Emotions, Demons, and Moral Ability
Chapter 2 Emotions, Demons, and Moral Ability This chapter deals with TriTrac’s relationship to ancient theories of emotions (πάθη) and cognition. What role do emotions play within the mechanisms of the mind? In ancient time, emotions were not only thought to be a cognitive matter, but very much a bodily matter, too;1 they were also closely intertwined with ethics and morality.2 As the famous philosopher-physician Galen stated plainly, the doctrine of virtues was thought to follow necessarily from the doc- trine of the emotions.3 Nonetheless, early Christian attitudes to emotions has been a somewhat neglected topic4 until fairly recently,5 while TriTrac’s rela- tion to ancient theories on emotions remains to be explored, especially from the perspective of their importance for ethical considerations. In this chapter, we explore the role that emotion, or passion,6 plays in TriTrac from the per- spective of ancient debates concerning the composition of the human mind and the cognitive apparatus. We also have reason to explore the connection between ancient theories of emotions and demonology. But first, a short look 1 See, for example, Carlin A. Barton, Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1–4; Sorabji, Emotion, 17–29. 2 See, for example, John T. Fitzgerald, “The Passions and Moral Progress: An Introduction”, in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 1–25. 3 Galen, On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato V.6.1. For a work that recognizes the central importance of the body for early Christian social structures, although the focus on cognition and emotions is not discussed to any great extent, see Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
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