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Lashkar-E-Taiba: Evolving Into a Hybrid Entity?

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Lashkar-E-Taiba: Evolving Into a Hybrid Entity? CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES ISSUE BRIEF No. 103 May 2017 Lashkar-e-Taiba: Evolving Into A Hybrid Entity? Brigadier Kuldip Singh (retd), Indian Army he recent statements by Talla Saeed (son of the LeT despite the deteriorated security situation inside Hafiz Saeed), the admission (6 March 2017) Pakistan and persistent pressure from the international Tby Pakistan’s former National Security Advisor community besides India. There is however another Mahmud Ali Durrani that a ‘terrorist group based in his view, that: (i) the LeT—Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD) country’ carried out the 2008 Mumbai terror attack, the combine, with its hospitals, universities, social-service National Investigation Agency’s findings (January 2017) wings, etc, is not merely a terrorist organization, but is a that the September 2016 Uri attack was carried out by three-dimensional “hybrid” movement that is emulating the operatives of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives,1 the Hezbollah or Hamas; (ii) the JuD-LeT combine’s and the February 2016 video-link deposition of David large social service programmes earns it the support of Coleman Headley together bring back focus on the links large swathes of the Pakistani population; and (iii) the of the LeT with Pakistani establishment particularly Pakistani military-ISI may use the JuD-LeT combine, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Traditionally, the along with ‘sleeper cells’ and Overground Workers Indian military and intelligence community has looked (OGWs) in India, as a tool to challenge the prevailing at: (i) the LeT as a terror entity which initially had an Indo-Pak conventional forces symmetry. India-specific orientation, but has been pursuing a There is hence a need to examine whether the LeT is trans-regional agenda in the recent years; and (ii) the just a terrorist proxy or whether the JuD-LeT, operating ties between the Pakistan Army/ISI and the LeT from quite freely in Pakistan, and with a large infrastructure a precise prism of “terrorism”. Additionally, the Indian and support base, is gradually turning into a ‘hybrid’ military-intelligence complex often ponders why the entity. However, prior to examining this precise aspect, Pakistani establishment remains unwilling to jettison it is important to analyze the history of the ‘Maktab The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an autonomous think tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflict and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic and outlook and policy-oriented in approach. Website: www.claws.in Contact us: [email protected] 2 CLAWS al-Khidamat’ and the JuD-LeT, as it highlights the assisted by two banks in Saudi Arabia which channelled similarities in the development of these entities. It funds through 20 NGOs, the most famous of which was is noteworthy that the US government2 has labelled the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO). ‘Maktab al-Khidamat’ (Office of Services or the Afghan Both IIRO and the Islamic Relief Agency functioned Services Bureau) (MaK)3 as the “precursor to Al Qaeda” under the umbrella of the World Islamic League.11 (AQ). According to Michael Scheuer, Head of the CIA’s anti- OBL unit, about $ 600 million passed through OBL’s Brief History: ‘Maktab al-Khidamat’—Al charity fronts between 1980 and 1989, most of it Qaeda through the MaK. It is from the MaK that OBL established the Bait al- The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and Ansar (House of Allies), the military training camps thereafter, the US-Saudi bloc bankrolled the jihad which necessary to train the jihadis and finally, the AQ in saw thousands of mujahideen reach Afghanistan to 1988.12 In April 1988, the former Soviet leader Mikhail fight the Soviets.Between 1980 and 1984, a Palestinian Gorbachev agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan under religious scholar Shaykh Abdullah Azzam,4 realizing the UN-brokered Geneva Accord. Shortly before the that the Arab jihadis fighting in Afghanistan required Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan (February 1989), organization and support,5 established the MaK astride Azzam and OBL decided to form a new vanguard group, the Pakistan-Afghan border. Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah (“The Solid Base”), whose concept According to the CIA’s biography, Osama bin is commonly attributed to the Egyptian theorist Sayyid Laden (OBL) (born in March 1957), deeply influenced Qutb’s vision of a revolutionary Muslim vanguard that by radical Islam while studying, reached Pakistan- would overturn un-Islamic regimes in the Middle East Afghanistan in the early 1980s to assist the mujahideen and establish Islamic rule.13 Azzam too had envisioned in their campaign against the Soviets.6 In Afghanistan, the AQ as an Islamic “rapid reaction force” that would Abdullah Azzam convinced OBL to join his nascent canalize the Afghan mujahideen into fighting on behalf organization, who then utilized his financial connections of ‘oppressed Muslims worldwide’.14 He, however, and business experience to organize the MaK. The MaK did not support killing of non-combatants and terrorist was nurtured by Pakistan’s ISI, which was the CIA’s tactics.15 By the end of 1988, OBL’s relationship with primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Azzam deteriorated on account of various issues. After the Soviets in Afghanistan.7 Azzam was assassinated in a car bomb attack (the late By 1986, MaK had many branches, including in about 1989; Afghanistan), hardliner Ayman al-Zawahiri took 30 cities in the US, collecting donations to support the over as the main ideologue of the AQ. Zawahiri, the jihad against the Soviets. The most important branch mastermind of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, then began of MaK, called the Al-Kifah Refugee Centre, namely, transforming the AQ into a terrorist organization.16 ‘Brooklyn Jihad Office’, was in New York.8 This Centre was also responsible for recruiting and training jihadis with the CIA’s assistance at shooting ranges Brief History: Jama’at-ud-Dawa-Markaz al- in New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut before Dawa wal-Irshad-Lashkar-e-Taiba dispatching them to fight in Afghanistan (the Al-Kifah Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi: The Soviet-mujahideen Refugee Center later played a role in the 1993 World conflict was in full bloom when Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi Trade Centre bombing9). Another significant branch (the LeT’s ‘military’ commander) moved (1982) from was at the Islamic Center of Tucson, Arizona, which the Pakistan’s Punjab to Paktia (Afghanistan) to participate US counter-terrorism expert Rita Katz10 calls the ‘the in the fighting. In 1984, Lakhvi, a fanatic supporter of first cell of Al Qaeda in the USA’. the Ahl-e-Hadith (AeH) an extreme interpretation of The MaK’s fighting and ‘services’ efforts were Islam, established his own AeH-based militant group. CLAWS 3 Hafiz Muhammad Saeed: Hafiz (LeT’s amir) founded by militants based in Pakistan- was reportedly born in 1950 in Sargodha to a Punjabi Afghanistan. family that had lost many members while migrating to • Both organizations believed in radical strains of Pakistan from India after the Partition (1947). In the Islam. early 1980s, Hafiz Saeed was appointed to General • Just as the killing of Abdullah Azzam allowed Zia ul-Haq’s ‘Council on Islamic Ideology’ and taught OBL-Zawahiri to take control of the AQ and turn Islamic studies at Lahore’s University of Engineering its focus towards terrorism, the deaths of Jamil & Technology. He then went to Saudi Arabia for higher al-Rahman (leader of JDSQ) and Allama Ehsan studies, where he met Abdullah Azzam, OBL’s mentor. Elahi Zaheer (leader of Jamaat AeH) allowed the Azzam encouraged Hafiz Saeed to also start a politico- JuD-MDI to grow stronger. militant-social organization like the MaK. • Both entities had a ‘services’ as well as militant Founding of Jamaat ul-Dawa (JuD) and the wings, gained experience in the Afghan crucible, Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI): In 1985, Hafiz and went on to set-up self-sustaining, social Saeed and another academician, Zafar Iqbal, created service organizations and well-organized JuD, an AeH social organization. The JuD however, militant-terrorist wings. could not gather traction as there already was a major • AQ, the terrorist wing of MaK, was formed in the AeH organization called the ‘Jamaat AeH’, led by a well- latter half of 1988; the LeT in the early 1990. known Pakistani scholar, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer. • Both were aided by the Pakistani military- So, in 1986, Saeed and Lakhvi joined hands, and along intelligence establishment as well as by foreign with foreign militants, set-up the MDI (Center for Call patrons. and Guidance) at Muridke (near Lahore; current HQ of • Like the AQ, the JuD-LeT’s ideological the LeT-JuD).17 Besides ‘social’ activities, the radical framework attracts members from outside of MDI also began fighting alongside the Salafist-adhering Pakistan; it also benefits from a support network ‘Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Suna’18 (JDQS) in outside of Pakistan that includes Saudi Arabia.19 Afghanistan. • From the AQ, the LeT learnt that establishing In 1987, three events shaped the final trajectory of networks is the most efficient way to manage the JuD-LeT; (i) the MDI established militant training resources, carry out attacks, and remain resilient. camps in Paktia and Kunar (Afghanistan); over the years, • The LeT’s strategic goals overlap with those of these camps hosted many militant groups including the AQ in many ways. While the relation between the AQ; (ii) Jamil al-Rahman, the leader of JDSQ, died; and AQ and the LeT is complex, both have assisted (iii) Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, the leader of Jamaat each other20 (case of Ramzi Yusuf) as well as AeH, was killed in Lahore.
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