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Home , Manipur, Nagaland, Naga nationalism

107

CHAPTER IV CASE STUDY : AND

The North-Eastem has been a grey-area of the country both before and after the independence of India. The geo-strategic location of the region naturally shows the need for an urgent solution to the problem on a permanent basis. On the other hand, In view of the ethnic fragility of the population of thg population of the area, the problem needs to be tackled cautiously and sensibly.

The North-Eastem region of made up of seven states. They are , , , Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal-Pradesh, and . Out of these seven states, the last two attained the status of statehood in February 1987.

According to the North-Eastem Areas (re­ organisation) Act, 1971, five states and Union Territories were created in the North-Eastem part of the country. The five new states are : Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland, The two 108

Union Territories are ; Arunacha]. Pradesh, (previously knovm as NEFA), and Mizoram (Ea«T*r3BRan ed Mizn Hill District)J

The population of the Nor%-£astem India is ^ around 23 million spread over an aresuoi ap&roximately 25f 300 square kilometers. ImpoiJ«tant td note i& that not only this region is suiji-oundec^ by foxeign countries but the vi^ole region iig cazCi,ected with the rest of India by a small strip o:^ igfid about 14 kilome­ ters wide known as "Siliguri neck".

North-iiast India is strategically innportant' as mentioned earlier due to common frontiers it shares with four countries i.e. in the north, Bliutan in the West, in the East and Burma in the» South. Therefore no other part of India occupies such 2 as strategic position as the North-iiast I

The geo-political condition of North-Eastem India in general and Nagaland in particular has played an important role in breeding and aggravating an insurgent movement in this area. This is more or less true of almost all insurgences situations in South-h^st Asia which have occured and thrived in the hilly, tropical forest-infested boarder regions, where sometimes borders of more than one country overlaps. The insurgencies in South - have another trait in common and that is suspenfikility to developments, influences and interferences across the international borders. However, despite these common traits relevant for functional insurgencies, North- 3 Eastern India has certain unique features of its own.

The aggregation in a complex situation like that In the hill states of North-xiastem India are ntmierous. Broadly however, the fonnations may appear tenable due to Strong Pnrrnyiiial pulls being persistant in the tribal societies of North-Eastem India with ethnic consideration wtiich played a major role in the voting pattern (The sixth- Election). The question of regional/tribal "identity" however is related to a certain level of conciousness found mainly among edu- cated middle class.

It is obvious that there has been a historical 110

trend of insurgency activity going on in this part of the country. And it has been spreading like an epidemic disease. The problem first started in Nagaland and erupted with violence in the year 1955, and ultimately caught up in Mizoram with a full swing in 1968. It has proliferated in Manipur more extensively in late 1978. It also touched Tripura with equal amount of violence in the middle of 1980s.

However, the other states are also not free from tension. Even Arunachal-Pradesh, vdiich was spread of insurgency for a long time, has now to contend with incursions from accross the Burma border by rebels of the National socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) led by T.Muivah, a Maoj^ist.^

In the following pages we present the case study of Nagaland and Ilanipur. It can be noted that insurgency problem in Mizoram has been solved with the signing of an accord called "Mizo Accord" on 30 June 1986, And the problem related to Tripura is yet in a stage of flux and hence too early to assess.

A. NAGALAND The problem in Nagland had erupted into violence Ill

earlier and intensification took place in the year 1955. Though the symptom of the problem had emerged long back, it is interesting to note that soon after the independence of India the policy planners were well aware of its potential threats. Thus after India attained independence and Nagaland along with other tracks of north-eastern hill area became a part of Indian Union, a conceited move was imdertaken by over ambitions and politicised section of the Nagas to secede from India and form an independent country. The seeds of this seperatism were probably laid when Sir Charles Pawsey, Deputy Commissioner of in 1945 established the District Tribal Councils to vmite the Nagas in the task of reconstruction after the Ilnd World War. A small newspaper known as The Naga Nation was started and later the Naga Herald emerged, which was subsequently banned in 1953. Zapu Phizo himself and u. re most of Phizo's too lieM;anants seem to have been ori­ ginally initiated into politics by Pdwsey.6

However, in June 1977 there was a demand for a seperation of Naga Hills from India. The separatist 112

idiemand was by no means unanimous. There were three main groups - one favoured immediate severance of all ties with India and independence for this land, and the second, advocated continuance of governmental relations with India till the Nagas were in a position to take up the reign of self government, and the third one wanted Nagaland to be a Mandatory State \inder the 7 British government for a given period.

In the initial stage, the Nagas were persuing a passive line of action. In June 1947, the Naga^< leade)« Mr. Z.A. Phizo along with a handful of Nagas, under the banner of (NNC) held a three day meeting with the then of Assam the late Mr. Akbar Hyadri. As a result of the meeting, specific document was produced. However, Article 9 of Idle document itself became the bone of conten­ tion to the agreement. The article states: "The agent of the Government of Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure the due observance a special responsibility for a period of ten 113

years to ensure the due observance of this agreement; and at the end of this period, the Naga National Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regard- Q ing the future of the arrived at".

Both the parties interpreted the contents of the article in different ways. The NNC interpreted in such a way that implied that the Nagas would have the right to be separated from India after the comple­ tion of ten years. Thus the negotiation were a total failure. Had the negotiation been successful, the situation today might have been different as ame the example of coming into the folds of Indian Union in a peaceful manner.

After the failure of the negotiation, the Nagas were still taking up the non-violent line for their demand. One of the notable examples is that of the meeting between the Naga delegation and Mahatma Gandhi on I4th August, 1947. The deligation which had written a memorandum in the form of a letter to Mahatma Gandhi 114

prior to the meeting had listed 11 points for consideration. Thus this letter dated July 16, 1947» was the first document for introducing the g Naga case: The eleven points were as follows:

1, 'The Nagas-are from a country from the North-iiast Frontier of India, which 'lies between two huge countries namely : India and China*, to use Pandit Nehru*s words. 2, ?^he Nagas were independent before the British advent *. 3, 'The Nagas were first attacked by the British Government in the year 1819. The Nagas fought the British for 30 years for their independence, *The last battle was fought in 1879 and the Nagas were conquered. 4, The Nagas (British subject's) demanded for independence in 1929 when the Simon's statutory commission visited Kohima, the head quarters of Naga hills. 5, The Naga hills has been a totally "Excluded Area" since 1935 Act came to force. 115

6. Again in 1946, the Nagas demanded for complete independence when the British withdraw from India. 7. An interim arrangement on the lines of district autonomy has been offered to the Nagas by the authority, and the Nagas have rejected it. 8. The Nagas fought for independence when the British threatened to take away their independence back in 19th century. 9. Again the Nagas resisted Japanese with all their might in 19^4 for independence. 10. The demand for Nagas for independence is not the opinion of a 'Dewan or Ruler' (the Nagas have no ruler, and the British are going), it is the will of the people. 11. The Nagas shall declare their independence on the 15th August, 1947.

As the General Secretary of the NNC, one Mr. Sakhrie prepared a note in this fonn of the points of 10 discussion with Mahatma Gandhi. The points are: 1. The Nagas w^re determined to have complete independence. They are determined not to Join 116

the union. They will die before loosing their independence; Will the use force to bring the Nagas under the (Indian) union. 2. Has anyone under the sun the right to take a vsraiy their independence? Not with justification. But is might right?

In the meeting, Mahatma Gandhi told the Nagas delegates that:

"... Nagas have every right to be independent. We did not want to live under the dominion of the British and they are now leaving us. I want you to feel that India is yours. I feel that the Naga hills are mine Just as much as they are yours, but if you say, "it is not mine", the matter must stop here. I believe in the brotherhood of mass, but I do not believe in force or forced unions. If you do not wish to Join the union of India, nobody will force 11 you to do that." < After this, the representatives of the NNC met the Prime Minister Pandit Nehru and referred the demand for Naga independence. However, the results were not 117

favourable towards the cause projected by the NNC. The MC thus, in started seeking the help of the United Nations by writing a letter to the Secretary General of U.N, At the same time, Phizo and his followers crossed over to Burma to establish a link with the anti government insurgent group in Burma known as the Jiastem Naga Revolutionary Council (ENRC). Phizo was incidently arrested by the Burmese government and sent back to India, and released by the government of India after a period of time from the jail. From this time onwards, the Nagas had started an armed insurgency operation.

In 1955, hostility and violence broke out and the Army was called and deployed. In the following year i.e., in 1956, a parallel government in the name of the "Naga Federal Government (FGN)" was formed with Phizo as the Chairman. Interestingly, in 1957» when violence had already erupted, Phizo's man wrote a letter to the then Dr. Radhakrishnan quoting their discussions with Mahatma Gandhi. This 118

had little or no impact on the situation. It may be of relevance to indicate the organizational set up of the FGN established by Phizo.

PHIZO'S PARALLEL FRONTS FEDERALGOVERMMiiNT

TATAR HOHO NAGA NATIONAL COUNCIL KEDHAGE () (POLITICAL WING) (PRESIDENT)

NAGA WOMEN'S NAGA YOUTH KEDALO SOCIETY MOVEMENT (VICE PRESIDENT) ANGS (GOVERNORS) KILONSERS FOR FOUR STATES OF (MINISTERS) JAPFU,DIKU, AND HALIP0N3 SUPREME COURT MIDAN PSYU REGIONAL COURTS (COMMISSIONER) AREA VILLAGE COUNCIL PANGTONGES RAZOU PEYUS (DY.COMi^SSI ONERS) (ASST. COMMI3SI0NERS) RUNA PEYU (CHAIRMEN FOR EACH VILLAGE) I G MAJOR TRIBES ANGAMI S£MA LOTHA AO CHKESANG PHOM KONYAK YIMCHUNGER KHIEi'4UNGAN CHANG Rii:NGMA 3ANGTAM ON THE MANIPUR SIDE TANGKHUL MAO MARAM ANAL ^Sources: Nirmal Nibedon" The Night of the Guerrillas" Lanc«rPublicers. New , 1983. 119

After fonning this Federal Government, in 1956, Phizo crossed over to Dacca (then East Pakistan) and made contact with the Pakistani authorities, Phizo thus :; • systematically established a full-fledged movement. In late 1959, the Naga leader managed to fly to the West. From Zurich, he entered the United Kingdom with the help of one Rev Michael Scott from the U.K. and opened an office in London. This "move" has to lay the founda­ tion of propaganda works for Naga demand and bring them before international community. However not much of a success was achieved. Rev, Scott continued ser­ ving as a in Nagaland for a long time and was regularly participating in the Naga problem and so called the peace efforts. However, he was expelled from India because of his activities. It is worth recalling.

That the (then External Affairs Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh, announced in the on 3rd May (1965) that R.V. Scott had been served orders to leave the country immediately because the minister stated that "In spite of our warnings and regrets expressed by him he has 12 continued to adopt a partisan attitude." 120

Back to the home-front, a series of encoimters took place between the Naga insurgents and the security forces. The intensity was high till the end of 1975. In the year 1975» brought a new chapter in the history of the Naga problem with the initiative to bring peace in Nagaland by a body called "Peace Mission" with the help of the church leaders. With the signing of an agreement between some representatives of the Naga rebel and the Government of India at Shi1long known as " Accord" on the 11th of November 1975, a new hope for peace came after a series of hot-confron­ tations. Under this agreement, the Naga Federal Government (NFG) agreed to recognize the Indian Consti­ tution and solve the Naga problem within the frame work of the Indian Constitution and thereby surrender of men and vi weaponsy^^ook place. ^.. " -. While, the Accord led to the surrender of few per per^sonals and some weapons in 1976 it however created a faction leading to the formation of a Maoist group. Thus the hope for a permanent peace remained illusive.

Shillong Accord of 1975 which astensity caused 121

a set back to insurgency, also discredited Phizo in the eyes of the section of the underground leaders. Although Phizo was in no way a party to the historic accord. Phizo's helplessness at the critical moment to safe succession was amply exposed. Thuingaleng Muivah formed, in 1980, a new millitant faction called

National socialist council of Nagaland (NSCN) and set its Head Quarters in the Burmese Jungle territory adjacent to Nagaland, Several important rebel leaders including S.S. Kapling and Isack Chishi Swu . also Joined the NSCN under the overall leadership of Muivah. 13

NSCN's guerrilla arms which is estimated to be around 2,COO men is the biggest among the various rebel groups. Its strength has been reported to be increasing. Several hundreds of its men have received mil^itary training in Lahsa in and in Yunan 14 Province of China.

The NSCN led by T. Muivah came out with an attestment to Maoism giving an ideological back-up to Naga insurgency. However, it is still a question as what extent Maoism could go along with in 122

the hills of North Eastern India. It seems that under the leadership of T. Muivah, a conglomerate of socialism (Maoist Line) and Christianity has been put into experiment while India is experimenting democratic- socialism.

The activities of the NSCN are vast. It uses all the available resources of the modern world which are in their disposal. Public support (to some eyipnt) to the NSCN in Nagaland and some of the hilly areas of Manipur cannot be ignored. And its relations with the church is quite obvious.

After T, Muivah, a Tankhul Naga from Manipur's East District took over the command of the new Insurgent group called NSCN, the activities of the Naga insurgent (NSCN) has stepped up in Manipur also, particularly in Manipur East District. Thus the presence and activities of the NSCN have almost become exf&^dtci H-fi yay^dbtrv^ The NSCN ha9:;^the potentiality to penetrate in the valley of Iraphal too.

The NSCN Initiated its first-violent act in 123

Manipur in the early 1982 with a successful ambush at Namthilok in Manipur East District killing 20 army men of the 21 st and €sc&f>ed' with the captured weapons and ammunitions. The NSCN killed the Pro-Shillong Accord elements and Pro-Government people. From November 1982 to May 1983, the NSCN had killed as many as k such people in Manipur jiiast District alone. Not only this, but this group started terrorism by persuing a line of eliminating Naga-public figures in Manipur. Notable among the victims killed were Mr. Y Shaiza, ex. Chief Mnisters of Manipur, and Mr. Solomon, v^o was a member of the Manipur Public service Commission. The NSCN also attempted on the life of Mr, , the present chief Minister of Manipur on two occassions.

After the second attempt on the life of the present Chief Minister of Manipur, "Risisttmce", a weekly English paper published in Manipur reported on December 11, 1984 that:

Once more the Chief Minister Rishang Keishing has cheated the NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) 124

Mr. Risbang who rode straight into carefully laid ambush at Leishi (Manipur East) to address campaign meeting at Pliungyar (Manipur East) on Saturday last ^ -••• - escaped mm^r%-. The ambush which reportly lasted about half an hour, however, left four jawans of the Manipur Refiles dead and seven other including the D.I.^. (Hills) ehhandabihari ,e»3tt*«4. This incidentally is the second time that NSCN attempt to assassinate the chief Minister has aborted. Earlier in July 1984, a hitman of the NSCN Mr. Ramkhathing had penetrated the security cordon at the chief Minister's residence and had entered the official bunglow. Luckily the Chief Minister was away from his home at that time attending the Sunday Church service elsewhere. That would be assasin Ramkhathing was the same man virtio had gunned down Mr. Yangimaso Shaiza at his home in Deulaland () on the morning of January 30,1984."^^ Thus, the NSCN by such activities has been intensifying its terrorist activities.'

B. MANIPUR:

It is interesting to note that, among the various 125

insurgent groups operating in the North Eastern India, insui-gents in Manipur Valley are . The valley of Manipur is inhibited by Meitftvs and the surround­ ing hills by various tribes. Majority of the various tribes in the hills of Manipur are christians converted ever since the time of British regime. ,/-.;

The Meiteis are in general vaishnavities of the Gauriya Cult, but they have not given up their old traditions of worshipping their ancestors and local dieties. They have overall conformity with the Hindus else where in India in the use of s^c»»edL songs, pilgri­ mage to holy places and predominance of the priest­ hood. The entire area populated by them is dot marked by temples, small or big, usually a small building for dikihj or dcHi^S?, and a big Mandop for regular congre­ gation. Four temples built by Jai Singh (1759-1798) in later part of the eighteenth century. Shri Govindajee, Vijay Govinda, Madan Mohan, and Gopinath examplify the religious aspirations of the Meiteis,

From times immemorial, Manipur had been an independent state with the king as the sovereign head. 126

After the Anglo-Manipuri war of 18911 Manipur fell into the hands of the British on 27th 1891 and they hoisted their flag (Union Jack) a^t Kangla, the Capital of the State, The state was regranted and from 21st Aiigust 1391, Manipur became a Suzerain state under the British (Government, vide publication in the Gazette of India Notification No. 1700 a, dated 21st August 1391. The British rule came to an end in India and wtien Manipur merger-agreement was signed by his Highness the late of Manipur on 21st September, 1949 at Shillong, the state was integrated with the Union of India from 15th October 1949. So from 15th October, 1949, we may take as post integration period 17 for Manipur. '

The first case of insurgency activity in Manipur was started by a small group of people vdio had gone to Burma in the early 1950s. This group was given training by the Burmese rebels. But the idea of the group was not for a seperate homeland for Manipur, but it was a part of the Communist movement in India. The group had come back to Manipur after some time (middle of 1950s) 127

and settled dovm to normal life as members of the communist party India. (C.P.I.)

It can be said that the group was well trained in the use of various fireanns as well as political Ideologies, They were given proper training on tactics and strategy of modem guerrilla warfare. Some of them had got military instructor's course.

In the year 1953» a party under the name of Revolutionary Nationalist Party CRN?) with an aspira­ tions for more au-^nomy had come up. Some leaders of this party met Pandit Ivehru vrtien he visited Imphal and demanded for a separate administrative set up entirely for Manipur. But Pandit Nehru (according to constant!ve R, in his book, Manipurl Maid of Mountains, Lancer Publi­ shers, , 1981) rejected the demand. This party later converted the name into Manipur Revolutionary Party (MRP) with an idea for armed insurgency, but did not get public support and hence faded away from the scene by itself.

In 1965, two groups came up. They are United National Liberation Front (UNLF), a Pan Mongoloid Move­ ment, and Revolutionary (R.G.M.) 128

The first group (UNLF),had an idea in having a separate nation of the Mongoloid races in Eastern India, The Second Group (RGM) was fairly active in an isolated manner till the middle of 1970s. It is alleged that these two groups are of tha same coin.

There was ano"ttier political party having secte- rian tendency known as "Meitei State Committee" which had emerged prior to the fourth general election in 1967, This political party had put up some candidates for the then Territorial Assembly. But all of them lost their security deposits at the time of elections.

After a quiet period of about 11 years, except for some stray incidents, a new group known as Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has emerged in the valley of Manipur with a flavour of Maoism and Meiteisra. Under the leadership of one time member of the Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM), Mr. N. Bfshesw&roingh, the P.L.A. had started its armed activity in the valley of Manipur in the late 1974. At the same period, many insurgent groups suddenly came up in the valley of 129

Manlpur. It can be noted that unlike the Naga Insurgency, which has got only two factions - N.S.C.N, and F.G.N, (now insignificant). has got a typical characteristic of having so many group and factions and^ their rank and file and orga­ nizational set up are confusing. The various insurgent groups operating in Manipur are as follows:

1. P.L.A. (Peoples Liberation Army)

The activities of this group had clearly surfaced in late 1979 v^en this group attacked a party of B.S.F. personal in the heart of Imphal tov/n killing and snatch­ ing away anns from the victims. The violent activity of the PLA was high till the last part of 1982, But the PLA suffered a set back with the arrest of its leader Mr, N. Bisheswar Singh on July 6, 1981. Many of the hard core leaders of the PLA were eliminated during the arrest of Mr. N, ^^BisheBwar Singh. Another blow to the PLA was the jpEai of Mr. S. Kunjabihari Singh in an encounter with the Security Forces on 13 April, 1982. Mr. Kun;3abihari took up the leadership 130

of the P.L.A. after the arrest of Mr. Bisheswar Singh, Subsequently the leadership of the P.L.A. has been taken over by Mr, S, Temba Singh.

The last quarter of 1982 witnessed the departure of around 85 new recruits to Burma and the Kachin •• Independent Army (K.I.A.). Recruitment was mostly reported from rural areas, unlike on earlier occassions, when the PLA recruits by and large confined to urban area only. This was a difference in the policy of the PLA under S. Temba. These recruits were taken across in the month of November 1982, and there are reports to the effect that the NSCN has also helped (within Burma) in taking the PLA recruits to Kachin Independent Army''^ (KIA)

In the year 1983» the PLA came out with a new tactic. Instead of attacking the security forces, it carried out propaganda works in the form of displaying their flags in various parts at Imphal, planting of small electronic cum low-calible mechanical devices etc. used as bobby — traps» 131

It can be recalled that the former leader of the PLA Mr. Bisheswar Singh is now a member of Manipur Legislative Assembly elected from Thongju constitu- tency in Manipur uriiile he was still in Imphal Jail, He along with other two former insurgents are now elected to the Manipur State Legislative Assembly, But a group under the leadership of Mr, S, Temba Singh is still in the Burmese territory looking for an appro­ priate time to come back to Manipur.

2. PREPAK (People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak)

Kangleipak is the old name of Manipur, This group is a Meitei Nationalist group dreaming for a seperate nation of Manipur by means of armed action. This group was very active in the valley of Manipur, more vividly in 1982. The PREPAK has been split into two group in the year 1980, One group was led by Mr. Maipak Sharma (now in Jail) and the other t>«e under the command of Mr. R,K. Tulachandra Singh (now killed by the Security Forces), The intra-party Confrontation between the these factions led the PRiiPAK to a oblivation. 132

3, K.C,P« (Kanglelpak Communist Party) t

This group is a fixture of Melfei revivalism and communist idea. With the surrender of its 4 top leaders along with 8 other members with arms and ammiinition in January 1983, the existence of this small group has been put off.

4. TRIPLE X

This arganization came to notice in November 1981 \^en it has sent Idireatening letters to some engineers. Later it has sent threatening letters to the Indian Air 20 Lines in January, 1983» There was no evidence of direct violent action by this group so far.

This group is said to have been formed by some stray members from the bigger groups. Nothing much has heard about it after the middle of 1982. Even the full form of the abbreviation of T.S.S. has not been known.

6. M.N.F. (Mizo National Front) The M.N.F*, a well-organized insurgent group of 133

Mizoram, under the leadership of Mr, Laldenga got its foot-hold in Manipur South District. After the signing of "Mizo Accord" »n 1987» and the election in Mizoram (with the status of statehood of 40 member Assembly) vriiich btxsught Laldenga to power. As Laldenga himself is the chief Minister, the MNF has given up the idea of a seperate Mizo country by coming back to Parliamentary democracy under the .

?, N.S.C.N. (National Socialist Council of Nagaland)

The N.S.CN, is an insurgent group of having a good organizational set up. This group, as it has been stated earlier under the head line of "NAGALAND" , has got its hold in at least three districts in Manipur. This group is now the largest and strongest among the various insurgent groups in North-Eastern India, g. UNLF (United National Liberation Front)

This insurgent group which has not been heard for a long time since 1965, has now started operating in Manipur, This organization started becoming promi­ nent again in the middle of 1986 by lootir^a petrol 134

pump at Imphal. The leader of this group was said to be R.K. Meghen Singh. Some of its members have been arrested after the petrol pump incident. Wow, this group is keeping a low profile without any direct armed action,

'S' ^'^*^' (Poirei Liberation Front)

This group was formed after the killing of Mr. Sudhir Kumar Singh, a former R.G.M, (Revolutionary Government of Manipur) man by the P.L.A. in the early part of 1979. This group is known to be a counter- group to P.L.A,

So far, -tiie various insurgent groups in the North-Eastem Region of India have not been able to come under a co-ordinated programe in a very explicit way, even though there are reports of their helping each other in their terrorist activities. On the other hand, it also cannot be ignored that they may co­ ordinate their activities in future. Therefore, it is essential to have a serious look into the problem 135

of insurgency in the North-East region (Particularly Nagaland and Manipur) by not merely countering it by use of force but by understanding the basic roots of this political problem to find a permanent solution.

C. BASIC ISSUES OF INSURGENCY PROBLEM IN NAGALAND AND MANIPUR

The basic causes of the emergence of insurgency may be combination of many a factors. In case of the insurgency problem in Nagaland and Manipur, indiich may not have come up at the same time^yet the genesis for indulging inviolent activities for achieving independent status for eachother or seperately, has been the same. It could be recalled that the population of the area belong to the same origin of Mongoloid stock and they joere animist before they converted into and Christianity respectively. 136

Even now they have not given up many of their old dLieLti^ and customs. The basic root of insurgency problem in Manipur and Nagaland are as follows:

1, Problem of Cultural Adjustment

^e Republic of India is the product of the Integration of many States. It is a fact that many States had their own political identity before and during the British rule. After the British left, the small areas of the North-ii-ast region were also merged into the Union of India. But due to different cultural and historical background, the people of this area have not been able to adjust themselves to the national main stream. It is but natural that people having different background would have different culture and values and hence display different hopes and aspirations.

The word culture in modem days, could be 137

interpreted in various ways, A brief summary observation made by Kroeber and Cyde Kluchokn could be meaningful. They have stated in their work that

"Culture consists of patterns explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and tr^uasraitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i,e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may be, on the one hand, be considered a products of action, on the other hand condi- tioning elements of further action",2 1

Fertts hawever explain in a way >diich may be more acceptable in a broader parameter. He states that:

"If,,, a society is taken to be an organized aet of individuals with a given set of indiKLduals with a given way of life, culture is that way of life. If society is taken to be an aggregate of social relations, then culture is the content of those relations. Society emphasizes that human component, the aggregate of people and their relations between them. Culture emphasizes the 138

component a accumulated resources, immateral as well as material, which people inherit, imply, transmit, add to, and transmit,"2 2

Culture, historically quite often, is in the process of change and adaptation, many a times, from a small to a bigger one. It will naturally occur only when there is inter-action between the population. In case of the North-Kastem India, it seems that the region is semi-isolated from the rest of India in a geogra­ phical sense.

It could be maintained that "the semi isolation of the communities living in the hills (North East) was strengthened by the British attitude of keeping them insulated from contact with other parts of India by means of policies like inner-line regulation, 23 extended areas, partially extended areas". "^ It is surprising to see that inner-line regulation continued to exist in Manipur till late 19503 and it is still existing in Nagaland. 2. Problem of :

Nationalism is a vital element needed for 13B

developing the sense of national integration to safe­ guard national security. The question of nationalism is, infact, one of the most important factor in connec­ tion with the problem of insurgency in the North-Easteni India.

Although India has had a long history, Indian 24 Nationalism is the product of only last century. It can he said that the light of nationalism has not been able to reach in many remote comers of the coxmtry.

Professor L.L. Synde has given a definition of nationalism. He states that ••,. .Nationalism, a product of political, econo­ mic, social and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history, is a sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical areas, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common tradi­ tions and customs, vinerating in its own heroes and in some cases, a common reiigfon". "^ - -*

For a pluralistic country like India, most of the above points may not go in the same order. But many 140

nations do exist and stable inspite of having many plural characteristics. It shows that collective nationalism is not confined to monolistic nations only.

Though a common language, religion or a common '^racial*' origin undoubtly helps to produce and cement the sentiment of nationhood, these things indi­ vidually or together may not be sufficient or necessary, Many a group whose national sentiments are stronger ? has diverse language, religion, and race, Switzerland and Belgium are good examples. The existence of a nation, however, presuppose some common historical experiences or in later times, the cherished tradition of common experiences often fused diverse peoples into a nation through being subjected to oppression at the hands of common adversaries. Such has been the case of thirteen colonies that waged the American 26 war of Independence,

Peter Taylor a political geographer has observed the following:

"Nations intended to describe on historic entity where nationalism is the ideology 141

associated witti this concept, surprisingly it is the fonas which is more difficult to pin down (Navari 1981). If we define it simply as a historic community sharing a common culture then such entities can be identified throughout the history."2 '7

3. Poverty and feeling of NefillRence;

Poverty is a general factor. According to Oscar Lewis:

On the level of individual, the major chara- teristics of poverty are a strong -feeling of marginality of helplessness of independence and inferiority, and a strong present time orientation and sense of resignation and faj^talism. On the community level, lack of effective participation and integration in the major institutions of the larger society is one of the crucial characteristics of the culture of poverty."

In case of the North-Eastem region of India, the case has dl«^P««

aggression of 1962, Mr. V.K. Sarin, has cited an example, of such kind in a rather crude way:

"It could be recalled that during the Chinese invasion of 1962 right upto the foot hills of Karaeng closed the plains of Assam, New Delhi virtually wrote off the entire north-east region by withdrawing its army to the west of^^Siluguri neck". The helpless people of the area were left at the mercy of God, and of course, the invading CMnese, Shattered by the sad turn of events, the then Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar- lal Nehru bit a tearful farewell to the people of the area. In a broadcast from the All India RadiOf he veiled my heart bleeds for the people of Assam. Mercifully the Chinese withdrew into Tibet much to the relief of the unfortunate people of the region. The bitter memories of 1962 debacle still rankles* in the mind in the inhabitants of the area." 29

Such a scenerio has been aggravated slowly by corruption in various political and administrative levels. Creating a kind of distruct and disloyalty to the authority which may be reflected in various forms 143

of violence, *

Among the various types of "curruptton existing in the region, the personal corruption charges against many Ministers and the present chief minister of Ifenipur is imique. Mr, L.?, Singh, former Governor of Memipur had asked the C,B,I. to probe into many corruption charges for misusing public funds against these political leaders.

The C.B.I, could complete the Investigation for period of the Janata regime only (197^-1930) because other relevent documents alleged to have been kept "50 locked in the personal safe of the Chief Minister. The instances of taking money for giving employement, transfer order, promotion, Akash bill (to hand over the cheque, before the construction for any work is done in the P.W.D. department) etc. are fairly well known to the public.

The health department once purchased Rs, 1.33 crore worth of non-medical items at exorbidant rates : a handkerchief priced at Rs. 3 in the market was purchased for Rs. 30 or a pin for Rs. 800, though the market price 144

is hardly 50 paise. The C.B.I, Is groping in the dark because the relevant files are "missing". This appears to be just the tip of the Ice-berg of corruption in the state. In angry pix>test against such rempant corruption, the educated youth of Manipur took up arms for socio-economic reforms. However, the politicians were quick in bringing these "misguided youths" under their wing for their gains* The first Congress (I) Chief Minister, R«K, Dorendi^, was sacked by vAien his nexus with the insurgents was proved. In a bid to pass the responsibility, a senior minister stated in a press conference: "police officers are financially benefited from insurgency. The proof is not far to seek. Just see the palatial buildings constructed by high ranking police officers yiich are disproportionate to their known income". A widely circulated vernacular daily Huyen Lanpao edi­ torially commented: "The Police are taking Rs. 15,000 or so if an insurgent, who faces immenent death, wants to surrender, or an undertrial insurgent does not want 31 to be deported to Jails of other states" The recent 145

corniption charges against two Ministers in Maghalaya State is interesting. These two Ministers of Megha- laya have been recently charged witii bugling of "52 Rs, 3 crore in medical supplies.^

• PERCENTAGE OF LITERACY AND ECONOMIC

BACKWARDNESS(NORTH EASTERN REGION OF INDIA

STATES LITERACY ECONOMIC BACKV/ARI»JESS

ASSAM 28.7 77.4 20.09 100.0 NAGALAND 42.0(1) 100,0 MANIPUR 42.2 100.0 MIZORAM 59.50 100.0 TRIPURA 41.6 100.0

MEGHALAYA 33.2 100.0

SOURCE t Census of India 1981.

The money for the developmental programmes in these area have not been utilized properly and has 146

ultimately hampered the developmental works and created chaos and distrust among the population against the government. .' / % The level of literacy in the seven states of the North-Eastem India is comparatively high, and on the other hand, level of economic landerdevelopment is (in percentage) is 100 percent backward except for Assam ^ich Is 77.4 percent (Chart as per 1981 census is given in the next page). In the absence of any major industrial unit in the area, the employment prospect is dim, and there is a limitation of employ­ ment options. Against the background of such a picture, the problem of insurgency in the North-iSastem region should not be taken as a surprising phenomenon.

• 4. Foreign Hand: Foreign hand ccMnes when there is vulnerability inside the country. The undesirable situation in the North-Eastem India and its strategic location naturally implies the probability of getting advantage by the interested foreign parties. International politics is 147

full of such games. Concepts and ideas enshrined in International Organizations such as the United Nations, often became meaningless in the arena of international politics, ^w ,

The principle of international law about non­ interference in the internal affairs of states has been given the following interpretation and a more accurate definition in the declaration on principles of Inter­ national law conceming Friendly Relations Among States in accrodance with Charter of tiie United Nation (Reso­ lution 2625 ^ XXV of October Zk, 1970, subsequently called in short the "Declaration of Principles") %riiich was unanimously adopted at the 25th session of the General Assembly. This Interpretation of the UN Charter is binding on all nuclear states. The Declaration on principles says. That "No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terro­ rist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state or interfare in civil strife in another state..,'^•^ However, all the 148

words of the UN do not have a legal binding for the States and the UN cannot force it legally or any state to follow. Therefore, the initiative of the state Itself is the most reliable option for safe guarding their owi national security. As far as the problem of foreign hand in the sensitive North-Eastern part of India is concerned, it is quite an obvious reality^

New Delhi has often accused and some British administrators of implanting the idea of inde­ pendence among the Nagas, It should be noted that in 1955 the last Baptist missionaries were made to leave the area.

Zt is an open sfcret that China and Pakistan ^well before the creation of Bangladesh) had been pro­ viding material and other help to the various insur­ gent groups operating in the North-Eastem India, iJtlll, Chinese attitude towardsv this issue is unpredictable. The Indian weekly Blitz reported on March 19, 1978, that Peking, far from scaling down (qualitatively and quanti­ tatively) its arms aid to the hostile Nagas and Mizo 149

tribes, has actually begun providing ever larger aid for subversive operations in Nortti-Eastem India,^^ It is essential to note that

"Given tliis grim scenerio, China*s incursion into Arunachal Pradesh causes serious alarm, particularly in the hight of the recent report that it may resume assisting the insurgents \idiich had stopped doing in 1930. The case for co-ordinated anti-insurgency measures remains even one discounts this report as well as the other one in September about 200 NSCN and ULFA insurgents were sighted moving into "56 China through Kachin area of Burma." In reference to general anraesty to the Mizo rebel to be included as a part of the Mizo Accord (while negotiations of the Accord was going on). Mr. Laldenga openly said that; "Mizoram situation is basically different. Hera we have armed ourselves openly, with foreign links and we have been like this for 20 years''."^'

The Americans also, on the otherhand, are not keeping silent, A news item in a soviet magazine named as "Izvestia" on June 16, 1984 reported thats 150

"Lasting American plans for the Bailfeani sation of India, the paper says that v^ile the Brahmaputra plan invisions the establishment of a buffer state in India's north-east, Khali Stan, centred in Pun;3ab, is planned to be set up in the north-west. According to the plan, the "South India will become part of 38 the independent, Dravidistan", the paper says"."^ Most of the insurgents in Nagaland and Manipur in particular started indulging in violent activities because of poverty, helplessness, lack of employment opportunities, indoctrination, frustration about corruption and problem of adjustment to the national mainstream,instigation from foreign countries etc. All these elements more or less combined together and projected itself in the form of separatist movement with an idea of achieving . The following lines will illustrate the picture more clearly.

Narrating his hard childhood days after he has lost his father one former leader of the insurgent 39 group, P.L.A, says that: "Being not able to persue further studies after his Pre-University o^amination in 1968 he used to stay on petty earning for livelyhood till 1967. In the early part of 1967» he had gone to Solan () to undergqT training for making thermo­ meter. After completing the training, he came hack to Manipur but 1 could not get a job despite his trained hand. Then in the last pat-t of 1968 he Joined the U.N.LJF. After the emergence of faction in the organisation he along with some others make a group iand we^t to Bangladesh (then 6ast Pakistan) in 196)9, ai*id came back after 10 days to prepare to se*id a batch ')f AO to 50 youths. After accpmpAishing the taf X he was arrested by Manipur PoXicfr along vdixi^ some other youths and released uncner General Amqiesty scheme in 1972." ^V,^^ ''^'

He attempted :itor getting a Job t® sV^tle down to normal life. He even approached the Chie^Winister of the State but nothing materialised. He then went to Moreh (Manipur boarder) to take up small business ( import) to enable him to start a normal peaceful life with ' his family. He could save around R3.5OO/- to get himself treated as he was a T.B. Patient in Pi Dribugarh Medical College Hos^al in 1975. However, 152

he was arrested in Drlbugarh by Assam police and released from ;3ail in early 1976. In July 1976 he along with 16 of his new group left for China. He along with his group stayed at Lhasha for 7 to 8 months. They underwent political indoctrination lectures on communism.

In the latter part of 1977 the group, (except for two including himself) went back to Manipur. He had lea'^mt Chinese language to enable him to understand the attitude of the Chinese. In the month of August 1978, he came back to Imphal and started his activities and named the organisation as P.L.A. (Peoples Liberation Army), The activities of the organisation intensified from early 1979. The organisation started maintaining contact with other anti Burmese Government groups and resorted to many violent activities. However, he was arrested on 6 July, 1981 after a brief encounter with security forces at Teckcham village in Manipur. During his interrogation this insurgent leader claims that "It is not a fact that I did not want to come on terms with the Government, But the Government had never 153

taken up any action to bring solution in right path. The only thing vAiich has brought to public openly by extremists had been taken and considered by the government but something deeper should have thought about vdiat was the source of the violent activities"

Another Insurgent leader of the group PREPAK says that : "Having-not able to pwrsue his education prx>perly, he helped his father in cultivating works during his childhood days. After passing his matriculation exami­ nation (after his attempt for the third time) he did Join to a cultural and social organisation with a hope of a revolution in Ilanipur. He was under the feeling that outsiders are in upper^in Manipur, In July 1975 he along with 16 of his new group left for China. He along with his group stayed at Lhasha for 7 to 8 months. They were given political lectures on coramxinism.

He thought that even in the state of Manipur itself Manipuris are at the mercy of the outsiders. Blaming the Central Government, he wanted to make 154

soffle plans so ihat the local people could govern themselves as a sovereign state. Thus he along with other youths decided to form an underground orga­ nisation. The next step -was collection of funds. The organisation bought an old model sten gun for that purpose and collected, around Rs.500,600,

In the later part of the year 1976, he carae in contact Vidth R.K. Tullachandra Singh (who Ss now Killed in the encounter with -the security forces )^and had talks about i-laoist Co-raiunist and started to come down to Maoist ideology. ¥ith this idea in mind they wanted to start a revolution \vith Maoist ideology, 'i-lie party has been named as PRiiPAK (People Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak), In the middle of 1979 he along with R.K. Tullachandra and some other youths of the organisation went to Tibet via Kathtnandu for Chinese help. He came back from Tibet to i4anipur in the middle of 1979 leaving the other youths at Tibet. In the early part of the follovdLng year he \^s arrested by .

While talking about his tough time during his 156

Forces while trying to organise the youths at Sekta village.

Saying that he had an idea to reform the society through the path of armed revolution, another insurgent who belongs to an organisation called U.N.L.F. (United National Libaration Front) says that :

i ' In the early period of his life, he had no such idea for armed revolution. His aim in his early life was to Join the through NDA examination. But due to a oronic problem in his left leg, he was disappointed. It was in the early part of 1971, when he was a student of Pre-University in D.M. College, Imphal that he was indoctrinated to the ideas of revivalism and Pan-Mongolism. In the year 1975, he passed both B.A. and B.Sc. final examination from two different colleges getting distinction in B.A.

He voluntarily Joined the UNLF as a member since April, 1976, In December 1976, he along with another person along with a group of about 47 to 48 volunteers of the iMSCN crossed over to Burma and met the NSCN leader 157

Mr, Isak Swu. In the last part of May 1977, he came back to Manipur •with some Naga Insurgents and Joined the Students Movement of Foreigner's issue from (1977- 80). Then he had contact with some youths from Assam when the Assam agitation was in full swing. He was arrestedv by the Security Forces on 23.5.1981, on *«- way to Burma to contact Mr. T.Muivah of NSCN.'

Similarly narrating the poor economic background of his family, one of the insurgents of the NSCN (vdio is now arrested), himself, son of a paster says that^^

ft '-•••>• and their dream for a seperate Naga-country is more valuable and Important than any other thing. Many Naga youths were recruited to the NSCN by means of indoctrination. The N.S.C.N, has many civilian agencies even in the government establishment. According to this particular insurgent, he and many others were given lectures about the cause of the NSCN and its goal for a Naga-country by a Head Master (who is now expired) of a school. 158

A new dimension has been added by the growing cooperation between the various insurgent groups active in the region. For quite some time men of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur has been trained in guerilla warfare by the NSCN at its headquarters at Challam, beyond the sorarat tract, in North Bunna. The ULFA, (United Liberation Front of Assam) which was set up in 1981 by hardcore elements of the Assam movement acting under the NSCN*s advice, has now about 80 of its men at Challam, According to a report a couple of months back, the ULFA and the NSCN had prepared a Joint operational bank plan to overcome financial diffi­ culties. Besides, the NSCN and the PLA have established links with the TNV vKhich has its headquarters at Singlum in the Chittagong hills tract district of Bangladesh.4 4

The feelings of fraternity have always been a strong unifying force in the North-^st India. The^-- mdtgenous ethnic stocks of the region were the guiding force of this conciousness. This factor thwarted the designs of the -early invaders in the iiorth-East sentiment of India. In the middle of the first millennium A.D. the 159

attanpts of Yasovarman of ilalvra (6th century, A.i^.), I4ahasengupta a successor of the a Great Guptas (6tli centairy A.D.) the Yasovara^ of KanauJ (8th century, A.D.) to sub;}ugatQ "tiEie land and its people miserably failed before the strong determinatifitn'3ssed within her territocial ^Jurisdictions creation of a number of states; I^agland in 1^3» Arunachal and 160

Meghalaya in 1972 and Mlzoram in 1973 () Besides these there are also some neiglibouring politi­ cal units encircling Assam viz., Tripura, Manipur, Bhutan, Sikkim and (Now a district of West ), But for geographical historical, political I and Ekjonomic reasons the entire North-JiJast of India developed a keen desire to assimilate and combine its diverse elements into a single organic conception.4 5 Such a background could be utilised by the insurgents, in the North-Eastem India, on their ovm level. Fortu­ nately, any combined action (by the insurgents in North-ii)astem India), has not been seen clearly in practice so far. It can be however said that they are trying for mutual co-operation among themselves.

It is not surprising that the Union Home Ministry has paid serious attention to a note by the Director- General of Police, Assam, apprehending a major offensive early next year by the insurgent groups active in North- Eastem India. Co-Operation between the National Socia­ list Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV) of Tripura and people's Liberation 161

Array of Manipur began at the end of 1984 when a rautiial assistance agreement was drawn up among them. It was reinforced when a four-member tactical advisory committee was set up following a secret meeting among their leaders in November last year.4 6

On reports that United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) activists were linking up with NSCN and moving across into Burma for training, Lt, Gen, Purl said the link-up could be a way to obtain arms to create insurgency in Assam. But he maintained, do not see any united action. Each groups is so diversed. The NSCN, being the largest could be acting as Big-Brother, but I don't think there is any threat of this becoming a large issue.4 7 But it is convinced that moves are going on for unified action by the insurgents in the North-iiastem India. 162

CHAPTER IV FOOT NOT^iS

1. R.C. Ma^umdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta, "An Advanced " (Macmillan India, Ltd., New Delhi, 1982), p. 990. 2. V.Venkata Rao, "rJorth-Sast India i Problems and Prospects" in Journal of Abstracts and Review J Political Science (Vol. III. No. 12, ICSSR, New Delhi, 1972), p. 306.

3. S.K. Ghosh, "The Gen£sis of Naga Insurgency" Vol. VII. No.1, Sept.-Oct., ICSSR. op.cit., p. 45. 4. S.K. Chaube, "The Sixth Lok Sabha Election in the Hill States of North-£ast India" Vol. III. Ko.l. Jan.-Jime, 1980, ICSSR, op.cit. p. 42. 5. "Indian jiXpress," Bombay, January 9» 1987. 6. Nadeem Haiisnam "Tribal India Today", (Harman Publications, New Delhi, 1983) p. 127. 7. H.Horam, "Naga Polity" (B.R. Publishing Corporation), Delhi, 1975, p. 17. 8. Nirmal Nibedan, "Nagaland : The Night of the Guerrillas" (Lancer Publications, New Delhi, 1983), p. 30. 163

9. Ibid., p. 31. 10. Ibid., p. 32 11. Luingam Luithui and Nandita Haksar, op.cit., p.9 12. M.Aram, "Peace in Nagaland" (A.H. Publications, New Delhi, 1974) p. 112. 13. Ma;3or K. Ki^ar, "Nagaland and India's Northern Security" in Eklavlya : Research Journal. Vol. II. (University of Grorakpur, 1984). p.2. 14. Ibid., p. 2. 15. "Resistance" Vol. VIII, No.12 (Pan Manipuri Youth League, Imphal, 1984), p.1. 16. R.P. Singh, "QeoRraphy of Manipur" (National Book Trust, New Delhi, 1982), pp. 127-28. 17. N. Khelchandra Singh, "Manipuri Language : Status and Importance" (N.Tombi Raj Singh, Imphal, 1975), p. 10. 18. Personal Interview with Com/rade Michael (former insurgent) and confirmed from his personal Dairy. 19. "Administrative Officer's Conference on Law and Order" (Government of Manipur, Imphal, May 27, 1983), 9*2, 164

20. Ibid., p. 7. 21. David L. Sills EA. "International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences Vol. 13, (Macmillan Company and • Free Press, U.S.A. 1968), p. 528. 22. Ibid., p. 533. 23« S.M. Dube, "Internation of North i:;ast India" Vol. IV, No. 1-2 I.C.3.S.R. op.cit. New Delhi, Jan-Dec, 1966, p. 13.

24. L.L. Synder, "The New Nationalism" (Cornell University Press, New York, 1968), p. 153. 25. L.Randeep Singh, "Insurgency and India's National Security: North-Eastern India" in Gautam Sen Ed., India's Security Considerations in Nuclear Age, (Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 1986), p. 115. 26. Harry M. Johnson, "Sociology ; A Systematic Intro­ duction, (Allied Publishers Private Lted., New Delhi, 1979), p. 315. 27. Peter Taylor, "Political Geography : World Economy, Nation-State, and Locality" (Longman, New York, 1985), p. 125. 165

28. Michael Haralamboa and Robin Harald, "Sociology ; Themes and Perspectives'* (, New Delhi, 1981), p. 154. 29. V.K. Sarin, '^India's North-'ijast in Flames" (Vikas, New Delhi, 1980), pp. 8-9. 30. Dr. M. Malavya, "Corruption in India" (Affiliated East-Weat Press, Private Ltd., Mauras, 1985), p. 37.

31. "Gentleman" (Sterling News Papers Private Ltd., Bombay, November, 1986), p. 40, 32. "Indian Jaixpress" Bombay, 18 December, 1986, 33. Gennady Alov and Vassily Viktrov, "Aggressive Broadcasting ; Psychological Warfare" (Novosty Press Agency, Publishing House, Moscow, 1985), p.143. 34. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Security in Asia : The Security of Southwest Asia (Gower Publishing Company Limited, Hants, 1984), p. 88. 35. I.Alexandrov, "Peking's Policy; A threat to Peace" (Novosty Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1987), pp. 7-8. 36. "Indian Express", Bombay, 9 January, 1987. 166

37. "India Today" Vol.X.No.19, (Living Media India Limited, New Delhi, October, 1-15, 1985), p.63. 38. "I.B.S.A. - News Review" Vol. 15. No.6. (I.D.S.A., New Delhi, July, 1984), p. 335. 39. Personal Interview with a former leader of the Insurgent group, P.L.A. 40. Personal Interview with a former leader of the Insurgent group, PREPAK. 41. Personal Interview with a former leader of the Insurgent group, K.C.P.; 42. Personal Interview with a fonner active member of the Insurgent group, U.N.L.F.,. 43. Personal Interview with a former active member of the Insurgent group, N.S.C.N. 44. "Indian iilxpress" Bombay, 9.1.1987. 45.-Dr. N.N. Acharya, "Historical Documents of Assam and Neighbouring States: Qrisinal Recorus in English" (Osmons Publishers, New Delhi, 1983), pp. XVI-XVII. 46, "Indian ii^ress" Bombay, 25 March 1987. 47. "Indian iibcpress" Bombay, 17 December, 1986.