Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters

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Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters

Ian Bremmer & Maria Kuusisto

SASSI Research Report 15

May 2008

Published by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), 36 Alie Street, London, E1 8DA © South Asian Strategic Stability Institute 2008

Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………..6

Introduction………………………………………………………………8

Overview of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability…………………………….10

Evolution of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system…………10

National Command Authority…………………………………………..10

Strategic Plans Division…………………..……………………………..11

The Services Strategic Forces Command… …………………………….11

Decision Making Procedures…………………………………………….12

Islamist Takeover of the Government or Military……………………….13

Assassination or Elimination of Key Leaders……………………………14

Conclusion………………………………………………………………..17

Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters

Ian Bremmer and Maria Kuusisto

Abstract

Pakistan needs to address three major developments—the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2003/2004 A. Q. Khan scandal, and the recent instability in Pakistan—triggered concerns in the international community that Pakistan’s control over its nuclear weapons may be weak. This perception has wide-ranging strategic diplomatic, political, and economic implications for Pakistan. Pakistan’s new Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led coalition government needs to build international—governmental and non-governmental—confidence in its nuclear command and control system and the security of its nuclear weapons if it is to have any hope of securing a more stable regional environment, a more stable economic and security environment, or any hope of gaining access to civilian nuclear technology argues Ian Bremmer and Maria Kuusisto.

6 1974 “peaceful nuclear test” was a major Pakistan’s nuclear command turning point. It heightened the country’s and control—perception sense of vulnerability and marked the matters beginning of the second, more robust and military focused phase (1974–98). By Ian Bremmer and Maria Kuusisto During this phase, Pakistan learnt to enrich uranium and to manufacture components for a nuclear weapon. Introduction Although it is likely to have achieved the Pakistan has significantly improved the technological capability to carry out an institutional frameworks and operational explosive nuclear test by mid-1980s, it procedures for its nuclear weapons and did not do so until late May 1998 (after moved from a clandestine nuclear India carried out an 18 May nuclear weapons program to greater openness. test). During the third phase (1998– However, three major developments— present) Pakistan has focused on the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2003/2004 designing more sophisticated nuclear A. Q. Khan scandal, and the recent weapons and delivery systems.1 Pakistan instability in Pakistan—triggered probably wants to develop a plutonium- concerns in the international community based weapon, improve the range of its that Pakistan’s control over its nuclear surface-to-surface missiles, and gain weapons may be weak. This perception naval and cruise missile capability. has wide-ranging strategic diplomatic, The details of Pakistan’s nuclear political, and economic implications for weapons capability and doctrine remain Pakistan. Pakistan’s new Pakistan uncertain because of Pakistan’s need to Peoples Party (PPP)-led coalition maintain strategic ambiguity. But, government needs to build Pakistan is estimated to have between 50 international—governmental and non- and 60 nuclear weapons and the governmental—confidence in its nuclear capability to deliver them either by command and control system and the aircraft (modified F-16s and Mirages) or security of its nuclear weapons if it is to surface-to-surface missiles. Pakistan has have any hope of securing a more stable not formally announced any nuclear regional environment, a more stable doctrine. However, statements by senior economic and security environment, or Pakistani military and government any hope of gaining access to civilian officials suggest that the objective of its nuclear technology. nuclear doctrine is to deter all forms of Overview of Pakistan's nuclear external aggression that could endanger capability Pakistan’s national security or strategic 2 Pakistan developed its nuclear capability forces. It is not clear what would in three phases. During the first phase (1954–1974) Pakistan acquired basic 1 Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Regional Dynamics and knowledge about nuclear energy and Deterrence: South Asia (2)”, Contemporary built its first research reactor in 1965. Security Policy, Volume 25 (2004), 185-186. 2 During this phase, development was Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic slow because of the government’s weak Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”, commitment and lack of skill, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, (New Mexico: technology, and investment. India’s May Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), 23

7 constitute a severe enough danger to free hand to pursue its research.7 Since Pakistan’s national security to trigger the 1975 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons use of nuclear weapons, but a variety of program has been controlled by the events have been suggested. This National Nuclear Command Authority threshold could be a loss of a significant (NCA) and the National Nuclear part of Pakistani territory, a destruction Command Committee (NNCC).8 There of a large part of Pakistan’s military, are different views on the composition of economic strangulation, or social the NNCC and the balance of power destabilization.3 Pakistan believes that it between its key members. Originally, can achieve deterrence against this committee is likely to have had six aggression through a combination of members including the president, the conventional and strategic forces.4 prime minister, and the chief of army Pakistan has not agreed to a no-first-use staff. The balance of power between but will not use nuclear weapon against these key members is likely to have non-nuclear weapon states.5 shifted in line with the wider political 9 Evolution of Pakistan's nuclear environment. In the 1990s, the command and control system membership of this committee is likely to have increased and the role of this Little is known about Pakistan’s committee is likely to have been command and control system during the formalized. In 1998, Prime Minister first two phases (1954–1998) but it is Nawaz Sharif ordered the military to 6 likely to have been relatively weak. The prepare a new institutionalized command government’s focus during the first two and control system. phases of Pakistan’s nuclear development was on building a weapon Since 1998 Pakistan’s nuclear command and little attention was therefore paid to and control system has been transformed developing a nuclear command and in four stages with the end result being a control system. For example A. Q. mature system. During the first stage Khan’s laboratory was granted a largely (1998–1999) Pakistan started to consider a more institutionalized command and control system. During the second stage (2000–2001) Pakistan introduced its first

3 Centro Volta, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear reforms. On 7 February 2000, Pakistan Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan”, Pugwash, available at 7 Douglas Frantz, “Pakistan’s Role in Scientist’s http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan- Nuclear Trafficking Debate: Islamabad’s nuclear.htm awareness of a Black Market led by the Father of 4 Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic its Atomic Bomb is still Uncertain”, Los Angeles Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”, Times, 16 May 2005. Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional 8 Mushahid Hussain, “Media off Target with Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, (New Mexico: Pakistan nuclear scare”, Asia Times, 7 Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), 23 November 2001. 5 Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic 9 Douglas Frantz, “Pakistan’s Role in Scientist’s Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”, Nuclear Trafficking Debate: Islamabad’s Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional awareness of a Black Market led by the Father of Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, (New Mexico: its Atomic Bomb is still Uncertain”, Los Angeles Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), 23 Times, 16 May 2005, Ahmed Rashid, Bare All 6 Nuclear command and control refers to a and Be Damned: Ex-army Chief Reveals Nuclear system to manage strategic nuclear assets and Secrets, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 May infrastructure. 1994.

8 announced a formal chain of command command and control system will over nuclear weapons. This system was remain unchanged.13 Prime Minister put into operation during 2001. During Yousaf Raza Gillani even expressed the third stage (2001–2003) Pakistan satisfaction with the current system.14 further strengthened oversight over its The government is likely to understand nuclear weapons. This was a response to the need to consolidate and build on the the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which focused existing, well-functioning system. international attention on Pakistan and Moreover, the government probably put pressure on Pakistan to secure its wants to focus on more urgently needed nuclear weapons.10 The final phase reforms, such as strengthening (2003–present) has been marked by the democracy, tackling the economic and investigation into the A. Q. Khan nuclear power crisis, and fighting terrorism and network and related improvements in the Islamic militancy. However, the balance command and control system, and export of power within the system is likely to controls.11 Finally, in December 2007 shift to the prime minister in line with President Pervez Musharraf transformed the wider political environment. While the ordinance establishing the system the military will retain operational into a law.12 control, the government will have more The current command and control say on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons system is likely to remain unchanged program. under the new government. Both the Overview of Pakistan's nuclear PPP and Pakistan Muslim League command and control system Nawaz (PML-N) argued in their election Pakistan’s nuclear command and control manifestos that nuclear command and system is considered to be relatively control system should be overseen by the sophisticated and balanced. It has cabinet defense committee chaired by civilian and military involvement, the prime minister instead of the NCA. checks and balances between the However, in April 2008 the PPP-led participating institutions, and a clear government announced that the nuclear division of responsibility between the institutions. The system is based on a 10 “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan three-tier structure: the National and the rise of proliferation networks”, (London: Command Authority (NCA), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the 2007). 107-109. three services’ strategic forces 11 For further information see “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of command. The composition and role of proliferation networks”, (London: International each of these institutions is outlined in Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2007), the following sections. Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, “Deception: Pakistan, the United States, And the National Command Authority (NCA) Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons”, Walker and The government created the NCA in Company, 2007), Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, “The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of 2000 as the highest decision-making the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets...And How We Could Have Stopped 13 Zeeshan Haider, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Him”, (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2007). Command Stays Unchanged: Official”. Reuters, 12 Stephen Graham, “Musharraf tightens his 8 April 2008. control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal”, 14 “Pakistan's nuclear assets safe – PM”, BBC Associated Press, 15 December 2007. Monitoring South Asia, 18 April 2008.

9 body in the nuclear command and SPD is headed by a director general who control system. It has ten members is appointed from the army and including the president (chairman), the comprises some 50–70 officers from the prime minister (vice-chairman) and the three services.18 It is responsible for chief of army staff.15 It is responsible for formulating policy options (nuclear formulating policies, deploying the policy, strategy, and doctrine) for the strategic forces, coordinating the NCA, implementing the NCA’s activities of all strategic organizations, decisions, drafting strategic and negotiating arms control/disarmament, operational plans for the deployment of overseeing implementation of export strategic forces.19 Moreover, the SPD controls, and safeguarding nuclear assets carries out the day-to-day management and sites.16 It has two committees: the of Pakistan’s strategic forces, Employment Control Committee (ECC) coordinates the activities of the different and the Development Control strategic organizations involved in the Committee (DCC). The ECC is nuclear weapons program, and oversees responsible for directing policy-making budgetary, administrative and security during peace time and deployment of matters.20 The SPD has eight strategic forces during war time, making directorates—including the Operations recommendations on the evolution of and Planning Directorate, the nuclear doctrine, establishing the Computerized, Control, Command, hierarchy of command and the policy for Communication, Information, authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate and establishing the guidelines for an (CCCCIISD), Strategic Weapons effective command and control system to Development Directorate, and the Arms safeguard against accidental or Control and Disarmament Affairs unauthorized use. The DCC is Directorate—and several divisions. One responsible for exercising technical, of the main divisions is the security financial, and administrative control over division, which has a 10,000-strong the strategic organizations involved in force charged with guarding and the nuclear weapons program, and protecting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. overseeing development of strategic The Services' Strategic Forces Command weapons programs.17 The Services Strategic Forces Command Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is raised from all the three services, The SPD was created in 1998 as the which all have their respective strategic permanent secretariat for the NCA. The force commands. It is responsible for

18 “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan 15 “Pakistan Says Its Nuclear Assets Are Safe and the rise of proliferation networks”, (London: from Militants”, Associated Press, 26 January International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 2008. 2007). 112 16 Kenneth Luongo and Naeem Salik, “Building 19 Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security”, Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”, Arms Control Today, 1 December 2007. Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional 17 Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, (New Mexico: Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”, Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), 51 Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional 20 Kenneth Luongo and Naeem Salik, “Building Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, (New Mexico: Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security”, Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), 50 Arms Control Today, 1 December 2007.

10 daily and tactical operational control of The NCA has established strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems (the operational policy guidelines and plans NCA is still responsible for overall for the deployment of nuclear weapons strategic operational control). This systems (these are national secrets). A operational control includes technical, decision to launch a nuclear strike is training, and administrative control over made by consensus within the NCA with missiles and aircraft that would be used the chairman casting the final vote. The to deliver nuclear weapons.21 NCA will communicate the decisions and delegate authority to implement the decision to the SDP and down the institutional hierarchy/structure. The details of this delegation are unclear. Nonetheless, Pakistan applies a two and/or three-man rule to the authorization of assembly and use of nuclear weapons. 22 While the number of people required in different parts of the hierarchy is likely to vary because of technical reasons no single individual in any part of the institutional hierarchy is in a position to launch a nuclear strike or operate a nuclear weapon on their own. In addition, the NCA has the ability to cancel the decision to launch a nuclear strike up until the last minute before delivery systems are activated.23 There is likely to be also contingency guidelines and plans in case of a disruption to the established guidelines. Risks to Pakistan's nuclear command and control system There are two major scenarios, which could subvert Pakistan's nuclear command and control system: Islamist takeover of the government or the military, and the assassination or elimination of key individuals in the command and control system. These

22 Mahmud Ali Durrani, “Pakistan’s Strategic Decision-making procedures Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, (New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004), 24 21 Kenneth Luongo and Naeem Salik, “Building 23 “Pakistan Says Its Nuclear Assets Are Safe Confidence in Pakistan's Nuclear Security”, from Militants”, Associated Press, 26 January Arms Control Today, 1 December 2007. 2008.

11 scenarios could lead to either weapons. The military sees nuclear unauthorized access to nuclear materials weapons as a major source of its (and proliferation of nuclear materials) influence and status and is therefore or use of nuclear weapons. Both of these motivated to maintain the security of the scenarios seem unlikely given the weapons and materials. This makes it political realities in Pakistan and unlikely that even if conservative Islamic sophistication of the nuclear command political forces were to control the and control system. These two scenarios government that they would be able to are discussed below. gain immediate access to nuclear Islamist takeover of the government or weapons and materials. the military There are also concerns that conservative There are concerns that conservative Islamic forces could increase their Islamic political forces could hijack the influence over the military and gain government—either through elections or access to nuclear weapons and materials. political manipulation—and gain This scenario is based on the fact that the influence over the nuclear command and Pakistani military is becoming socially, control system. This scenario is based on ethnically, and religiously more diverse, the use of these forces by earlier with an increasing number of soldiers Pakistani leaders and governments to from low-income and religiously consolidate their power, the perceived conservative backgrounds. Additionally, weakness of the secular political forces, some elements within the military are and the growing social conservatism of known to have had links to Islamic some sections of the population. There extremist militant groups (such as the have been two examples of previous Taliban). This is also an unlikely leaders encouraging the growth of scenario because Musharraf has carried Islamic groups. In the late 1970s and out major reshuffles in the military, early 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq removing officers believed to have encouraged increasing Islamic influence sympathies for conservative Islamic in the Pakistani government, military, forces or values, or who are suspected of and society while President Pervez having links to extremist groups. The Musharraf manipulated the 2002 election new Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez result to help the religious Muttahida Kiani is considered a liberal and is will probably move to prevent this scenario Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) win more seats. But despite such examples, it is unlikely from emerging. Even if some extremist that conservative Islamic groups could individuals were to assume influential gain control of the government. Post- positions in the military, a decision to Haq governments have rolled back launch of nuclear weapons requires Islamization of the government, the consensus among the military and majority of Pakistanis are unsympathetic civilian members of the NCA. Moreover, to conservative Islamic groups—as these individuals would need to secure demonstrated by the MMA’s weak the cooperation of several senior officers performance in the 18 February in order to gain access to nuclear elections—and the fact that the military weapons or materials. maintains significant influence over the Assassination or elimination of key nuclear command and control system leaders and the operational control of nuclear

12 The second major scenario involves Strategic implication of concerns about fears that extremist Islamic elements Pakistan's nuclear command and control could assassinate or eliminate key system individuals in the command and control Since 1998 Pakistan’s nuclear command system and create a dangerous vacuum and control system has been significantly in the system that might make nuclear improved. In the process, the risk of a weapons and materials vulnerable to failure in the system that would allow unauthorized access or use. It is true that unauthorized access to nuclear materials Islamic extremists are willing to attack or use of nuclear weapons has been government figures. Such groups have considerably reduced. The main carried out three major suicide bomb improvements include the establishment attacks against President Pervez of the NCA and SPD, the integration of Musharraf in 2003. All three involved the command and control system, and middle-ranking army and air force the use of a two/or three-man rule and personnel with connections to Al Qaeda. indigenous Permissive Action Links A fourth security incident involving (PALs) on nuclear weapons. This belief Musharraf took place in July 2007, when is shared by senior members of the US an airplane carrying the president came military including Admiral Michael under antiaircraft fire a few minutes after 24 Mullen, the chairman of the US Joint take off from Rawalpindi. Islamist Chiefs of Staff, who in 2007 said that he extremists were also responsible for the did not “see any indication right now 28 December 2007 suicide attack against that [the] security of those weapons is in PPP leader Benazir Bhutto. These jeopardy.”26 Nonetheless, the 9/11 elements have also targeted senior terrorist attacks, the 2003/2004 A. Q. military leaders, military sites and Khan scandal, and recent instability in convoys, and high-security military Pakistan have created the perception of areas. In February 2008 Pakistani weakness in the nation’s command and military’s most senior medical officer, control system. This has caused concern Lt. Gen. Mushtaq Baig, was killed in a 25 among the international community. In suicide bomb attack in Rawalpindi. But January 2008, the head of the despite the litany of such attacks this International Atomic Energy Agency remains an unlikely scenario because it (IAEA) Mohammad ElBaradei would require the simultaneous expressed concerns that Pakistan’s assassination and or elimination of nuclear weapons could fall into the several individuals within the command hands of extremist groups in either and control system. In addition, it Pakistan or Afghanistan.27 These ignores the fact that Pakistan has concerns highlight the fact that contingency plans in place to respond to institutional and technical improvements such scenario. need to be accompanied by efforts to

24 Salman Masood and Garlotta Gall, “Musharraf’s Plane Fired Upon as Mosque Standoff Continues”, New York Times, 7 July 26 Peter Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan's Drive To 2007. Guard Its A-Bombs”, Wall Street Journal, 29 25 “Pakistan army's top medic killed”, BBC November 2007. World Service, 25 February 2008, see 27 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “A State of Denial http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7262 Pakistan’s Nuclear Threat”, International Herald 622.stm Tribune, 17 January 2008.

13 combat negative perceptions in order to Failure to combat negative perceptions build international confidence. and build international confidence will In order to do this, Pakistan needs to undermine the dialogue between India demonstrate openness (without and Pakistan. While the US and Western sacrificing national security) and provide countries have expressed mounting details about its command and control concern over the security of Islamabad's system. Pakistani officials have started nuclear weapons, India has been this process with steps to brief the extremely restrained in its public government and parliament about the comments. However, on 18 February nuclear command and control and 2008, India’s special envoy to Prime security measures. On 16 April 2008, the Minister Manmohan Singh, Shyam head of the SPD, Khalid Kidwai, briefed Saran, said that there is "mounting the new PPP-led government on the concern over the likelihood that in a command and control system, and situation of chaos, Pakistan's nuclear security measures.28 Kidwai has also assets may fall into the hands of jihadi started to engage diplomats, academics, elements” and that “India has to be and journalists. In January 2005, he deeply concerned about the danger it faces” from this new and growing visited the US and spoke in academic 31 think thanks about Pakistan’s nuclear threat.” Saram’s comments are likely command and control system.29 In to reflect a widely held sentiment within January 2008, Kidwai also organized the Indian government. Pakistan’s new two unprecedented briefings for government has expressed its Islamabad-based diplomats and commitment to dialogue with India. This journalists to further explain the process also needs to include system.30 Kidwai said that Pakistan has confidence-building measures in the "instituted command and control nuclear front. Pakistan needs regional structures and security measures in a stability, and stability along its eastern manner so as to make these foolproof." border, in order to tackle its pressing These briefings have increase political, economic, and security international community’s understanding challenges. on the level of sophistication related to The failure to combat negative the command and control system. The perceptions and build international PPP-led government and military— confidence will heighten international under Kiani’s leadership—should concerns and pressure regarding the continue this approach. Failure to do this security situation in Pakistan. These will will have wide-ranging diplomatic, undermine the government’s efforts to political, and economic consequences for pursue a more independent and Pakistan- Pakistan. focused approach to the battle against Islamic extremists needed to improve the security situation. The new PPP-led government argues that Pakistan must 28 “New Govt Committed to Pak’s Nuke Prog: Gillani”, The Press Trust of India, 17 April 2008. pursue its own interests rather than those 29 “A Q Khan “a Sordid Chapter” Pakistan wants of the international community. The to leave behind”, Indo-Asian News Service, 25 October 2006. 31 “Indian official warns over Pakistan nukes: 30 “Pakistan says its nuclear assets are safe from report”, Agence France Presse, 18 February militants”, Associated Press, 26 January 2008. 2008.

14 government is also transferring policy- economic and security environment in making to the parliament and shifting its the country, including perceived growing focus away from military operations, Islamic extremism and presence of which had resulted in the spillover of nuclear weapons. Therefore, there is a militancy and terrorism (especially risk that the current trend in foreign suicide bombings) from the troubled investment will continue, slowing tribal areas. As part of its policy shift, Pakistan’s economic growth. The PPP- the government has proposed a dialogue led coalition government has already with selected militant elements. It also been forced to scale back its GDP wants to extend and strengthen growth target to around 6% from an government control of the tribal areas, earlier 7%. and to boost social and economic Pakistan’s failure to tackle this issue development in the area. The US could also hinder development of government, however, fears that this new civilian nuclear capability and efforts to approach will play into the hands of the tackle the country’s power crisis. militants and strengthen their operational Pakistan is currently facing a power capability. The US will pressure the shortage of about 3,000 MW, which is Pakistani government to continue expected to increase to over 7,000 MW Musharraf’s approach and allow targeted by 2010 with the growth of the US strikes in tribal areas. population, and domestic and industrial The fallout from a failure to build power consumption. Pakistan currently international confidence will also generates about 400 MW of its power include slower foreign investment in from nuclear plants and hopes to Pakistan, something that could hurt the gradually increase this to 8,800 MW by economy. Pakistan is facing a looming 2030. Pakistan is not able to produce economic crisis: it has large fiscal nuclear power using its own technology (9.5%) and current account (9.2%) and needs access to foreign civilian deficits, and an inflation rate of 10%. nuclear technology and uranium. Moreover, it was reported in April 2008 Pakistan wants access to Western that there has been a 46% year-on-year technology. Press reports indicate that drop in foreign investment during the high-level military officials want to first nine months of the 2007–2008 fiscal move that way. Press reports from 25 year from $5.55 billion to $2.98 billion October 2006, cited a senior Pakistani compared to the same period a year military official as saying that Pakistan earlier.32 After the 18 February election, wanted to leave behind the A. Q. Khan the country received about $300 million scandal, improve its image in the in foreign investment, which is much US/West and get access to nuclear lower figure than expected. This technology for civilian use.33 suggests that the drop in foreign Musharraf’s government expressed its investment was not just related to the interest in a civilian nuclear agreement February elections and related political similar to the 2006 US/India deal and the instability but because of much wider new government is likely to have similar concerns related to the political, interests. There has been no US or

33 “A Q Khan “a Sordid Chapter” Pakistan wants 32 Rizwan Bhatti, “Foreign investment down by to leave behind”, Indo-Asian News Service, 25 46%, Business Recorder”, 22 April 2008. October 2006.

15 Western involvement in Pakistan’s Authors civilian nuclear industry since late 1970s Ian Bremmer, President, Eurasia Group —due to international nuclear proliferation concerns—and this has Ian Bremmer’s career spans academic, forced Pakistan to rely on China for investment, and policymaking nuclear cooperation. Although China has communities. His focus has been global offered to build six more nuclear plants, emerging markets—for Bremmer, those Pakistan is interested in larger and more countries where political will matters at effective Western-designed plants. least as much to the market as economic fundamentals. Bremmer’s work to define Conclusion the business of politics has accordingly Since 1998, Pakistan has taken a more focused on making political science mature approach to the command and relevant to the global marketplace. control of its nuclear weapons and Ian Bremmer received his PhD in started to promote openness. The political science from Stanford command and control system has been University in 1994. Bremmer went on to significantly improved, considerably the faculty of the Hoover Institution reducing the risk of unauthorized access where, at 25, he became the Institution’s to nuclear materials or unauthorized use youngest ever National Fellow. He has of nuclear weapons. While Pakistan feels held research and faculty positions at that it has already met international Columbia University (where he standards, it needs to continue to presently teaches), the EastWest strengthen the NCA’s and SPD’s control Institute, Lawrence Livermore National over nuclear weapons, to improve Laboratory, and the World Policy operational procedures and promote Institute, where he has served as Senior openness. Failure to do this could cause Fellow since 1997. problems for the new government. The PPP-led government has announced that Bremmer’s research focuses on states in it wants to continue the dialogue with transition, global political risk, and US India, to develop a more independent foreign policy. His five books include strategy to tackle terrorism and Islamic The J Curve: A New Way to Understand militancy, and to tackle its power Why Nations Rise and Fall (Simon & shortages, and its economic problems. In Schuster, 2006), selected by The order for the government to achieve Economist as one of the best books of these key political and economic goals, it 2006. Bremmer has also published over needs to improve international 200 articles and essays in The Harvard confidence in its nuclear command and Business Review, The New Republic, control systems and the safety of its Survival, Fortune, The Los Angeles nuclear sites and assets. In short, Times, The Washington Post, The international perceptions about Pakistan Financial Times, The Wall Street nuclear command and control system do Journal, and The New York Times. He is matter. a columnist for The International Herald Tribune and the webzine Slate, contributing editor at The National Interest, and a political commentator on CNN, FoxNews, and CNBC.

16 In 1998, with $25,000 in hand, Bremmer Maria Kuusisto is a research analyst in founded the research and consulting firm Eurasia Group's Asia practice. She Eurasia Group. Today, Eurasia Group is specializes in the politics of South Asia the preeminent global political risk with special focus on Pakistan. consultancy, with 80 full-time Prior to joining Eurasia Group, Kuusisto employees in New York, London, and was based in London and worked as a Washington; as well as 480 experts in 65 research analyst for Control Risks countries worldwide. Widely respected Group. She has provided political for its objectivity, Eurasia Group has analysis and investment advice to a worked with government leaders (as well broad range of investors in South Asia, as opposition leaders) throughout the with a particular focus on the energy and world. AIG, Bear Stearns, Boeing, Coca mining sectors. Before joining Control Cola, ExxonMobil, Fidelity, Goldman Risks she worked for the leading Sachs, Google, Lehman Brothers, international think tank on strategic Merrill Lynch, Motorola, News affairs, the International Institute for Corporation, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Strategic Studies (IISS), as a researcher and Shell are among Eurasia Group’s for South Asia, and the Finnish Ministry more than 200 multinational clients. of Foreign Affairs as a desk officer in In 2001, Bremmer authored Wall the arms control department. Kuusisto Street’s first global political risk index, has travelled widely in South Asia and now the GPRI (Global Political Risk Middle East, including extended Index)—a joint venture with investment research trips to Pakistan and bank Citigroup. The GPRI brings Afghanistan. Kuusisto is a political together Eurasia Group political commentator for Al-Jazeera and CNN. scientists with Citigroup economists and Kuusisto has a Masters Degree in strategists, and represents the first time International Law from the University of political science methodology has ever Tampere (Finland) and Bachelors degree been used on Wall Street to assess risk. in International Relations from the Throughout his career, Bremmer has London School of Economics (United spent much of his time advising world Kingdom). leaders on US foreign policy, including US presidential candidates from both Democratic and Republican parties, the former Russian prime minister, Sergei Kiriyenko, and the former Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe.

Maria Kuusisto, Analyst, Eurasia Group