Intellectual Intuition and Thing-In-Itself: Preserving the Possibility of a “Transcendent Metaphysics”

CHAPTER THREE

INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AND THING-IN-ITSELF: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY OF A “TRANSCENDENT METAPHYSICS”

Chapter 2 broadly introduced Mou Zongsan’s appropriation of the concept of intellectual intuition, which he considers the epitome of a Chinese spiritual tradition that emphasizes the possibility of a direct knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe. But “intellectual intuition,” if it is to serve the purpose of a dialogue with Kant, is not a concept that can be appropriated alone. It is embedded in a semantic field of other Kantian concepts that Mou Zongsan also needs to take into account. The most important of these concepts is that of thing-in- itself (wu zishen 物自身), which is the correlate of intellectual intuition. Somehow, thing-in-itself is the equivalent for intellectual intuition of what the “object” is in the realm of “ordinary” knowledge (i.e., knowledge, as we usually understand it, whose possibility relies on sensible intuition and which is the only one possible for Kant). In this chapter, we explore how Mou Zongsan’s appropriation of intellectual intuition translates into a reinterpretation of the meaning of “thing-in-itself.” To do this, we also need to understand why Mou Zongsan dedicated so much effort to differentiating thing-in-itself from another concept inherited from Kant but discussed primarily by Heidegger: the “transcendental object X” (chaoyue duixiang 超越對象 X). At stake in this discussion is the possibility for Mou Zongsan of establishing a moral metaphysics understood as a “transcendent metaphysics” and clearly differentiated from Heidegger’s “immanent metaphysics.” Kant opposes, on the one hand, a phenomenon that can be an object of knowledge thanks to the synthesis, in the unity of appercep- tion, of sensible intuitions and concepts of a spontaneous understanding and, on the other hand, thing-in-itself or noumenon, two notions that overlap to some extent. Thing-in-itself is a reality considered independently from an act of knowledge (for example: the table in front of me, in itself, independently from the way I get to know it thanks to my sensibility, to time and space). Noumenon is the intelligible object of understanding (Verstand ). Negatively, noumenon is only a “limitative 94 chapter three concept” that reflects the limitations of our cognitive abilities, our dependence on sensible intuition. Positively, it is the correlate of a non-sensible intuition (intellectual intuition, intuitive understanding), of which we are, in Kant’s opinion, deprived. In principle we have no direct access to noumena, hence the necessity for practical reason of referring to postulates (of free will, the existence of God, etc.).1 Kant sometimes conflates thing-in-itself and noumenon (especially in the negative sense) and sometimes differentiates between them. As for Mou Zongsan, we will see later that he transforms the meaning given by Kant to thing-in-itself and endows it with a dimension of value. The positive meaning that he ascribes to thing-in-itself becomes a piv- otal component of his system of “moral metaphysics.” In order to understand—especially from the 1970s onward—Mou Zongsan’s relation to Kant, one should be aware that his reading of Kant has been deeply influenced by Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique of the Pure Reason. One might even wonder whether Heidegger is Mou’s real interlocutor in his central work, Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy. What we could call “the challenge of Heidegger” comes from the fact that, on the one hand, the latter, like Mou Zong- san, directly links metaphysics/ontology and practical philosophy,2 and that, on the other hand, he does it in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics on the basis of a reinterpreted first Critique. The interpretation by Heidegger of transcendence, practical reason, or fundamental ontology undermines Mou’s appropriation of and creative elaboration on Kantian philosophy. In brief, if Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is justified, it is Mou’s philosophical project that is threatened. This line of argument will be developed in the current chapter with the concept of transcendental object X and in Chapter 4 in the framework of a discussion on fundamental ontology.

1 Nevertheless, we already introduced in our previous discussions whether on the fact of reason and the postulate in Chapter 1 or on the Third Critique in Chapter 2 that one could ﬁnd elements that invoke direct access to the intelligible in Kant’s thought. Subsequent developments will reinforce such an idea. 2 Two precisions: (1) This direct link is not possible in Kant’s philosophy (hence, his transcendental apparatus: postulates, facts of reason, etc.) unless it is reinterpreted in Heidegger’s way; (2) It is possible to draw an analogy between Heidegger and Mou Zongsan with respect to this direct link despite the huge differences in their concep- tion of metaphysics (Heidegger’s metaphysics is considered “immanent” for Mou who intends to reconstruct a “transcendent” metaphysics) and ontology (Mou considers that Heidegger’s ontology remains “attached” whereas his fundamental ontology is “detached”). These points will be addressed in chapter 4.