ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: WHAT EMOTION DOES: AFFECT
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ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: WHAT EMOTION DOES: AFFECT IN EMPATHY, ART, AND BEYOND Heather Adair, Doctor of Philosophy, 2020 Dissertation directed by: Professor Peter Carruthers, Department of Philosophy This dissertation puts forth a series of arguments about the role of affect in everyday cognition. I begin in chapter 1 by developing a generalized philosophical and scientific account of what “affective” states—a term encompassing emotions, moods, pleasures/pains, and felt desires—are and how they arise. From there, I address a number of debates in moral psychology, aesthetics, and philosophy of art that revolve around the function of affective states. In chapter two, I weigh in on a long-standing disagreement about the automaticity of empathy; I contend that different so-called “kinds” of empathy are not in fact automatic, and that an explanatorily robust model of empathy must account for the influence of affectively-laden “underlying values.” In chapter three, I focus on the “processing fluency” view of aesthetic pleasure, which equates aesthetic pleasure with ease of perceptual processing. I critique and amend this view by highlighting the ways in which perceptual disfluency and negative affect also contribute positively to aesthetic appreciation. And, in chapter four, I attempt to redress the so-called “paradox of fiction” by claiming that emotions do not require belief-states to be considered real and theoretically rational instances of emotion. To do this, I point to research on affective prospection and mind-wandering to argue that emotions must in principle be distinguished from our beliefs. WHAT EMOTION DOES: AFFECT IN EMPATHY, ART, AND BEYOND by Heather Victoria Adair Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2020 Advisory Committee: Professor Peter Carruthers, Chair Professor Jerrold Levinson Professor Rachel Singpurwalla Professor Dan Moller Professor Elizabeth Redcay, Dean's Representative © Copyright by Heather Victoria Adair 2020 Dedication For my mom. ii Acknowledgements I am deeply indebted to the great many people who have supported me throughout my writing of this dissertation, my academic career, and more generally throughout my life as a whole. My greatest debt is to my mother, Vivyan Adair, who has been an unending source of unconditional love and encouragement. My mother first introduced me to the gripping world of philosophical thought when I was just 8 years old, and she has patiently and lovingly read every word that I have written ever since. My other great debt is to my supervisor, Peter Carruthers, who is a brilliant and prolific philosopher, an unparalleled advisor, and an incredibly kind and generous person. Working with Peter has been a privilege and an inspiration, and I cannot imagine having taken this journey without his incredible guidance. Many thanks are also owed to Jerrold Levinson, Rachel Singpurwalla, Susan Dwyer, Jill de Villiers, Peter de Villiers, and Todd Franklin, all of whom played important roles in my development as a scholar. While I have benefited tremendously from the help of many faculty members, colleagues, and friends over the years, few have pushed me or reassured me as insistently as Christian Tarsney and Jesse St. Charles, both of whom I am honored to call friends. iii Table of Contents Dedication ..................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................iii Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... iv Chapter 1: All About Affect ......................................................................................... 1 I. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 II. What Affective States Aare: Feeling, Motivation, & Evaluation ........................ 2 III. How Affect Arises: Appraisal, Values, & Valence .......................................... 10 IV. Kinds of Affect: Targets & Causes ................................................................... 20 V. Debates and Puzzles ........................................................................................... 26 Chapter 2: Underluing Values: The Role of Appraisal in Empathy ........................... 31 I. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 31 II. Shared Affect &Vicariously Shared Affect ....................................................... 33 a. Mirroring ......................................................................................................... 33 b. Perspective-Taking ......................................................................................... 38 III. Affective Appraisal & Underlying Values ....................................................... 44 Appraisal and Valence ........................................................................................ 54 Underlying Values .............................................................................................. 53 IV. Explaining Failures of Empathy ....................................................................... 53 a. Psychopathy .................................................................................................... 53 b. Sadism ............................................................................................................. 57 c. Everyday Failures ............................................................................................ 59 d. Intra and Intergroup Failures .......................................................................... 61 V. Conclusion and Future Research........................................................................ 62 Chapter 3: Disflueny, Negatice Affect, & Interest: A Better Theory of Aesthetic Pleasure ....................................................................................................................... 66 I. Introdiction .......................................................................................................... 66 II. Positive Features of the Account ........................................................................ 70 III. Problems with the Processing-Fluency Account .............................................. 75 IV. Disflueny, Negatice Affect, & Interest ............................................................ 82 V. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 88 Chapter 4: Updating Thought Theory: Emotion and the Non-Paradox of Fiction ..... 90 I. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 90 II. ‘Existance Beliefs’ and Quasi or Irrational Emotions ....................................... 94 III. Thought Theory & Real Emotions ................................................................... 97 IV. Thought Theory & Rational Emotions .......................................................... 109 V. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 116 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 118 iv CHAPTER 1 ALL ABOUT AFFECT I. INTRODUCTION People’s lives are profoundly emotional. On a daily basis, we run a gamut of feelings both evolutionarily ancient and cognitively complex, from happiness, sadness, anger, and fear, to satisfaction, offence, pride, and awe. Indeed, on average, adults report spending approximately 90% of their waking days in one or more of these emotional states—and those are just the emotions that make it into conscious awareness!1As scientific research on emotion has grown over the last several decades, it has become apparent that sentiments such as these are far from idle. Emotions impact how we represent and engage with others, make decisions, form judgements of value and preference, develop notions of moral right and wrong, and motivate us to take interest in the world around us. And yet, despite its intuitive significance, many questions remain about the precise role that emotion plays in everyday cognition. The aim of this dissertation is to resolve some of those questions. In the chapters that follow, I address a number of long-standing debates in moral psychology, aesthetics, and philosophy of art, all of which revolve around the function of emotion. In chapter two, I focus on a well-established dispute over the 1 These figures were found by polling participants at random intervals throughout the day and surveying them as to the presence of 18 emotional states that are relatively high-arousal, e.g. awe, anxiety, joy, etc. (Trampe, Quoidbach & Taquet, 2015). Given that low-arousal and mildly valenced emotions themselves provide appraisals about the environment (e.g. boredom, contentment), and given the plausibility of unconscious affect (see section III), we are arguably in some sort of emotional or affective state at all times. 1 automaticity of empathy and argue that a complete model of empathy must account for the underlying influence of emotionally-laden values. In chapter three, I amend a promising