FICTION WITHOUT PRETENSE by Jillian Alexandra Isenberg A
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FICTION WITHOUT PRETENSE by Jillian Alexandra Isenberg A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Philosophy) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2013 © Jillian Alexandra Isenberg, 2013 Abstract A No-Object theory of fiction denies that there is any sense of “object” in which the objects of fiction are objects at all. This is conjunction of two fundamental assumptions. The first is a metaphysical principle that asserts that there is nothing that does not exist. The second asserts that the individuals and events that figure in works of fiction do not exist. I call these assumptions “Parmenides’ Rule” and the “Non-Existence Postulate”. The No-Object theory also raises what I call the subject-matter paradox. If the objects of fiction are nothing, how can it be that we refer to them, ascribe properties to them, and draw inferences about them? My dissertation dissolves the subject-matter paradox by providing an explanandum for philosophical theories of fiction. A theory of fiction must explain how we can know that there are no objects of fiction, while we respond as though there are. In order to better understand these responses to fiction, I consider recent empirical work in psychology. This work supports the claim that fictional narratives impact our beliefs and attitudes about both the fictional and the actual worlds and shows that we do in fact accept and act as though fictional statements are true, even when we are aware of their falsity. Empirical data concerning our responses to fiction supports a number of claims. First, fictions have objects. Second, we refer to, make true claims about, and draw correct inferences about the objects fiction. The Rule and the Postulate seem to cost us the truths of these two claims; given the Rule and the Postulate are true the claims must be false. If we accept the No-Object view, we shouldn’t feel philosophically obliged to honour our linguistic intuitions. What the data also show, however, is that the very people whose intuitions the No-Object view tramples have other commitments that actually support these intuitions. It is this seeming contradiction that a theory of fiction must accommodate. It must account for the fact that our responses to fiction are double-aspected. I provide a characterization of these double-aspected responses. ii Preface This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Jillian Alexandra Isenberg. iii Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... ii Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................... v Dedication ................................................................................................................................................... vi Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1 1 Objects Not Included .............................................................................................................................. 8 1.1 The No-Object View ....................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Ambiguation .................................................................................................................................... 13 1.3 Sainsbury .......................................................................................................................................... 14 1.3.1 Negative Free Logic ............................................................................................................... 16 1.3.2 Proper Names ......................................................................................................................... 18 1.3.3 Fiction ...................................................................................................................................... 20 2 A Tale of Two Fictions ......................................................................................................................... 25 2.1 Representation ................................................................................................................................ 25 2.2 Imagination ..................................................................................................................................... 29 2.4 Bootstrapping ................................................................................................................................. 37 2.5 Implicit Definition ......................................................................................................................... 38 2.6 Literary Fiction ............................................................................................................................... 40 2.7 Adaptation vs. Instantiation ......................................................................................................... 44 3 We Can Believe It for You Wholesale (Or, Total Acceptance) ...................................................... 49 3.1 So Close and Yet So Far? .............................................................................................................. 52 3.2 Fiction by the Numbers ................................................................................................................ 54 3.2.1 You Can’t Not Believe Everything You Read ................................................................... 54 3.2.2 Fictional Narratives Change Beliefs ..................................................................................... 58 3.2.3 Replications with Mixed Corroboration ............................................................................. 61 3.2.3.1 Initial Adaptation ............................................................................................................ 61 3.2.3.2 Need for Cognition and Personal Relevance ............................................................. 63 3.2.3.3 Perceived Strength of Story Assertions and Levels of Scrutiny .............................. 65 3.3 Philosophical Implications ............................................................................................................ 67 4 The Curious Case of Double-Aspected Responses .......................................................................... 71 Afterword ................................................................................................................................................... 87 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 89 iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank my committee for their support on this project. Individual thanks goes to my supervisor Dominic Lopes for all of the time, encouragement and helpful discussions that he so generously provided in order to help me accomplish my goals. Thanks to John Woods for your early guidance and encouragement as well as your ongoing help and support. Thanks to Roberta Ballarin for always providing a new perspective and helping me to see things in ways that I had not yet considered. I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students in the Philosophy department for all of the productive and supportive conversations that we’ve had over the years. Special thanks goes to Nola Semczyszyn and Joshua Johnston who have been the two best travelling companions I could have asked for on this journey. I would also like to give special thanks to Nissa Bell and Rhonda Janzen for always being there to listen to me as well as for immense amounts of help and support. I would especially like to thank Elisabeth Ratz for her eleventh hour effort to help ensure that everything was formatted correctly and submitted on time. More importantly, thank you for your blind faith in my abilities and your amazing friendship. Finally, I would like to thank my family for the moral, emotional, and financial support without which this project would not have been possible. You have been incredibly generous, patient and understanding. Words cannot express my gratitude. v Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my parents. vi Introduction Philosophical attention to fiction has gathered momentum since the early 1970s, when it became a serious topic of interest for logicians and philosophers of language, and for philosophers of art. Philosophers of language take a semantic approach, concentrating on theories of reference, truth and inference. Philosophers of art concentrate on representational and normative questions. Recently, philosophers of mind have also done work that draws upon and connects with psychology and cognitive science in an attempt to explain our responses to fiction and aesthetics now draws upon this work in an attempt to give an account of our engagement with literary fiction. When, in the pages to follow,