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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Passions, Virtue, and Moral Growth in John of Apamea’s Dialogues on the Soul A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Theology and Religious Studies Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By Rodrigue J. Constantin Washington, D.C. 2020 Abstract Passions, Virtue, and Moral Growth in John of Apamea’s Dialogues on the Soul Rodrigue J. Constantin, Ph.D. Director: Paul J. Scherz, Ph.D. Virtue cultivation is an under-researched topic in theological virtue ethics. Moreover, little attention is given in virtue ethics to vice and its impact on virtue cultivation. In this dissertation, I respond to this lacuna by examining the role of the removal of evil passions in moral growth in the Dialogues on the Soul, whose author, John of Apamea, is a fifth-century ascetic who has introduced the discussion of passions in Syriac Christianity. For John, moral growth occurs in three stages: somaticity, psychicality, and pneumaticity. I argue that, for John, the gradual healing from evil passions facilitates one’s moral progress from one stage to another. After examining John’s theological anthropology, in the first chapter, I explore his views on the relationship of the body and the soul with the passions in chapters two and three. In chapter four, I focus on the morality of the passions, that is, whether the passions in themselves are good or evil, and to what degree one is morally responsible for them. I, then, reconstruct, in chapter five, a list of the passions and their variations in the Dialogues on the Soul, as well as the structure of the passions as stirrings that are intimately connected to thoughts. In chapter six, I synthesize the different techniques of the ascetic therapy of the passions, and, finally, in chapter seven, I show how the ascetic therapy of the passions helps one to progress morally from somaticity to psychicality. The state one must reach on earth is the purity of the soul, which is characterized by the absence of evil passions. This paves the way for the manifestation of true virtue at the pneumatic level. The full manifestation of the natural virtue of the soul, however, is an eschatological gift of the Divine Grace. Finally, through this dissertation, I aim to draw attention to the central role of removing vice in moral growth and, more broadly, to the significance of Syriac asceticism for virtue ethics. This dissertation by Rodrigue J. Constantin fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Moral Theology and Ethics approved by Paul J. Scherz, PhD, as Director, and by John Grabowski, PhD, Robin Darling Young, PhD, and Aaron M. Butts, PhD as Readers. ________________________________________________ Paul J. Scherz, PhD, as Director ________________________________________________ Robin Darling Young, PhD, Reader ________________________________________________ John Grabowski, PhD, Reader ________________________________________________ Aaron M. Butts, PhD, Reader ii I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Mona, and my father, John, who have taught me the value of a good education and instilled in me a thirst for knowledge, and to my siblings, Wissam, Grace, and Solange, and their families who have been my lifeline and my rock. iii “To descend from the height of knowledge is the depravation of the soul. Virtuous strife is war against the passions. True valor is victory over bad thoughts. Learning about virtuous things is a salutary affair” John of Apamea, Dialogues on the Soul, 90 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 I. THE ACADEMIC CONTEXT ................................................................................ 1 A. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN VIRTUE ETHICS AND SYRIAC STUDIES ........................ 1 B. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DIALOGUES ON THE SOUL ............................................. 4 II. JOHN OF APAMEA AND THE DIALOGUES ON THE SOUL .......................... 7 A. JOHN OF APAMEA .................................................................................................... 7 B. THE DIALOGUES ON THE SOUL............................................................................... 14 III. GREEK INFLUENCE ON JOHN OF APAMEA ............................................... 19 A. THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES ....................................................... 19 B. GREEK TEXTS IN TRANSLATION ............................................................................. 22 IV. METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE .................................................................... 27 CHAPTER ONE: DUALISM AND PARTNERSHIP IN JOHN OF APAMEA’S THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY .................................................................................... 33 I. DISTINCTION AND UNITY BETWEEN THE BODY AND THE SOUL ...... 37 A. THE BODY AND THE SOUL AS DISTINCT ENTITIES .................................................. 37 B. THE BODY AND THE SOUL UNITED ........................................................................ 49 II. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE BODY AND THE SOUL .................................................................................................................................. 65 A. THE BODILY SENSES AND THE SOUL ...................................................................... 67 B. THE BODY AND THE SENSES OF THE SOUL ............................................................. 72 C. THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL ....................................................... 81 CHAPTER TWO: SOUL AND PASSIONS IN JOHN OF APAMEA’S PSYCHOLOGY . 92 I. THE SOUL AS THE TRUE, VIRTUOUS PERSON .......................................... 92 A. THE INNER PERSON IN SYRIAC AND GREEK WRITINGS .......................................... 94 B. THE INNER PERSON AS THE SOUL .......................................................................... 97 C. THE INNER PERSON AS THE TRUE PERSON ........................................................... 100 D. THE SOUL AS THE VIRTUOUS PERSON .................................................................. 108 II. THE SOUL AND THE PASSIONS..................................................................... 112 A. JOHN OF APAMEA’S DIVERSE INTELLECTUAL MILIEU ......................................... 112 B. THE SOUL AS NATURALLY IMPASSIBLE ............................................................... 117 III. IMPASSIBILITY AND ANIMAL PASSIONS .................................................. 123 A. THE CASE FOR ANIMAL PASSIONS ....................................................................... 123 B. EVALUATING THE CASE FOR ANIMAL PASSIONS .................................................. 127 C. IMPASSIBILITY, SIMPLICITY, AND IMMORTALITY ................................................. 136 v CHAPTER THREE: BODY AND PASSIONS IN JOHN OF APAMEA’S PSYCHOLOGY ..................................................................................................................................................... 142 I. THE BODY AS THE CAUSE OF PASSIONS .................................................. 143 A. BODY AND PASSIONS IN THE PHAEDO AND THE ENNEADS .................................... 144 B. BODY AND PASSIONS IN THE DIALOGUES ............................................................. 152 II. IMPASSIBILITY OF THE SOUL REVISITED ............................................... 162 A. BODILY PASSIONS STIR UP THE SOUL .................................................................. 163 B. PASSIONS AS SCARS AND WOUNDS ON THE SOUL ................................................ 169 C. PASSIONS AS TROUBLING STIRRINGS IN THE SOUL .............................................. 179 III. HOW THE BODY CAUSES THE PASSIONS.................................................. 182 A. THE GENESIS OF PASSIONS .................................................................................. 183 B. PASSIONS IN THE ENNEADS ................................................................................... 188 C. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DIALOGUES AND THE ENNEADS ................................ 200 CHAPTER FOUR: PASSIONS IN THE DIALOGUES ON THE SOUL: LISTS, VARIATIONS, AND STRUCTURE ....................................................................................... 206 I. LISTS AND VARIATIONS OF THE PASSIONS ............................................ 207 A. DISTINCTION ACCORDING TO ATTRIBUTION ......................................................... 208 B. DISTINCTION ACCORDING TO OBJECT .................................................................. 218 II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PASSIONS .......................................................... 225 A. PASSIONS AND THOUGHTS ................................................................................... 225 B. PASSIONS AND STIRRINGS .................................................................................... 236 CHAPTER FIVE: PASSIONS AND MORALITY IN THE DIALOGUES ON THE SOUL ..................................................................................................................................................... 253 I. THE PASSIONS: VALUE AND VALUATION ................................................ 254 A. THE MORAL VALUE OF THE PASSIONS ................................................................. 254 B. PASSIONS AND VALUATION ................................................................................
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