UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE Kant and The
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE Kant and the Significance of the Self A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Courtney Allison Morris June 2015 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Pierre Keller, Chairperson Dr. Jill Buroker Dr. Maudemarie Clark Dr. Andrews Reath Dr. Larry Wright Copyright by Courtney Allison Morris 2015 The Dissertation of Courtney Allison Morris is approved: ________________________________________ ________________________________________ _________________________________________ _________________________________________ _________________________________________ Committee Chairperson University of California, Riverside Acknowledgments UCR is a special place to do philosophy. The professors are unusually committed to the graduate students and engage in passionate and serious dialogue not just in classrooms, but in halls, parking lots, and their own homes. I am grateful for having been a member of such a department. This dissertation took root in two pro-seminars during my first year in the program: Robin Jeshion’s on Self-knowledge and Self- reference and Erich Reck’s on Explanation. Those seminars were exactly the right way to begin a graduate career, if only to work with Robin and Erich who are both extraordinary teachers and scholars. I was lucky to have a dissertation committee full of my philosophical heroes. Pierre Keller spent countless hours with me discussing Kant and everything related to Kant, which, as Pierre has shown me, is everything. Pierre constantly pushed me to my intellectual limits; he not only encouraged me to strengthen my existing philosophical talents, he challenged me to develop new ones. Those familiar with Larry Wright’s work will recognize his influence in every chapter of this dissertation. Andy Reath is not only a formidable Kant scholar, but a careful reader of students’ work. Maudemarie Clark began teaching at Riverside my second year, which was a great stroke of luck for me. Watching her do philosophy is to want to emulate it. Jill Buroker is an exacting thinker and a careful reader of Kant. Her sharp and insightful eye has been a model for me, and her comments are every writer’s dream. I thank each of them for their guidance and feedback. iv At my time at UCR, I have been surrounded by a supportive community of mentors and peers. Robin Jeshion was a fantastic mentor and role model. Coleen Macnamara continues to be an amazing mentor. She spent an enormous amount of time with me, poring over my documents at every stage. I owe her a lot. Samantha Matherne has been a good friend and interlocutor of all things Kant. Others I would like to thank include friends and members of the RON writing group: Justin Coates, Joe Cressotti, Megs Gendreau, Michael Goerger, Heinrik Hellwig, Bach Ho, Meredith McFadden, Ben Mitchell-Yellin, Luis Montes, John Ramsey, Patrick Ryan, Megan Stotts, and Justin White. Clinton Tolley was kind enough to add his valuable voice to my prospectus committee. I also thank the members and organizers of the UCR dissertation writer’s retreat, particularly Maggie Grover, Rory Moore, and Janet O’Shea. I would also like to thank my wonderful colleagues and students at West Point, particularly the very talented students in my Kant and 19th Century Philosophy course. My regular conversations about Kant with Daniel Ehrlich have helped me tremendously. I thank him for his friendship and for his enthusiastic willingness to discuss even the most obscure details of Kant’s theory. Whitney Morris and Charly provided a good support system especially at the beginning of my graduate work. I also thank Cyndi Tromba. In some ways, this dissertation is the continuation of a philosophical argument we have been having for decades. I have no doubt that it settles nothing. I owe a particularly special thanks to Monique “CT” Wonderly. She has encouraged me in those inevitable dark hours of dissertation writing, has celebrated with me when things were good, and has given me invaluable feedback. Most importantly, v she has laughed with me. I cherish her friendship and marvel at her philosophical mind. Here’s to GWU, Monique. I owe my husband, Adam Stockman, more thanks than I can articulate without writing another dissertation. One has to be brave to begin a relationship with a dissertation writer; one has to be certifiably crazy to marry one. This document has been our constant marriage companion, and Adam has accepted, embraced, and proofread it. He has supported me, cheered me on, and made significant life changes for me. He is a real partner. I thank him for all the big stuff, but more importantly, for all the little stuff, including all the philosophical conversations along the way (especially those not about Kant). Finally, I would like to thank my parents. One memory stands out as I put the finishing touches on this dissertation. It was late summer about nine years ago. My parents and I were sitting on their patio and I was lamenting that even though I loved philosophy and would love to pursue it as a career, going to graduate school was surely idiotic: it is difficult, there are no jobs, no money, and no security. They listened, smiled, and nodded. Then they told me to do it anyway. So I did. vi For Mom and Dad vii ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Kant and the Significance of the Self by Courtney Allison Morris Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Philosophy University of California, Riverside, June 2015 Dr. Pierre Keller, Chairperson Kant’s philosophy, it is often thought, leads to an untenable picture of the self. He argues that we cannot have knowledge of the type of entity we are, but seems to contradict that conclusion by claiming we are free and morally responsible. Commentators accuse him of blindly prioritizing his ethical views, not recognizing that his metaphysical views prohibit the very picture of the self his moral theory necessitates. Sympathetic interpreters of Kant’s view of the self focus on either his theoretical or ethical view, despite Kant’s insistence that the two are interdependent. I argue that Kant offers us a deeply consistent, unified, and plausible view of the self. For Kant, an individual necessarily thinks and acts as though he or she—and any other human being—is a substantial, complete entity with an identity that remains the viii same over time. As this work shows, the significance of the self, for Kant, is practical, not theoretical. A theory aims to gain knowledge of the self and examine what type of object it is and how it is constituted. Perhaps we are spiritual, immaterial souls, or alternatively, entities ultimately reducible to the brain or body. I establish that Kant thinks that such views are doomed to be either tautological or contradictory. This is because they answer the wrong question. The right question is not how the self is constituted, but what we are committed to. Kant thinks the answer is clear: we must hold ourselves and others responsible, and we must believe that we are free and that our actions and choices matter. My interpretation reveals that Kant’s true aim is to demonstrate how we can make good on these commitments without fear of being contradicted by theory. Theorizing about the self, according to Kant, is idle. But recognizing so makes room for one to act in accordance with one’s commitments, both moral and explanatory. Furthermore, I prove that Kant thinks we must act under the idea of the self not just to hold ourselves and others responsible but to view the world as the causally unified place we do. ix Table of Contents Introduction …………………………………………………………………………….. 1 1. Problems with Interpreting Kant on the Self ………………………………... 4 2. Kant’s Different Characterizations of and Roles for the Self ..……………… 7 a. The Thinking Self ……………………………………………………….. 7 b. The Substantial Soul …………………………………………………... 10 c. The Psychological Idea ……………………………………………….... 11 d. The Moral Self …………………………………………………………. 13 e. A Unified Picture? …………………………………………………….. 15 3. The Self and Reason ……………………………………………………….. 17 4. The Realist’s Challenge ……………………………………………………. 22 5. The Structure of This Dissertation …………………………………………. 24 Chapter 1: The Self Under Kant’s Revolution ……………………………………… 27 1. The Problem: Noumenon …………………………………………………... 31 2. Our Interest in Metaphysics ………………………………………………... 38 3. Kant’s Analysis of Traditional Approaches to Metaphysical Questions …………………………………………………………………… 42 4. Kant’s Revolution: The Experimental Method …………………………...... 48 5. The Significance of the Self as Noumenal …………………………………. 53 Chapter 2: The Transcendental Ideas as Necessary Presuppositions of Reason ……………………………………………………………….. 62 1. The Transcendental Ideas of Reason ………………………………………. 67 2. Our Capacity to Reason Logically …………………………………………. 69 x 3. Presupposing the Totality of Conditions …………………………………… 73 4. Presupposing the Transcendental Ideas of Reason ………………………… 78 5. Pure Reason: Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses ……………………………. 91 Chapter 3: The Illusion of an Immaterial Self: Transcendental Reflection and the Soul…………………………….......97 1. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason: The Arguments and Their Various Interpretations ………………………………………….. 99 2. Introduction to Transcendental Reflection: The Concepts of Comparison ……………………………………………... 108 3. The Concepts of Comparison and the Logical Forms of Judgment.............. 114 a. Comparing Representations According to Their Relation: The Concepts of Inner and Outer ……………………………………... 115 b. Comparing Representations According to