Emotions, Demons, and Moral Ability
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Chapter 2 Emotions, Demons, and Moral Ability This chapter deals with TriTrac’s relationship to ancient theories of emotions (πάθη) and cognition. What role do emotions play within the mechanisms of the mind? In ancient time, emotions were not only thought to be a cognitive matter, but very much a bodily matter, too;1 they were also closely intertwined with ethics and morality.2 As the famous philosopher-physician Galen stated plainly, the doctrine of virtues was thought to follow necessarily from the doc- trine of the emotions.3 Nonetheless, early Christian attitudes to emotions has been a somewhat neglected topic4 until fairly recently,5 while TriTrac’s rela- tion to ancient theories on emotions remains to be explored, especially from the perspective of their importance for ethical considerations. In this chapter, we explore the role that emotion, or passion,6 plays in TriTrac from the per- spective of ancient debates concerning the composition of the human mind and the cognitive apparatus. We also have reason to explore the connection between ancient theories of emotions and demonology. But first, a short look 1 See, for example, Carlin A. Barton, Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1–4; Sorabji, Emotion, 17–29. 2 See, for example, John T. Fitzgerald, “The Passions and Moral Progress: An Introduction”, in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 1–25. 3 Galen, On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato V.6.1. For a work that recognizes the central importance of the body for early Christian social structures, although the focus on cognition and emotions is not discussed to any great extent, see Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 4 See the overview in Stephen C. Barton, “Eschatology and the Emotions in Early Christianity”, Journal of Biblical Literature 130:3 (2011): 571–591. For example, as Barton points out, there was no entry on “emotions” or “passions” in The Dictionary of New Testament Background, eds. Craig A. Evans and Stanley E. Porter (Downers Grove, I. L.: Inter-Varsity, 2000). 5 Today there is much written on the subject. For example, see Fitzgerald, The Passions and Moral Progress; Sorabji, Emotion; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2004); Matthew A. Elliott, Faithful Feelings: Rethinking Emotion in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2006). 6 To translate the Greek πάθος and πάθη I will here use the terms “passion” and “emotion” somewhat interchangeably. I use the term “emotion” when the everyday use of the concept is closer to hand and in a more neutral sense, and the term “passion” when the meaning is closer to the meaning of that which one “suffers under”, in a more negative sense. For a discussion of the way πάθος and πάθη are usually translated into English, see Fitzgerald, “The Passions and Moral Progress”, 2–5. © PAUL LINJAMAA, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004407763_004 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.Paul Linjamaa - 9789004407763 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:54:54PM via free access 72 Chapter 2 at previous research, followed by a historical survey that will work as an intro- duction to the discussion of TriTrac’s particular view of emotions and their importance for ethical deliberations. In Christian and Jewish apocrypha, we find a preoccupation with the na- ture of emotions and particularly the negative influence emotions have on humans.7 One example of the way ancient theories of emotions could be integrated into Judeo-Christian worldviews can be seen in ApJohn. Takashi Onuki has shown that this text (in the long version) is heavily dependent on a Stoic theory of emotions. Emotions are associated with the different heav- enly powers that build the human body and soul and that influence human life on earth.8 When it comes to Valentinian writings, Ismo Dunderberg has done much toward exploring the influence of, and relation to, ancient philosophi- cal theories on emotions.9 Dunderberg argues that Valentinian writings differ from the Sethian ApJohn, which associates emotions with the lower angels of the Demiurge.10 In Valentinian writings, Dunderberg notes, the role of emo- tions is associated with the youngest Aeon,11 often called Wisdom, but not with the lower demons.12 Wisdom is portrayed as unable to control her emotions; she becomes entangled with them and finally yields to desire, resulting in the creation of the Demiurge and the Cosmos. Wisdom is then healed from her destructive emotions by the Savior.13 Dunderberg has argued that ancient the- ories of emotion played an important role for Valentinians, to the extent that he has called Valentinian theology “the therapy of emotions”.14 Geoffrey Smith has recently criticized Dunderberg for this, stating that terming Valentinian thought “therapy of emotions” is a misrepresentation that neglects the Christian aspects of the theology in favor of philosophical traits. According to Smith, this is a result of Dunderberg’s uncritical reading of the heresiologists’ 7 See, for example, Pseudo-Clementine Homilies 19.20.6–21.7; 4Macc 1–3, 6–7, 13–16, 18. 8 ApJohn NHC II, 1.18. Takashi Onuki, Gnosis und Stoa: Eine Untersuchung zum Apokryphon des Johannes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1997). 9 Dunderberg, “Stoic Traditions”, 220–238. Dunderberg also discusses some Stoic notions in Valentinian theology in Beyond Gnosticism, 95–118. 10 Dunderberg, “Stoic Traditions”, 225–229. I agree with Dunderberg that in Valentinian writ- ings emotions do not seem to be connected to the four primal passions as Onuki has shown is the case for ApJohn. However, I here argue that passions and lower material angels are indeed intimately linked. 11 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies I.4.3; ExcTheod 67:2; Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies VI.32.5. 12 Dunderberg, Gnostic Morality, 123. 13 ExcTheod 45:1–2; Irenaeus, Against Heresies I.2.2. In some versions, a Lower Wisdom is separated from the healed Higher Wisdom and the Lower Wisdom falls and needs a sec- ond healing experience from the Savior (Irenaeus, Against Heresies I.4.1–5; Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies VI.32.5–6. 14 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 95–118. Paul Linjamaa - 9789004407763 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:54:54PM via free access Emotions, Demons, and Moral Ability 73 polemical descriptions of the Valentinians as “school of learning” rather than a church.15 Although I agree that the comparison of Valentinians to a philo- sophical school is potentially misleading (Chapter 5 explores this question in detail), I argue here that Dunderberg’s point about emotions is not at all ill- founded, at least when it comes to TriTrac. Concern for the negative impact of emotions was not uncommon among Christians, and TriTrac is certainly not an exception. Furthermore, I agree with Dunderberg that TriTrac is in tune with Stoic thought and that the concept of eradication of emotions is an im- portant theme in the text. A closer look at TriTrac shows a nuanced and very complicated picture. We encounter material powers connected to “desire” (ⲉⲡⲓⲑⲩⲙⲓⲁ), to “fear and per- plexity and forgetfulness and confusion and ignorance” (ⲑⲣ̄ⲧⲉ· ⲙⲛ̣̄ ⲧ̣ⲁⲡⲟⲣⲓⲁ· ⲁⲩⲱ ⲧⲃ̄ϣⲉ· ⲁⲩⲱ ϯⲁⲣⲙⲉⲥ ⲁⲩⲱ ⲧⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲁⲧⲥⲁⲩⲛⲉ·) (98:2–4).16 We also encounter higher-order powers associated with “enjoyment” (ⲧⲁⲡⲟⲗⲁⲩⲥⲓⲥ), “brotherly love” (ⲧⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲙⲁⲉⲓⲥⲁⲛ), “generosity” (ⲧⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲁⲫⲑⲟⲛⲟⲥ), “faith” (ⲡⲛⲁϩⲧⲉ), “obe- dience” (ⲡⲥⲱⲧⲙ̄), and “joy” (ⲡⲣⲉϣⲉ) (96:26–97:16). On top of this, there is a middle level of powers that are drawn toward feelings like “honor” (ⲧⲁⲉⲓⲟ), “glory” (ⲡⲉⲁⲩ), the “lust for command” (ⲧⲙⲛⲧⲙⲁⲉⲓⲟⲩⲉϩ ⲥⲁϩⲛⲉ), and “empty lust for glory” (ϯⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲙ̣ⲁ̣ⲉⲓⲉⲁ[ⲩ]· ⲉⲧϣⲟⲩⲉⲓⲧ) (83:34–84:24).17 To sort out the re- lation between these different emotions and powers and in order to grasp the full depth of their importance to the ethics of the text we need a firm grasp of ancient theories of passions and cognition. Thus, it is fitting to begin with a short overview of ancient discussions of emotions in general and in particular among Christians. 1 Emotions and Cognitive Theory in Ancient Thought All philosophical schools in ancient time had a position on the nature of emotions and how best to relate to them. Most of them viewed emotions prin- cipally as a sickness of the soul that needed healing (θεραπεύειν). However, with closer scrutiny one encounters many nuances, nuances that were impor- tant for ethics.18 Stoics were at the forefront of discussions of emotions and 15 Smith, Guilt by Association, 168–169. 16 Translation by Attridge and Pagels, slightly modified. 17 Attitudes toward honor and the particular notion “lust for command” (ⲧⲙⲛ̄ⲧⲙⲁⲉⲓⲟⲩⲉϩ ⲥⲁϩⲛⲉ) is explored in detail in Chapter 6. 18 For a work on this topic that has become a modern classic, see Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire : Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). Paul Linjamaa - 9789004407763 Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 12:54:54PM via free access 74 Chapter 2 their role in ethical theory,19 but it is with Plato that we first find a developed theory of emotions, and as we shall see, it was intimately linked to the mecha- nisms of human behavior. Plato divided the human soul into three parts: the faculty that reasoned (λογιστικόν); the tempered or spirited part (θυμοειδής); and the emotive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν). The spirited and emotive part was associ- ated with the body while the reasoning part belonged to the immortal mind.20 The spirited part belonged to the body but was more closely associated with cognition than the body, and as such it could become a supporter for the rea- soning part.21 Honor, pride, and admiration were feelings associated with the spirited part.