11) The most general terms which express various terms is so intimate, that no complete the central thoughts of the resulting theory account of this terminology could be given of knowledge can be brought together by : without a lengthy exposition of the whole means of a series of theses. As Kant teaches — system. One must confine the following (a) We can know only phenomena (Erschein- statement to a very few important points ; ungen), not things in themselves (Dinge an and in general, the remainder of this article sich), or Noumena. (b) But we can know, must be devoted merely to specimens of Kant's a priori or aus reiner Vernunft, that the terminology. Erscheinungen are subject to universal and (10) Kant's theory of knowledge, as is well necessary laws (Regeln), so that a priori known, maintains that the internal process of Grundsatze, upon which all empirical science applying the forms of the understanding to depends, are possible, and can be exhaustively

the facts of sense introduces into our whole stated, on the basis of a complete enumeration conceptual world that conformity to law which of all the categories or the understanding or the earlier rationalistic theories of knowledge of the fundamental concepts or Begriffe. (c) bad supposed to be the revelation of an In view of this limitation and accompanying absolute external truth, but which Kant views necessity to be found in the world of our as no revelation of anything absolute. While knowledge, the field of human insight can be our experience has to conform to law, and is defined as Erfahrung. Erfahrung constitutes, a known in advance to be thus subject to neces in sense, one whole ; for although empirical sary principles, the lawful connectedness of our facts are countless, and although the brute experience is due to the unity of appercep data of sense are not controlled by the under tion, to the synthetic work of the Einbildungs- standing, the order of the realm of experience

kraft, to the activity of the Verstand, to is due to the categories, and the Einheit der the of our in or spontaneity thought (Denken) mbglichen Erfahrung, unity of possible

general, and not to our knowledge of any experience, is assured in advance, by virtue of absolute or external truth. All these expres the relation of all special facts of experience sions dwell, as we have now seen, upon various to the Ich denke or to the original unity of

aspects of what is, for Kant, the same great Apperception, (d) The knowledge of this It is a fact. the intellect that weaves the unity whole theory is, for Kant, transcendental of its own world. Meanwhile, the intellect, knowledge. Applied to the interpretation of is or the Einbildungskra.fi in particular, indeed the problems of philosophy, it frees us from produktiv but not creative (schopferisch). It the Antinomien with which human thought needs, namely, material for its weaving, and has thus far been beset. It rids us from

without such given material it can do nothing. bondage to the necessary illusions, the Dia is it This material furnished to by the Sinn- lectic of the Vernunft ; and so at once sets the lichkeit. The latter, although passive, has its due limits to our knowledge, and assures us Forms. These are usually called the forms of the sovereignty of rationality within the A i. of the nsclmuung, e. of . They sphere that is open to our science. Hereby

are space and time ; and these forms (espe the possibility (Moglichkeit) of experience, of cially the latter form, time) predetermine science, and of synthetic judgments a priori,

what schemes, or general types of objects is established. (Schemata), the Einbildungskraft can weave, (12) All the terms thus named are of central it when applies the forms of the Verstand to importance for Kant ; and many of them are the facts of sense. Thus there are two types difficult. We may begin here with one of the of or of characteristic conditions most famous and of — forms, of puzzling the list the knowledge, which are determined for us by adjective transcendental. The word had in the original nature of our sort of intelligence: scholastic terminology its established usage,

viz. the forms of the Verstand, and the forms which is very different from the Kantian of the Sinnlichkeit or of the Anschauung. The usage. It was an adjective applied to those forms of the Anschauung Kant considers in predicates which the scholastic doctrine re 594 KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

yarded as transcending in generality even Adickes calls weitherzig (see his note to p. 25 the Aristotelian categories themselves. These of the 2nd ed. of the Krit. d. reinen Vernunft), transcendentals were unity, truth, and good and which Vaihinger declares to constitute ' ' ness, together with thing and something. But the most difficult terminological problem in the term transcendentals referred solely to the Kant, and even in 'all modern philosophy' high degree of generality of these predicates, (Commentar, i. 467). The term is often and had no relation to the possibility of our confused with transcendent, and then means knowing them, or to the conditions of our going beyond, or transcending, the limits of knowledge of them. In Baumgarten's Meta- human knowledge. Of the other meanings, physica (§§ 72-123), while these same pre no complete account has yet been published dicates, unum, verum, bonwm, are treated by any student. They must be made out upon the basis of the scholastic tradition, from the context, each time afresh. stress is laid upon the fact that, in every (14) Our necessary knowledge about the being, these predicates are in some sense world of experience is founded upon a priori present of necessity ; and unum transcenden- principles. The term here used has its origin taliter is translated, in Baumgarten's note in the well-known Aristotelian distinction (§ 73), by the German phrase wesentlich eins, between what is prior in nature and what is while Veritas transcendentalis (§ 89) is trans prior for us. In modern thought, ever since lated in the note by nothwendige metaphysische the scholastic period, the Aristotelian dis Wahrheit. The twofold character of the tinction had been familiar; and the special epithet transcendental, as thus known to Kant expressions a priori and a posteriori, used as in former usage, appeared to him to warrant adjective phrases qualifying especially th;; an analogous, but novel usage. For transcen noun demonstration, had been employed since dental had thus been (a) no direct predicate the later scholasticism. To know or demon

of any , but a predicate technically strate a priori is, in this sense, to know

applied to certain predicates, viz., as we have through causes or principles, as opposed to a seen, to the predicates unum, verum, bonum. knowledge gained wholly through the parti (b) It had also (in Baumgarten's usage) come cular facts of experience. Kant gives the

to imply a certain necessity and universality term a new and more special meaning. Know

aboutthese predicates themselves. Havingonce ledge a priori is for him knowledge in advance

to himself the of a of all and hence is a of

proposed problem theory of experience, knowledge necessary knowledge, or of knowledge valid in the content of any of the necessary concepts advance of all experience, Kant needed a pre or principles of thought. These necessary dicate to characterize the type of knowledge principles are themselves a priori, because which should constitute this new theory. He they are independent of experience. chose transcendental, and declared (Krit. d. (15) But by virtue of this knowledge, which reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., 25) that by transcen- we get through the a priori principles, we dentale Erkenntniss he intended (a) to mean become acquainted with phenomena, and not not any kind of knowledge of objects, but a with Noumena, with Erscheinungen, and not knowledge concerned with a particular type with Dinge an sich. The terms here used have ofknowledge (Erkenntnissart), viz. of that type become extremely familiar in recent literature. of knowledge which (|3) his new theory of the Their Kantian usage still suggests, however, necessary principles of the understanding was many topics of controversy. The phrase an to embody. This new usage thus imitated, for sich goes back to the well-known Greek usage,

the purposes of Kant's theory, both of the in both Plato and Aristotle, according to which

aspects of Baumgarten's former usage. anything that truly exists, or that truly is i. (13) But the meaning of transcendental as known, exists or is known ko6'

in his own mind, with the ideas associated in a contrast with knowledge only. This con with his new enterprise. The term is otherwise trast of the thing in itself with the thing's explained in the Krit.d.reinenVernunft,z$2-$. seeming or appearance was indeed not new ;

It is otherwise used in a fashion which but Kant expressly emphasizes it as against 2 Q 595 q KANT'S TERMINOLOGY

all other aspects of the an sick. The Ding an (17) The transcendentaler Gegenstand is a sich then is the thing as it exists independently concept of still a different origin. The of and apart from all knowledge. The prin Verstand refers all content of sense to an ob cipal problems as to the Ding an sich are : (a) ject. This is the very nature of the Ver whether Kant really assumes its existence as stand. Hereby it accomplishes its task of a positive fact ; (6) how he conceives that exis conceiving the facts of sense as in unity. But tence; and how he reconciles such affirma object once conceived, through an intel

(c) any tion of the thing's existence an sich with the lectual synthesis of sense-data, e.g. this house, theory of the subjectivity of all our knowledge. this stone, remains, as an object present to our

While a discussion of these problems belongs experience, still but a Vorstellung, i.e. a par elsewhere, there can be no doubt that Kant ticular idea, or content of our consciousness. does assume the independent reality of Dinge So soon as we view this Vorstellung as such, a an sich as positive fact, and does not make we are again led to seek for its object ; and any serious attempt to demonstrate that so on. The limit of this process of referring reality. The correlate of the Ding an sich is the contents of experience to still further

the Erscheinung, to which, however, Kant objects as their basis is given by the con attributes not mere existence in our private cept of an Etwas = x, whereof we can only is and isolated experience from moment to mo say that it an Etwas, a something in general. ment, but a certain secondary type of reality, This is the transcendentaler Gegenstand, the or of , due to the fact that the Er object that I am trying to know through every scheinung follows universal laws, which are particular act my knowledge.

of empirical equally valid for all men. An Erscheinung is no This object, the permanently sought beyond of it is

a — mere Schein ; fact for all of us men, my empirical search for truth, can never be I a verifiable content of possible experience. presented in experience. therefore can only is (16) In addition to the term Ding an sich, define it as beyond every experience. It the Kant uses for the objects of the metempirical law of my consciousness thus to seek for, but

realm two other terms : Noumenon and trans- never to find, the ultimate correlate of my own cendentaler Gegenstand. The former of these conscious activity, namely, the final object that terms comes to Kant from his own dogmatic I am trying to know. While the Noumenon, period (cf. his Inaugural Dissertation, Werke, then, as such, is first positively conceived as ii. 403). It is the relic of the stage the object of the pure intellect, and is there when he still opposed to the phenomenal after found to be nothing knowable to us, world the world of true Being, knowable, in the transcendentaler Gegenstand, as such, is abstraction from all sensuous facts, through first conceived as that which would finally A if the pure intellect. Noumenon is a reality determine, and present would satisfy, my such as one would know who could seize ulti empirical search for the truth of my own

mate truth through his understanding alone, objects. The latter, then, is der gandich un-

without the aid sense. As a con bestimmle Gedanke von Etwas or of positive Uberhaupt, cept, this is wholly rejected by Kant in his der Gegenstand einer sinnlichen Anschauuiig critical period. Viewed negatively, the con uberhaupt. Since it can never be found cept of the Noumenon as the object which we within experience, but is driven, through the (who are bound to sense whenever we seek to essential endlessness of the search, beyond all win any positive knowledge) do not know and experience, the transcendentaler Gegenstand cannot know, — this Noumenon becomes, in de comes at last to denote, once more, the abso

notation, identical with the Ding an sich ; but lute beyond, for which the Ding an sich was

the two concepts have a different origin. The the first name.

Ding an sich is a concept expressing a selbst- (18) The three terms then, with different verstdndliche Voraussetzurtg (see Benno Erd- origin and connotation, come, in most passages mann's work before cited, Kant's Kriticis- where they are used, to denote the same mus), viz. the presumption that phenomena object, the inaccessible reality. See Krit. d. somewhat independently real must correspond. reinen Vernvmft, 1st ed., 109, and the section '

The Noumenon is a concept reached by first Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung oiler Ge- conceiving an object of the pure intellect, and genstdnde Uberhaupt in Phenomena und Nou- by then observing that such an object must for mena,' in both editions. Compare the Doctor- ever lie beyond our ken, since what we know Dissertation of Budolf Lehmann, Kant's Lehre

is a phenomenal world, where sense-facts are vom Ding an sich (Berlin, 1878); Cohen's subject to the a priori laws of the Verstand. discussion in Kant's Theorie der Erfalirwtg 59° KANTS TERMINOLOGY ff. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1885), 501 ; and the doomed to failure. We cannot primarily accounts of Benno Erdmann (op. cit.) and avoid the illusions of reason, but we can Paulsen (pp. 153-5 of his op. cit.). detect them. In doing so we deal, first, with

(19) The realm of our actual knowledge is the Antinomien or necessary conflicts between

Erfahrung. Here again we have a word of contradictory propositions, to which the Ver

ambiguous meaning. In general it is used in nunft is led. We solve these contradictions two : (1) as the sum total of facts so by showing that they are due to our tendency far as they are determined not by necessary to view as absolutely true of things in them principles, but by the immediate data of selves, principles which apply only to pheno

sense ; (2) as the sum total of facts in so far mena. The later discussions of the Dialektik as they are determined to unity by the appli lead to the problems of Rational Psychology and cation of the principles of the Understanding. of Rational Theology. But henceforth, in the and are so under the Krit. d. reinen while the termino brought unity of apper Vernunft, is ception. In the first sense, Erfahrung the logy remains intricate enough, it is oftener in it is source of knowledge in so far as not touch with that of the older metaphysic ; and

a priori. In the second sense, Erfahrung is one who has proceeded so far has grappled

a realm of possible , all of which with the most serious of the terminological are woven into unity by their universal and difficulties of the Kritik. synthetic relations to the self. (22) The foregoing must serve merely as (20) The judgments which we can make, specimens of some of the most famous of in advance, concerning all objects of possible Kant's terms, and as instances of the general experience, are synthetic judgments a priori. principles regarding the nature and growth Such judgments are opposed, as synthetic, to of his usage which have been discussed in the analytic judgments. The latter judgments early portion of this article. No space can express in their predicates nothing but what here be given to the terminology of the later was already contained in the explicit or works of Kant, except in so far as the fore

known meaning of their subjects ; e. g. going discussions already give guidance. Every triangle has three angles. But a syn thetic judgment passes beyond the direct GLOSSARY. meaning of its subject to bring this meaning numbers refer to the paragraphs of this

; article.] into unity with that of a new predicate e. g. [The Every change ha-i a cause. That such syn A priori, 14. Aesthetik, thetic judgments a priori can be made re IO. Analytic Judgments, 20. the whole constitution of our ex garding Analytik, 10, 21.

is his thesis in ; Tkbminology perience Kant's principal Anschauung, 10 see also (German). Deduction the The categories Antinomien, 11.

of Categories.

themselves (by no means identical either in Apperception, 8, 11. 5, name or in character with the original Cate Begriff, 7, 11.

gories of Aristotle, despite some points of Categorien, 7, 11. are the fundamental a agreement) concepts Den ken, 5, 10. priori of the Verstand, the forms in conformity Dialektik, 11, 31. with which the Einbildungskraft weaves into Ding an sich, 11, 15 ; in relation to Noumenon and to transcendentaler Gegenstand, 16-18. unity the data of sense. The list of the cate

; 10.

Einbildungskraft, 7 produktive, gories can be given exhaustively, as Kant 8 Einheit der Apperception, ; Einheit der moglichen an thinks, and upon this basis equally exhaus Erfahrung, 11. tive list of the Grundsatze of the under Erfahrung, 11, 19.

standing, the principles or basal synthetic Erkenntnissvermogen, 5. 11,15. judgments a priori, can be drawn up. Erscheinung, Forms of Sense and Understanding, 10. (21) The Analytik of Kant's Kritik is Gefuhl, devoted to the development of this theory 5. Gemtith, 6. of Erfahrung. The Dialektik is devoted to an Grundsatze a priori, 11. examination of the inevitable claims and 1 Ich denke, 8, 1. efforts of the Vemunfl, our organ of prin

Innerer Sinn, 6, 7. ciples, to transcend all experience by attempt Intellect, 10. to weave the unities of the ing provisional Kritik der reinen Vtrnunjt, general character of

Verstand into absolute unities. These efforts ; terminology of its principal theories, terminology, 9 of the Vernunft are as necessary as they are ic—11. 597 KARMA — KATATONIA

nut, Metaphysik, 4. Karyokinesis [Gr. mpvov, a + nivr/cns, der 11. Moglichkeit Erfahrung, movement] : Ger. (the same) ; Fr. cariocinese ; Noumenon, II, 16-18. Ital. cariocinesi. Indirect nuclear division, Oberea Erkenntniajvermogen, 5. involving the formation of a spireme or nuclear Phenomena, 11. thread, its segmentation into Chromosomes in Philosophic general, 4. (q. v.), and the splitting of the chromosomes. Praktische Philosophic, 4. A term by Schleicher in 1878; Produktive Einbildungskraft, 10. suggested equivalent to the mitosis of Flemming(i882). Regeln, 5, 11. See Mitosis. Schein, 15. Schemata, 10. Literature : Schleicher, Die Knorpelzell- Seele, 6. theilung; Flemming, Zellsubstanz. (C.U.M.) Sinnlichkeit in See also 10. general, 5. Karyoplasm [Gr. mpvov, a nut, + irXao-pa, SynthetUche Urtheile, 1r, JO. a thing formed] : Ger. Zellkernxubstanz ; Fr. Theoretische Philosophic, 4. carioplasme ; Ital. carioplamna. The nuclear, Transcendent, 13. as substance of the Transcendental, 11-13. opposed to the cytoplasmic, Transcendentaler Gegenstand, 17, 18. cell. 17, 18. Transcendentatphilosophie, A term due to Flemming (1882). In the Urtheilskraft, 5. same year Strasburger introduced the term Vernunft, 5, ai. nucleoplasm for the same substance. Veraunfterkenntnisp, 4. Literature : Flemming, Zellsubstanz ; Verstand, 5, 17. (ML) Strasburger, Ueber den Theilungsvorgang Karma [Sansk. Karman, from Kar, to do or der Zellkerne. (c.Ll.m.) Kara, create]. In , the principle Katabolism [Gr. down, -f- /3dXXftv, to cataboligme of individual existence by virtue of which the cast] : Ger. Katabolismus ; Fr. ; sum of moral desert in the life of one sentient Ital. catabolismo. The distinctive Metabo being becomes the germ which develops lism (q.v.) whereby complex organic sub another in whose destiny it is a predetermin stances break down into less complex forms ing factor. with concomitant liberation of energy. Whether the Brahmistic metaphysic of the A term introduced by Gaskell in 1886. or the more negative conceptions Cf. Anabolism. (c.ll.m.) which underlie Buddhism be regarded as the ^Catatonia [Gr. Kara, down, + rnW, to truer expression of Hindu thought, it is still stretch tightly] : Ger. Kataionie, Spannungs- true that in the phenomenal world of causation irrsinn ; Fr. catatonie ; Ital. catatonia. A and change the only persistent feature is the mental disorder with marked neuro-muscular process of metempsychosis, which is an endless symptoms, described by Kahlbaum in 1874. re-creation of the world in obedience to moral Although not admitted by all writers as necessity. The source of this necessity is a distinct disorder, but only as the presence Karma, which is the seed out of which a new of a group of symptoms in cases of mental life emerges. A man dies but leaves his stupor or of circular insanity, &c, yet clini Karma, the sum of his moral desert, which cally, as well as theoretically, the term has necessitates another life as the bearer of its been recognized in recent literature (cf. retribution. The process is unending, but the Kraepelin, Psychiatrie, 441 ff.). motive of it is Karma exerting the pressure In typical cases the disease shows at first of a moral destiny that is imperishable and a condition of depression, melancholia, and inexorable. The only escape from this fatality distress ; which condition is at times preceded is through the suppression of Karma itself, by a period of nervousness, unsettlement, which can be attained only by travelling the headache, languor, desire for solitude, and the Hindu road of salvation. The suppression of like. With the depression are apt to occur Karma means freedom from the necessity of hallucinations and illusions, mostly connected existence and absorption into Nirvana, which with the self-accusations and distress of the is either Brahm, the universal life, or nothing patient. The depression gives place to, or is ness. See Oriental Philosophy (India). at times replaced by, a condition of excitement Literature : Deussen, Die Sutras des and agitation, of wild, senseless actions and Vedanta (Leipzig, 1887); Appendix to his exciting hallucinations ; and it is in this Metaphysics ; and art. Buddhism, in Encyc. stage that the more distinctive symptoms of Brit. (9th ed.); Buddhism, in Oriental Re katatonia are observed. There is an abeyance ligions Series (ed. by Max Mtiller). (A.t.o.) or absence of movements, even movements of 598