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Faiza Bashir Political Science Final PAK-US MILITARY ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS & FOREIGN RELATIONS (1954-2010) BY FAIZA BASHIR Ph.D. (research Scholar) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR (JUNE, 2014) PAK-US MILITARY ALLIANCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS & FOREIGN RELATIONS (1954-2010) Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (JUNE, 2014) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR APPROVAL SHEET A Thesis presented by Faiza Bashir entitled “Pak-US Military Alliances and their Implications on Pakistan’s Domestic Politics & Foreign Relations (1954-2010)” to the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Ph.D in Political Science. We, the undersigned have examined this thesis and do hereby approve it for the award of Ph.D Degree. External Examiner: _________________________________ DR. ASMA SHAKIR KHWAJA Department of Peace & Conflict Studies National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. Supervisor: ______________________________ PROF. DR. GHULAM MUSTAFA Department of Political Science University of Peshawar Chairman: ______________________________ Date: ______________________________ ABSTRACT This research is an attempt to study the relations between Pakistan and the United States in the context of alliances of modern age. The study primarily discussing the need of alliances in modern times and suggests that even though there is a shift in power balance in the international state system, the concept still prevails in international politics. The study assesses the conditions that obligated Pakistan to join Western alliances and argues that Pakistan joined the US sponsored Western alliances for acquiring economic and strategic aid, while the US wanted to shape a defense system of non-communist states. The study further emphasizes that after joining Western alliance system Pakistan’s relations with Muslim countries and Soviet Union deteriorated. The study further dives into the intricacies of Pakistan’s deteriorated relations with the US in 1960s and revived in post 1979 period. The US after realizing its objectives into the region left Pakistan alone with unresolved issues, in the wake of disintegration of Soviet Union. The study further elucidated that the event of 9/11 elevated the significance of Pakistan in the eyes of the United States once again. The findings in post 9/11 study reveal that this relation meant a lot to Pakistan while for the US is a marriage of convenience. Additionally, both the states are not on the same page regarding security issues as both views Middle East, India, issues of non-proliferation differently. Although the United States and Pakistan are allies, the US considered former Soviet Union more important during Cold War era than its ally Pakistan. And in the post 9/11 period is more focused on combating terrorism, while Pakistan since its inception till today is preoccupied with the perceived threats from India. The study argues that though the interests of Pakistan and the United States diverge, still the US cannot deny Pakistan’s significance for promoting regional security. This is one of the reasons why the US though tilted towards India does not want to lose Pakistan’s support in the region. i TABLE OF CONTENTS S.No. Topic Page No. Abstract i List of Tables vii List of Maps viii Acknowledgement ix Acronyms x INTRODUCTION 01 Research Questions 05 Significance of the Study 05 Objectives 06 Literature Review 06 Theoretical Framework 10 Conceptual Development of Theory of Alliance in Post Cold-War 12 Methodology 17 Scheme of Study 18 Chapter – 1 1. PAK-US ALLIANCE: FACTORS, DYNAMICS AND STRATEGY OF 21 PAKISTAN 1.1 Historical Perspective of Pak-US Military Alliance 22 1.2 Motives behind Joining Western Alliances 24 1.2.1 Pakistan’s Security Quandary 25 1.2.2 India as a Threat to Pakistan 25 1.2.3 Afghanistan as Threat to Pakistan 28 1.2.4 Ineffectiveness of the Arm Forces 31 1.2.5 Economic Problems 33 ii 1.3 United States intents behind Alliance 35 1.3.1 US Strategic Interest 37 1.3.2 Political Interest 38 1.3.3 Economic Interest 38 1.4 Client Garrison Strategy 38 1.5 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 40 1.6 South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 41 1.6.1 Pakistan & SEATO 42 1.6.2 Pakistan Entrance into SEATO 44 1.7 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 45 1.8 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (1959) 47 1.9 Costs of Alliance 47 1.9.1 Political 48 1.9.2 Strategic 50 1.9.3 Economic 51 1.10 Domestic Upshots of Alliance with US 52 1.11 Conclusion 54 Chapter – 2 2. US COLD WAR POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA 55 2.1 Relations with US 1972-1979 55 2.1.1 Policy Ups & Downs 56 2.2 Soviet Intrusion in Afghanistan 57 2.2.1 Background 58 2.2.2 The Soviet Role & Incursion 58 2.2.3 The Intent behind Soviet Encroachment of Afghanistan 61 2.3 Pakistan since Soviet incursion of Afghanistan 63 2.3.1 Pakistan’s Security Subsequent to Soviet Intrusion 63 2.3.2 Zia Rejoinder 65 2.3.3 Pakistan Security Options 66 iii 2.4 Revitalization of Alliance 69 2.5 Pakistan Drives Behind Alliance 69 2.5.1 Protection of State Ideology 70 2.5.2 Economic Aims 70 2.5.3 Strategic Drives 71 2.5.4 Counter Indo-Soviet Alignment 71 2.5.5 Rejuvenation of Defense System 72 2.6 US Intentions Behind Alliance 72 2.6.1 Policy of Containment 72 2.6.2 Vengeance of Vietnam War 73 2.6.3 US Desire of Making Soviet a Bleeding Wound 74 iv 2.7 Benefits to Pakistan from Re-alignment 76 2.7.1 Military Gains 76 2.7.2 Economic Gains 77 2.7.3 Flagging Pakhtun Racial Nationalism 79 2.7.4 Feat of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy 80 2.8 Implicates of the Alliance on Pakistan 80 2.8.1 Afghan Refugees Burden on Pakistan 80 2.8.2 Refugee Burden on NWFP 82 2.8.3 Refugee Burden on Baluchistan 83 2.8.4 NWFP & Baluchistan under Soviet Menace 83 2.8.5 Soviet Air Raids & Radical Activities 84 2.8.6 Economic Cost of Afghan Refugees 84 2.8.7 Decay of the Tourism Industry 86 2.8.8 Kalashnikov Culture 86 2.8.9 Denominationalism 87 2.9 US Departure from Afghanistan and Pakistan 88 2.9.1 Geo Strategic Milieu 88 2.9.2 Pak–US Tautness 89 2.9.3 The Nuclear Issue & Sanctions 89 2.10 Conclusion 91 Chapter – 3 3. PAK-US SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 93 3.1 Historical Perspective of Pak-US Security Relations 94 3.1.1 Regional/External Constituent 95 3.1.2 Politics of Insight/Muddle 98 3.1.3 Bilateralism Reentered 99 3.2 9/11 Bouts and Pak-US Security Relations 103 3.2.1 9/11 Occurrences & United States 103 v 3.2.2 Bush Doctrine 104 3.3 Pakistan’s Retort to US Security Policies 105 3.3.1 Pakistan: Yet again on the Track of Alliance 105 3.3.2 Transformation in Bilateral Relations 108 3.3.3 Joining War on Terror and Indian Factor 109 3.3.4 Pakistan’s Endeavor for Taliban to Stay in Power 109 3.3.5 Revivification of Terrorists 110 3.4 Terrorism Menace and Rejoinder 110 3.5 Evident and Clandestine Military Operations of Pakistan & United States 113 3.5.1 Pak-US Operations in Waziristan 113 3.5.2 Pak-US Excursions in the Pretext of the Forward Policy 115 3.6 War on Terror and its Bearings on Pakistan 117 3.6.1 US National Laws and its Bearing on Pakistani Community 117 3.6.2 Discernment by US Administration 118 3.6.3 Immigration Dealings of Justice Department 118 3.6.4 Newfangled Registering Policy 119 3.6.5 Furtive Confinements 119 3.6.6 Visa Screening knottiness & Social Estrangement 119 3.7 Domestic Out comes of 9/11 in Pakistan 120 3.8 Conclusion 123 Chapter – 4 4. US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN: PROMISES, 125 CONDITIONS AND BENEFITS 4.1 History of US Aid to Pakistan 127 4.1.1 1950s: Pakistan Allied with the US 128 vi 4.1.2 1960s: An Appropriate Takeover & More Aid 130 4.1.3 1970s: Pakistan’s Nuclear Determinations & Authorizations 131 4.1.4 1980s: Military Dictatorship & More Aid 133 4.1.5 1990s: Post-Cold War Aloofness 134 4.1.6 US Aid to Pakistan after 9\11 136 4.2 Significant Issues and Recent Developments 144 4.2.1 The Shakil Afridi Case & US Assistance 144 4.2.2 Assistance to Pakistan Energy Sector 144 4.2.3 2012 GLOC Reopening & Coalition Support Fund Release 145 4.2.4 Flooding & Humanitarian Assistance 145 4.3 Pakistan Dependence on US Aid 146 4.4 Can Pakistan Subsist without US Aid? 153 4.5 Inadvertent Costs of US Aid to Pakistan 155 4.6 US Aid & it’s Input to Pakistan’s Army 158 4.6.1 Descending Helix 158 4.6.2 Economic Impact 159 4.7 The Actual Beneficiary of US Aid 159 4.7.1 Five Decades of Aid to Pakistan 1950-2001 160 4.7.2 From Soviet Incursion to 9\11 160 4.7.3 The Complex Issue of US Aid 2001-2010 161 4.7.4 Kerry-Lugar-Berman and a Reconsidering US Aid 162 4.8 Has Aid been Effective? 164 4.9 Conclusion 168 Chapter – 5 5.
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