Passionate Platonism: Plutarch on the Positive Role of Non-Rational Affects in the Good Life by David Ryan Morphew A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Classical Studies) in The University of Michigan 2018 Doctoral Committee: Professor Victor Caston, Chair Professor Sara Ahbel-Rappe Professor Richard Janko Professor Arlene Saxonhouse David Ryan Morphew [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4773-4952 ©David Ryan Morphew 2018 DEDICATION To my wife, Renae, whom I met as I began this project, and who has supported me throughout its development. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I am grateful to my advisors and dissertation committee for their encouragement, support, challenges, and constructive feedback. I am chiefly indebted to Victor Caston for his comments on successive versions of chapters, for his great insight and foresight in guiding me in the following project, and for steering me to work on Plutarch’s Moralia in the first place. No less am I thankful for what he has taught me about being a scholar, mentor, and teacher, by his advice and especially by his example. There is not space here to express in any adequate way my gratitude also to Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Richard Janko. They have been constant sources of inspiration. I continue to be in awe of their ability to provide constructive criticism and to give incisive critiques coupled with encouragement and suggestions. I am also indebted to Arlene Saxonhouse for helping me to see the scope and import of the following thesis not only as of interest to the history of philosophy but also in teaching our students to reflect on the kind of life that we want to live. I have been very fortunate and greatly blessed by excellent advisors, mentors, and teachers throughout my journey at the University of Michigan, the University of Colorado at Boulder, and Baylor University. Most of all, I must thank Jeff Fish. As a great teacher and mentor, Jeff first instilled a love for Greek and the Classics and set me on this path. He has been a constant source of encouragement and a good friend. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS viii LIST OF PLUTARCH’S WORKS CITED ix ABSTRACT xii INTRODUCTION 1 I The Purpose and Scope of This Study 1 II Plutarch: A Philosophical and Political Life 3 III Perceptions of Plutarch: Reconsidering Eclecticism 5 IV The Unity of the Academy 10 V Core Doctrines and Tenets 15 V.a. Platonic Psychology: Bipartition and Tripartition 16 V.b. Moderation or Eradication of Emotions? 17 V.c. Moderation and Eradication of Passions from Plato through Porphyry 19 V.d. Plutarch and μετριοπάθεια 22 VI Outline of Chapters 23 iv CHAPTER 1. Emotional Vulnerability and Friendship 27 I Stoic Value and the Invulnerability of Stoic Happiness 29 II Invulnerability and the Elimination of Passions (ἀπάθεια) 32 III Human Nature and the Phenomena of Human Experience 35 IV Invulnerability and the Cost of Friendship 40 V Intimacy and the Good of Friendship 49 VI Friendship, Human Nature, and the Stoic Theory of οἰκείωσις 57 VII Stoic Invulnerability and Self-Mutilation 65 2. Grief and Moderating Passions: Plutarch Against Plato? 71 I Plato on Eliminating Grief 72 II Plutarch on the Naturalness and Usefulness of Grief 78 III Plato and the Negative Evaluation of Passions 88 IV Plutarch on the Naturalness and Usefulness of Passions 100 V The Moderation of Passions (μετριοπάθεια) and Moral Virtue in Plutarch 105 VI Moral Virtue and the Harmony of Bodily Humors 113 VII Plutarch, Aristotle, and the Unified Academy 117 3. Spirit and Love: Enhancing Action 129 I Passion, Practical Action, and The Division of Virtues 130 II Passions as the Wind in Our Sails 140 III Enhancing Action and Divine Aid 144 IV Attached Passions and Intensifying Virtue 148 v V Incitement to Virtue, Enthusiasm, and Non-Rational Longing for Virtue 151 VI That Life is Better with Passions Than Without Them 156 4. Restraint and Cognitive Emotions 161 I. Rational Restraint and Passionate Restraint of Errant Desires 164 II Spirited Passions in Lieu of Reason 171 III The Spirited Part of the Soul and Cognitive Emotions in Plato: A Synopsis 177 IV Non-Rational Passions are Not Wholly Non-Rational 182 V Participating in Reason to Different Degrees 190 VI Cognitive Emotions: The Desire for Honor, Shame, Anger, Hate, and Envy 199 VII Internalizing Standards and Forming Beliefs 208 5. Honor, Shame, and Early Education 218 I Shame, Honor, and Non-Rational Persuasion (ψυχαγωγία) 220 II Correcting Xenocrates on Education and the “Grips of Philosophy” 229 II.a. The Grips of Philosophy as Preparation for Progress in Virtue 231 II.b. The Grips of Philosophy as Oar-Handles 235 II.c. The Grips of Philosophy as Enduring Holds on Character 241 III Aristotle and Plato on Habituation of Passions 244 IV Reflection and Shame as One Becomes the Cultivator of One’s Own Passions 249 V Anchoring the Sense of Shame to Reason 256 6. Cultivating Virtue and Becoming Like God 260 I Character Formation and the Metaphor of Cultivation 262 vi I.a. Cultivating Virtue: Plant Metaphors, Passions, and Pruning the 262 Desire for Honor I.b. Cultivation of Virtue and Weeds of Vice Endemic to Human Nature 271 I.c. The Growth within the Passions and the Fruit of Virtue 277 II The Seeds of Virtue: The Background 280 III Affection and the Seeds of Virtue in Plutarch 283 IV Plutarch, Identification (οἰκείωσις), and Becoming Like God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) 292 CONCLUSION 309 APPENDIX to Chapter 4: Plato and Spirited Evaluation: A Background 316 A.I. Plato and Spirited Evaluation of Action 317 A.II. Evaluations and Beliefs of the Non-Rational Parts of Soul in Plato 323 A.III. High Standards of Belief (δόξα) in Plato’s Sophist, Theaetetus, 326 Timaeus, and Philebus A.IV. The Top-Down View: Receiving Beliefs from the Rational 336 Part of the Soul in Plato A.V. Spirited Evaluations Independent of Rational Evaluations in Plato 347 BIBLIOGRAPHY 351 vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Collections of Ancient Texts: DK Hermann A. Diels and Walter Kranz (edd.) 1951–2, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th revised edn. (orig. 1903), 3 vols., Berlin: Weidmann. FGrH Jacobi, Felix (ed.) 1923–1959, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin: Weidmann. LS Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley (edd.) 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SVF Hans von Arnim (ed.) 1903–5 (repr. 1964), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig: Teubner; Maximilian Adler (1924), vol. 4 (Indices), Stuttgart: Teubner. Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: LSJ Henry G. Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry S. Jones (edd.) 1996, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn., with a revised suppl., Oxford: Clarendon Press. SEP Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/ Ancient Authors: D.L. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, in Miroslav Marcovich (ed.) 1999, Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum, 3 vols., Stuttgart: Teubner. S.E. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Professors, in Jürgen Mau and Hermann Mutschmann (edd.) 1912–14, Sexti Empirici opera, 3 vols., Leipzig: Teubner. Stob. Stobaeus, Anthology, in Otto Hense and Curt Wachsmuth (edd.) 1884–1912 (repr. 1958), Ioannis Stobaei anthologium, 5 vols., Berlin: Weidmann. viii LIST OF PLUTARCH’S WORKS CITED Plutarch’s Moralia: How a Young Man Should Read Poetry = Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat (Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν) On Listening to Lectures = De recta ratione audiendi (Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν) How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend = Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur (Πῶς ἄν τις διακρίνειε τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου) On Moral Progres = Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus (Πῶς ἄν τις αἴσθοιτο ἑαυτοῦ προκόπτοντος ἐπ᾿ ἀρετῇ) How to Profit by One’s Enemies = De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (Πῶς ἄν τις ὑπ᾿ ἐχθρῶν ὠφελοῖτο) On Having Many Friends = De amicorum multitudine (Περὶ πολυφιλίας) On Virtue and Vice = De virtute et vitio (Περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας) Consolation to Apollonius = Consolatio ad Apollonium (Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον) Advice on Keeping Well = De tuenda sanitate praecepta (Ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα) Advice to Bride and Groom = Coniugalia praecepta (Γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα) Dinner of the Seven Wise Men = Septem sapientium convivium (Τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν συμπόσιον) On Superstition = De superstitione (Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας) Sayings of Kings and Emperors = Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata (Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν) Sayings of the Spartans = Apophthegmata Laconica (Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά) Bravery of Women = Mulierum virtutes (Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί) Roman Questions = Quaestiones Romanae (Αἴτια Ῥωμαϊκά) On the Great Fortune or Virtue of Alexander 1 and 2 = De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute, libri ii (Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς, λόγοι β΄) On Isis and Osiris = De Iside et Osiride (Περὶ Ἴσιδος καὶ Ὀσίριδος) On the E at Delphi = De E apud Delphos (Περὶ τοῦ ΕΙ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς) On the Oracles at Delphi = De Pythiae oraculis (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ χρᾶν ἔμμετρα νῦν τὴν Πυθίαν) On the Obsolescence of Oracles = De defectu oraculorum (Περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων χρηστηρίων) Can Virtue be Taught = An virtus doceri possit (Εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή) On Moral Virtue = De virtute morali (Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς) On the Control of Anger = De cohibenda ira (Περὶ ἀοργησίας) On Tranquility of Mind = De tranquillitate animi (Περὶ εὐθυμίας) On Brotherly Love = De fraterno amore