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I 1 Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory Readings
I J
! I Second Edition
Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by
J Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson ■ I [
Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis/Cambridge 11-92 to 11-94 Ethics 191 190 follow, he will nevertheless be forced to. The same thing happens in the Diogenes, Antipater and Posidonius. For Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes, case of men. Even if they do not want to follow, they will nevertheless as might be expected from earlier thinkers, made less elaborate distinctions be forced to go along with what has been destined. in their subject matter. But they did divide both logic and physics. 85? They say that an animal’s first [or primary] impulse is to preserve itself, because nature made it congenial to itself from the beginning, as Diogenianus in Eusebius Prep. Ev. 6.8, [11-93] Chrysippus says in book one of On Goals, stating that for every animal 265d-266d (SVF 2.998) its first [sense of] congeniality is to its own constitution and the reflective So in book one of his [Chrysippus’] On Fate he used proofs of this awareness of this. For it is not likely that nature would make an animal nature, and in book two he tries to resolve the absurdities which seem alienated from itself, nor having made the animal, to make it neither to follow on the thesis that all things are necessitated, which we listed congenial to nor alienated from itself. Therefore, the remaining possibility at the beginning: for example, the destruction of our own initiative is to say that having constituted the animal she made it congenial to concerning criticism and praise and encouragement and everything which itself. For in this way,it repels injurious influences and pursues that seems to happen by our own agency. which is congenial to it. So„ in book two he says that it is obvious that many things occur by The Stoics claim that what some people say is false, viz. that the our own initiative, but nonetheless these are co-fated with the administra primary [or first] impulse of animals is to pleasure. 86. For they say that tion of the universe. And he uses illustrations like these. pleasure is, if anything, a byproduct which supervenes when nature itself, The non-destruction of one’s coat, he says, is not fated simply, but on its own, seeks out and acquires what is ‘suitable to [the animal’s] co-fated with its being taken care of, and someone’s being saved from constitution. It is like the condition*of thriving animals and plants in top his enemies is co-fated with his fleeing those enemies; and having children condition. And nature, they say, did not operate differently in the cases is co-fated with being willing to lie with a woman. For just as if, he says, of plants and of animals; for it ditects the life of plants too, though someone says that Hegesarchus the boxer will leave the ring completely without impulse and sense-perception, and even in us some processes untouched, it would be strange for him to think that Hegesarchus should are plant-like. When, in the case of animals, impulse is added (which fight with his fists down because it was fated that he should get off they use in the pursuit of things to which they have an affinity), then untouched (the man who made the assertion saying this because of the for them what is natural is governed by what is according to impulse. fellow’s extraordinary protection from being punched), so too the same When reason has been given to rational animals as a more perfect governor thing holds in other cases. For many things cannot occur without our [of life], then for them the life according to reason properly becomes being willing and indeed contributing a most strenuous eagerness and what is natural for them. For reason supervenes on impulse as a craftsman. zeal for these things, since, he says, it was fated for these things to occur 87. Thus Zeno first, in his book On the Nature of Man, said that the goal in conjunction with this personal effort. . . . But it will be in our power, was to live in agreement with nature, which is to live according to virtue. he says, with what is in our power being included in fate. For nature leads us to virtue. And similarly Cleanthes in On Pleasure and Posidonius and Hecaton in their books On the Goal. Again, “to live according to virtue” is equivalent to living according to the experience of events which occur by nature, as Chrysippus says Ethics in book one of his,0« Goals. 88. For our natures are parts of the nature of the universe. Therefore, the goal becomes “to live consistently with Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131 [11-94] nature”, i.e., according to one’s own nature and that of the universe, 84. They divide the ethical part of philosophy into these topics: on doing nothing which is forbidden by the common law, which is right impulse, on good and bad things, on passions, on virtue, on the goal, on reason, penetrating all things, being the same as Zeus who is the leader primary valued on actions, on appropriate actions, on encouragements of the administration of things. And this itself is the virtue of the happy and discouragements to actions. This is the subdivision given by the man and a smooth flow of life, whenever all things are done according followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zenp of Tarsus, Apollodorus, to the harmony of the daimon in each of us with the will of the 192 II-94 Ethics 193 administrator of the universe. So Diogenes says explicitly that the goal are good and bad and neither; courage is knowledge of which things are is reasonable behaviour in the selection of things according to nature, to be chosen and avoided and neither; and .... [There is a lacuna here.] and Archedemus [says it is] to live carrying out all the appropriate acts. 93. magnanimity is knowledge or a condition which makes one superior 89. By nature, in consistency with which we must live, ChrysippuS to those things which happen alike to base and virtuous men; self-control understands both the common and, specifically, the human nature. Clean- is an unsurpassable disposition [concerned with] what accords with right thes includes only the common nature, with which one must be consistent, reason, or a condition which cannot be defeated by pleasures; endurance and not the individual. And virtue is a disposition in agreement. And it is knowledge of or a condition [concerned with] what one is to stand is worth choosing for its own sake, not because of some fear or hope or firmly by and what is not and neither; quick-wittedness is a condition some extrinsic consideration. And happiness lies in virtue, insofar as which injtantly finds out what the appropriate action is; and deliberative virtue is the soul [so] made [as to produce] the agreement of one’s excellence is a knowledge of how to consider the type and manner of whole life. actions which we must perform in ofder to act advantageously. And the rational animal is corrupted, son^etimes because of the persua Correspondingly, of vices too some are primary and some are subordi siveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of nate. For example, imprudence, cowardice, injustice and wantonness are companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. primary, and lack of self-control, slow-wittedness and poor deliberation 90. Virtue in one sense is generally a sort of completion [or: perfection] are subordinate. Those vices whose [counterpart] virtues are forms of for each thing, for example, of a statue. And there is also non-intellectual knowledge are forms of ignorance. virtue, for example, health; and intellectual virtue, for example; prudence. 94. Good is in general that from which there is something beneficial; For in book one of his On Virtues Hecaton says that those virtues which in particular it is either the same as or not different from benefit. Hence, are constituted out of theorems are knowledge-based and intellectual, for virtue itself and the good, which participates in it, are spoken of in example prudence and justice; but those which are understood by exten these three ways: [1] the good is that from which being benefitted is a sion from those which are constituted out of theorems are non-intellectual, characteristic result; [2] it is that according to which [being benefitted] is for example health and strength. For it turns out that health follows on a characteristic result, for example, action according to virtue; [3] it is and is extended from temperance, which is intellectual, just as strength he by whom [being benefitted is a characteristic result]; and “by whom” supervenes on the building of an arch. 91. They are called non-intellectual means, for example, the virtuous man who participates in virtue. because they do not involve assent, but they supervene even in base They give another particular definition of the good, as follows: “that people, as health and courage do. which is perfectly in accord with nature for a rational being, qua rational”. Posidonius (in book one of his Ethical Discourse) says that a sign that And virtue is such a thing, so that virtuous actions and virtuous men virtue exists is the fact that the followers of Socrates, Diogenes, and participate [in it]; and its supervenient byproducts are joy and good Antisthenes were making [moral] progress; and vice exists because it is spirits and the like. 95. Similarly, of bad things some are imprudence, the opposite of virtue. And that it is teachable (virtue, I mean) Chrysippus cowardice, injustice and the like; and vicious actions and base men partici says in book one of his On the Goal, and so do Cleanthes and Posidonius pate in vice; and its supervenient byproducts are low spirit? and depression in their Protreptics and Hecaton too. It is clear that it is teachable because and the like. . base men become good. Again, some goods are in the soul, some are external, and some are 92. Panaetius, anyway, says that there are two {kinds of] virtues, neither in the soul nor external. The ones in the soul are virtues and theoretical and practical; others [divide virtue into] logical, physical and virtuous actions; the external are: having a virtuous fatherland and a ethical. Posidonius’ followers, [say there are] four, and those of Qeanthes virtuous friend and their happiness; those which are neither external nor and Chrysippus and Antipater [say there are even] more. But Apollo- in the soul are: for someone, in and for himself, to be virtuous and to phanes says there is one virtue, viz. prudence. be happy. 96. Conversely, some bad things are in the soul, i.e., vices and Of virtues, some are primary and some are subordinate to these. The vicious actions; the external ones are having an imprudent fatherland primary are these: prudence, courage, justice and temperance. Forms of and an imprudent friend and their unhappiness; those which are neither these are magnanimity, self-control, endurance, quick-wittedness, and external nor in the soul are for someone, in and for himself, to be base deliberative excellence. And ,prudence is the knowledge of which things and to be unhappy. 194 11-94 Ethics 195 Again, of goods some are final and some are instrumental and some 101. They say that only the honourable is good, according to Hecaton are both final and instrumental. So a friend and the benefits derived from ii) book three of his On Goods and Chrysippus in his book On the Honour him are instrumental; but confidence and prudence and freedom and able] and this is virtue and that which participates in virtue; this is the enjoyment and good spirits and freedom from pain and every virtuous same as [saying] that everything good is honourable and that the good action are final. 97. 41. The pun is untranslatable. They also see fit to believe that [moral] mistakes are equal, according to n-94 200 Ethics 201 Chrysippus, in book four of his Ethical Investigations, and Persaeus and from the gods, according to Posidonius jn book one of his On Appropriate Zeno. For if one truth is not more [true] than another, then neither is Actions and Hecaton in book three of On Paradoxes. And they say that one falsehood [falser] than another. So, neither is one deception [more friendship exists only among virtuous men, because of their similarity. of a deception] than another nor is one [moral] mistake more [of a moral They say that it is a sharing [or: community] of things needed for one’s mistake] than another. For he who is a hundred stades from Canopus life, since we treat our friends as ourselves. They declare that one’s friertd and he who is one stade away are [both] equally not in Canopus. So too is worth choosing for his own sake and that having many friends is a he who makes a larger [moral] mistake and he who makes a smaller one good thing. And there is no friendship among- base men and that no base are [both] equally not acting correctly. 121. But Heracleides of Tarsus, man has a friend. And all the imprudent are mad; for they are not prudent, the student of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus say that [moral] but do everything in accordance with madness, which is equivalent to mistakes are not equal. imprudence. They say that the wise man will participate in politics unless something 125. The wise man does Everything well, as we also say that Ismenias prevents him, according to Chrysippus in book one of On Ways of Life; plays all the flute tunes well. And everything belongs to wise men; for for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. And he will marry, as Zeno the law has given them complete authority. Some things are said to belong says in his Republic, and have children. Again, the wise man will not to the base, just as things are also said to belong to men who are unjust; hold opinions, that is, he will not assent to anything which is false. And in one sense we say they belong to the state, in another sense to those he will live like a Cynic. For the Cynic life is a short road to virtue, as who are using them. Apollodorus says in his Ethics. And he will even taste human flesh in They say that the virtues follow on each other and that he who has special circumstances. He alone is free, and the base men are slaves; for one has them all. For their theoretical principles are common, as Chrysip freedom is the authority to act on one’s own, while slavery is the privation pus says in book one of his On Virtues, and Apollodorus in his Physics of [the ability] to act on one’s own. 122. There is also another kind of in the Old Stoa, and Hecaton in book three of On Virtues. 126. For he slavery, in the sense of subordination [to another]; and a third, in the who has virtue has a theoretical knowledge of what is to be done and sense of subordination [to] and possession [by another]; its opposite is also practices it. And what one is to do and choose is also what one is mastery [or: despotism], and this too is base. Not only are the wise free, to endure for and stand firmly by and distribute, so that if he does some but they are also kings, since kingship is a form of rule not subject to things by way of choosing and others by way of enduring and others by review, which only the wise could have, as Chrysippus says in his book way of distributing and others by standing firmly by [something], one On the Fact That Zeno Used Terms in Their Proper Senses. For he says will be prudent and courageous and just and temperate. Each of the that the ruler must know about good and bad things and that none of virtues is demarcated by a particular sphere of relevance, such as courage the base understands these things. Similarly they alone are fit for office which is concerned with what is to be endured'for, prudence with what or for jury duty, and [they alone are] public speakers, but none of the is to be done and what not and what is neither; similarly, the other base are. Again, they are also free of [moral] mistakes, since they are not virtues revolve around their proper objects. Deliberative-excellence and subject to making [moral] mistakes. 123. And they do no harm; for they understanding follow on prudence, organization and orderliness on tem harm neither others nor themselves. But they are not prone to pity and perance, even-handedness and fairness on justice, constancy and vigour forgive no one. For they do not relax the penalties which the law fixes on courage. as relevant, since giving in and pity and equity itself are the vapidity of 127. They believe that there is nothing in between virtue and vice, a soul which aims to substitute -niceness for punishment; nor does he while the Peripatetics say that [moral] progress is between virtue and think that [such punishments] are too severe. Again, the wise man is vice. For, they say, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so astonished at none of the things which appear to be wonders, such as must a man be either just or unjust and neither ‘more just’ nor ‘more the caves of Charon or tidal ebbs or hot springs or fiery exhalations [from unjust’; and the same for the other virtues. And Chrysippus says that the earth]. Moreover, the virtuous man will not, they say, live in solitude; virtue can be lost, while Cleanthes says that it cannot be lost; [Chrysippus for he is naturally made for [living in a] community and for action. He will, says] that it can be lost owing to drunkenness and an excess of black moreover, submit to training for the sake of [building] bodily endurance. bile, while [Cleanthes says it] cannot, because [it consists in] secure 124. They say that the wise man will pray, asking for good things [intellectual] grasps; and it is worth choosing for its