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ADVERTIMENT. Lʼaccés Als Continguts Dʼaquesta Tesi Doctoral I La Seva Utilització Ha De Respectar Els Drets De La Persona Autora

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ADVERTIMENT. Lʼaccés Als Continguts Dʼaquesta Tesi Doctoral I La Seva Utilització Ha De Respectar Els Drets De La Persona Autora ADVERTIMENT. Lʼaccés als continguts dʼaquesta tesi doctoral i la seva utilització ha de respectar els drets de la persona autora. Pot ser utilitzada per a consulta o estudi personal, així com en activitats o materials dʼinvestigació i docència en els termes establerts a lʼart. 32 del Text Refós de la Llei de Propietat Intel·lectual (RDL 1/1996). Per altres utilitzacions es requereix lʼautorització prèvia i expressa de la persona autora. En qualsevol cas, en la utilització dels seus continguts caldrà indicar de forma clara el nom i cognoms de la persona autora i el títol de la tesi doctoral. No sʼautoritza la seva reproducció o altres formes dʼexplotació efectuades amb finalitats de lucre ni la seva comunicació pública des dʼun lloc aliè al servei TDX. Tampoc sʼautoritza la presentació del seu contingut en una finestra o marc aliè a TDX (framing). Aquesta reserva de drets afecta tant als continguts de la tesi com als seus resums i índexs. ADVERTENCIA. El acceso a los contenidos de esta tesis doctoral y su utilización debe respetar los derechos de la persona autora. Puede ser utilizada para consulta o estudio personal, así como en actividades o materiales de investigación y docencia en los términos establecidos en el art. 32 del Texto Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual (RDL 1/1996). Para otros usos se requiere la autorización previa y expresa de la persona autora. En cualquier caso, en la utilización de sus contenidos se deberá indicar de forma clara el nombre y apellidos de la persona autora y el título de la tesis doctoral. No se autoriza su reproducción u otras formas de explotación efectuadas con fines lucrativos ni su comunicación pública desde un sitio ajeno al servicio TDR. Tampoco se autoriza la presentación de su contenido en una ventana o marco ajeno a TDR (framing). Esta reserva de derechos afecta tanto al contenido de la tesis como a sus resúmenes e índices. WARNING. The access to the contents of this doctoral thesis and its use must respect the rights of the author. It can be used for reference or private study, as well as research and learning activities or materials in the terms established by the 32nd article of the Spanish Consolidated Copyright Act (RDL 1/1996). Express and previous authorization of the author is required for any other uses. In any case, when using its content, full name of the author and title of the thesis must be clearly indicated. Reproduction or other forms of for profit use or public communication from outside TDX service is not allowed. Presentation of its content in a window or frame external to TDX (framing) is not authorized either. These rights affect both the content of the thesis and its abstracts and indexes. TESI DOCTORAL KANT'S NOTION OF A TRANSCENDENTAL SCHEMA: THE CONSTITUTION OF OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY Lara Scaglia SUPERVISOR Prof. Thomas Sturm FACULTAT DE FILOSOFIA I LLETRES DEPARTAMENT DE FILOSOFIA 2018 To my lands and ices. Table Of Contents Preface 9 Introduction 11 Part I: Kant’s theory of schematism in its contexts 1. The notion of schema before Kant 19 1.1 Ancient times 22 1.2 Middle Ages 22 1.3 Modern Ages 23 1.3.1 Tetens’s concept of schema 29 1.4 Conclusion 33 2 . Kant’s precritical notion of a schema 34 2.1 The metaphysical notion of schema in the Nova Dilucidatio 37 2.2 The new significance of schema in the Dissertation of 1770. A first reference to the problem of objectivity 38 2.2.1 Schema and the forms of the worlds 39 2.2.2 The new view of space and time as schemata in the Dissertation: Comparison with Newton and Leibniz 42 2.2.3 The limits of Kant’s Dissertation and the need of a further solution to the question on objectivity 44 3. The introduction of the transcendental forms in the Critique of Pure Reason 47 3.1 The doctrine of sensibility 48 3.2 The doctrine of understanding 52 4. Analysis of the schematism chapter 60 4.1 A transcendental doctrine of judgement 61 4.2 Time-mediation 64 4.3 Schemata and their faculty 66 4.4 Schemata, images or concepts? 67 4.5 The table of schemata 69 4.6 Schemata as conditions of the significance of the pure concepts 73 5. Debates over the schematism chapter in Kant scholarship 79 5.1 Zschocke’s criticism of schematism and his theory of objectivity as “practical act” through categories 79 5.1.1 Schematism as a redundant addition 80 5.1.2 The thought of the necessity as main value of the categories 82 5.1.3 A misleading illustration of an actual problem 82 5.1.4 Critical remarks 83 5.2 Curtius: The obscure and unnecessary schematism chapter 88 5.2.1 The redundancy of the problem of schematism 88 5.2.2 Subsumption 89 5.2.3 Schema as rule 91 5.2.4 Critical remarks 92 5.3 Bussman: Schematism as a self-reflection of the understanding’s own activity 94 5.3.1 Homogeneity 95 5.3.2 Schematism of the underlines 96 5.3.3 Schematism as a model of the understanding’s activity 98 5.3.4 Critical remarks 101 5.4 Walsh’s criticism of the Kant’s one way-schematisation 102 5.4.1 The importance of the problem of schematism: use and meaning of categories 103 5.4.2 How to define schemata in distinction to empirical concepts, categories and ideas 105 5.4.3 Walsh’s fundamental criticism of Kant: an incorrect view of metaphysics and the project of “organic” schemata 108 5.4.4 Critical remarks 109 5.5 “Knowing that and knowing how”: The transcendental meaning of schemata in Dahlstrom’s interpretation 112 5.5.1 “Knowing that and knowing how” 113 5.5.2 Critical remarks 116 5.6 Guyer’s criticism of the temporality of schemata and their unclear relation to categories 118 5.6.1 Schemata and temporality 119 5.6.2 Some incongruences in the relation between categories and schemata 121 5.6.3 Critical remarks 122 5.7 Allison’s view of the Kantian schematism 123 5.7.1 The necessity of schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason 123 5.7.2 What about space? 125 5.7.3 Judgement and its role between reason and understanding 126 5.7.4 Subsumption 128 5.7.5 “To be and to do”: Definitions of schemata 129 5.7.6 Categories and schemata 132 5.7.7 Schemata and principles 134 5.7.8 Critical remarks 136 Part II: After Kant 1. The philosophical reception and criticism of the doctrine of schematism 145 1.1 The earliest receptions 146 1.2 Idealism and post-Kantianism 147 1.3 From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries 154 2. Kant’s distinction between philosophy and psychology 167 2.1 Philosophy as system of concepts 168 2.2 Psychology: A doctrine of inner sense 174 2.3 A transcendental psychology? 182 3. Kant’s notion of a schema in twentieth-century psychology 189 3.1 Schema theories 189 3.2 Frederic Bartlett 191 3.2.1 A pioneer of applied psychology 192 3.2.2 Experimental method 192 3.2.3 The topics of experiments 193 3.2.4 Remembering 194 3.2.5 Schematic settings 195 3.2.6 Meaning 198 3.2.7 Conclusion 201 3.3 Jean Piaget’s interpretation of the Kantian notion of schema 202 3.3.1 An interest in both theoretical and empirical studies 203 3.3.2 A “philosophical shock” 205 3.3.3 Piaget’s notion of schema 206 3.3.4 An example of a schema: The object 208 3.3.5 Experience as organisation through schemata. Piaget’s perspective between empiricism and apriorism 214 3.3.6 Piaget’s novelty and difference from Kant’s view 216 7 3.4 Lawrence Barsalou’s reception of the Kantian transcendental schematism and its significance for reconsidering the relation between psychology and philosophy 219 3.4.1 Cognitive psychology 220 3.4.2 Categorization 220 3.4.3 Modal theory versus amodal theory 222 3.4.4 Properties 224 3.4.5 Barsalou and Kant 229 3.4.6 Psychology and philosophy 230 Conclusion 232 Bibliography 244 Preface “Hang up philosophy! Unless philosophy can make a Juliet, Displant a town, reverse a prince’s doom, It helps not, it prevails not: talk no more.” Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, III, 3 “Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence.” Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell Thinking about how to start this preface, it suddenly came to my mind how it all started. It was a rainy Milanese September morning when I sat in my first lesson of philosophy at school. The teacher asked us what our opinion about philosophy was, and if we thought it was a science. With the self-confidence typical of imagination, I raised my hand and answered that philosophy is not a science because its claims cannot be demonstrated. Science is stable, clear, and certain, whereas philosophy, as Romeo harshly says, is just talk: it is useless and does effect nothing. But then, my teacher showed me that my ideas had some cracks: scientific claims are often based on hidden assumptions and theories change through time. Nothing is stable and fixed. That disturbed me a lot. I had my preferred views, my plans for the future (to become an ethologist or an archaeologist studying the world and its sands) but then my teacher challenged me.
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