Intelligence Power and Prevention after 9/11: The Role of Intelligence in Facilitating and Legitimising Controlling Security Strategies o f the UK, US and UN Chris Mackmurdo London School of Economics PhD in International Relations 2007 1 UMI Number: U501B72 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U501372 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ^sses p- British itxary o* Politico' mg EcanoiPic, bs. I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Word-count: 96,403 Chris M ackmurdo ................................................................... 2 To Mum, Dad and Erin & In loving memory of Mormor, Grandma, Bob and Corrie 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. I am indebted to: Dr. Bruce Jones and Dr. Shep Forman at the Centre on International Co-operation at New York University; Mark Hoffman; Prof. Michael Cox; Prof. James Gow; Michael Herman; Andres Salazar; Axel Wennmann; Kristina Segulja; and, Teresa Whitfield; and all the members of the UK and US intelligence communities who were willing to talk to me. And thanks Mum, Dad, Sonam and Dickie for reading (or at least offering to read) drafts along the way. 4 ABSTRACT The theoretical framework for this thesis is provided by a revised version of James Gow’s Constructivist Realism, based on Phenomenalist ontology, epistemology and causation, that explains the role of social processes in a material world that is socially constructed, but available to Positivist verification. After 9/11, the strategic imperative to prevent the threat posed by apparently incoercible and unconstrained terrorist actors has led to a shift from coercive strategies, which seek to prevent attacks through reactive mechanisms, to controlling security strategies that seek to prevent attacks through pro-active mechanisms. Although rational, controlling security strategies contravene the socially-agreed Caroline formula that underpins international order. This situation has led to a rational action/legitimate action astigmatism in international society. Controlling security strategies have vital intelligence requirements: an actor is incapable of preventing threats unless it is capable of anticipating threats. The post- 9711 strategic reality has triggered the need to revise Herman’s concept o f ‘intelligence power’, considering the roles of intelligence in facilitating and legitimising preventive responses to threats to international peace and security. These threats to international peace and security are posed by the two separate threats presented by ‘new’ terrorism and WMD proliferation, as well as a post-9/11 terrorism-WMD threat nexus. However, unlike states such as the UK and US, the UN is incapable of fulfilling the intelligence requirements of its controlling security strategy, owing to a lack of an intelligence capability. The differentials in the levels of intelligence power between the UN and states such as the UK and US entail significant implications for international order and intelligence affairs. If international order is to be maintained in the post- 9/11 strategic reality, then the rational action/legitimate action astigmatism needs to be corrected. To potentially achieve this, the UNSC needs to develop an intelligence- assessment capability that will help enable it to facilitate and legitimise pro-action against anticipated threats in line with its and other states’ strategic goals. Collective intelligence machinery will need new organisational structures at the international level that will encourage the provision of credible intelligence that has a better chance of meeting the standards of evidence that are required by the UNSC in determining threats prior to their materialisation. 5 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4 ABSRACT 5 INTRODUCTION 14 Purpose 14 Aims and Objectives 14 General Issues 15 Particular Focus on the UK, US and UN 16 Structure 18 Methodology and Sources 21 CHAPTER ONE Theory 23 Introduction 23 Section One: An Appraisal of Realism, Idealism and Constructivism 24 Realism 24 Idealism 27 Constructivism 30 Section Two: An Appraisal of Constructivist Realism 33 Constructivist Realism: Attempting to bridge the Constructivist/Realist Divide 33 Gow’s Constructivist Realism 35 Gow’s Position on Realism 35 Gow’s Position on Constructivism 38 The Weakness of Gow’s Constructivist Realism 40 Making Constructivist Realism Rational 43 Section Three: Phenomenalism 45 Logical Positivism: Setting the Parameters of Rationality 45 6 Language and Meaning 47 The Verification Principle* 49 Phenomenalism: The Construction of the Material World 51 Phenomenalist Ontology 54 Phenomenalist Lpistemology 54 Phenomenalist Causation 55 Section Four: A Revised Theory of Constructivist Realism 57 The Phenomenalist version of Constructivist Realism 58 Prevised Ontology 58 Revised Lpistemology 59 Revised Causation 60 International Order 60 The Rational Action/ Legitimate Action Astigmatism 62 Conclusions 63 CHAPTER TWO Prevention 64 Introduction 64 Section One: Defining Prevention 66 Prevention vs. Pre-emption 66 Coercion vs. Control 69 Coercive Strategies 69 Controlling Strategies 70 Reaction vs. Pro-action 74 Reactive Mechanisms 75 Pro-active mechanisms 76 Section Two: The UN Order and Prevention 80 Threats 80 Rational Action 81 Sovereignty 82 Self-defence 84 Collective Security 86 7 The Cold War Situation 88 Legitimate Action 89 Prevention in the Post-1945 and Cold War Situations 90 Section Three: The Post-Cold War Order and Prevention 92 Threats 92 Rational Action 94 The Sovereignty Revolution 95 Pro-active Self-defence 97 Preventive Diplomacy 99 Legitimate Action 102 Prevention in the Post-Cold War Situation 105 Section Four: The Post-9/11 Order and Prevention 105 Threats 106 Rational Action 107 The Irrationality of the U N Order 108 Prevention as Rational A.ction 111 Legitimate Action 112 US and UK action against Iraq 113 Legitimacy and Intelligence-driven A.ction 117 Prevention after 9/11 120 Conclusions 121 CHAPTER THREE Intelligence Power after 9/11 122 Introduction 122 Section One: A Constructivist Realist Theory of Intelligence Power 124 The Lack of Intelligence Theory 124 Constructivist Realism: A Theory of Intelligence Power 129 Section Two: The Concept of Intelligence Power 132 The Nature of Intelligence Power 132 Rational Government 132 National Power 135 8 National 'Entities 137 National Objectives 138 The Changing Nature of Intelligence Power 140 Perceptions and vulnerabilities9/11 after 140 Intelligence Power after9/11: Threats to International Security as Intelligence Targets143 Section Three: Intelligence Power and the Imperative of Prevention 147 International Roles 147 International Role 1: Facilitating Prevention 149 Rational Government9/11 after 149 Rational Government and Intelligence Differentials 151 International Role 2: Legitimising Prevention 153 Intelligence as Evidence 154 International Role 3: Coalition-forming 157 International Role 4: Influence International Policy 158 Section Four: Intelligence Co-operation 159 Development in Intelligence Co-operation 160 Cases of Bilateral Co-operation 160 Cases ofMultilateral Co-operation 161 Limitations in Intelligence Co-operation 163 Operational Security Limitations 163 International Politicking 164 Conclusions 166 CHAPTER FOUR The Terrorism-WMD Threat 168 Introduction 168 Section One: Threat vs. Risk 169 Section Two: The Terrorism Threat 174 Problems of Definition 174 Terrorism before 9/11 178 Propaganda by Deed 178 Terrorism as State Regime 180 9 State-sponsored Terrorism 181 International Terrorism 182 Terrorism after 9/11: ‘New’ Terrorism 183 What ‘New’ Terrorism Is N o t 183 TSfew’ Terrorism: The Nature of Al-Qaida 185 Al-Qaida Core 186 Objectives 187 Methods 187 Affiliates 188 Global jihad 190 Economic Jihad 193 Section Three: The WMD Threat 195 The Nature of the Threat 195 Nuclear Weapons 195 Radiological, Chemical and Biological Weapons 196 The Non-proliferation Regime 197 Current WMD Threats: Iran and Black Markets 198 Iran 198 North Korea 199 Black Market 200 The scope of A. Q Khan’s Network 201 The Reach of A. Q. Khan’s Network 202 Amendments to the Non-proliferation Regime 203 Section Four: The Terrorism-WMD Threat Nexus 204 The Threat of Terrorism involving WMD 204 The Nature of the Terrorism-WMD Threat Nexus 207 Al-Qaida and WMD 209 Religiousjustification for WM D 209 Al-Qaida and Iran 213 Conclusions 215 10 CHAPTER FIVE UK, US and UN Capabilities to Fulfil the Intelligence Requirements of Controlling Security Strategies 217 Introduction 217 Section One: UK Capability to Fulfil the Intelligence Requirements of a Controlling Security Strategy 219 Pre-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Capabilities 219 Secret Intelligence Service 220 Security Service 221 Government Communications Headquarters 222 Defence Intelligence Staff 223 Joint Intelligence Committee 223 Post-9/11 Controlling Security Strategy 224 Post-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Requirements 229 Pre-9 /11 Strategic Intelligence Capabilities