sign in sign up
<<
Home , Critique of Pure Reason

BTU Chair of General Ecology of in the „ of Pure ” 1

THE CONCEPT OF NATURE IN THE LIGHT OF ’S „” Scriptum

Udo Bröring BTU, Chair General Ecology

Table of Contents Summary Introductory Remarks Prerequisites: Various Philosophers and General Approaches Different Attitudes Towards Nature and the Concept of The „Critique of Pure Reason” - Contents and Reception - Transcendental Aesthetics and Analytics - Transcendental Apperception and the Four Tables of Understanding, Concept of Nature Within the Transcendental Outlook: The Kantian “Critical Business” References and Further Readings

Summary It is reason which prescribes its laws to the sensible universe; it is reason which makes the cosmos. (I. Kant, Prolegom. 85) The „Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) by Immanuel Kant, first published in 1781, is one of the most important philosophical publications, and the „ in Philoso- phy” was the result. Various fields of philosophical discussion are affected. I start to give a brief overview on different of (empirism, ) and different attitudes towards nature before 1781. After some terminological clarifications (transcendental, analytic and synthetic a priori , , recognition, reason, and apperception), an overview of the general contents and architecture of CPR and a brief summary of the different parts is given. Special emphasis is laid on the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic within the first part of CPR („transcendental doctrine of elements”) in order to analyze the concept of nature in the light of the CPR. Discussion within the transcendental aesthetic reveals ideality of and , that means that space and time are just modes of our („conditions of faculty of ”) and are not within nature itself. With space and time our intellect arranges our sensations and by applying the of pure understanding. This process is discussed in detail, as according to CPR nature is nothing else than the result of such an application of categories using time schemes within the frame of a BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 2 system of : the result is a representation of the and the condition is the „facility of the synthesis of the manifold by transcendental apperception” („I think”). What we know about nature are just appearances which are manifold and unreservedly arranged by the . We perceive appearances only; the thing in itself („Ding an sich selbst”) is unknow- able to us. Kant himself writes: „By nature, in the empirical sensse, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws” (B239) and in the chapter „Analogies of Pure Reason” he provides „transcendental laws of nature”, which he also characterizes as „a priori that are intellectual and at the same time synthetic”. By this it is concluded thaat nature is essentially the existence of things, as it is determiined by scientific laws.

Introductory Remarks The „Critique of Pure Reason” by Immanuel Kant is by far the most important philosophical book ever written in Europe (Schopeenhauer). Various fields of philossophical discussion are affected. For modern concepts of nature and scientific research it is a fundamental basis. The Kantian approach is completely different from the very beginning, he straightly goes in the opposite direction (figure 1). Philosophers before Kant asked most frequently: What is the limit of our reason (Gr. λόγος, logos, Lat. ratio), and what is the limit of our perception? What is beyyond our reason ()? What is beyond the visible world?

Figure 1: Transcendentality versus transcendency.

Epistemology (gr. ἐπιστήμη, epistéme – lat. scientia: knowledge, „Erkenntnis”) as one field of philosophical reasoning refers to the first two questions, ontology (gr. ὄν – , sein) refers to third and fourth question. Contrary to this Kant asked: What is before reason, that is in his words, what are the necessary conditions for the faculty of experience? By this, the approach is „transcendental”, his philosophy is referred to as „transcendental ideaalisms”. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 3

Revolutions in Europe and Conditions for Philosophical and Scientific Progress The political, social, cultural, scientific situation in Europe in the middle of the changed dramatically. Epoch-making changes in a small time window („beginning of the modern age as a historical formation”, „Beginn der Neuzeit”) were:  the publication of „Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (1781) by Immanuel Kant for the field of philosophy and human mind in general;  the (1789) for the field of socio-political and economic situation;  the Napoleonic realignment (since 1800) for the political map of Europe. Preconditions were of course the proceeding secularization and the emancipation of human mind. At the end of the 18th century various political and social developments (which started already at the of the renaissance) and a synthesis of different patterns of thought lead to the end of the age of enlightment („Aufklärung”). The resulting world view is the basis of our today’s scientific and philosophical thinking. A side-effect of this development is of course the irreversible divergence of the philosophy of nature and science („” in the sense of Schelling vs. „Naturwissenschaft”) in the course of the 19th century. – „You, that way; we, this way” (Shakespeare, Lost Labour‘s Lost, V,2 the end). Various patterns of thought are characteristic for the cultural and scientific sphere at the end of the 18th century1:  Science is purely secular (Hume, Kant, and Laplace): The condemnation of the curios- itas (Augustinus)2 and other theological presettings abridging scientific reasoning is rejected. There is no return.3  Scientific knowledge is knowledge of laws in nature, process has to be described in mathematical (quantitative) terms (Kant).  Scientific knowledge is based on experience (Hume, Kant), basic procedure of scien- tific nature research is observation and experiment: Platonic philosophy (e.g. concept of and type) and Aristotelian doctrines (e.g. concepts of teleology and entelechy) were eroded.  Scientific research leads to scientific and social progress: Everything is possible, it is just necessary to do more and more research!

Prerequisites: Various Philosophers and General Approaches When Immanuel Kant was born on April, 22nd 1724 in Kaliningrad, the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalism dominated the philosophical debate in continental Europe, while in Britain prevailed Newton and Locke. The CPR was revolutionary and crushing down everything completely like an earthquake (Mendelssohn: „alles zermalmend”), however, there

1 See discussion in Trepl (1987) [Geschichte der Ökologie. Frankfurt]. 2 Aurelius Augustinus (354-430) condemned curiosity (curiositas in the „Confessiones”; German: Neugierde) to be too much related to senses and the visible world. His had an extremely deep impact for more than thousand years and lead to rejection of scientific research. 3 „Pure religion is based on belief” (Hume 1740 [A treatise on human nature. London. p. 9], see also discussion in Kühn 2001 [Kant. Cambridge: especially p. 301ff.]). BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 4 were a number of important precursors, and Kant developed his critique of reason closely in the light of the philosophical discussion of his time. Rationalism is formed based on the philosophy of different thinkers: (427-347 BC), René Descartes ('Renatus Cartesius' 1596-1650), Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677), G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Accordingly, sensory are neither the basis nor limitations of our recognition. True is not what sense, but only what reason tells us about the world (Descartes). Metaphysics is possible and necessary. For the dogmatist thinking is a cognitive function and has absolutely no boundaries and therefore claims universality. – Empirism is based on (384-324 BC), Francis Bacon ('Baco de Verulam', 1561-1626), (1632-1704), Isaac Newton (1643-1727), (1685-1753), and (1711-1776). Contrary to rationalism, empirism states that experience is the only source and limitation of all our recognition and knowledge. There is nothing in our intellect that is not in our senses before (Locke). Therefore, metaphysics is impossible. Additionally, for the skepticism thought is completely unable to perform an act of definite or at least assured knowledge. Kant follows Plato in respect to his distinction between the sensual and the intellectual world, he smoothes and polishes this approach for his own purpose: the construction of the noume- non and the phaenoumenon. The concept of the Platonic idea is modified as well: For the knowledge non-empirical elements are of basic importance, and the idea is not constitutive for knowledge, but has a research- and experience-regulating function (see Höffe 2004). Howev- er, unlike Plato, Kant significantly upgraded the importance of sensuality in the Critique of Pure Reason. Illusion is never in the , because senses basically don’t appear in the mode of possible deception: misapprehension occurs only, when inadequate concepts of understanding (“categories”) are applied to given sensations (error) or when reason is expanding or transcending over sensation-based knowledge (illusion). The of is a theory of the phenomena, the logic of illusion a theory of the nomena („thing in itself”) (discussed in detail in Höffe 2004.). – The logic of illusion is advanced in the largest part of the CPR, the „Transcendental ” with respect to the transcendental (derived from inner sense: immortality), cosmos (derived from outer sense: freedom, i.e. independency of human acting from causality), and (all-embrassing) the of pure reason (). Following Francis Bacon and especially George Berkeley, John Locke began to separate the „thing” from its appearance. He separated primary and secondary properties of things. The secondary properties are properties that do not lie in the itself (such as color or smell). Kant continues on that way consistently in the CPR. The most important philosopher of skepticism in Kant's time was undoubtedly David Hume with his writings, „A Treatise of Human Nature” (1740) and „An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” (1748). Hume recognizes the experience as the only source of our knowledge. With regard to any judgments he distinguishes only between „matters of fact” (Kant: analytic judgments a priori), and „ of ideas” (Kant: synthetic judgments a posteriori): therefore, statements are either purely logical and by this always true („the circle is round”), or based on empirical observations and can be true or false. Kant will show in the Critique of Pure Reason, that there is something in between. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 5

Different Attitudes Towards Nature and the Concept of Causality

Greek and Roman Concept of Nature as Physis and Natura The Greek word  (physis) means everything that is moving, and changing, it is the totality of everything that comes into being and has an origin and passes. Physis means what we call the („Wirklichkeit”), in the concept of „physis” a concept of „reality” is available. Contrary to this, for the Romans „natura” is something that is available, the focus was set to nature as being something, that came into being and that has an origin. In this view nature is everything that emerges and that is created. It is something substantial, and the aspect of the development is one-sidedly stressed by exclusion of the aspect of passing. Physis was reduced to the „natura naturans”, and subsequently, to the „natura”. This process was fundamental for the further development of our modern understanding of nature.4

Medieval and Post-Medieval Concepts of Nature During the late antique and the medieval world nature was everything that is fateful. Nature is unfixed, spontaneous, and ordered by an almighty power. Subsequently, „nature” became the „existence of things, as it is determined by general laws of nature” (Kant, CPR, CJ). According to the post-medieval view of nature at the beginning of the modern age ideas of scientific perception, perception of laws, importance of experiments, and the idea of progress in science became important for the concept of nature.

The Concept of Causality Causality denotes the relation between cause and effect. David Hume introduced the of causality as subjective-psychological tendency of mind to arrange observed processes in time according to obvious apparent necessity in order to set up a coherent imagination. According to Hume, the verdict: „Every change has a cause” is not derived from perception, since we empirically perceive only a sequence.5 Causality within the Critique of Pure Reason is something different, here it is one of 12 categories („pure concepts of understanding”), and by this it is a necessary way of thinking.6 The objectivity of appearances is constituted by the cause–effect relationship. Every change is always the result of the principle of causality, because a series of appearances can only be interpreted as being an objective event, when it is accepted as a temporal succes- sion, in which the sequence of events is not invertible, and that means that the later situation is the result of the cause–effect rule. The former situation is not only „before” (temporal, „the

4 Of course, this is one of the most important reason for the doctrine of exploitation (and overexploitation) of nature resources, and not the DOMINIUM TERRAE of 1 Mose 1.28 (= Gen 1.28; „fill the earth and subdue it”; „macht euch die Erde untertan”) as it is supposed most often. 5 An extensive discussion in: Höffe 2004 [Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft]. 6 The to Hume‘s approach on causality is discussed most clearly in Critique of A 92, for the (philosophical) concept of causality in CPR see Höffe (2004) [Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft]. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 6 lightning occurs before the thunder”), but also therefore („because”, conditional, „it thunders because there was a lightning”). Nature at all is what we know from it a priori, before any real contact: Conformity of appearances, and by this, causality in both forms of intuition (space and time). The concept of nature is a concept of a nature which is realized in its coherency of laws.7

The „Critique of Pure Reason” „We cannot go beyond experience.” (D. Hume, THN: p. 4) Nur in der Erfahrung liegt die Wahrheit. („Only in experience there is truth.”) (I. Kant, Prolegomena: p. 3)

Contents and Reception The first of the preface to the first edition is on an important property of reason: „Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. - The perplexity into which it thus falls is not due to any fault of its own.”8 Subsequently, the main objectives of the CPR are outlined: Examination and analysis of the ability of the faculty of perception. Therefore, it is asked: Is pure metaphysics, i.e. metaphys- ics independent of all experience possible, and if, in which way? Kant writes: „I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limits - all in accordance with principles.” (A IX)9 In the preface to the second edition it is explained, why a „Copernican turn of metaphysics” is initiated, and by this a revolution in the mentality („Revolution in der Denkungsart”). It is stated that our knowledge is not in accordance with the objects, but the objects are constituted according to our way of perception. As the thing-in-itself cannot be the object of our experi- ence, reason enters serious problems when it tries to focus on the essence of reality. Serious contradictions are resulting, and this is shown in the dialectics-chapter.

7 Höffe 2004 [Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft]. 8 „Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in einer Gattung ihrer Erkenntnisse: daß sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann; denn sie sind ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht beantworten kann; denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der menschlichen Vernunft. - In diese Verlegenheit gerät sie ohne ihre Schuld.” 9 „Ich verstehe aber hierunter nicht eine Kritik der Bücher und Systeme, sondern die des Vernunftvermögens überhaupt, in Ansehung aller Erkenntnisse, zu denen sie, unabhängig von aller Erfahrung, streben mag, mithin die Entscheidung der Möglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit einer Metaphysik überhaupt und die Bestimmung sowohl der Quellen, als des Umfanges und der Grenzen derselben, alles aber aus Prinzipien.” BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 7

In the introduction basic terms for the analysis of intellect and reason are introduced, pure and empiric knowledge, analytic versus synthetic judgments, judgments a priori versus judgments a posteriori and the notion of „transcendental philosophy”. Additionally, metaphysics is defined, and by this another main objective of the Critique of Pure Reason: The „unavoidable problems set by pure reason itself are God, freedom, and immortality. The science which, with all its preparations, is in its final intention directed solely to their solution is metaphysics; and its procedure is at first dogmatic, that is, it confidently sets itself to this task without any previous examination of the capacity or incapacity of reason for so great an undertaking.” (B46) The „Critique of Pure Reason” is difficult to read and to understand. Problems of reception and translation arise due to many . Kant liked to include commonly used terms and concepts assigning unusual meanings. Sometimes different are given (reason), sometimes broad, sometimes narrow (idea, apperception), sometimes a is missing (). Sometimes he is not consequent in using certain terms (understanding or intellect = „Verstand”, reason = „Vernunft”, perception = „Anschauung”, imagination = „Vorstel- lung”). Additionally, discussion within different chapters is sometimes dismatched and not well-structured (e.g. chapter „Transcendental Deduction” in both editions10). The standard English translation is by Norman Kemp-Smith (published 1929), though there is a more recent one by and Allen W. Wood. Some important translations used are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Some important German – English translations.

Vernunft: Reason (logos, ratio) Vorstellung: Representation

Verstand: Understanding, Intellect, Comprehension Grund/Folge: Reason/Consequence

Erkenntnis: (Re‐) Ursache/Wirkung: Cause/Effect

Wissen: Knowledge Geist: Spirit (Anaxagoras: nous)

Erfahrung: Experience Eigenschaft: Property

Wahrnehmung: Perception Reine Verstandesbegriffe: Pure Concepts of Understanding

Anschauung: Intuition Begriff: Concept (Begrifflichkeit: Notion, Term)

Einbildung: Imagination Urteil: judgment

Empfindung: Sensation Urteilskraft: (faculty of) judgment

10 The first edition (referred to as “A-edition”) was released in April 1781; Kant revised the text considerably and published the second edition in 1787 (referred to as “B-edition”). Commonly, citation is done referring to this notation, so B46 means page 46 of the second edition. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 8

In order to meet some of the reception problems in table 2 some translations into modern language are given – these translations, of course, must be used very carefully.

Table 2: Some translations into modern language (use carefully!).

Original: Critique of Pure Modern English Original: Kritik der Modern German Reason (Kemp‐Smith) reinen Vernunft

Critique of Pure Reason Examination and Analysis Kritik der reinen Genaue Analyse/Unter‐ of Pure Thinking Vernunft suchung des Denkens pure Conditional, without any Rein (Vernunft, Ver‐ Vorempirisch, erfahrungs‐ empirical ingredients standesbegriffe etc.) unabhängig

Thing in itself Essence of things without Ding an sich Eigentliches Wesen und a relation to the observer Essenz der Dinge

Sensitive intuition Imagination Sinnliche Anschauung Vorstellung

Judgment Conclusion Urteil Schlussfolgerung

Apperception Realization Apperzeption Bewusstwerdung

Transcendental Appercep‐ Self‐awareness transzendentale Selbstbewußtsein tion Apperzeption a priori Before a conclusion a priori Vor einer Schlußfolgerung a posteriori After (according to) a a posteriori Nach einer Schlussfol‐ conclusion gerung

Transcendental Aesthetics and Analytics The general structure of the „Critique of Pure Reason” is: Prefaces (to the first and to the second edition) Introduction Transcendental Doctrine of Elements Transcendental Aesthetic (Perception) Transcendental Logic (Thinking) Transcendental Analytic (Intellect) Transcendental (Reason) Transcendental Doctrine of Methods BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 9

The transcendental doctrine of elements is composed of the transcendental aesthetic11 and the transcendental logic. In order to anallyse cognition both aesthetic and analytic is necessary: „Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are bllind” (Kant, CPR B75: „Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind”). Kant distin- guishes between sensibility, which produces intuitions („sensible ideas”), and understanding (intellect, Verstand), which elaborates and fixes them. By combining booth, the transcendental condition of recognition is given (figure 2). In recognition he distiinguishes between the faculty of judgment (the faculty of connecting the intuitions with each other) according to certain a priori laws (understanding, Verstand) and the faculty of arranging our judgments under a series of universal ideas (reason, Vernunft: see figure 3).

Recognition

Sensitivity Understanding Intuition Concept

Figure 2: Transcendental conditions for possible recognition: Intuition and concept.

Analysis of concepts Transcendental Transcendental aestetics (Theory of analytics (Theory of perception) understanding) Transcendental Analysis of principles doctrine of elements Transcendentall logic (Theory of thinkking) Dialectical concepts Transcendental dialectics (Theory of reason) Dialectical inferences

Figure 3: Structure of the transcendental doctrine of elements.

11 „Aesthetic” here simply refers to the original Greek aisthesis (derived from αἰσθηητικός [aisthetikos)]) = Lat. perceptio = Engl./French perception = Ger. Wahrnehmung, and has nothing to do with „beauty” (this is different in Kant’s „”). BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 10

The inquiry concerning the understanding is subdivided into the crittiique of the faculty of judgment (use of the intellect, „Verstandesgebrauch”) and the critique of reason („Vernunft- gebrauch”), or into the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. The transcen- dental analytic is discussed by introducing the table of categories and by the introduction of the doctrine of judgment, which inclludes the schematism, a system of principles and the distinction between phainomenon and (figure 4). The trranscendental dialectic provides a theory of reason, the largest chapter within the critique of pure reason, the general structure is shown in figure 5. The transcendental ideas soul, freedom, annd God (“ideal of pure reason”) are introduced.

Metaphysical deduction (Types of judgment)

Analysis of concepts (Table of categories) Idea of transceendental logic Transcendental deduction (Transcendental self- awareness)

Transcendental Transcendental logic analytics Schematism (Connection of intuition and categories)

Transcendental dialectics Principles of Analysis of prrinciples preconditions of (Doctrine of judgment) possible experience

Phainomenon vs. Noumenon

Figure 4: Structure of the transcendental logic.

Transcendental illusion (illusion and reason)

„„Psycology”: The Transcendental dialectic: Concepts of pure reason: paralogisms Theory of reason Transcendental ideas

Dialectic inferences of pure „CCosmology”: The reason

„Theology”: The ideal of pure reason (God)

Figure 5: Structure of the transcendental dialectics. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 11

In order to analyse the question whether metaphysics is possible as a science all types of all possible judgments are examined: The result was that there are analytical and synthetical, a priori and a posteriori judgments (table 3). Kant shows subsequently that metaphysics is possible, if „synthetic a priori judgments” are possible. Then, „synthetic a priori truths” are found and it is asked: How is it possible? The answer is given in the first part of the CPR.

Table 3: True Propositions, analytic and synthetic truths, judgments a priori and judgments a posteriori.

Judgments Analytic Truths Synthetic Truths

Intentional (reflecting) Extensional (expanding) Judgments a priori Analytic a priori Synthetic a priori

transcendental Hume: „matters of fact” Hume: (necessary, universal) impossible (before experience) The circle is round. 7 + 5 = 12. An area cannot be There is no ironwood. limited by two straight lines. Judgments a posteriori Synthetic a posteriori

empirical Analytic a posteriori Hume: „relations of ideas” (not necessary or universal) (after experience) Senseless, not considered Empirical statements on observations

In the transcendental aesthetics the pure concepts of intuition are derived. The conclusion of the critical examination of sensibility is the extraction of the pure concepts of intuition: an outer and an inner sense: space and time. It is shown that space and time are empirically real, but transcendentally ideal. They are just modes of perception. We necessarily perceive appearances through space and time, but space and time are not applicable concepts to things in themselves. This is contrary to various other approaches which claim space and time to be purely ideal or purely real (figure 6). The rationale is: In order to assume sensations to be out of the perceiving subject necessarily there must be space. It follows that it is impossible to imagine that there is no space. Space itself cannot be divided, singular are necessarily parts of the space itself. Therefore space is imagined to be an infinite defined quantity. – Thus similarly, it is impossible to imagine succession of events when there is no time, and there- fore, it is impossible to imagine that there is no time at all. Time is something unseparated, it cannot be divided. Single time segments are always part of the overall time itself. The basic representation of time is unlimited: Space and time are necessarily related to reason and its intuitive activity, therefore, things in themselves are considered independently by the reason which thinks them. If sensibility shows us things in time and space, it does not show them as they are in themselves, but as they appear to it through its spectacles, one of the glasses is the BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 12 time, the other the space: Sensibility gives us appearances and it is incapable of giving us the thing-in-itself. – „Between us and the object is the cognition apparatus” (Schopenhauer): the spectacles, the intellect.

Essential properties (Descartes, Kant 1747))

REAL Independentt things (things in themselves) (Newton, Kant 1768)

Relationns maintainning (Leibnittz) Space and Time IDEAL Simply imagination (intermediate approach) (Berkeley)

Subjectiive REAL-IDEAL conditions ((Kant: (appearences) CRP 17881)

Figure 6: Real, ideal or real-ideal character of space and time (accordiing to Höffe 2004, op. cit., modified).

Kant himself gives a short summary of the transcendental aesthetics which includes a large part of the „Copernican revolution in philosophy”: „(…) all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; (…) the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and (…) if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving thhem - a mode which is peculiar to uus, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, cerrttainly, by every human being. With this alone have we any concern.” (B 82)12

12 „(…) alle unsere Anschauung [sei] nichts als die Vorstellung von Erscheinung (…): daß die Dinge, die wir anschauen, nicht das an sich selbst sind, wofür wir sie anschauen, noch ihre Verhältnisse so an sich selbst beschaffen sind, als sie uns erscheinen, und daß, wenn wir unser Subjekt oder auch nur die subjektive Beschaf- fenheit der Sinne überhaupt aufheben, alle die Beschaffenheit, alle Verhältnisse der Objekte im Raum und Zeit, ja selbst Raum und Zeit verschwinden würden, und als Erscheinungen nicht an sichh selbst, sondern nur in uns existieren können. Was es für eine Bewandtnis mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Rezeptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit haben mögee, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt. Wir kennen nichts, als unsere Art, sie wahrzunehmen, die uns eigentümlich ist, die auch nicht notwendig jedem Wesen,, obzwar jedem Menschen, zukommen muß. Mit dieser haben wir es lediglich zu tun.” (B 82) BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 13

After extraction of the pure concepts of intuition, derived from necesssary preconditions for sensitive faculty of intuition, the next step is the isolation of pure concepts of understanding, which are necessary preconditions for the thinking of the intellect: Understanding (intellect) is the faculty to apply concepts, the faculty to generate knowledge, and tthe faculty to use laws (figure 7). The intellect is the faculty ((„the condition of the possibility”) to synthesize objects of intuition to a complete imagination, it composes judgments into a singular unity and, by this, fixes it for the self-awareness. Faculty of imagination and faculty of judgment are necessary ingredients. These considerrations are discussed in detail within the first part of the chapter „Transcendental Analytics”.

Laws

Intellect

Know- Concepts ledge

Figure 7: The intellect applies concepts, generates knowledge and derives laws.

Within the transcendental analytic chapter the pure concepts of understanding are found. „Puree” means that there are no empirical ingredients in these conceptts. The examination of thinking leads to the dissection via the exposition of the general types of judgments. As there are exactly 12 types of judgments twelve categories are assigned: „There are (…) twelve categories, arranged in threes, under fofour groups or fundamental categories: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. One of these, relation, governs and embraces all the rest. It is the highest category, since every judgment, whatever it may be, expressses a relationo ” (Weber 190813 according to CPR B79). As to the quantity judgments are either universal or particular or singular, as to the quality judgments are either affirmative or negative or categorical, as to the relation they are either hypothetical or infinite or disjunctive, and as to the modality either problematic or assertoric or apodictic. The assigned categories are accordingly:

13 Es sind zwölf Kategorien, in Dreiergrupppen unter vier fundamentalen Kategorrien angeordnet: Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität. Eine, nämlich die Relation bestimmt und umfasst alle anderen. Sie ist die höchste Kategorie, denn jedes Urteil, was es auch immer sein mag, bringt eine Relation zum Ausdruck. (Weber, A. 1908. History of Philosophy. New York. (http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/Weber%20ToC.htm). BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 14

1. Categories of Quantity: Unity – Plurality – Totality 2. Categories of Quality: Reality – Negation – Limitation 3. Categories of Relation: Inherence/Subsistence (substantia et accidens) - Causality/ Dependence (cause and effect) – Community (reciprocity between agent and patient) 4. Categories of Modality: - Possibility/impossibility – Existence/ Non-Existence – Ne- cessity/ Example for a synthetic judgment a priori: The sum of angles in a triangle is always 180°. 1. Category of Quantity: unity, as it is a universal statement (judgment) 2. Category of Quality: real, as it is an affirmative statement (judgment) 3. Category of Relation: causal, as it is an infinite statement (judgment) 4. Category of Modality: necessary, as it is an apodictic statement (judgment) The tables of judgments and categories including some examples are given in table 4.

Table 4: Tables of possible judgments and assigned categories with some examples.

Judgments Examples Categories Examples

Quantity Quantity

Universal All M are N. Unity All people sleep. Particular Some M are N. Plurality Some people sleep. Singular One M is N. Totality Kant was sleeping.

Quality Quality

Affirmative M is N. Reality This woman sleeps. Negative M is not N. Negation This man doesn’t sleep. Catagorical M is not -N Limitation For sleeping one must be able to sleep.

Relation Relation

Hypothetical M is N. Inherence This man sleeps. Infinite If M is N, than S is T. Causality When you lay down you fall asleep. Disjunktive M is either N or S or T. Coexistence Either the students or the teachers sleep.

Modality Modality

Problematic Maybe, M is N. Possibility Maybe, some people sleep. Assertoric Actually, M is N. Actuality Actually, some people sleep. Apodictic M must be N. Necessity Everybody has to sleep.

BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 15

These „transcendental concepts” („pure concepts of understanding”, „reine Verstandesbe- griffe) link the concepts („Begriffffe”) to a judgment („Urteil”)). The understanding („Verstand”) stamps the categories liike a stamp into the sensitive . By this, the categories order different experiences into the unity of the subject. – So far we have by this: After dissecting the pure concepts of inntuition a dissection of the pure cooncepts of understand- ing is necessary. With the aid of the outer and the inner sense (space and time) sensations are ordered. This is the precondition for thhe faculty of understanding to assign it to concepts (for illustrations see figure 8 and figure 9).

Figure 8: Receptivity of impressions annd spontaneity of thinking.

Figure 9: Transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic.

Transcendental Apperception and the Four Tables of Understandinng At this stage we have the pure concepts of intuition (space and time), and the pure concepts of understanding (12 categories). As we have seen in the previous chapter the intellect fixes the objects of experience which were ordered by the inner and outer sense, stamps the category of, for example, causality into the raw material of the sensitive perception and finds the causality (of course) in the representation again. The result is a synthettiic judgment a priori. – The next question to answer is, how, in which way the link is possible, and maybe, this is the BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 16 most difficult and important question in the CPR. Kant answers: By the synthesis of the unity of the manifold by the transcendental apperception, and by application of transcendental schematism under the conditions of the system of principles. The „I Think” is the transcendental self-awareness, which runs parallel to all recognition process and unifies the manifold of intuitions with the aid of the categories. The necessary and subjective „I Think” is the objective condition for the recognition of things, because the realized object is the product of the unifying action of the transcendental self-awareness which uses the pure concepts of understanding. In which way this is done? Kant looks for a linking and unifying approach. He finds it in the „transcendental schematism”. Intuitions and categories, extremely different sources of recognition, must have something in common. This is the time. Time includes sensitive and conceptual elements, which are transcendental both, and must be, otherwise, evidently empirical sources are included and the properties of the (transcendental) „conditions of a faculty” are lost. Categories are closely related to certain determinations of time („Zeitbestimmtheiten”). The pure concepts of understanding can be applied to empirical intuitions by the form of all intuitions. The application of a category to the form of time is the „scheme of this form of time”. The scheme „conceptualizes” intuitions and „intuitionizes” concepts, and the result is: nature, as it appears to us! „Suddenly you have a representation of the world” („Mit einem Schlage steht die Welt vor dir”). [Schopenhauer] The schemata of the concepts of pure understanding according to the categories are:  Categories of the Quantity correspond with the scheme of the time series (temporal succession: counting);  Categories of the Quality correspond with the scheme of the time content (fulfillment from real to not real);  Categories of the Relation correspond with the schemata of the time order (duration, course of time, simultaneity).  Categories of the Modality correspond with the schemata of time concepts (anytime is possible, this time is real, every time is necessary). Additionally a corresponding system of principles is derived: Quality, quantity, relation, and modality correspond to certain principles which offer a frame for all judgments, the limits of our intellect. First, for all main categories main principles are advanced.  Quantity is related to the „ of Intuition”: „All intuitions are extensive magni- tudes.”  Quality is related to the „Anticipations of Perception”: „In all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.”  Relation is related to „Analogies of Experience”: „Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.”  Modality is related to „Postulates of Empirical Thought in General”. Subsequently, the tables of understanding can be completed for all categories. We receive the four tables of understanding (table 5): „The four tables ... are all parts of one whole, a schematic construction that stands between the analysis of thought and its synthesis in the system which is the Critique [of Pure Reason]. It deals with the construction of Nature out of BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 17 the material of thought. The Aesthetic adds to this the necessary prerequisite, in the parallel construction of space and time out of the material of intuition” (Kant: Logic. Cited according to Hartman & Schwarz 1974).

Table 5: The four tables of understanding. Categories and judgments with the schemata and the system of principles.

Schemata Categories Principles (judgments/derivations) (judgments) (limits of the intellect)

Time Series Quantity Axioms of intuition

Unlimited Unity (Universal) Limited Plurality (Particular) Extension Unconstrictable Totality (Singular)

Time Content Quality Anticipations of perception

Real (fulfilled) Reality (Affirmative) Intensity Not-real (empty) Negation (Negative) of the impact Transition (real, not real) Limitation (Catagorical) on the sense

Time Order Relation Analogies of experience

Duration Inherence (Hypothetical) Substance Succession Causality (Infinite) Causality Simultaneity Coexistence (Disjunctive) Reprocicity

Time Modality Modality Postulates of empirical thought

Anytime Possibility (Problematic) Formal Correspondence At a certain time Actuality (Assertoric) Material Coherence Every time Necessity (Apodictic) Connection with the Actual

The conditions for the faculty of recognition from experience are illustrated in figure 9. The condition of the unification of sensual perception (intuition) with the categories using the schemes to judgments is the transcendental „I think” („transcendental self-awareness”). The evidence is given in the famous chapter „Transcendental deduction” within the „Transcenden- tal analytic of the elements”. This is the necessary instance (a condition) for all recognition. By this, also, the laws of continuity and causality can be constituted: Every phenomenon, everything presented by the intuitive faculty as existing in space and in time, is a quantity, i.e. a fixed extent and a fixed duration. This principle excludes the hypothesis of the indivisible. Every phenomenon has certain content, a certain degree of intensity. This principle excludes BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 18 the hypothesis of the emptiness. All phenomena are united by causalitty, which excludes the hypothesis of chance. There is a reciprrocal action between the effects and their causes, which excluudes the idea of fate. Every phenomenon is possible, and this coonforms to the laws of space and time, and every phenomenon is necessary, the absence of which would imply the suspension of these laws, which excludes miracles.

Figure 9: Synthetic unifying the manifold by transcendental apperception (Kant, CPRP ).

Concept of Nature Within the „By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws” (CPR B239). The analogies provide „transcendental laws of nature”, which Kant also characterizes as „a priori propoositions that are intellectual and at the same time synthetic” (CPR A216/B263). Human reason assigns law to nature. Our recognition is not complied with objects, but the objects are complied with our recognition. This is the essence of the Copernican turn in metaphysics. Reason can only recognize in nature what was implemented before by reason itself. The objects, the sensitive world are emerged by reason so that appearances are result- ing. Therefore, only references as to appearances are possible. As the „tthing for itself” („Ding an sich”) cannot be object of our experience, reason has problems, when it tries to refer to the essence of things in reality. As the result there will always occur contraddictions as is shown in the second part of the doctrine of elements (chapter „transcendental diallectics” in CPR). The necessary preconditions are arranged graphically in order to illustrate the transcendental aesthetic and analytic (figure 10). Note that it is not a (temporal) proceess (first this, than that, than that, etc.), but an arrangement of necessary conditions for the facculty of knowledge; by this, the argumentation is not psychological, and, of course, not linguistiical. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 19

Figure 10: Overview of the synthesis of the manifold: from noumenon (thing in itself) to phaenoumenon (world).

The inner and outer senses receive impressions which are structured by assigning spatiality and temporality. The result is a rather rough intuition. The transcendental self-awareness (“I think”), limited by certain transcendental principles, uses the intellect to assign the pure concepts of understanding by applying certain time schemes. The resulltt is a representation of a part of the world. Different realizatiions lead to experience, and subsequently to individual and common knowledge, particularly, whaen it is linguistically and textually fixed. By the Kantian transcendental approach and his Copernican turn in metaphysics empirism and rationalism are „crushed down” (Mendelssohn). The empirical point of vview is wrong because it doesn´t begin where science shoulld that is with synthetic a priori truths. The rationalist point of view is wrong because it tries what is impossible: an attempt to know the true nature of thhings outside our mode of perceptiion. By showing (1) that both of these points of view are impossible, (2) that neither dogmatism nor skepticism is tenable, Kant actually sets the stage for a new era in modern philosophy. The argumentation is: Necessarily, empirism must be wrong: It is iimpossible to exclude „spatiality” and „temporality” from experience. Space and time are preconditions of all perception and make experiences possible. – Necessarily, rationallism must be wrong: Representation of space and time is the precondition of all the various concepts of space and time: various spaces and times are part of the overall space and time. Space and time („spati- ality” and „temporality”) are unlimited quantities and no concepts. The most important implications of Kant´s revolution as to the concept of nature is that nature is not outside of our mind and perception. The question what facts are can only be described with the aid of the conditions of the faculty of experience, i.e. our faccuulties how to perceive facts. There is no cognition of naturee, what it is by itself (things in themselves), there is no self-evidence of things. What we perceive are phenomena (manifestations, appearances). BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 20

Therefore, conformity of phenomena with natural laws and causality wiithin the two modes of intuition (time and space) must be taken into account. The expresssion of „nature” is an expression of a nature within a body of scientific laws. What follows for scientific research? Observe and describe pattern and process and look for causality! Do it in mathematical terms as far as you can! As our intelllect is strictly limited recognition of nature is a process itself. And: Beyond our intellect there is a reasonable potential and space for further ideas to be elaborated (practical reasoonn: ethics and religion, aesthetical judgment: art).

Outlook: The Kantian “Critical Business” An essential property of human reason is asking questions which exceed the limit of the phaenoumenon. Kant claims that from the outer and the inner sense each a transcendent idea is derrived (figure 11), - from the inner sense the idea of the soul (including immortality) which lead to paralo- gisms that cannot be solved, - from the outer sense the idea of freedom (including the independence from causality and cosmological questions) which lead to antinomies that cannot be solved, - additionally, and everything inncluding the idea of the ideal of pure reason, god, and his existence cannot be proved: the famous four medieval god’s prooofs are rejected.

Figure 11: The agenda of the Critique of Pure Reason. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 21

The discussion of these questions is outside the empirical world, outside of scientific research, thus transcendent. It leads to ethics and theology. The Critique of Pure Reason provides a general frame for the transcendental idealism, in Kant’s words the “Critical Business” (table 6). Fixing the intellect as a basic faculty of human mind, and by this, fixing the borderline of the empirical world, two further faculties are separated referring to a human faculty of desire and a feeling of pleasure and aversion. In the CPR it was shown that the idea of freedom is thinkable (but not provable), therefore, the elaboration of ethics from principles a priori is possible; this is carried out in the second critique, the “Critique of Practical Reason”. Within the “Critique of Judgment” the business is completed: the aesthetic and teleological judgment is founded by exposing the suitability of objects as a principle a priori: Aesthetic judgment refers to an outer suitability for the observer (beauty and sublime), and teleological judgment refers to an inner suitability of the object appearing to the observer (teleology).

Table 6: Foundation of transcendental idealism: the complete „Critical Business” (according to the “Critique of Judgment”, Introduction: 9).

Faculty of Mind Faculty of Principles Application (Gemüt) Recognition a priori

Intellect Nature Faculty of Recognition Lawfulness (Verstand) (Natur)

Feeling of Pleasure / Judgment Art Suitability Aversion (Urteilskraft) (Kunst)

Reason Freedom Faculty of Desire Final Purpose (Vernunft) (Freiheit)

Due to these different faculties of human mind objects as appearences can be explained, judged and evaluated (figure 12). By this, the intellect answers the question whether some- thing is true or false. Knowledge and scientific research is restricted to this area. Reason produces ideas, f.i. the idea of freedom, and can answer the question whether something is good or bad. Note that from this point of view both areas cannot be dismatched and thus must be separated very seriously. Otherwise a naturalistic (to be – to ought – false conclu- sion, “Sein-Sollen-Fehlschluß”) is the result. Additionally, a judgment as to the suitability is BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 22 possible by the faculty of judgment, this refers to the question whether something works or not and whether something is appropriate or not, respectively, and is related with aspects of organization and purposiveness, teleollogy and art.

Object

Explanation of Judgment of Evaluatioon of appearences appearences appearences

Intellect Faculty of Reason (Concepts) Judgment (Ideass)

Technically and Mechanically Aesthetically Ethically Is it true or false? Does it work? Does it Is it good orr bad? fit in?

Organization / Science Purposiveness Ethics and Phhilosophy Teleology / Art

Figure 12: Explanation, judgment and evaluation (Erklärung, Beurteilung, Bewertung) according to Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” (Introduction).

References and Further Readinngs

References: Basics Kant, I. (1781, 1787): Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1. und 2. Auflage. Abgedruckt in: Weische- del, W. (Hrsg.): Immanuel Kant Werkaausgabe. Band III und IV. Suhrkaammp, Frankfurt: 717pp. Kant, I. (1783): Prolegomena zu einer jeden Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. Abgedruckt in: Weischedel, W. (Hrsg.): Immanuel Kant Werkausgabe. Band V. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt: 96pp. See also: Schopenhauer, A. 1819. Kritik der Kantschen Philosophie. In: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Bd. 2. Abgedruckt in: Hüübscher, A. red., Züricher Ausgaabbe, 2. Band. Diogenes Verlag. BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 23

Some WEB - References Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Critique de la raison pure, Critica de la regione pura, Critica de la razon pura) – Translations: English: http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/ or: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html (by N. Kemp-Smith) German: http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/kant/krvb/krvb.htm French: http://perso.club-internet.fr/folliot.philippe/pu_pref1.htm Italian: http://www.filosofico.net/kantpur.htm Spanish: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01349474244648160076579/index.htm

References and Further Readings Dietzsch, S. 2004. Kant. Leipzig. Grondin, J. 1994. Kant zur Einführung. Hamburg. Hartman, R.S. & Schwartz, W. 1974. Immanuel Kant. Logic. Dover. Höffe, O. 1992. Kant. München. Höffe, O. 2004. Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Grundlegung der modernen Philoso- phie. 3. Auflage. München. Kuehn, M. 2001. Kant. A Biography. Cambridge. Pippin, R.B. 1976. The Schematism and Empirical Concepts. Kant-Studien 67: 156-171. Strawson, P.F. 1966. . An Essay on Kants Critique of Pure Reason. London. Tuschling, B. 1984. Probleme der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft”, Berlin. Wolter, G. 1989. Immanuel Kant. In: Böhme, G. (Hrsg.) Klassiker der Naturphilosophie: Von den Vorsokratikern bis zur Kopenhagener Schule. München.