Socio-Economic and Demographic Analysis of the September 2019 Israeli Elections

November, 2019

Dr. Roby Nathanson

Yanai Weiss

Eyal Zilberman

Table of Contents

Introduction and Methodology ...... 3

Classification of the Parties ...... 4

Part 1: National Analysis...... 5

Results by Potential Coalitions and Blocks ...... 5

Change in Turnout amongst the Jewish Population ...... 7

Socio economic Analysis ...... 8

Part 2: Israel Beytenu (IB) and Avigdor Liberman ...... 11

Part 3: Shifts Between Blocks ...... 14

Part 4: Voting trends in Jewish SAs signaled as important in the previous research ..... 16

Part 5: The Arab Vote ...... 16

2

Introduction and Methodology

On September 17th 2019, Israel held its second election in the year of 2019, after negotiations to form a government following the April 2019 elections were unsuccessful. After the previous round, the Macro Center for Political Economics conducted a research of the election results in order to identify socio-economic and demographic patterns in voting trends, and mark possible battleground areas for the upcoming election. As part of the research, 91 areas were marked as possible battlegrounds in September.

With the results of this election now clear, although their political outcome still uncertain, there is no doubt that significant shifts have occurred between the two election cycles. First and foremost, the number of seats held by parties supporting Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu decreased from 60 to 55, and thus Netanyahu failed to secure an overall majority needed to form a right-wing coalition without Avigdor Liberman's Israel Beytenu (IB) party. Liberman's party, campaigning for a unity government, was able to gain three additional seats, mainly increasing its support due to shift from voters who voted to other RW parties in the April elections.

Another major shift between the two cycles was in the participation of the Non-Jewish population in the election. Voting amongst Non-Jewish citizens increased significantly during the September election and the Joint Arab List, that was reformed during the campaign, was able to receive 13 seats, three more than the cumulative amount of seats held by the two lists that merged into the Joint Arab List, Hadash-Ta’all and Ra'am-Balad.

These two major trends, as well as many others will be thoroughly examined as part of this research, using similar methods to those used during the report of the April results. The Macro Center for Political Economics will identify new trends evident based on the September results, re-examine the socio-economic effect on voting trends, and assess if potential trends suggested in the previous report actually occurred.

As in the previous research, this report is based on Statistical Area (SA) zoning created by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) during 2011.1 Using this distribution, and the 2013, 2015,

1 Statistical areas are specific polygons within municipalities in which the residents Socio-Economic and demographic backgrounds are quite similar. The amount of voters in each SA varies from a few hundred to as much as 10,000 voters in bigger areas. The average amount of registered voters in each SA is 2,285. 3

4.2019 and 9.2019 results in each of the over 10,000 ballots, the Macro Center for Political Economics created a unique database consisting of election results in each SA during the past four elections. This database was combined with the most recent Socio-Economic and demographic data available regarding each SA. While the previous research was based on economic data dating back to 2012, the upcoming report uses a newly published updated socio-economic analysis conducted by the CBS in 2015. This analysis ranks 1,624 of the 2,000 SAs throughout the country based on their socio-economic standing, such that the weakest SA in the nation is ranked 1, and the strongest 1,624.

Based on this database, the Macro Center for Political Economics was able to identify trends and gain insights regarding voting patterns in Israel. These insights are based on a general analysis of the national results, an inquiry into changes in voter turnout amongst Jewish voters, an examination of the effect of socio-economic factors on voter trends, a research aimed to identify characteristics of new IB voters, and lastly an in depth analysis of voting trends amongst the Non-Jewish population.

Classification of the Parties

As part of the previous research, parties running in each election since 2013 were divided into four main blocks and two potential coalitions: (1) Central Left Zionist parties (CLZ) and (2) Arab parties, who together formed the Center-Left coalition; and (3) Right Wing parties (RW) and (4) Jewish-Religious parties (JR), who together formed the Right-Orthodox coalition. During the report we emphasized that such a divide is debatable, yet crucial in order to allow comparison of results from different election cycles since each election new parties formed, existing parties merged and dissolved, etc.

Following the political developments that resulted in the need for a second election, the abovementioned classification became even more contentious due to the fraction between the IB party and the rest of the RW block. Therefore, in contrast to the previous research, the IB party will be examined separately than the rest of the RW block. Other, less dramatic, changes in party affiliation occurred, such as the merger of the Gesher party, not examined in the previous analysis, with the Labor party, and the merger of four RW parties into two lists (Ha'Likud with Kulanu, and the United Right with the New Right).

4

Table 1: Classification of Parties into Blocks, 2009-20192 2013 2015 04/2019 09/2019 1. Yesh Atid 1. The Zionist 1. Blue & White 2. Labor 1. Blue & White Union 2. Labor-Gesher CLZ 3. Ha'Tnua 2. Labor 2. Yesh Atid 3. The Democratic 4. Meretz 3. Meretz 3. Meretz Faction 5. Kadima 1. Ha'Likud- 1. Ha'Likud 1. Ha'Likud Beytenu 2. The United 2. Kulanu 1. Ha'Likud 2. The Jewish Right RW 3. The Jewish 2. Yamina Home 3. Kulanu Home 3. Otzma Yehudit 3. Otzma 4. The New Right 4. Yahad Le'Israel 5. Zehut 1. Shas JR 2. The United Torah 1. Raam-Taal 1. The Joint 1. Hadash-Taal 1. The Joint Arab Arab 2. Hadash Arab List 2. Raam-Balad List 3. Balad IB 1. Israel Beytenu

Part 1: National Analysis

Results by Potential Coalitions and Blocks

An analysis of vote shares of the five abovementioned blocks reveals that for the first time since 2013, the CLZ block received more support than the RW block, and that the latter received a smaller vote share than in any of the last 4 elections. With that said, if Israel Beytenu were counted as part of the RW block, then the block would have surpassed the CLZ parties, and even increased its support by approximately 0.5% since the April elections.

2 The list contains only parties that received more than 1.75% of the votes in each election cycle. Thus, all the analyses in this section will be based on these parties alone, resulting in voting shares never adding up to exactly 100%. 5

Chart 1: Vote share distribution by block, 2013-2019

45% 40.12% 40% 37.28% 39.23% 35% 34.81% 33.80% 34.10% 32.51% 30% 31.35% 25% 20% 15% 14.14% 13.75% 10.91% 12.06% 10.86% 10% 11.05% 9.61% 7.92% 7.14% 5% 5.20% 4.15% 0% 2013 2015 4.2019 9.2019 CLZ Right Liberman JR Arab

In September, the RW block's vote share decreased for the second consecutive time, but in contrast to the April election, where the decrease was proportional, meaning the block still received more votes than the 2015 election, in September the decrease was numerical as well, with the block receiving almost 235,000 less votes than in April. This means that at least 250,000 people who voted for the RW block in April, 15% of the block's voters, did not vote for the block in September. Thus, while the decrease in support in April was mostly due to inability to recruit new supporters, the decrease in September stemmed from previous supporters not voting for the block. However, it is most likely that the majority of them voted for Liberman and did not shift to the CLZ block.

Chart 2: Number of Votes per block, thousands, 2013-2019

1,800 1,701.8 1,709.2 1,556.5 1,600 1,416.1 1,473.2 1,457.9 1,400 1,323.4 1,297.9 1,200 1,000 800 599.0 527.8 507.3 600 446.6 470.2 451.8 348.9 400 310.2 337.1 214.9 200 173.0 0 CLZ Right Liberman JR Arab 2013 2015 4.2019 9.2019

6

Chart 3: Change in votes by block, percentage, 04.2019-09.2019

100% 76.4% 80%

60% 40.4% 40% 16.8% 20% 4.6% 0%

-20% -15.1% CLZ RW Liberman JR Arab

Change in Turnout amongst the Jewish Population

As part of the various debates regarding the September results, some have argued that the decrease in support for the RW block resulted from a shift in voter turnout, while CLZ supporters, and the Arab-Israeli population, voted at higher rates than in April, RW supporters stayed at home. Based on an analysis of September voter turnout and the April results, this assertion can be deemed fallible.

It is true that the increase in overall voter turnout was a result of the increase in Non-Jewish voters, since turnout in Jewish SAs decreased from 67.4% to 66.7%, and that amongst the Non-Jewish voters, only a small fraction vote for the RW block. Nonetheless, as abovementioned, the RW block lost almost 250,000 voters, most of them from Jewish SAs, and thus the increase in the Non-Jewish vote does not fully explain the RW plummet. If the decrease was in fact due to lower turnout amongst RW supporters, than we would expect to see a negative correlation between the change in voter turnout in a specific SA and the rate of support for the RW block in that SA. In other words, we would expect that the higher the support in for the RW block in a specific SA, the steeper the decrease in that SA's voter turnout during September.

In reality, no such statistically significant correlation could be found, and in fact the insignificant correlation shows an opposite trend. This means that the decrease in voter turnout was, on average, similar in each SA regardless of the rate of support for the RW block during April. While it might be the case that within an SA CLZ September voters who did not vote during April replaced RW voters who did vote in April but did not in September, 7 it is unlikely that such a trend occurred in throughout the country, in each and every SA, to the extent that the RW decrease in turnout would be undetectable based on the abovementioned regression. Therefore, it can be determined with a high rate of confidence that the change in turnout of RW supporters was similar to the change in turnout amongst CLZ supporters, and thus that the decrease in RW support was not a result of voter indifference, but of support decrease and a shift to IB.

Chart 4: The change in voters’ turnout between April and September depending on total voters’ turnout in the SA

10% y = 0.018x - 0.0204 R² = 0.0223

5%

0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

-5%

-10%

Socio economic Analysis

In the analysis of the April results, an inquiry into the effects of socio-economic factors on nationwide voting trends was conducted. This analysis was based on two main rankings conducted by the CBS: a percentile ranking of each municipality in the country, and a percentile ranking of a pool of around 1,200 SA's chosen randomly by the CBS. Based on these two rankings, indications were found that strengthened the connection between socio- economic standing of an SA and the rate of support given by its voters to the CLZ block.

The upcoming findings based on the September election correspond with the abovementioned analysis, but emphasize the scope as much more significant than previously thought. It is important to note that this is not due to a change in the effect of socio-economic factors on voting trends between April and September, but due to the ability to use a newly published dataset conducted by the CBS, ranking over 1,600 SA's based on their socio-economic

8 standing relative to all other SA's.3 This new ranking allows to conduct a more thorough analysis of this issue for three reasons:

1. The ranking is much more extensive and includes data of almost 80% of all SAs, as opposed to less than 60% in previously used datasets. 2. The ranking is based on updated data from 2015, as opposed to 2012 in the previous report. 3. The ranking is unique for each SA, allowing to differentiate between different SA's within the same socio-economic percentile, and thus examine different trends based on the ranking of each SA within the same percentile.

Generally, The CLZ block's vote share is almost perfectly correlated with the socio-economic ranking of the SA, such that the richer the SA, the more it's voters support CLZ parties. In fact, the block received an overall majority in all 150 highest ranking SAs, and amongst the top 300, in all but 29 areas. In contrast, amongst the bottom 600 SAs, the block received above 40% in only 8 SAs.

Chart 5: Percentage of vote to the CLZ block depending on SA socio-economic ranking

100% y = 0.0005x - 0.0104 R² = 0.7807 80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

1

49 97

817 145 193 241 289 337 385 433 481 529 577 625 673 721 769 865 913 961

1057 1105 1153 1201 1249 1297 1345 1393 1441 1489 1009

For the RW block, the trend is more complex, but still clear and significant. As found in the previous report, the block underperforms in both very low ranked SA's, where the JR and Arab blocks have vast support, and in high ranking SA's, where the CLZ party receives more

In fact, a basic examination of the April results using this newly published dataset suggests that not only were 3 the same trends evident during the April election, their effect was also of similar scope. 9 votes. The RW block receives its highest rate of support in mid-ranked SA's, i.e. SA's ranked 300-1,000.

Chart 6: Percentage of vote to the RW block depending on SA socio-economic ranking

100%

80%

60%

40%

20% y = -6E-07x2 + 0.0009x + 0.1262 R² = 0.3933

0%

1

49 97

817 145 193 241 289 337 385 433 481 529 577 625 673 721 769 865 913 961

1057 1105 1153 1201 1249 1297 1345 1393 1441 1489 1009

As seen in the previous report, the RW block receives a more significant support in all SAs regardless of ranking, while the CLZ block performs extraordinarily well in high ranking SAs, but is basically omitted from lower ranking SAs. This is best illustrated by pointing two main facts found when dividing the SAs into 16 groups based on their socio-economic ranking:

1. The CLZ's highest average support within a group is 74.3%, from SAs ranked 1,500 and over, while the highest average for the RW block is 47.1%, from SAs ranked 501- 600. In fact, while the CLZ block received an average support rate of over 70% in two groups (1,400-1,500, and 1,500 and over), the RW block received such support from only 6 SAs in total. 2. The CLZ block received an average of more than 33.3% of the votes in 7 groups, while the RW block was able to do so in 10. In contrast, the CLZ block received an average of less than 25% in 6 groups, as opposed to only 3 for the RW block.

These two findings, combined with the fact that the two blocks ultimately received similar nationwide support rates, strengthen the assertion that the RW block is successful in gaining support from various social classes, even if it is somewhat lower amongst higher ranking voters, while CLZ support is almost exclusively based on voters from a higher class. 10

Table 2: Share of vote to the RW and CLZ blocks based on social-economic ranking of SAs

1- 101- 201- 301- 401- 501- 601- 701- 801- 901- 1001- 1101- 1201- 1301- 1401- Over 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1500 CLZ 3.1 6.9 15.4 17.9 21.7 22.9 25.2 27.3 30.6 35.7 45.2 50.8 55.9 64.9 72.8 74.3 RW 9.1 25.3 36.6 42.4 45.3 47.1 45.9 45.9 45.1 44.2 38.5 36.1 33.0 25.9 20.2 19.2

Part 2: Israel Beytenu (IB) and Avigdor Liberman

The single party that was able to increase its support the most between April and September was, of course, the IB party of Avigdor Liberman. The party’s agenda of promoting a unity government between the two major parties Blue and White and the Likud, and their adamant residence to include JR parties in a future collation, was thought to increase the parties support amongst both right and left leaning voters. The election results do in fact suggest that the party was able to increase its support in areas where it was not able to receive votes historically, but an in depth analysis suggests these votes came mostly from moderate right wing voters, and not from supporters of the left.

From a social-economic standpoint, the IB Party has always had inconsistent support in lower socio-economic areas. In other words, in some low socio-economic SAs it received major support while in other low support. The majority of support from lower socio-economic SAs are those in which many former USSR immigrants reside. Yet, historically, the support for the party in all SAs that considered to be from a high socio-economic status is low. Yet, during the September elections, for the first time, the party was able to recruit support from voters in stronger areas, while keeping the same inconsistent results amongst areas with a weaker background. In fact, 37.4% of the 127,496 new votes cast for the party, came from the 500 highest ranking SAs.

The blue areas are those in which percentage of vote rose in the September elections. As can be seen, the growth has been chiefly in strong socio-economic SAs, even if in general the support in those areas is smaller compared to middle and low areas. The conclusion from this chart is the Liberman’s strategy was successful in addressing new voters from strong areas. Yet, he was less successful in gaining more support in other SAs – as can be

11 seen those areas are mostly red – meaning, the share of vote for his party in April was higher or similar to the share of vote in September.

Chart 7: Percentage of vote to IB depending on SA socio-economic ranking in the two 2019 election

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

2

60

115

165 215 264 318 369 420 469 518 570 623 676 725 777 829 877 927 976

1130 1181

1075 1286 1494 1026 1234 1337 1390 1442 1545 1597

September April

Table 3: Municipalities in which there has been more than one SA in which support for Liberman grew significantly

Municipality Number Share of votes in Share of votes in Percentage of SA's April in those areas September in those areas of change Tel-Aviv Jaffa 32 0.36% 3.80% 944.48% Ramat Gan 8 0.53% 4.71% 779.07% Ramat Hasharon 7 0.34% 3.67% 957.26% Givataiim 4 0.48% 3.93% 719.75% Herzelyia 4 0.37% 4.49% 1094.01% Jerusalem 3 0.24% 2.45% 890.26% Ness Zyiona 3 0.53% 4.43% 725.77% Raanana 3 0.46% 3.69% 699.04% Shoham 3 0.44% 4.12% 834.43% Binyamina 2 0.18% 3.05% 1574.55% Hod Hasharon 2 0.32% 3.72% 1058.14% Zihron Yaakov 2 0.37% 3.70% 880.53%

12

Yehud-Monoson 2 0.40% 3.32% 720.18% Modiin 2 0.29% 4.00% 1257.94% Kiryat Ono 2 0.30% 3.01% 888.82% Kiryat Tivoon 2 0.40% 3.97% 892.66%

Another testimony to the rise in support for Liberman in stronger socio-economic SAs is the fact that municipalities in which the rise in support for him was prominent in more than one statistical area are those which are considered to be strong municipalities – Tel-Aviv, Ramat- Gan, Givataiim, Hasharon area (Herzelyia, Raanana, Ramat Hasharon), Zihron Yaakov, Binyamina, Kiryat Tivoon, etc.

At first glance, one might think that these findings, together with the social economic analysis above, would suggest that the party shifted its base of support from the RW bloc to the CLZ bloc. Yet, further analysis suggests otherwise. Firstly, while 96 of the 100 SA's in which the party was able to increase its support are areas in which the RW block performed better than the CLZ block. This means that while the party was able to recruit new supporters in CLZ controlled municipalities, its main base is still in RW leaning areas. Moreover, in the 100 areas in which IB was able to increase its support the most, CLZ parties increased their support by 1.76% between April and September, while support for the RW block decreased by 4.1%. This suggests that the new IB voters in these areas most likely voted for the RW block in the April election, and not for the CLZ.

Those finding are crucial for two reasons. First, it helps examine and analyze the demographic that is most affected by a campaign calling for secular unity government, promoted by the party. Secondly it means that areas in which the party increased its support are areas in which the ability to shift RW supporters to the CLZ bloc are the largest. In a future election, these areas can be seen as battlegrounds for the RW and CLZ parties, if the IB party loses its new support base amongst moderate right wing supporters.

With regards to immigrants from the former USSR, the trend that was shown in the April election remains. Areas in which many immigrants came in the 1990’s show greater support for IB. The explanation is that IB’s campaign managed to keep the support of the traditional base of the party and to increase the support to new areas, mainly from RW leaning areas from high socio-economic status.

13

Chart 8: Percentage of voting to IB depending on percentage of European immigrants in the 1990’s in the SA

50% y = 0.0024x - 0.0009 R² = 0.4701 40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Part 3: Shifts Between Blocks

Overall, out of over 2,200 SAs around the country, 150 areas shifted their majority from RW to CLZ parties and only 4 areas shifted from CLZ to RW. The fact that only in 154 SAs the majority changed means that there have not been many changes between the April and September elections. Out of the 4 areas shifting to the RW block, two are in mixed cities, Acre and Haifa, and thus the shift is mostly due to the increase in voting for the Arab block at the expense of the CLZ parties and not from an increase in support for the RW block. The remaining two areas are very small - the municipalities of Nurit, with 84 voters altogether, and Ivim, with 24 voters. This signifies that throughout the country, the RW block was not able to recruit new voters in a substantial amount.

The 150 areas in which the CLZ block was able to shift voters are located in 77 different municipalities. Overall, in these areas the CLZ block increased its support by 7.3%, and the RW block suffered a decrease in support of 19.1%. Meaning, more than the increase in support for the CLZ block, there has been a declining in support for the RW party. Out of the 77 municipalities, 17 had shifts in more than one SA, and 3 had shifts in 10 or more SAs. Rishon Lezyion was the city with most SAs shifts (21), and in Netanya, the shift from RW to CLZ in the 2 relevant SAs was the largest, from a 16.91% lead for the RW block to a 1.56% for the CLZ block in September.

14

Out of the 17 municipalities, 13 are from the 6th and 7th socio-economic municipal percentiles, and only three are above that percentile. This is unsurprising since in the previous election, the 7th percentile was the tipping point between an RW majority and a CLZ lead, thus it can be asserted that the CLZ block was successful in gaining support from battleground areas, but was not successful in turning voting trends in weaker areas, where RW support remained stronger. In this election the battleground managed to go down in the socio-economic percentile, and CLZ parties were more successful in the 7th socio-economic municipal percentile.

Table 4: Municipalities in which there has been more than one SA in which support for CLZ parties grew significantly

Municipality Number of Municipality’s RW margin CLZ Margin SA's Socio-Economic in April in in September percentile those SAs in those SAs Rishon Lezyion 21 7 5.13% 5.75% Holon 19 7 7.31% 4.9% Petah Tikva 10 7 6.57% 3.79% Haifa 7 7 6.05% 5.03% Jerusalem 5 2 3.54% 2.00% Kiryat Motzkin 4 7 9.60% 5.64% Kfar Yona 3 7 3.87% 8.13% Carmiel 3 6 2.77% 5.42% Modiin 3 8 5.58% 4.25% Kiryat Biyalik 3 7 5.82% 5.83% Rehovot 3 7 6.49% 3.49% Tel-Aviv Jaffa 3 8 4.55% 6.27% Azur 2 7 6.76% 2.32% Gan Yavne 2 7 7.62% 5.32% Hadera 2 6 7.59% 6.31% Netanya 2 6 16.91% 1.56% Ramat Gan 2 8 2.64% 11.88%

15

Part 4: Voting trends in Jewish SAs signaled as important in the previous research

During the previous research, 57 SAs in Jewish municipalities were signaled as areas with a potential of voter increase for CLZ parties. This assessment was based on various factors that indicated both a possibility to increase voter turnout in those areas, and gain new supporters. During the September elections, the average decrease in voter turnout within these areas was similar to that of all Jewish SAs, thus indicating that those areas did not see an increase, or a slighter decrease in voter turnout compared to April. Nevertheless, a statistically significant difference in voting trends could be seen in September. Meaning the assessment that those areas could experience an increase in support for the CLZ camp was true.

Combining these findings suggests one of two trends occurred. Either the same people came out to vote, but a significant number of RW voters shifted to the CLZ block, or CLZ supporters who did not vote in April did come to the ballots in September, while amongst RW supporters the trend was opposite. It is not possible to determine which of the two trends occurred, yet it is more likely that in those areas voting patterns shifted from the RW block to the CLZ block due to former findings. In any case these findings confirm that the marked SAs from the previous research were in fact areas in which the CLZ block was able to strengthen its support. Overall, while the amount of votes for the CLZ block in Jewish SAs rose by 6.6%, in the marked SAs it rose by 9.7%.

Part 5: The Arab Vote

During the September elections, the Arab-Israeli population voted at much higher rates than in April, both due to the reestablishment of the Joint Arab List, and the increased desire to take part in political arena following the inflammatory campaign against them led by the Likud party. Overall, the Joint Arab List received 13 seats, as opposed to the 10 distributed to the two major Arab parties in the April elections.

Voter turnout in September among Non-Jewish voters was 58.5%, as opposed to 49.2% in April, an increase of 18.8% but still below the 2015 of 63.4%. Yet, the number of Non- Jewish votes cast in September surpassed the amount of votes cast in 2015, and in fact for the first time since 1948, more than 500,000 Non-Jewish votes were cast.

16

Chart 9: Turnout percentage and number of voters in the Non-Jewish society, 2013- 2019

600,000 70%

500,000 60%

50% 400,000 40% 300,000 30% 200,000 20%

100,000 10%

0 0% 2013 2015 4.2019 9.2019

In order to assess the rate of support for each block amongst Non-Jewish voters, an analysis of absolute vote share was conducted. As explained in the previous research, examining vote share provides a distorted assessment of support of each block, since it does not take into account significant changes in voter turnout. For example, between 2015 and April 2019 the support for the Arab block decreased by almost 80,000 votes, but the vote share of the block remained consistent.

Based on an analysis of absolute vote share, meaning percent of votes out of the overall amount of registered voters, and not of only those who came to vote, it is evident that the Arab block was successful at receiving 47% of the Non-Jewish population's vote, higher than in 2013 and 4.2019, but lower than in 2015. The absolute vote share for the CLZ block decreased by 17.2%, from 9.3% in April to 7.7%, but this was a much more moderate decrease compared to 2015, when the Arab Joint List was established. In the 2015 elections, the CLZ block's absolute support amongst Non-Jewish voters decreased by almost 27%. The cause for this is that the CLZ camp lost support among Arabs due to the re-establishment of the Joint Arab List, yet the decline in support was not as prominent as in the 2015 elections.

A very interesting trend in the past election was in the absolute vote share of the RW block. Since 2013, absolute support for the RW block amongst Non-Jewish voters consisted of 2.4- 2.8%, which translated to 17,500-18,500 votes in the 2013, 2015, and April 2019 elections. In September, the RW block received only 1.1% of the vote, just over 8,500 votes – the block 17 lost 52.7% of its Non-Jewish voters. While some of these probably voted for IB the RW block and Liberman's party received less votes in September than the RW party without IB did in April. That is to say, even if some of the Non-Jewish voters that in the past voted to RW parties now voted for Liberman, this is insignificant on a large scale. While it is true that the amount of Non-Jewish voters for the RW block has never been significant, and thus this trend does not have significant electoral implications, it is a testament to the depth of the crisis between the Non-Jewish population and the RW block led by Netanyahu, as a result of his policies and hostile campaigns.

Chart 10: Absolute vote share for the Joint Arab List (line) and other parties (columns)

60% 10% 9% 50% 8% 7% 40% 6% 30% 5% 4% 20% 3% 2% 10% 1% 0% 0% 2013 2015 4.2019 9.2019

RW CLZ JR IB Arabs

Amongst all Non-Jewish SAs, both in Non Jewish municipalities and in mixed cities, voter turnout increased by an average of 25.9% in each SA. In the SAs targeted as part of the previous research, voter turnout increased by 27.4%. The difference between the targeted SAs and all SA's is statistically significant. Meaning, in the marked areas voters turnout increased more dramatically compared to other areas among the Non-Jewish voters.

During the elections, two attempts were made to encourage voter turnout in Arab cities- A "Get Out the Vote" (GOTV) campaign, and the parallel referendums held in various cities regarding municipal issues. Based on the election results, it is more likely that the GOTV campaign was successful, while the Referendum seemed to have little assistance in raising voter turnout. Amongst cities in which the GOTV campaign took place, voter turnout increased by 29.5%, 13.8% more than in all Non-Jewish cities. In Referendum cities, voter turnout increased by only 17.8%. One referendum city in which voter turnout was 18 highly irregular was Sahnin where voter turnout dropped by 6.4%. Nonetheless, the city remained one of the cities with the highest voter turnout amongst Non-Jewish cities. When excluding Sahnin from the examination, voter turnout amongst referendum cities increased by 22.4%, closer to the general voter turnout increase in Non-Jewish cities. Regarding the GOTV attempts, if they are in fact the reason for the higher voter turnout, than they resulted in around 15,000 votes, without which the Joint List would have received 12 seats.

Chart 11: Change in voters’ turnout in different Non-Jewish areas

35% 29.5% 30% 27.4% 25.9% 25% 22.4%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0% All Non-Jewish GOTV campaign Referndum Targeted Sas municipalities municipalities municipalities*

*excluding Sahnin

19