j' I 1 Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory Readings I J ! I Second Edition Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by J Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson ■ I [ Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis/Cambridge 11-92 to 11-94 Ethics 191 190 follow, he will nevertheless be forced to. The same thing happens in the Diogenes, Antipater and Posidonius. For Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes, case of men. Even if they do not want to follow, they will nevertheless as might be expected from earlier thinkers, made less elaborate distinctions be forced to go along with what has been destined. in their subject matter. But they did divide both logic and physics. 85? They say that an animal’s first [or primary] impulse is to preserve itself, because nature made it congenial to itself from the beginning, as Diogenianus in Eusebius Prep. Ev. 6.8, [11-93] Chrysippus says in book one of On Goals, stating that for every animal 265d-266d (SVF 2.998) its first [sense of] congeniality is to its own constitution and the reflective So in book one of his [Chrysippus’] On Fate he used proofs of this awareness of this. For it is not likely that nature would make an animal nature, and in book two he tries to resolve the absurdities which seem alienated from itself, nor having made the animal, to make it neither to follow on the thesis that all things are necessitated, which we listed congenial to nor alienated from itself. Therefore, the remaining possibility at the beginning: for example, the destruction of our own initiative is to say that having constituted the animal she made it congenial to concerning criticism and praise and encouragement and everything which itself. For in this way,it repels injurious influences and pursues that seems to happen by our own agency. which is congenial to it. So„ in book two he says that it is obvious that many things occur by The Stoics claim that what some people say is false, viz. that the our own initiative, but nonetheless these are co-fated with the administra­ primary [or first] impulse of animals is to pleasure. 86. For they say that tion of the universe. And he uses illustrations like these. pleasure is, if anything, a byproduct which supervenes when nature itself, The non-destruction of one’s coat, he says, is not fated simply, but on its own, seeks out and acquires what is ‘suitable to [the animal’s] co-fated with its being taken care of, and someone’s being saved from constitution. It is like the condition*of thriving animals and plants in top his enemies is co-fated with his fleeing those enemies; and having children condition. And nature, they say, did not operate differently in the cases is co-fated with being willing to lie with a woman. For just as if, he says, of plants and of animals; for it ditects the life of plants too, though someone says that Hegesarchus the boxer will leave the ring completely without impulse and sense-perception, and even in us some processes untouched, it would be strange for him to think that Hegesarchus should are plant-like. When, in the case of animals, impulse is added (which fight with his fists down because it was fated that he should get off they use in the pursuit of things to which they have an affinity), then untouched (the man who made the assertion saying this because of the for them what is natural is governed by what is according to impulse. fellow’s extraordinary protection from being punched), so too the same When reason has been given to rational animals as a more perfect governor thing holds in other cases. For many things cannot occur without our [of life], then for them the life according to reason properly becomes being willing and indeed contributing a most strenuous eagerness and what is natural for them. For reason supervenes on impulse as a craftsman. zeal for these things, since, he says, it was fated for these things to occur 87. Thus Zeno first, in his book On the Nature of Man, said that the goal in conjunction with this personal effort. But it will be in our power, was to live in agreement with nature, which is to live according to virtue. he says, with what is in our power being included in fate. For nature leads us to virtue. And similarly Cleanthes in On Pleasure and Posidonius and Hecaton in their books On the Goal. Again, “to live according to virtue” is equivalent to living according to the experience of events which occur by nature, as Chrysippus says Ethics in book one of his,0« Goals. 88. For our natures are parts of the nature of the universe. Therefore, the goal becomes “to live consistently with Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131 [11-94] nature”, i.e., according to one’s own nature and that of the universe, 84. They divide the ethical part of philosophy into these topics: on doing nothing which is forbidden by the common law, which is right impulse, on good and bad things, on passions, on virtue, on the goal, on reason, penetrating all things, being the same as Zeus who is the leader primary valued on actions, on appropriate actions, on encouragements of the administration of things. And this itself is the virtue of the happy and discouragements to actions. This is the subdivision given by the man and a smooth flow of life, whenever all things are done according followers of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Zenp of Tarsus, Apollodorus, to the harmony of the daimon in each of us with the will of the 192 II-94 Ethics 193 administrator of the universe. So Diogenes says explicitly that the goal are good and bad and neither; courage is knowledge of which things are is reasonable behaviour in the selection of things according to nature, to be chosen and avoided and neither; and .... [There is a lacuna here.] and Archedemus [says it is] to live carrying out all the appropriate acts. 93. magnanimity is knowledge or a condition which makes one superior 89. By nature, in consistency with which we must live, ChrysippuS to those things which happen alike to base and virtuous men; self-control understands both the common and, specifically, the human nature. Clean- is an unsurpassable disposition [concerned with] what accords with right thes includes only the common nature, with which one must be consistent, reason, or a condition which cannot be defeated by pleasures; endurance and not the individual. And virtue is a disposition in agreement. And it is knowledge of or a condition [concerned with] what one is to stand is worth choosing for its own sake, not because of some fear or hope or firmly by and what is not and neither; quick-wittedness is a condition some extrinsic consideration. And happiness lies in virtue, insofar as which injtantly finds out what the appropriate action is; and deliberative virtue is the soul [so] made [as to produce] the agreement of one’s excellence is a knowledge of how to consider the type and manner of whole life. actions which we must perform in ofder to act advantageously. And the rational animal is corrupted, son^etimes because of the persua­ Correspondingly, of vices too some are primary and some are subordi­ siveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of nate. For example, imprudence, cowardice, injustice and wantonness are companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. primary, and lack of self-control, slow-wittedness and poor deliberation 90. Virtue in one sense is generally a sort of completion [or: perfection] are subordinate. Those vices whose [counterpart] virtues are forms of for each thing, for example, of a statue. And there is also non-intellectual knowledge are forms of ignorance. virtue, for example, health; and intellectual virtue, for example; prudence. 94. Good is in general that from which there is something beneficial; For in book one of his On Virtues Hecaton says that those virtues which in particular it is either the same as or not different from benefit. Hence, are constituted out of theorems are knowledge-based and intellectual, for virtue itself and the good, which participates in it, are spoken of in example prudence and justice; but those which are understood by exten­ these three ways: [1] the good is that from which being benefitted is a sion from those which are constituted out of theorems are non-intellectual, characteristic result; [2] it is that according to which [being benefitted] is for example health and strength. For it turns out that health follows on a characteristic result, for example, action according to virtue; [3] it is and is extended from temperance, which is intellectual, just as strength he by whom [being benefitted is a characteristic result]; and “by whom” supervenes on the building of an arch. 91. They are called non-intellectual means, for example, the virtuous man who participates in virtue. because they do not involve assent, but they supervene even in base They give another particular definition of the good, as follows: “that people, as health and courage do. which is perfectly in accord with nature for a rational being, qua rational”. Posidonius (in book one of his Ethical Discourse) says that a sign that And virtue is such a thing, so that virtuous actions and virtuous men virtue exists is the fact that the followers of Socrates, Diogenes, and participate [in it]; and its supervenient byproducts are joy and good Antisthenes were making [moral] progress; and vice exists because it is spirits and the like.