DOCSLIB.ORG

Reason in Kant and Hegel

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Reason in Kant and Hegel View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Archivio della Ricerca - Università di Pisa Alfredo Ferrarin Reason in Kant and Hegel Das ist nun das dritte Werk der Alten, das ich sehe, und immer derselbe große Sinn. Eine zweite Natur, die zu bürgerlichen Zwecken handelt, das ist ihre Baukunst… J. W. Goethe, Italienische Reise Abstract: In this paper I want to compare and contrast Kant and Hegel on reason. While both emphasize the close connection between reason and its ends, moti- vations and needs, and denounce a futile understanding of reason as a formal, instrumental, or simply logical reasoning, they diverge on how to interpret rea- son’s restlessness, teleology and life. After a section illustrating some uncritical assumptions widespread among readings of Kant, I move to a treatment of their respective views on reason’s self-realization (the relation between thought and the I, concepts and intuitions, faith and history), and conclude by showing the main differences in their respective understandings of method, dialectic, limit and ideas. 1 Thought without realization. Introduction I have recently written two books, one on Kant and one on Hegel.¹ As I was com- pleting them, I realized something I had not clearly or explicitly thought out at first. As I wrote my Kant book, I realized that I was often trying to respond to Hegel’s critique of Kant. The sketch of Kant’s idea of reason that surfaced with greater and greater necessity to my mind was indebted to what I interpreted as Kant’s possible reply to what I began to identify as Hegel’s onesided reading, if not misunderstanding, of Kant. As I wrote my Hegel book, while deploring that Hegel never took seriously the Doctrine of Method of the first Critique or even the Dialectic which he was one of the few (and first) to praise, I realized that Hegel tried to solve, or give a very different version of, some problems which I had isolated as internal to the Doctrine of Method itself. The Powers of Pure Reason. Kant and the Cosmic Idea of Philosophy, Chicago ; Il pensare e l’io. Hegel e la critica di Kant, Rome . 10.1515/kantyb-2016-0001 2 Alfredo Ferrarin Eventually realizing something we had not thought out at first is a case in point. Sometimes what drives our ideas are motivations we are not aware of, and the spontaneity of mental life is beyond the control of our will. The tension between natural and constructive metaphors for reason is one obvious example of a resilient, surd, possibly insoluble core that forms human reason’s lot and therefore returns at decisive moments in the history of philosophy. In the Doc- trine of Method, Kant often portrays reason according to two models which are far from overlapping: the model of the organism and the model of the archi- tect. Reason is a seed (Keim) out of which an organism grows and develops in- ternally as a system, and it is an architect who plans an edifice of laws, the sys- tem of reason’s a priori cognitions. That reason should be an end to itself and that it should set itself ends involves two concepts of teleology as different as the finality of a human being qua natural and qua will transcending nature. In one respect reason is subject to a force it does not make (and possibly even know), and every member of a species naturally follows a predetermined course; in the other, reason is self-making and presupposes individuality as the distinc- tion of oneself from the species as one introduces change by producing some- thing new. Life is for every organism of a distinct species the same, but the ar- chitect’s deliberate and intentional construction of an edifice is an individual project. This non-identity between organism and architect, between species and individual, between life and will, cannot be taken as a mere inconsistency on Kant’s part. It is a decisive tension that keeps Kant’s reason alive. Part of this tension can be rephrased as follows: reason works through the transcendental apperception and the I-think, but is irreducible to individual self-consciousness and to the subject of thinking. Often, and starting with Fichte and Hegel, we tend to conflate the problems of a philosophy of reason with those of a philosophy of subjectivity, and the two again are by no means the same. In fact, I think that this non-identity between reason and subjectivity may well be the fundamental problem Kant bequeaths to post-Kantian philosophy. Kant discovers that the alternative between analysis and a priori on the one hand, and synthesis and experience on the other, is a false one. Reason is an a priori synthesis. It is neither a formal and subjective arrangement of contents coming from without nor is it affected by experience, for it generates its own con- tents. As such, it does not inhabit a realm of forms alternative to reality, but has a force that allows it to extend itself to the world in the shape of a legislation over nature and freedom. It is because the question of reason’s powers begins thus to be raised that Kant speaks of its instincts, interests, needs, destiny, ends; and Hegel, who pushes this new thought to its extreme consequences, speaks of rea- son’s impulse to realize itself in the world. In both Kant and Hegel the separation between eros and logos cannot hold any more; in fact, what we find is an eroti- Reason in Kant and Hegel 3 cized logos, or, in early modern philosophy’s terms, a recasting of the relation between cogito and conatus. Even before – specifically in the second Critique – reason is recognized as of itself practical, in both Kant and Hegel reason seems animated by a drive to be; and for it to be is for it to exercize itself. Both denounce defective understandings of reason. Kant speaks of vernünf- teln, Hegel of räsonnieren to denote an insubstantial and futile use of reason which, more absorbed by its own distinctions than by the necessity to follow the thing at hand over which it ineffectually “hovers”, adopts a formal, technical or instrumental argumentation. What is thereby lost in Kant is reason’s relation to its ends, in Hegel reason’s relation to reality. In both, the defective use of rea- son construes it as one of its several functions as it reduces reason to the under- standing, so that what is thereby lost is the inner articulation of reason in its dif- ferent modes of activity. What I realized as I wrote the Hegel book is that the tension internal to ideas, which in the Architectonic of the Critique of pure Reason are both a seed and a design, is mirrored in Hegel’s logic. Hegel inherits Kant’s tension in the duplicity of thought qua spontaneous force that at first moves unconsciously and qua ab- solute self-consciousness. Thought is for Hegel reason’s force and life, a logical instinct driven by the desire to be-at-home in the world, and at once the knowl- edge of its self-realization in the world. Naturally Hegel’s solution to the problem of the relation between thought and I, between reason and subjectivity, differs from Kant’s, and Hegelians may well point out the advantage of making thematic life and with it the relation between internal and external teleology as integral to the Idea’s immanent development. However that may be and if in the end it is more important to show the differences between Kant and Hegel than their points of contact, however, I think it is crucial to see how their divergences are best understood as the result of what is initially the common ground they share. In order to see that, calling into question some assumptions of Hegel’s cri- tique of Kant is indispensable. This is the backdrop of my discussion of the meaning of reason in Kant and in Hegel. 2 The standard reading of Kant Let me begin with a few points about the Doctrine of Method. Key to Kant’s new conception of reason is its teleology. Philosophy consists more in the promotion of reason’s ends than in logical self-consistency or in the instrument of man- kind’s progress. Reason is a legislative, end-setting, self-organizing, architecton- ic, unifying and autonomous power. The problem that moves Kant in his concep- 4 Alfredo Ferrarin tion of reason is a metaphysical one, and critical inquiries serve the ultimate metaphysical need of reason. This is why I think we must challenge the wide- spread tendency to ascribe mentalistic premises to Kant and to treat the problem of skepticism (the response to Hume) as the issue that animates critical argu- ments. In my book I have tried to show the limits of what I have called the stan- dard reading of Kant. This widespread form of interpretation has failed to do jus- tice to Kant’s philosophy primarily because it is infected with several uncritical and unjustified reductionist assumptions. Two are particularly egregious: a com- partimentalization of the first Critique, and an isolation of each Critique from the others. Five reasons why the standard reading falls short, all of which result from these assumptions, are the following. First, it misunderstands pure reason’s fin- itude by construing it as the situatedness of human nature. Second, it assumes an implicit positivism, which in turn legitimates its dismissal of ideas and nou- mena through the reduction of the Transcendental Dialectic to the thesis that we cannot know things in themselves.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kant's Theoretical Conception Of
    KANT’S THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF GOD Yaron Noam Hoffer Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, September 2017 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Doctoral Committee _________________________________________ Allen W. Wood, Ph.D. (Chair) _________________________________________ Sandra L. Shapshay, Ph.D. _________________________________________ Timothy O'Connor, Ph.D. _________________________________________ Michel Chaouli, Ph.D 15 September, 2017 ii Copyright © 2017 Yaron Noam Hoffer iii To Mor, who let me make her ends mine and made my ends hers iv Acknowledgments God has never been an important part of my life, growing up in a secular environment. Ironically, only through Kant, the ‘all-destroyer’ of rational theology and champion of enlightenment, I developed an interest in God. I was drawn to Kant’s philosophy since the beginning of my undergraduate studies, thinking that he got something right in many topics, or at least introduced fruitful ways of dealing with them. Early in my Graduate studies I was struck by Kant’s moral argument justifying belief in God’s existence. While I can’t say I was convinced, it somehow resonated with my cautious but inextricable optimism. My appreciation for this argument led me to have a closer look at Kant’s discussion of rational theology and especially his pre-critical writings. From there it was a short step to rediscover early modern metaphysics in general and embark upon the current project. This journey could not have been completed without the intellectual, emotional, and material support I was very fortunate to receive from my teachers, colleagues, friends, and family.
    [Show full text]
  • Special Issue on the Concepts of Contradiction and Unity of Opposites
    World Journal of Education and Humanities ISSN 2687-6760 (Print) ISSN 2687-6779 (Online) Vol. 2 No. 2, 2020 www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjeh Special Issue On the Concepts of Contradiction and Unity of Opposites Prof. Zhiyong Dong1* 1 Northwest University, P. R. China * Prof. Zhiyong Dong, Northwest University, P. R. China Received: October 10 18, 2019 Accepted: October 22, 2019 Online Published: October 30, 2019 doi:10.22158/wjeh.v2n2p182 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjeh.v2n2p182 1. Contradiction In Chinese language, the concept of contradiction first refers to the phenomena that people make the two things, which could not be the true things at the same time, as the true things at the same time, that is, to make two opposite and conflict opinions as the correct opinions at the same time. For example, there is a story in ancient China. It is said that a person is selling weapons on the street. He says that his spears could thorn through any thing at one time. Then he says that his shields can keep out any thing at another time. An onlooker asks him what would happen if he use your spear to thrown your shield. Then the person could not answer. (Note 1) This kind of phenomena are called contradiction in formal logic in Chinese language. From this example we can see that it is quite easy to make the phenomena of contradiction in the sense of formal logic, when people make the results of different processes of thinkings as the phenomena and matters to begin a new process of thinking.
    [Show full text]
  • HAVE YOU EVER WONDERED Why Life Comes in Opposites?
    2 H AVE YOU EVER WONDERED why life comesin opposites?Why everything you value is one of a pair of opposites? Why all deci- sions are between opposites? Why all desires are based on opposites? Notice that all spatial and directional dimensions are opposites: up vs. down, inside vs. outside, high vs. low, long vs. short, North vs. South, big vs. small, here vs. there, top vs. bottom, left vs. right. And notice that all things we consider serious and important are one pole of a pair of opposites: good vs. evil, life vs. death, pleasure vs. pain, God vs. Satan, freedom vs. bondage. So also, our social and esthetic values are always put in terms of op- posites: successvs. failure, beautiful vs. ugly, strong vs. weak, intelligent vs. stupid. Even our highest abstractions rest on opposites. Logic, for instance, is concerned with the true vs. the false; epistemology, with appearance vs. reality; ontology, with being vs. non-being. Our world seemsto be a massive collection of opposites. This fact is so commonplace as to hardly need mentioning, but the more one ponders it the more it is strikingly peculiar. For nature, it seems, knows nothing of this world of opposites in which people live. Nature doesn't grow true frogs and false frogs, nor moral trees and immoral trees, nor right oceans and wrong oceans. There is no trace in nature of ethical mountains and unethical mountains. Nor are there even such things as beautiful speciesand ugly species-at least not to Nature, for it is pleased to produce all kinds.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
    Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Philosophy 270 Prof. B. Look I. Some Background Look at Prolegomena: David Hume awoke Kant from his “dogmatic slumber.” Kant tried to see if he could put Hume’s problem in a general form. (p. 581b) What is the general form? In a letter in 1772 Kant raises two questions: (1) How can we be justified in applying a priori categories to appearances in advance of experience, as we must if we are to do science? (2) Can there be any justification at all for applying a priori categories to reality? The Critique is going to answer these questions Critique has two aims: (1) In the Aesthetic and the Analytic to provide a philosophical basis for physical science. Think of the notions of cause, interaction, etc. – these are necessary for science but can’t be justified empirically (2) In the Dialectic “to deny knowledge to make room for faith” (Bxxx) What is at issue? God, freedom, immortality Kant claims that his philosophy is akin to the Copernican Revolution Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects (transcendental realism), but this leads to problems concerning the possibilities of knowledge; let us assume that objects conform to our cognition (transcendental idealism) We could say that there are two competing models of knowledge: a theocentric model of knowledge and an anthropocentric model theocentric model: the standard of knowledge is a God’s-eye perspective on the way the world is; the point is to have the mind conform to the objects Æ transcendental realism anthropocentric model: the mind is to determine the way we are to conceive of objects Æ transcendental idealism II.
    [Show full text]
  • The Wisdom of the Unsayable in the Chinese Tradition Karl-Heinz Pohl
    3 The Wisdom of the Unsayable in the Chinese Tradition Karl-Heinz Pohl Concerning Eastern teachings such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, there is often widespread confusion about how these are to be classified—as religion or as philosophy. This problem, however, is culturally homemade: the distinction between religion and philosophy based on European cultural tradi- tions often does not apply when we leave our culture behind. Thus, the Eastern teachings, which are often referred to as “wisdom religions” (e.g. by Hans Küng), are either religion and philosophy or neither religion nor philosophy; whichever way you prefer ideologically. As is well known, there is a certain “family resemblance” (as Wittgenstein would put it) between Daoism and Buddhism. There is, however, very little that connects these Asian philosophies and religions with the European tradition emanating from Greco-Roman and Christian thought. This does not mean that their philosophemes would be fundamentally alien to the Europeans: at most they do not belong to the European mainstream. So the family resemblance could certainly be extended to certain European philoso- phers and schools: There is in Europe a tradition—from the pre-Socratics through the apophatic theology and mysticism of the Middle Ages to existen- tialism and philosophy of language of modernity—that has very much in common with Daoism and Buddhism. Hence, a blend of selected passages from Heraclitus (cf. Wohlfart 1998: 24–39), Neo-Pythagoreanism, Sextus Empiricus, Gnosticism, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, Jacob Boehme, Montaigne, Hegel (cf. Wohlfart 1998: 24–39), Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, et al.
    [Show full text]
  • The Concept of Nature in the Light of Immanuel Kant's „Critique of Pure
    BTU Chair of General Ecology Concept of Nature in the „Critique of Pure Reason” 1 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE IN THE LIGHT OF IMMANUEL KANT’S „CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON” Scriptum Udo Bröring BTU, Chair General Ecology Table of Contents Summary Introductory Remarks Prerequisites: Various Philosophers and General Approaches Different Attitudes Towards Nature and the Concept of Causality The „Critique of Pure Reason” - Contents and Reception - Transcendental Aesthetics and Analytics - Transcendental Apperception and the Four Tables of Understanding, Concept of Nature Within the Transcendental Idealism Outlook: The Kantian “Critical Business” References and Further Readings Summary It is reason which prescribes its laws to the sensible universe; it is reason which makes the cosmos. (I. Kant, Prolegom. 85) The „Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) by Immanuel Kant, first published in 1781, is one of the most important philosophical publications, and the „Copernican Revolution in Philoso- phy” was the result. Various fields of philosophical discussion are affected. I start to give a brief overview on different concepts of science (empirism, rationalism) and different attitudes towards nature before 1781. After some terminological clarifications (transcendental, analytic and synthetic a priori truths, intuition, recognition, reason, and apperception), an overview of the general contents and architecture of CPR and a brief summary of the different parts is given. Special emphasis is laid on the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic within the first part of CPR („transcendental doctrine of elements”) in order to analyze the concept of nature in the light of the CPR. Discussion within the transcendental aesthetic reveals ideality of space and time, that means that space and time are just modes of our perception („conditions of faculty of experience”) and are not within nature itself.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Argument's for God's Existence Kant's Criticisms O
    Kant’s Arguments for God’s Existence Introduction Background: Three Argument’s for God’s Existence Kant’s criticisms of these three arguments Ground vs. Cause: Kant’s reason for rejecting constructive proofs of God’s existence Kant’s first argument for God’s existence: God’s existence as the foundation of causal explanation Kant’s second argument for God’s existence: Natural orderliness as being grounded in the coherence of God’s mind Kant’s third argument for God’s existence: morality as grounded in the coherence of God’s mind Kant’s arguments for God as transcendental arguments Introduction Kant puts forth three arguments for God’s existence---or, what might be more accurate, three very different versions of a single such argument. Each is original and none has any obvious flaws. This is not to say that they prove what they are meant to prove, only that, if they fail to do so, it is not immediately clear why. Background: Three Argument’s for God’s Existence When philosophers try to prove God’s existence, it is almost always by way of one of the following three arguments: the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, and the teleological argument. Kant rejects each of these arguments, and his own arguments are to be understood in terms of this fact. Right now, I will state and evaluate these arguments, and then I will state and evaluate Kant’s arguments. The ontological argument: God is by definition perfect; failure to exist is an imperfection; therefore, God must exist. Analysis: This argument is a total failure, since all it shows is the truism is that if God existed, then, having as he would every conceivable perfection, he would exist— since, in other words, all it shows is that if God existed, then God would exist.
    [Show full text]
  • The Relativity of the Unity of Opposites
    RELATIVITY OF THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES 185 essence of the doctrine and would open the door to mech­ anism, relativism, teleology, and modern neo-Hegelianism. Indeed the mechanists also, as we know, are ready to admit that" all flows, all changes." But" flows and changes" in CHAPTER V their understanding is only a quantitative process, the actual elements remaining unchanged. And the relativist not only admits that " all changes, all flows," but makes THE RELATIVITY OF THE such change absolute, including within it our own know­ UNITY OF OPPOSITES AND THE ledge. Thus every kind of stability in objective phenomena ABSOLUTENESS OF THEIR is swept away, becoming but a subjective appearance. Our knowledge is held to be limited and distorted in its very CONFLICT nature so that it does not even reflect truly the creative flow ofreality. The teleologically inclined bourgeois thinker also admits IN THE FOR E W 0 R D to the first volume of Capital Marx that" all flows, all changes." But he goes on to affirm wrote: that this flow, this change, is nothing else than the path to " In its rational form dialectic is a scandal and an the realization of ever more perfect forms, the tendency abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokes­ towards which is deeply seated in life itself, that movement men because while supplying a positive understanding is determined by those ideal forms in which the imminent of th~ existin~state ofthings, it at the same time furni<;hes purposes of life reside. an understanding of the negation of that state of things, There are other eclectic points of view, as, for instance, and enables us to recognize that that state of things will the theory that history shows an alternation of stable and inevitably break up; it is an abomination to them be­ revolutionary epochs, the first characterized by definiteness, cause it regards every historically ?evdoped soci~ form stability and self-identity of the processes found in it, the as in fluid movement, as traDSlent; because It lets.
    [Show full text]
  • Spinoza's Ethics Beth Lord
    EDINBURGH PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDES Spinoza's Ethics Beth Lord Spinoza’s Ethics Edinburgh Philosophical Guides Series Titles in the series include: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Douglas Burnham with Harvey Young Derrida’s Of Grammatology Arthur Bradley Heidegger’s Being and Time William Large Plato’s Republic D. J. Sheppard Spinoza’s Ethics Beth Lord Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy Kurt Brandhorst Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology Katrin Joost Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra Martin Jesinghausen and Douglas Burnham Spinoza’s Ethics An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide Beth Lord Edinburgh University Press © Beth Lord, 2010 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh www.euppublishing.com Typeset in 11/13pt Monotype Baskerville by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire, and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7486 3449 1 (hardback) ISBN 978 0 7486 3450 7 (paperback) The right of Beth Lord to be identifi ed as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Contents Series Editor’s Preface vi Acknowledgements vii List of Figures viii Introduction 1 1. A Guide to the Text 15 Part I: Being, Substance, God, Nature 15 Part II: Minds, Bodies, Experience and Knowledge 49 Part III: The Affects 83 Part IV: Virtue, Ethics and Politics 103 Part V: Freedom and Eternity 136 2. Study Aids 159 Glossary 159 Further Reading 167 Types of Question you will Encounter 168 Tips for Writing about Spinoza 169 Bibliography 173 Index 179 Series Editor’s Preface To us, the principle of this series of books is clear and simple: what readers new to philosophical classics need fi rst and foremost is help with reading these key texts.
    [Show full text]
  • Herr Kant, Der Alleszermalmer-Kant the "All-Crushing" Destroyer of Metaphysics: Metaphilosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Honors Theses Department of Philosophy Spring 5-18-2015 Herr Kant, der Alleszermalmer-Kant the "All-Crushing" Destroyer of Metaphysics: Metaphilosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason Jake De Backer Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses Recommended Citation De Backer, Jake, "Herr Kant, der Alleszermalmer-Kant the "All-Crushing" Destroyer of Metaphysics: Metaphilosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2015. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses/12 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HERR KANT, DER ALLESZERMALMER: THE “ALL-CRUSHING” DESTROYER OF METAPHYSICS KANT’S METAPHILOSOPHY IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON An Honors Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation with Undergraduate Research Honors Georgia State University 2015 by Jake Christopher de Backer Committee: Dr. Eric E. Wilson, Honors Thesis Director Dr. Sarah Cook, Honors College Associate Dean 27 April 2015 HERR KANT, DER ALLESZERMALMER: THE “ALL-CRUSHING” DESTROYER OF METAPHYSICS KANT’S METAPHILOSOPHY IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON by JAKE CHRISTOPHER DE BACKER Under the Direction of Dr. Eric E. Wilson ABSTRACT The Critique of Pure Reason inaugurated Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Commentators commonly distinguish between Kant’s Positive Project (PP), that is, his epistemology as laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, from his Negative Project (NP), expressed in terms of the destructive implications his epistemology has on speculative metaphysics and rational theology.
    [Show full text]
  • The Concept of Non-Duality in Śaṅkara and Cusanus
    Comparative Philosophy Volume 12, No. 1 (2021): 98-110 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / www.comparativephilosophy.org https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120109 THE CONCEPT OF NON-DUALITY IN ŚAṄKARA AND CUSANUS JEROME KLOTZ ABSTRACT: When comparing diverse philosophical traditions, it becomes necessary to establish a common point of departure. This paper offers a comparative analysis of Advaita Vedānta Hinduism and esoteric Christianity, as represented by the two highly celebrated figures of Śaṅkara and Nicholas Cusanus, respectively. The common point of departure on which I base this comparison is the concept of “non-duality”—a concept that is fitting for at least two reasons. First, it is general enough to encompass both traditions, pervading the work of each figure, and thus allowing for a kind of “shared language.” Second, it is specific enough to identify a set of core and well-defined principles amenable to systematic study, chief among which are the notions of (1) the “Absolute” as an infinite unity that transcends all determinations (“no-thing”) and exceeds all oppositions (“not-other”), and (2) the world as an ontologically ambiguous “reflection” that simultaneously hides and manifests its meta- ontological Principle. In drawing these connections, I hope to show how the concept of non- duality provides the possibility for a mutual understanding among diverse traditions at the philosophical level. Keywords: Advaita Vedānta, metaphysics, mysticism, Nicholas Cusanus, non-duality, Śaṅkara 1. INTRODUCTION The concept of “non-duality” is not the exclusive possession of any one philosophical system. On the contrary, it can be found—mutatis mutandis—within religio- philosophical traditions the world over: from Philosophical Daoism, Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Advaita Vedānta Hinduism in the East, to Kabbalistic Judaism, esoteric Christianity, and mystical Islam in the West.
    [Show full text]
  • Dewey and the Empirical Unity of Opposites Author(S): James W
    Dewey and the Empirical Unity of Opposites Author(s): James W. Garrison Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall, 1985), pp. 549-561 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320113 . Accessed: 28/04/2014 18:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.95.104.66 on Mon, 28 Apr 2014 18:57:39 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JamesW. Garrison Deweyand the. EmpiricalUnity of Opposites i This paper concentrates on a single paragraph in John Dewey's Experience and Nature, one that introduces an importantand vital principle for the developmentof his thought. Although this principle is well known to Dewey scholars, its full significancehas not always been adequately appreciated. In writingthis paper I hope to establish this theme as crucial to a proper understandingof Dewey's empirically groundednaturalistic metaphysics. II The paragraph in question occurs in the context of Dewey's re- buttal of those philosophies intent on "denying to the universethe characterof contingency.
    [Show full text]