The Politics of International Law

Department of Political Science (International Relations)

Master Thesis Political Science, Specialization International Relations

Iran Nuclear Challenge

Name: S. Pezjman Mortezayi

Student Number: 10434712 E-mail: [email protected]

Thesis Supervisor/1st Reader: Dr. Sara Kendall

Thesis Supervisor/2nd Reader: Dr. P.E. (Polly) Pallister Wilkins Date: 30-April-2014 Table of Contents Page

Map I: The Islamic Republic of 3 Map II: The Middle East 4 Map III: Iranian Nuclear Facilities 5 List of abbreviations 6

Abstract 7 Acknowledgements 8

CHAPTER 1: Iran nuclear program 9

1.1. Introduction 9 1.2. Objective 10 1.3. Research Question 11 1.4. (Sub) Questions 12 1.5. Methodology 12 1.6. Theoretical Framework 13 1.7. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-Proliferations Treaty (NPT) 17 1.8. Conclusion 22

CHAPTER 2: The Iranian nuclear motive and purpose 23

2.1. Introduction 23 2.2. The Iranian nuclear motivations 23 2.3. The Iranian nuclear purpose 25 2.4. Iran previous presidents nuclear program process 28 2.5. The nuclear program since president Rouhani 32 2.6. Conclusion 34

CHAPTER 3: The Position of different Actors, Diplomacy and Sanctions 34

3.1. Introduction 34 3.2. Iran’s approach to the west & A few statements that Iran has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons 36 3.3. Russian view towards the Iran nuclear program 37 3.3.1. China’s view on Iran’s nuclear program 38

1 3.3.2. The policies of China & toward Iranian nuclear program 39 3.4. The position of The States (GCCS) 39 3.5. Iranian nuclear program and US 42 3.6. Iranian nuclear program and EU 44 3.7. Iranian nuclear program and Israel 50 3.8. Diplomacy and Sanctions 52 3.9. Conclusion 55

Conclusions and General Findings 56

Bibliography 60

Appendix 1: Full text of Iran's letter to IAEA over Nuclear Fuel Swap 73

2 Map I. The Islamic Republic of Iran

Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/iran/

3 Map II. The Middle East

Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/middle-east-map.html

4 Map III. Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2101691/Iran-dares- west-flaunts-nuke-power-Oil-prices-touch-month-high-120-barrel-supply-worries.html

5 List of abbreviations

Abbreviations Meaning

AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

AOE Assembly of Experts

CfSR Center for Strategic Research

EC Expediency Council

EU

GCCS the Gulf Cooperation Council States

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IISS the International Institute for Strategic Studies

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

IRI Islamic Republic of Iran

MAD Mutually Assured Destruction

MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security

MKO Mojahaedin- e Khalq Organization

NCRI the National Council of Resistance Iran

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NTI the Nuclear Threat Initiative

PDKI the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

RAIOH Research Association for Iranian Oral History

SNSC the Supreme Council

UN

UNSC the United Nations Security Council

US United States of America

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

6 Abstract

Despite the fact that nuclear energy has a plethora of advantages including making contribution towards lower price, cleaner environment, assisting the development of industry, agriculture and technology and electricity production in comparison with other energy sources however, it suffers from a disadvantage too. A plant is an object whether it is for peaceful purposes or threat.

Iran's nuclear energy is a matter for the international community. They are concerned whether Iran's plan is peaceful or is an attempt to achieve nuclear bomb. There are diverse opinions on the Iranian atomic energy plan. States and researchers as well, disagree on Iran's development of the atomic energy programs which resulted in a tremendous suspicion whether Iran's plan is peaceful or not. The present thesis is an attempt to indicate to what extent Iran is a threat for the regional and international community and how it would be possible to regularly, technically and tactically neutralize Iran's nuclear threat which hasn’t had any effective alternative yet.

It is quite further development of nuclear program to cease its nuclear activity. The sanctions resulted in noticeable that Iran’s nuclear program brought a new concern to the international community. There had to be a novel way to resolve Iran’s nuclear activities. Sanction and trust are the words which I utilize them as an option. Sanctions have been a penalty against Iranian oil, car industry, exports and insurance of transport as a means to devastate the economy and dissuade Iran on Iranian delegations’ returning to the negotiating table. The strengthening of trust among countries in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacturing of nuclear weapons could be an option to resolve the issue.

In this thesis, harder sanctions and cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons is emphasized to convince Iran to stay away from attempt to achieve nuclear bomb.

Various arguments including; scientists’ opinion, sanction, disagreement about interpretation of the NPT articles, political interest and countries’ technical and political view on the topic will be perceived.

Keywords: Iran, Nuclear Weapons, Threat, Security, deterrence, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

7 Acknowledgements

Hereby, I would like to thank my supervisor Sara Kendall for her comments, advices, tolerance, academic expertise and guidance. I feel privileged to have had her as my supervisor. Furthermore, my special thanks goes to my dear brother, Salah Mortezayi receives large votes of thanks and my deepest appreciation for his enduring support in writing this thesis. Husseini’s family especially, Mrs. Mahvash Zardoshti.

8 Chapter 1: Iran’s nuclear program

1.1. Introduction

It has been more than four decades since the Iranian government has claimed that they have achieved a nuclear program, but this achievement has never reached its end. The ambition to make Iran a nuclear state began under the government of Shah (), but it failed to achieve the goal. The Islamic revolution in 1979 was one of the main reasons behind its failure. The Islamic Revolution collapsed the government of Shah and established a completely different Iran with different policy.

The Islamic Republic had begin to work on Nuclear policy the year after the revolution and continued working towards the beginning of the end of the Iran-Iraq War under President .

Today the Iranian nuclear program is one of the complicated issues in the international arena and many countries suspect its development. A nuclear Iran raised a serious tension among different states. It is a challenge either for peace or security. Those countries whom are skeptical about the development of Iran’s nuclear program are U.S.A., EU states and Israel as well as Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCCS) which consider Iran’s nuclear program as a step towards an atomic bomb. And this is unacceptable for the International Community, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), U.S. and many more. Nuclearization of Iran can destabilize the region as North Korea destabilizes Pacific region and Iran follows the same policy. Hereby, the international community suspects Iran to violate the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Article II and III. Moreover, Iran violates the international law of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The Iranian authority claims that its nuclear ambition is just for domestic peaceful purposes and energy use. Islamic Republic of Iran feels obliged to pursue the IAEA under the Non- Proliferation Treaty as a legal process. The collaboration is extraordinarily important for Iran to cooperate with the Agency. In contrast, Iran expects mutual respect from the Agency. It was noted in the Iranian letter to IAEA on Monday June 13, 2010: “Our commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related materials that we stress the rights of all members, including the Islamic Republic of Iran's peaceful use and without discrimination, to

9 develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as the nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) are recalled” (Iran Embassy in Denmark, June 13, 2010).

Iran violated Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) according to IAEA´s report. The report of November 2003 of GOV/2003/75, stated that the Iranian government broke the IAEA regulations. Moreover, the Iranian government violated both Articles of NPT, namely articles II and III, and the rules which came from G-3 obligated Iran to stop the development of nuclear program (IAEA, 2 June, 2008) directly.

Furthermore, Iran has violated the other articles for example Article 45 of IAEA of Safeguards agreement. IAEA Director General (IAEA, 2010) argued in his report of February 2010 “Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to enrich to a maximum of 20% uranium” (IAEA, 2010). Article 45 of that agreement entails and requires the government of Iran of notifying the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary,” according to IAEA Director General Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly relevant for safeguards purposes” (IAEA, 2010).

The previous researchers concentrated on a few articles of IAEA and did not focus on how to create confidence for the IAEA members to pursue Regulations. The confidence must be mutual rather than powerful countries determine it and as a result the other countries feel threatened. In this thesis, what should be done to tackle the suspicion and distrust of the countries that start nuclear activity is emphasized. This thesis consists of the following structure: in chapter one, the applicability of existing international low is addressed. In chapter two, Iran’s motivations and purposes of nuclear program is analyzed. In chapter three, the position of various factors, procedures of diplomacy and the effects of sanctions towards Iran are defined. Finally, I will conclude by answering my research question which is to what extent does the nuclear program of Iran threatens regional and international peace and security.

1.2. Objective

The international community has dealt with Iranian atomic energy program in the last three decades, whether the program is peaceful or a gradual development to achieve nuclear bomb

10 and threaten the world. The issue is divided into two conceptions, namely the West who believes that the program is not peaceful and the East, China and Russia who have the opposite view. Although there is a functioning regulatory framework, namely the NPT but countries interpret it for their national interest. As it stands, countries have taken a hard line and none of them give up for the other. Each one is firmly determined and tries to establish his version of the atomic program. Iran has definite claim that their nuclear program is peaceful and there is no reason to forego its rights under the regulations. Other countries spearheaded by the U.S. have definitely convinced that Iran's nuclear program is an attempt to acquire nuclear bomb. Everyone has their explanations for who is right and how to interpret the question. Despite the sanctions and threats of military attacks, the sanctions did not affect Iran to abstain its main goal, but they forced it to negotiate. Recently, a positive development has taken place. The West has abandoned his determined policy namely Iran gets the right to enrichment and promised to halt further enrichment. The outcome of the negotiation is expected to provide answers in the next six months, i.e. mid-2014. The objective goal in this thesis is to notice the circumstances behind the developments and then, analyze the evidence on the table regarding the Iranian nuclear program negotiations and its likely result. Taking this whole discussion into consideration, the research question of this thesis is the following:

1.3. Research Question

The central question in this thesis will be:

To what extent does the nuclear program of Iran threatens regional and international peace and security?

I would like to enquire how far Iranian nuclear program can challenge and threaten peace in Arabic neighboring countries in The Gulf Cooperation States and Israel. The theoretical framework of Iran’s nuclear program is formed and based upon the realism and rationalism theories and related assumptions for explaining the behaviors of states according to these theories.

I would also like to analyze the extent of applicability of international law relating to the Iranian nuclear issue. The issue should be politically and scientifically relevant. A safe Middle East and a democratic Iran will contribute to stability and peace in the region and the world. The only way to maintain stability, peace and security is to attempt to convince the region 11 without nuclear weapons. The Iranian nuclear program is spectacular to study, given of military and political aspects. Finally, this separates me from other researchers, who have not focused on how it is possible to neutralize the Iranian threat. In that way it is important that the whole NPT rules apply in the relationship as well as: “Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control would be done” (NPT, 2005).

1.4. Sub Questions

To answer my main question; to what extent does the nuclear program of Iran threatens regional and international peace and security?

The following sub-questions guide me to answer my main questions:

 To what extend has the Iranian regime violated the NPT and rules of NPT and how far have the members of NPT succeeded to deny Iran from achieving nuclear ambitions?

 What is the motive and purpose of Iranian nuclear program?

 How was the political debate about the nuclear program shaped in Iran before the new president and what is this debate since president Rouhani was elected and what kind of impact does it have on the Government and relations with the West?

 What are the views of neighbors and western countries including the US and Israel on Iran’s nuclear program and what are their positions on it?

1.5. Methodology Since there aren’t any statistical studies on the topic, this study will utilize a qualitative research method. First, I try to answer some of these questions, and then I will answer the most important questions from the collected and relevant data. Relevant data consist of scientific journals, newspapers, documents, and academic literature. In addition, I have used the various websites and documents from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council. These resources are necessary to provide answers to the main

12 questions in this study. This research forms the theoretical framework based on the realism and rational behavior or Rational Actor model theory and related assumptions to explain the behavior of states under these two theories.

1.6. Theoretical framework The theoretical framework in this research consists of two theories; Realism and Rational Actor Model (Rationalism). These theories, political decisions, and approaches are also significant and have influences over the terms of peace and security by the Iranian nuclear weapons’ policy and by international relations.

According to the realist theory, states have to survive in a world system characterized by anarchy and as a matter of fact their safety cannot be guaranteed by other states. And that is why in such circumstances it is rational for states to compete in order to ensure their own power and safety (Baylis and Smith, 2008).

Here I refer to the rationalists and irrationalities and interpret the subject from their empirical and theoretical viewpoints. Realism is divided in to two camps, structural realism and neoclassical realism. The structural realism includes defensive realism, argues that states should maximize the security and offensive realism believes in distribution of power. By (neo) realism three Ss compose the core principles: Statism, Survival and Self-help (Baylis and Smith, 2008).

Statism is the centerpiece of realism and it involves two claims. Firstly, the state is the principal actor in international politics and sovereignty of the State is the second; there the state is an independent political community who has legal authority over its territory.

According to realism survival is one of the main goals of states and it is the highest national priority, which all political leaders must keep in mind. Under anarchy, “the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed”. The criticism in this area is that there are no limits to what actions a state can take, which is the necessity and safety. The last S of realism is Self-help which is an action in an anarchic system with no global governance. Realists don’t believe in an organization such as The United Nations. They claim that the state must not trust such organizations. As long as there is no world government the states will not be secure and they will be in conditions of uncertainty and under threat against each other. That’s why they are concerned with issues such as power and survival. Kenneth Waltz (1988) argues that the

13 structure of the international system is the key factor in the ability of the behavior of states. Waltz claims that the great powers still determine world politics.

The realistic vision of international cooperation is quite pessimistic. According to realism man has by a restless desire for power and self-interest and this can be an obstacle for security and cooperation (Keohane, 1986, p. 211). Mearsheimer (1995, pp. 12-13) believes that the two major and main problems for international cooperation and security are ‘relative gains considerations and threats’ both of which derive from the logic of anarchy. According to Grieco (1998, pp. 487-488) realists believe that states are positional and not atomistic in nature and therefore, they are afraid of any good cooperation. Because the international relations are a zero-sum game, states are always trying to compete with each other to get maximum profit within a certain partnership. According to realists survival in the global anarchic international system is very important. Waltz (1979) says, “When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?

Baylis and Smith (2010) argue security as a contested concept: “The sense of security has been extended too many aspects including political, economic, social, and also military aspects” (Ibid). These aspects are interpreted differently by many theories. According to realists and neo-realists security dilemmas are the essential source of conflicts between states and trust is often difficult among them due to the cheating and deception of other states. But in contemporary European politics there is a kind of trend towards ‘mature anarchy’, which focuses on the growing importance of international security. This occurs because there are more states in the world recognizing that their own security is closely linked to the security of other states or neighboring countries. And they believe the less danger and fewer threats and wars in neighboring countries, the more security and stability within its own borders.

In the case of a possible threat of nuclear weapons possessed by Iran, even the neighboring Muslim countries of Iran are alarmed and very afraid about the increasingly expanding sphere of influence in the Middle East. The Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCCS), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar and are becoming more concerned about their own security and safety. Because they believe that Iran and other neighboring countries are ready to start a nuclear arms race if the country will develop an

14 atomic bomb and this is also confirmed by different countries like the US and Israel (Cronin & Masalha, 2011, p. 16).

According to realism, the betterment of the national security of a state is the most important stimulant for the attainment of nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1981; Brown, 2007, p. 10). Sagan (1996, pp. 57-58) argues that in connection with their security, each country can have a goal to develop a nuclear program and gain nuclear capacity to protect the survival of the nuclear threat from other countries. From this vision the attainment of nuclear weapons from different countries can be seen as a reaction and warranty to survive against each other (Ibid). As an example, the attainment of nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union and China against America, the Indian nuclear reaction to China and Pakistan and for countries like Israel, North Korea and finally Iran to get nuclear weapons (Brown, 2007, p. 11). It’s apparent that a world without nuclear weapons will be quite difficult to disarm by the nuclear states. According to Waltz (1981) realists can point out that the prevalent and future formal military power of opponents is to arouse and drive states to obtain nuclear weapons.

The idea of the “world without nuclear weapons” will not infuse and excite countries like Iran to stop their nuclear attainment and will not necessitate any development in the context of the non-proliferation argument of Brown and Deutch (2007) and that’s why in the realist view there is not a connection or strong place, between non-proliferation regime and disarmament. The next quote of Nunn (2007) makes this view clearer:

“This [nuclear disarmament] is not because our example will inspire Iran, North Korea or Al Qaeda to say, “we have seen the light,” but because many more nations will be willing to join us in a firm and vigorous approach to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials and prevent catastrophic terrorism” (Nunn, 2007, p. 6). Realists have specific views about disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and the Treaty. The treaty has three essential goals: (a) the first one is non-proliferation, (b) nuclear disarmament and (c) peaceful use of nuclear energy. Article VI of the treaty says “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament […]” (IAEA, NPT, 22 April 1970). Realists believe that this article does not mean as “an obligation for the de jure nuclear powers to give up their nuclear weapons” (Ford, 2007, pp. 401-406). But only suggest them to follow up on consultation and work towards stopping nuclear weapons competition and nuclear disarmament. According to realism these kinds of consultations don’t and can’t take

15 place or even may not succeed. Different states’ interests can serve as a canton for the performance of harder dimensions against the spread of nuclear arms, for example by the funding of the IAEA and the enforcement of the NPT.

Here it's mostly about countries' own security and their lack of confidence to other states (Yudin, 2011, p. 3). Although many countries have no common interest, but circumstances affect that they will have confidence in each other and force the mutual credibility, sovereign equality that can “orient them to realize the internationalization of the fuel cycle that is not in their interest”. And that is why the state interests pose clear and obvious barrier and difficulties to a more potent fulfillment and performance of the NPT. Therefore, security issues and security dilemma will be increased due to the national interest of some states (Goldschmidt, 2009, pp. 17-18).

The other theoretical framing in this project is rationalism or a rational actor model. According to rationalism, states are rational and have positive effects as well. There is a sense of common interests and values. This can lead to international agreements. Statesmen have foreign obligations derived from their membership of the international society where there are rights and obligations attached to it, as defined by international law. Samuel Abbott (2013) in his article, “Why Iran is Rational in Trying to Obtain Nuclear Weapons”, argues “rational means exercising reason and sound judgment”. By the International relations theory, the rationality or rational actor model can be defined as “when making a decision the rational decision maker takes into account the foreign policy goals of and determines which one takes priority over others” (Abbott 2013). Then depending on the cost and benefits of the action, the decision maker(s) analyze and weigh(s) up the optimal choice with the influence and diversity of other influences, to what can be best and what will have more benefit and less cost to his state and country. Then in the final stage, the decision maker in the rational actor model would be able take the best and most effective choice in good way.

In the case of Iran the reasons why the Islamic Republic is trying to get nuclear weapons is exactly the same as other nuclear powers states in the world; the US, France, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea and finally Israel. The Iranian regime’s aim is to have more credibility and policy decisions in world, to have equal power as well and more influence in the United Nation Security Council and international arena (Abbott, 2013). The authority of Iran can have the same goal for as the other. 16 1.7. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-Proliferations Treaty (NPT)

Iran’s nuclear program is an issue for the international community since 2002, when it was revealed in public by The National Council of Resistance Iran (NCRI) or Mojahedin Khalgh, an Iranian organization opposition group in exile in 2002 alleged that Iran has a secret nuclear program construction facility in a different part of Iran. The USA played an important role in the cooperation with IAEA. According to knowledgeable former officials, the USA was aware about these activities (Samore, 2004). Considering this information, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors discovered that Iran has secret nuclear activities and evidence indicates that Iran is developing nuclear activity. Iran, hence, violated its nuclear safeguards obligations.

The IAEA Board of Governors referred this case to the UN Security Council. On the whole, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted six resolutions in February 2006. The main requirements of the Security Council are that Iran has to fully cooperate with IAEA in its nuclear activities and suspend its enrichment program, construction of reactors and related projects. has signed, but not ratified. Tehran constantly continues to deny the agreements made and the requirements of the Security Council.

In August 2007, IAEA and the Iranian government agreed to work on outstanding issues relevant to the nuclear program of Iran (IAEA, 27 August 2007). Some of the issues are solved according to IAEA (IAEA, 2 June 2008) but Iran’s nuclear program in military dimensions is still a big question. According to IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei and the report of Director-General Yukiya Amano, no progress has been made in several aspects of Iran’s military nuclear energy program (IAEA, 22 Mei 2013). According to the article 3 of NPT (The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in 1970) each non-nuclear-weapon state part of the agreements is assumed to accept safeguards. Iran agreed with the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. In 1974 Iran has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA (IAEA, 1974).

The Iranian nuclear crisis reflects international worries that the Regime of Iran is looking for nuclear weapons. The main reason of those worries is ‘uranium enrichment base of that enrich uranium by spinning gas’. Such centrifuges can produce 2 types of : low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU). LEU is used for the nuclear power reactor and HEU is used as fuel in certain types of (Kerr, 2013, p. 1). Iran has a uranium conversion possibility too, 17 which converts uranium oxide into several compounds. Iran almost has all the equipment, facilities and possibilities for all kinds of nuclear interactions for high nuclear operations. Iran has always expressed its uranium enrichment program as exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for military reasons. But can this be questioned with such power plants in the country’s military dimensions repeatedly threatening neighboring countries? The UN Security Council has passed Resolution 1929 June 9, 2010 that Iran must fully cooperate with IAEA investigations in relation to its nuclear activities and stop its uranium enrichment program and constructions of a heavy water reactor. Resolution 1929 also prohibits Iran from ‘any achievement or activities related to ballistic missiles with the ability of nuclear capacity or carry a nuclear warhead’ (Ibid).

Iranian government publicly and repeatedly announced that they would resume the program of uranium enrichment and other nuclear activities. Because of the authority of the IAEA limit of possible nuclear weapons, the IAEA is not permitted to inspect too much in-depth investigative search in Iran's nuclear activities. Our mission is to be sure that all nuclear materials in Iran is declared to us, Director General ElBaradei said in an interview in 2005 (Kerr & Pomper, 4 February 2005). In October 2003 Iran made an agreement with the influential power block of Europe: France, Germany and the United Kingdom (known as the E3) that Iran would stop and suspend its uranium enrichment program and will show respect to Additional Protocol, to its IAEA safeguards agreement and rules of NPT. According to the IAEA report agency: “Tehran signed this Additional Protocol in December 2003, but has never ratified it” (IAEA, 21 October 2003). Iran has also agreed to its cooperation with IAEA.

In June 2005 was elected as Iran’s new president. Iran is still continuing nuclear activity and uranium enrichment and did not cooperate with its safeguards agreement (IAEA, 24 September 2005). The IAEA Board and board of directors however did not refer Iran to the Security Council. They decided to give the Iranian government more time and adopted a resolution that demands:

“transparency measures, access to individuals documentation relating to procurement dual use equipment certain military owned workshops and research, development locations to re- establish full and construction of the , to ratify and implement in full with the provisions of the Additional Protocol” (IAEA, 24 September 2005).

As noted above, Mohamed ElBaradei stated in his report in September 2008 that without cooperation of Iran in taking steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear 18 program, he is unable to confirm that there is no nuclear material nor nuclear activities in Iran. In 2006, the Iranian government claimed that they would continue to develop its centrifuges. Subsequently IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran’s case to the U.N. Iran reacted and said that it would stop implementing its additional protocol. In accordance with part of the article in safeguards agreement in March 2007, Iran has stopped collaborating with IAEA. That article has obliged Iranian regime to provide all information about new projects related to its nuclear activities including building, constructing, designing and etc., 180 days before starting (Tehran Times, November 9 2011). Thereafter (since 2007), this decision has become the logic of Iran’s policy to reject and refuse its remarks. For example, in many cases Iran has refused to give any information related to update plans and constructions of its nuclear activities in different places like: , Arak, Tehran, Darkhovin and Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, but in September 2009 Iran only gave some basic and ordinary information about its nuclear activities (IAEA, 16 November 2009). According to Amano’s report in September 2010, Iran’s information related to reactors is limited and Iran claimed that Fordow facilities near the city of (147 kilometers by south of Tehran), comply with safeguards obligations based on its principles in March 2007. In May 2012, IAEA asked Iran about information and explanation related to the decisions of Fordow’s activities, but the Iranian authority replied that this information was not ready yet (IAEA, GOV/2010/46).

Asking IAEA for reconsideration and Iran’s refusal, both were against the rules of the safeguards agreement, however for modifying or revoking there were some rules with reciprocal agreement between the parties. But according to Kerr (2013), the IAEA legal adviser said in March 2009, “Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s obligations under its subsidiary arrangements” (Kerr, 2013, p. 6; Legal Adviser Iran March 2009). On the other hand, IAEA adviser added that it is difficult to make the conclusion that Iran’s refusal to provide information is against the safeguards in the agreement. Constructing Arak, Fordow and Darkhovin facilities were the main worries and matters of ElBaradei’s report in November 2009 that was inconsistent with Iran’s safeguards obligations. IAEA was always clear that the Iranian government is not providing any information concerning nuclear activities, including: building, designing, researching and new projects as nuclear reactor or in laser enrichment technology based on February 2010 Iran's announcement. If Iran carries out any nuclear activity and any project without informing the IAEA, as mentioned above, it violates the Agreement on Safeguards.

19 Iran’s March 2007 decision has been one of the main obstructions and hardships on the way of IAEA. Arak reactor is one of those cases, which is inconsistent with Iran’s safeguards agreement, IAEA inspectors have never been permitted to visit Arak reactor. ElBaradei also reported this in his report November 2008 (IAEA, 2008).

Moreover, Iran has violated the other articles as for example Article 45 of IAEA of Safeguards agreement. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano (IAEA, 2010) argued in his report of February 2010 “Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to enrich uranium to a maximum of 20% uranium” (IAEA, 2010). Article 45 of that agreement entails and requires the Government of Iran of notifying the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary”. According to IAEA Director General Amano’s report, in which he described Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly relevant for safeguards purposes” (IAEA, 2010).

In March 2006, U.N. Security Council’s president demanded Iran to “take steps required”. In the period of 2006-2010 altogether six resolutions have been accepted against Iran. The second, third, fourth and sixth resolutions imposed variety of restrictions on Iran (IAEA, 4 February 2006). Resolution 1696 was a mandatory resolution in which it was stated that Iran must stop all the programs that IAEA demands based on February 2006. Resolution 1737 is related to the heavy water projects. Iran’s rights under Article IV of the NPT for the peaceful purpose reasons reserved. Resolution 1929 requires Iran to stop any ballistic missiles activity with the capability of delivering nuclear weapons (IAEA, NPT, 22 April 1970).

Decided resolutions by IAEA on Iran’s nuclear program in the last few decades:

 Related to Iranian issue of September 2005, IAEA’s board of directors of the resolution (GOV/2005/77) offered and reported that the board “found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute noncompliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute” (Kerr, 2013, p. 8). Furthermore, the board of the directors’ resolution has reported the following point: The secret history of the Iranian nuclear activities.  General report and nature of these activities.  An absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.  Given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council. 20  The main primary task of organ responsible for international peace and security. In ADEA General Mohamed ElBaradei report of November 2003, he argued and described that Iranian nuclear program activity has violated Iran’s safeguards agreement many times. In addition, according to IAEA´s report, the report of November 2003 of GOV/2003/75, the Iranian government has failed the next activities to the IAEA:

 “The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges, as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium.  The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.  The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes.  The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets.  Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.  Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds”  A centrifuge testing facility” (IAEA, 10 November 2003).

Several types of articles have been made to impose requirements and sanctions on Iran (UN Charter, 1985). Article 24, the main primary task and responsibility for international peace and security is that specific powers be granted to Security Council on the implementation of these tasks. Chapter VII contains three articles related to Iranian issues and the Iran’s case. Resolution demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 states that the council “shall determine the existence of any threat and breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, for international peace and security” (Kerr, 2013, p. 9).

According to IAEA, Iran has violated Article II and III of NPT. The content of the first article, Article II of the NPT, describes that: “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices; and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture” (IAEA, 22 April 1970). The content of Article III of NPT is: “Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application

21 of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities and to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (IAEA, 22 April 1970).

According to Article II, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty is demanded not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (IAEA, 22 April 1970).

According to the IAEA, in Article III of NPT, IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT fulfil the non-proliferation commitment they have made "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (IAEA, 22 April 1970).

According to Article II and III, Iran may violate its safeguards agreement. IAEA continues to investigate about what ADEA General Mohamed ElBaradei reported in 2008 related to possible military dimensions (IAEA, 2 June 2008). IAEA, also consider NCRI/Mojahedin Khalgh Iran organization allegations (until fall 2003) that the Iranian military was working under the government’s direction to develop nuclear weapons. And that has given rise to the question of how IAEA, Security Council, must act within the competent and efficient manner because it has the main responsibility for the maintenance of International security and peacekeeping from the treat of Iranian nuclear activity. It would be the case that the Iranian regime is greedy to acquire nuclear weapons and that would be a threat for Middle East region and the world.

The international community is divided on Iran’s nuclear program. In one hand, Russia and China do not suspect Iran of its nuclear program, but other Security Council members such as the USA, France and Britain insist that Iran will attain their nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is even more divided among scientists how they define Iran’s nuclear program.

1.8. Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be understood that Iran's nuclear technology created a dilemma that it can hardly be interpreted concretely both for researchers and countries. Some countries

22 suspect Iran that it is in direction to create an atomic bomb, and others believe that the intention is to create so and eventually Iran will create an atomic bomb, but at the moment, there is no evidence that Iran has or is trying to produce nuclear weapons. Suspicion addresses to the nuclear activities of Iran. These activities are in different parts of Iran without reporting to the IAEA and Iran will not allow the IAEA to inspect the facilities which are suspected. These circumstances made IAEA and International community more suspicious and distrustful to Iran’s real goal and purpose of nuclear program. They accused Iran if the purpose is peaceful and the motive is for domestic energy use, then why they try in secrecy and continue underground nuclear activity? In the next chapter I will analyze and explain more the possible motive and purpose of Iranian nuclear program.

Chapter 2: The Iranian nuclear motive and purpose

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter I want to analyze the different reasons and motives behind Iran's nuclear program. The suspicion is directed against Iran's ambitions to attain nuclear weapons in order to defend its sovereignty. I analyze Iranian highest priority on international security and its motives and purposes behind the nuclear program. Furthermore, in this part I'll refer how nuclear program was managed during former presidents and the present one namely, Hassan Rouhani. How will the negotiations be affected given Rouhani’s entry? Will Iran change its approach and improve the relationship with the west?

2.2. The Iranian nuclear motivations

Considering the geopolitical situation has changed in the Middle East and the influence of the United States after the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, this made political tensions in the countries around the Persian Gulf. There is a political and military agreement between United States and Saudi Arabia, it provides a motive for Iran to imagine that “It is possible that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability may increase not only Iran’s self-confidence but also its propensity for brinkmanship and risk-taking” (Dokos, 2012, pp. 2-3). The second reason behind the motivation of Iranian nuclear arms attainment is to “cater and prepare Iran with a bigger and more influential voice at the international arena” (Hanna, 2001, p. 28). At this moment Iranian leaders have accepted the world order and policy, which is presented from stronger and more influential countries such as United States, United Kingdom, France,

23 Russia and China whom have Veto right at the United Nations and all of them have nuclear weapons and are considered as nuclear powers. The Iranian leadership which is based on religious Mullahs has attempted to be a leader of the Islamic Shia world and try to attain nuclear weapons to get honor, to produce an “Islamic Bomb”. Iran's primary motive for achievement of nuclear technology is the shortage that exists between U.S. military capabilities and Iran (Hanna, 2001, p. 28). There is a large gap between Iranian military and the U.S. Iran knows well that they cannot have the same capabilities provided by the United States at the moment and the only way to get the position that gives Iran the capability to stand against United States is to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran's decision makers and elite group within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) knows for sure how they can best defend itself against a much stronger power. According to some scholars such as (Michael Elleman, 2010, pp. 1-5; Cordesman, 2004, pp. 24-26) they believe it may be the best solution for the survival of Iran's Islamic Republic from eventual threat of the United States or Israel. Therefore, Iran has been producing various ballistic missiles and is finally able to produce its own missiles, short-range and medium-range. Shahab 1 as it has a range of 300 km, the Shahab 2, 500 km, the Shahab 3, 900 km (Ibid). Additional missiles by Sajjil 2 it has a range of 2200 km, “the Sajjil 2 [...] is the most likely nuclear delivery vehicles - If Iran decides to develop a nuclear bomb. But it would have to build a bomb small enough to fit on top of this missile, which would be a big challenge” (Elle Mann, 2010, p. 3). The Shahab 3 its long enough to reach countries like Israel “Its nominal range is believed to be 1,300 km – long enough to hit virtually any target in the Gulf as well as Israel -- and its payload to be 1,000-1,200 kg. It can carry a warhead with a 550-700 kg” (Vick, 2007; Cordesman, 2004).

Last but not least, the main reason for Iran's nuclear motives is “suppression and deterrence of other countries”, mainly Israel and the United States (Ibid). During the war with Iraq, Iran did not advance new military weapons in that time at the level of Saddam Hussein. Saddam had received financial and military aid from various Arab and Western countries. Saddam got technical military weapons, such as biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They came from various Western countries including companies in Germany, Netherlands, France and even European arm dealers such as Dutch businessman, Frans Van Anraat. German companies and engineers helped Iraqi government by building chemical weapons facility such as labs and bunkers (Maggie, 1990, pp. 1148-1152), 1980 – 1988, the other German companies have sent more than 1,000 tons of precursors with different 24 mustards such as Tabun, Sarin and Tear gases. According to the German newspaper Der Spiegel (Maggie, 10 October 1990, pp. 1148-1152), nearly 52% of the Iraqi international chemical weapons came from Germany. Experience in the war in Iraq, when Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali) used chemical weapons against the Kurds in the town of Halabja (16-march-1988) and the Iranian Army in the war, the government changed in Iran's mind from Imam Khomeini fatwa who said earlier that year, that nuclear weapons are against Islamic religion and its is against humanity, and we never try to have a nuclear bomb. When Saddam used chemical weapons in the war against Iran, Iran changed its policy on Khomeini's Fatwa on many points. As Peter Jones (2012) says: “after years of bloody conflict with Iraq, no assistance from the international community (despite Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, in violation of the Geneva Protocol), and proof that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear program that Iran began to resurrect its own nuclear program” (Jones, 2012, p. 201).

The above statement can give a reason for the Iranian government that the only way to prevent and deter other states which are trying to achieve nuclear weapons is to become a nuclear power in the world. As a nuclear power, you have more to say and other powerful countries can expect more of Iran's power. In that sense it can minimize the U.S. threat to Iran and its territories. A land holding nuclear weapons can ward off U.S. threats that are nearby in Arab Gulf countries. It affects the enemy not to try to take some wrong decisions in the nearby and guarantees Iran's foreign policy and security interests in the area (Eisenstadt, 1999, p. 128).

2.3. The Iranian Nuclear Purpose Most of the American and European commentators and policymakers including the Gulf States and Israel warn that a nuclear armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome for the world security and for the current stalemate, Waltz (2012). In 2006-2007 in the same report, it appears that the Iranian regime had in some places as 1000 centrifuges. According to the Iranian authority they are just for peaceful purposes and for civilian nuclear energy. They are far lower to enrich uranium and to attain uranium for military purposes and make nuclear bomb (Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2006, p. 66; Manashri, 2001, pp. 218-219). Although the regime of Tehran in different time has claimed that all nuclear activity for uranium enrichment in different installations in the country for example in Arak and Natanz are just for medical purpose and Bushehr reactor is for fueling domestic energy. But in contrast west countries US, G5 and even IAEA suspect 25 the regime of Tehran secretly trying to make nuclear bomb (Broad, 2006, p. 14; IAEA, September 24, 2005). The experts such as William Broad (2006); Albright & Hinderstein (2006) from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), have claimed that the Iranian regime is able and tries to get nuclear weapons, if they “use only half of the centrifuges at Natanz (500) and feed them low-enriched uranium, Tehran can produce weapons grade fuel for a nuclear bomb in just six months” (Ibid, 2006, p. 14). The reasons that why Iranian regime have not succeeded to obtain nuclear bomb are due to different factors including; impact of IAEA, possible technical difficulties in nuclear program and the political uncertainties (Albright & Hinderstein, March 27, 2006). Now after couple of years it appears that the Iranian regime has reach up to almost 20,000 centrifuges, which will be in such high level just to attain nuclear weapons and it is against what it is for medical or civilian nuclear domestic energy (Thompson on CNN News, November 20, 2013). According to Waltz (2012) the other reason would be the regime’s own survival and security from some foreign threats as US and Israel. While Waltz is not certain if Iranian regime’s intentions are true, as Waltz argue “Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities” (Waltz, 2012, p. 3). Waltz (2012) believes that Iranian regime is very alert about his own preservation and doesn’t want to provoke the western side and the countries such as United States with his nuclear purposes in short time and act quickly against regime of Tehran: “Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January” (Waltz, 2012, p. 3). Lotfian (2008) argues, there is not any evidence that Iran’s aim behind his nuclear activity would be attacking other states for example Israel or US military facility in the Gulf or even attacking the Arabic Gulf states’ neighbours. It would be completly opposite what western conutreis believe about the purposes of Iranian regime “to destroy Israel and southern Europe in the name of Islam” (Lotfian, 2008, pp. 41-79). The assumption that the purpose of Iranian regime will be for seeking to expand his regional hegemony is not correct because of his past behavior; “during its extensive history of conflicts with foreign states, the Islamic Republic has continuously been on the receiving end of external aggression, never once having initiated an offensive attack on its neighbors” (Lotfian, 2008). But it does not mean that Iranian regime will not continue to achieve nuclear weapon. Iran believes that the only way to be secure and ensure his power of any foreign threat is only to 26 have nuclear weapons. As Waltz said “that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks” (Waltz, 2012, p. 2). And thats logical by a state like Iran to try to warranty his security in this way because under anarchy, the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed and as Waltz (1988) argued the great and powerful states still determine world politics. The icon man of International Relations, Waltz (2012) believes that the nuclear Iranian will be better for the stability of the Middel East and in the opposite view of the many other scholars such as Amatzia (2012); Yaphe and Schake (2000); Cordesman (2004); Abbott (2013); he argued that to have more nuclear powers can warranty the balance of the powers between states, which he call that “bags to be balanced” and further this will be one of the main reasons for the security and stability at the region “In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less” (Ibid, 2012, p. 3). Hence, in this way because of the monopoly of nuclear powers of Israel at the Middle East region, if Iran obtains nuclear weapon this can make the region more secure and the balance of power will be more between both states says Waltz (2012) due to the term that he name it bags to be balanced. Waltzs argument and theory could be right, but it brings more instability in the region. It also makes a sphair for differnt countries to develop military capabilities against each other and each states attempt to be able as soon as possible to achieve nuclear arms. Though this way they try to increase thier military capability and compete for thier own survival in the unsafe world. Based on the above declaration, the circumstances is logical for each state to compete in order to ensure its own power and safety (Baylis and Smith, 2008) on the contrary, the defensive realism argues that the states should maximize their security (Ibid). According to Waltz theory if any country attempts to attain nuclear weapons and its purpose is its own survival then they guarantee that no powerful nuclear state threaten their security in an anarchic world. For example at the moment there is a horrible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both ideologically and politically. A country such as Saudi Arabia probably will soon realizes nuclear arms is a option for their own security against threats from Mullahs regime. As Hossein Mousavian and Kaveh afrasiabi (2012, p. 3) argue; “[...] an Iranian bomb would spur the Gulf Cooperation Council states headed by Saudi Arabia to get their own bombs, thus hurling the sub-region into a costly, dangerous and ultimately unnecessary nuclear arms race”. This kind of policy will spread further to other countries such as Turkey and Egypt. As Waltz (2012) argued; ‘new nuclear states generally produce more regional and 27 international stability’. Moreover, I think when Waltz specially says “more nuclear weapons are better for the worlds security”, it can be really a hazard and threat for the region in the early future. Such opinion runs and ignores international regulations such as IAEA Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) goals. There are many other scholars whom are not in the same line with Waltz. Cordesman (2004) argued that Tehrans nuclear purpose is finaly to achieve nuclear weapons. Cordesman (2004) in his article “Iran’s Develping Military Capabilities” argued that Iranian regime’s intention by different activities such as developing military capabilities appears certainly that the purpose is the attainment of nuclear weapon and absolutely not only for domestic energy uses and for peaceful purposes. Einhorn (2000) also argued that the purpose of Iranian regime behind his nuclear program will be to develop his nuclear capability and reach its nuclear arms and soon Iranian regime will be ‘credible nuclear threats’. Given that there are two menacing nuclear weapons U.S. and Isreal close to Iran, Iran gets the feeling that is under threat and believes it is in desperate need of nuclear capability (Jones, 2012, p. 202). Iran rogue relationship with US and Israel, which is not friendly and it seems each state is more opportunist and prefers its own security in an anarchic world, made Iran alert to seek a nuclear capability necessary to ensure itself from threat in a realistic world and if it is necessary they can use thier own capabilities against foreign threats (Jones, 2012, p. 202-203). As Dorraj (2006) says; “The majority of foreign relations scholars view Iran’s aspirations for nuclear development from a realist perspective, suggesting that the nation’s past conflicts with its regional neighbors and paranoia of western incursions on its independence fuel the desire for a workable deterrent against future attacks”. Iran's attempts to develop nuclear weapons capability in different part of Iran has brought GCCS to doubt about Iran and security, stability and peace in the region. Despite differing views on Iran’s nuclear program, the majority believe that Iran's purpose is to acquire Atomic Bomb. Maybe an overview of Iran’s nuclear program from previous presidents of Iran can give a new image of Iran’s nuclear activity and purposes!

2.4. Iran previous presidents nuclear program process In this part of this thesis I try to analyze the nuclear policy during the previous presidents:

 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from (1989-1997)  Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005)  Mahmud Ahmadinejad from (3 August 2005 till 3 august 2013).

28 The policy on Iran's nuclear activities has been up and down during different presidencies and international responses.

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was the most influential and powerful icon since the Islamic Revolution of Khomeini in 1979. In his presidency, the Iranian government had decided to reinitiate its nuclear activity, which was a plan from Shah. Rafsanjani began to connect and negotiate with different persons such as the Pakistani scientist expert and China and France to build nuclear reactors in Iran. In the mid 1990s, Iran made a network with Khan and in this way got offers by him. Although the Iranian authority claimed that the offers had been just about the “drawing of centrifuges but not the design”, the Pakistani government affirmed that the Khan offered to help the Iranian government (Linzer, 2006, p. A01). Except Khan, the Pakistani government helped Iran with its nuclear activity and shared its nuclear technology. Rafsanjani offered more than $3.5 billion to nuclear program argument concerning the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), (1992). Further, in 1991 the Chinese government prepared and provided “1000 kg of natural uranium hexafluoride, a gas that can be used to enrich uranium” (Sahimi, October 10, 2013). In February 21, 1993, Rafsanjani and his government signed a deal to construct two 300MW nuclear power plants in Ahvaz, a South-West city in Iran (NTI, 1993). Although the apparent government of Rafsanjani had tried to make it clear that Iran was just trying to attain a nuclear program for peaceful domestic energy use and medical purposes, in secret they had military purposes to try to enrich nuclear weapons.

In 1994 the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) signed an agreement with the Iranian government. The plan was to build two nuclear reactors in (Farhi, 2010). It began a protest from the Western side, and increasing diplomatic pressure of United States against CNNC to turn down the agreement (Farhi, 2010, pp. 7-8). Rafsanjani tried in many ways to get other partners to run the nuclear activity. In the middle of 1991 after a couple of negotiations, French government accepted an agreement, which was based on the development of medical science. But at the same time Iran was suspected from some of the Western countries for underground activities for nuclear military purposes in different areas argued David Manashri (2001, pp. 218-219). In 1992 the Iranian authority made it clear that the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could visit the Iranian nuclear activities and nuclear facilities. Rafsanjani tried to restore the mutual trust. IAEA reported that Iran developed nuclear arms activity in secret (Chubin, 2010, P. 74). The IAEA at the beginning saw the purpose of Iranian nuclear activity and enrichment for only domestic 29 peaceful purposes, medical science and energy use. But a few years later this secret activity raised serious tension among different states and became a big international concern, when it became clear in 2002 that the regime had a secret nuclear activity and construction facilities in a different part of Iran such as Natanz and Arak. It was clear (at that time) that Rafsanjani and IRGC gave relief again to the Iranian nuclear program after almost two decades of silence. For example on January 19, 1995 Rafsanjani established nuclear medical research and a production unit in the city of Karaj nearby Tehran. “The facility will be used to produce radioactive materials for medical scans. It contains a cyclotron accelerator with a 30 million electron-volt power” (NTI, 1995). In this way Rafsanjani tried to mislead international agency that his government was just trying to obtain nuclear program for medical purposes. But his government didn’t stop nuclear activity and kept going further with different nuclear activities in different parts of Iran. So on March 6, 1997 Rafsanjani argued “the Bushehr nuclear plant would be able to produce 2000MW of power” (NTI, 1997).

In August 2, 1997 became the 5th . In the beginning of his presidency nuclear issue was easer compared with Rafsanjani’s term, due to his soft politics, sweet talks and such policy as a proposal and his slogan of ‘Dialogue Among Civilizations’ (UNESCO, 5 September 2000). In 2002 it became known that the Iranian government had nuclear activity in secret in different parts of Iran. It created more tension between than before. Since 2002 the nuclear activity still continued and diplomatic tension with west created huge obstacles in relationship of Khatami’s government with European Union. On February 9, 2003 Khatami has invited the head of IAEA agency, Mohamed ElBaradei to visit different nuclear facilities of Iran like Natanz and Arak. Khatami’s goal was to show transparently his cooperation with IAEA. But ElBaradei reported that they were not satisfied with the Khatami’s government obligations and cooperation with IAEA “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed” (IAEA, June 6, 2013 p. 7).

Then Khatami tried to reduce higher political and diplomatic tensions with Western countries from one side and at the same time keep the nuclear activity going further with underground enrichment of uranium (because of the interference of IRGC and Khamenei). Khatami let inspectors visit some nuclear activity’s sites (Bakhtiari 2010) and they started negotiation regarding its nuclear issue with EU3, which includes the power block of the European Union; 30 the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Ibid, 2008, p. 28). EU3 foreign minister's visit to Iran has brought Khatami's regime to a new phase and stage, and in this way they tried to make it clear that Iran has the right of enrichment and this gave Iran international legitimacy to proceed with its nuclear activities (Bakhtiari, 2010). At the time, the conflict grew between reformist wing lead of Khatami and Conservatives wing lead of Khamenei and (Chubin, 2010). The conservative faction has argued that Iran has the right to enrich uranium and the reformed negotiator Khatami has not adequately represented Iranian national interest (Chubin, 2010, p. 75). Therefore, the Iranian government has again in a broader way started uranium enrichment by the leadership of IRGC and conservatives’ faction. Western countries and especially United States was under pressure from a different war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The conservative wing saw a good opportunity to precede nuclear enrichment. The Iranian government has known that the United States cannot be a real threat for them at that time due to its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. US was preoccupied in the war point to that they did not have a real interest in negotiations with EU3 and Iran managed its two main goals, domestic and international: International to keep enrichment going on and domestic, to put away the reformist wing from power. In the next presidential election in 2005 they brought the hard-line candidate from the Principalists faction Mahmud Ahmadinejad to power (Chubin, 2010).

In the presidential election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad on 3 August 2005, the nuclear negotiations with EU3 was cold and collapsed through his rough rhetoric language against the US and state of Israel (Waltz, 2012). On 12 April 2006, a city in northeast Iran, Ahmadinejad claimed, “Dear, Iran has joined the club of nuclear countries” (Tait and Macaskill, The Guardian, 12 April 2006).

Ahmadinejad has frequently publicly argued that nuclear enrichment is Iran’s national right and they will never give up its right. The government tries to make it clear that they don’t stop or reduce its nuclear achievement goals and refers to other states, that they have no tendency to reduce or destroy their arsenal (Waltz, 2012). The nuclear issue in his presidency became controversial and a concern internationally. At the same time, it brought a conflict between domestic factions and policy makers and divided them into several groups.

Ahmadinejad didn’t contribute any positive point to Iranian nuclear program, and even he deteriorated the negotiations process before Rouhani started his presidency on 14 June 2013.

31 2.5. The nuclear program since president Rouhani Hassan Rouhani has been a chief and head of a nuclear negotiating group for the Iranian government and top negotiator of Iran from 2003-2005 with G-3; UK, France and Germany. When he was head of the nuclear negotiations with G-3 he made it clear that the attainment of nuclear activity will be truly the national right of Iran and the Iranian regime will keep going its nuclear program (Gerami, June 24, 2013).

At the beginning of 2003 the Iranian government decided to pay more attention to nuclear activity program and related issues. The primary task and strategy of Rouhani and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) at that time was indeed preventing western countries to send Iranian nuclear issue to United Nations Security Council (UNSC). And at the same time keeping the development of secret nuclear activities on and increasing more centrifuges “Nuclear fuel cycle capabilities” on the other hand (Gerami, June 24, 2013). To confirm these claims and the Iranian regime policies about nuclear activity, the following quote from Rouhani make this clearer, which was given to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council (SCRC) in 2004: “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [uranium conversion] facility at Isfahan, but we still had a long way to go to complete the project. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work in Isfahan” (Gerami, June 24, 2013. p. 2).

The main goal of Rouhani at that time was further development of a nuclear facility and attainment of more nuclear centrifuges (IAEA, 2004). In his protocol from 2003-2005 Rouhani as nuclear negotiator with G-3 didn’t prove any benevolence towards G-3 and western countries about stopping the development of nuclear activity. During his power at that time he wasn’t able to improve nuclear negotiations and work fairly with IAEA and in many cases he refused to give any information relating to the update of construction of Iran´s nuclear activity in places as Arak and Fordow (Ibid). Moreover, then the Iranian government violated both Articles of NPT, articles II and III, and the rules which came from G-3 and obligated Iran responsible to stop the development of nuclear program (IAEA, 2 June, 2008) directly. During the negotiations with G-3, underground nuclear activity in different parts of Iran, Arak and Natanz went on without Rouhani reporting it to the agency. (IAEA, 24 September 2005).

Rouhani during his presidential candidate on 2014 promised to improve the relationship with the west and have more respect for international community.

32 However, the negotiations took place between Iranian team follow the lead of Mohammad- Javad Zarif, Iranian foreign minister and also head of the nuclear negotiating group and US secretary of State, and the foreign ministers of G5. Rouhani had two goals: firstly, creating better atmosphere to repair the economy and end oil embargo as soon as possible. The second goal is to keep developing nuclear activity go on in different parts of Iran. Rouhani suggested Khamenei, this is an option for survival from the situation we ended up in. Khamenei agreed but say “A technical wrestler may also show some flexibility on technical grounds occasionally, but does not forget who his opponent is and what his main goal is” (HaghighatNejad, September 18, 2013). From this background the Iranian regime spearheaded Rouhani, has decided to take one step forward and come closer to G5+1 conditions regarding the nuclear issue. The last negotiation took place on Monday November 25, 2013 in Geneva, required the regime of Rouhani to comply with the following conditions:

 “Iran will stop enriching uranium to the 20 percent purity that is close to weapons grade. Its existing stockpile of this material will be converted into harmless oxide.  Tehran can continue using almost 10,000 working centrifuges to enrich uranium, in breach of six United Nations resolutions  The 9,500 Iranian centrifuges currently standing idle will stay idle.  Iran will not increase its store of uranium processed to the 5 percent level needed for power stations.  Iran’s new reactor at Arak now under construction will not be fueled or commissioned. Essential work will be halted.  Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency will be allowed to pay daily visits to Iran’s nuclear plants” (Blair, D. In , November 25, 2013).

Negotiations in Geneva on November 2013 gave Iran several benefits. What Iran gets in return will be as follows:

 “The US and EU will suspend sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and associated services such as insurance or transport, and on gold and precious metals.  An agreed amount of revenue from sanctioned Iranian oil sales held abroad will be repatriated.  US trade restrictions on Iran’s car industry and associated services will be eased and it will license the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for fight safety.  The UN Security and EU will not impose any new nuclear related sanctions for six months” (Blair, D. In The Daily Telegraph, November 25, 2013).

Now it seems that president Rouhani and his team tries through diplomacy and negotiation with G5+1 to solve the issue. As usual, the key of final decision is in the hands of Khamenei

33 and IRGC (Ibid). We will see what will happen after six months and to what extent the regime of Rouhani can get satisfactory results from the G5+1 conditions and how Khamenei will react after these six months. This will be a big challenge in 2014 for both sides.

2.6. Conclusion There are many explanations, both against and for the intent of the Iranian nuclear program. Iran firmly states that the issue is peaceful, but the suspicion is imminent. Immediately the country realizes that there is a risk of threats from outside, and should acquire nuclear bomb for its own safety, we end up in an anarchic world where a race will last that each country get the nuclear bomb. There are rules for the intent, say the researchers. Iran is suspected that they realize a threat from outside and the purpose about its nuclear program is to produce nuclear bomb. Signs of suspicion are Iran's development of long-range missiles, military maneuver, support of various terrorist organizations and political interference in countries with Shia minority. Notes from former regime indicated that the intention was peaceful with the purpose of the use of energy and medical purposes. New regime claimed that they have been following the same goal. President after president tried to convince international community, but so far they have failed. The new president has with a sensible and diplomatic way, started negotiations with the international community and the result is an agreement that led to become real recently, in the middle of 2014 it will be clear which side violating the agreement.

Chapter 3: The position of different Actors, Diplomacy and Sanctions

3.1. Introduction In this chapter, Russia and China’s view on Iranian nuclear program on one side and the Western countries, Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCCS) on the other side will be referred to. Furthermore, I will cover the theories and views from realism and rationalism. Finally, the outcome of Iran’s nuclear negotiations and the potential impact of the sanctions will be discussed. I will also provide details of Iran's nuclear program. Moreover, relevant theories of realism and rationalism will be dealt with and the results of Iran's nuclear negotiations and potential impact of the sanctions will be presented. Even though, Iran consistently argues that its nuclear activities and developmental research is only for peaceful

34 purposes and domestic usable energy, leaders and policymaker’s ambiguous statement give the signal that they acquire nuclear weapons (Cordesman & Al-Rodhan 2006, p. 4). Iran’s aim on nuclear activity generates multiple opinions among five permanent members of UN Security Council (UNSC). Two strong members i.e. Russia and China's strategies are equal to Iran and support Iran's nuclear program (Harold & Nader, 2012). In contrast, three other powerful countries, the USA, UK and France are doubtful towards Iran's declaration that their nuclear activities are peaceful (Chubin, 2010). Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCCS) and Israel are far more apprehensive about when Iran becomes a nuclear power, it will have a negative consequence, which destabilizes peace in the Middle East (JTA and Times Israel Staff, July 8, 2013; Cordesman & Al-Rodhan, 2006, p. 4). They believe a nuclearized Iran can be a great and serious threat for them in the future (Thompson, CNN News, November 20, 2013; Waltz 2012; Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010, pp. 33-49). Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) indirectly supports various terrorist groups that may lead to their use against the U.S. or Israel (Staff, September 25, 2012; Abbott, 2013; Waltz, 2012). Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran supported various religious organizations and terrorist groups, including and Hamas (Abbott, 2013). The question is: if the regime of Tehran argued that its nuclear activity is for peaceful purposes and domestic energy, then why did all of their activities ran in secret until 2002 without the permission of IAEA and why didn’t they let IAEA’s inspectors visit nuclear installation in Iran? Furthermore, why did the Iranian regime aggressively develop its military capability, especially in the last decade with the support of various countries like Russia, China and North Korea? Speculations about the Iranian nuclear technology applications are not only contrary among countries, even the experts are more desperate about what Iran strives for its nuclear power. The famous and well-known researchers Kenneth N. Waltz (2012), Amatzia (2012), Abbott (2013) and many others have different views on the approach of Iran’s nuclear program and issues around it. Some researchers such as Waltz are more controversial, therefore Waltz has been an international icon for four decades. I will focus mostly on his arguments and even other researchers. I will provide arguments both for and against Iran's nuclear activities.

The view of international institutions about Iran's nuclear energy for peace and security in the Middle East and even GCCS and Israel view will be analyzed as well. How can sanctions affect the regime in Iran? Can sanctions determined by the UN influence Iran to end its nuclear program?

35 3.2. Iran’s approach to the West & A few statements stating that Iran has no plan to acquire nuclear weapons

According to Article IV in NPT, Iran believes that they have the fundamental right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Article IV 1. “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty” (IAEA, NPT, 22 April 1970). 2. “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in. The fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world” (IAEA, NPT, 22 April 1970). In addition to this article, there are also some confirmations that Iran could convince the international community that the ambition is just for domestic peaceful purposes and energy use. It can be seen in Iran’s letter to IAEA on June 13, 2010 that Iran will have the utmost respect for the NPT declaration as an active member of IAEA (see appendix 1). And the following:

Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who spent 12 years at IAEA states: “I don’t believe Iran is a clear and present danger. All I see is the hype about the threat posed by Iran”, told to investigative journalist Sherwood Ross (June 02, 2011).

Yukiya Amano did not find clear evidence that Iran is trying to buy time to develop nuclear weapons: “I don’t see any evidence in IAEA official documents about this,” (Global Research, July 06, 2009).

36 Hans Blix, the former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), does not consider “a shred of evidence” that Iran was “building nuclear-weapons facilities and using enriched materials”. According to Hans Blix Iran's nuclear weapons are not a threat, but it is just an exaggerated claim from western countries and he says: “there is no evidence that Tehran is also interested in producing weapons of mass destruction. So far, Iran has not violated the NPT and there is no evidence right now to suggest that Iran is producing nuclear weapons” (Press TV, March 07, 2013). He said that any justifying action against Iran's nuclear activities are not righteous “mere suspicion or intentions that cannot exist” (Ibid). Some well-known figures in International Law such as Tyler Cullis and Ryan Goodman have a different view about to what extent Iran has the right to continue to develop its uranium enrichment. Cullis agreed with the peaceful enrichment of Iranian nuclear program according to article I of NPT (Heller, , 2013). Unlike Cullis, Ryan Goodman questions who does not give Iran the "right" to NPT and has been replaced by a series of Security Council resolutions, referring to Larry Johnson quote:

“While Iran claims that it has a right to enrich uranium as part of its peaceful nuclear energy program, the IAEA Board of Governors found that there had been a history of concealment and failure to declare certain activities to the agency, and therefore reported the matter to the Security Council. The Council has decided that over and above its obligations under NPT and the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran was required, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to suspend all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, including all enrichment- related and all reprocessing activities, as confidence-building measures” (Heller, November 24, 2013).

3.3. Russian view towards the Iran’s nuclear program Is Iran’s nuclear program a Threat?

Russia does not agree that Iranian nuclear program would pose a serious threat. In contrast, a radical Islamic regime with possession of a nuclear weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is unacceptable in Moscow. Russian authorities believe a nuclear-armed Islamic regime in southern Russia would be much less positive in Central Asia and the , and it could undermine Moscow's influence in these ex-Soviet areas, and they could furthermore destabilize the situation in the Middle East. The disclosure by the secret Iranian program in

37 2002 affected Russia to revise its cooperation with Iran (Kozhanov, April 19, 2012). There were three years in which Russia signed a number of agreements with Tehran to use fuel from Bushehr power plants which shall be sent to Russia. At the same time, Iran was not allowed to produce Russian weapons in Iran (Ibid).

Moscow does not believe that there are urgent deadlines for discussions with Iran. The Russian government and its experts are doubtful whether the Iranian authorities would consider creating a nuclear weapon, but they are absolutely convinced that the Iranians, at least in the short term, could produce such weapons if they wanted to (Ibid). On the whole China has the same opinion.

3.3.1. China’s view on Iran’s nuclear program

China believes that as long as Iran is on its Nuclear Non - Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and they do not use nuclear technology for military purposes, there is no reason to give up their rights, including enrichment, according to the agreement. Beijing is convinced that Iran does not have the capability to develop nuclear weapons in the short term and do not share the West’s interpretation of urgency about the possibility of a nuclear Iran, even though this would involve risks to China's long-term interests. Moreover, sanctions will not solve the problem proposed by the West, especially considering the failure of this approach so far. Despite Beijing supporting a “nuclear-free” Middle East, they do not sacrifice their own energy interests in Iran. If it is unanimously concluded in the inclusion to be in favor of sanctions from other Security Council members, China will delay it but not block the decision and they hope to weaken the penalty terms. General Zhang Zhaozhong, who is from the National Defense University (NDU), said “the enrichment technology of Iran is very primitive. … Iran does not have large quantities of uranium ore. … And it’s a very long process from processing nuclear materials to actually developing nuclear weapons. Zhaozhong argued that “Iran does not have the required facilities, equipment or technology” (Crisis Group Asia, February 17, 2010, p. 3). The Chinese analysts say Iran's nuclear program is “political, not technical” but western countries put pressure on China to take the same posture as they have, without any concrete evidence (Ibid).

Despite the fact that Iran has not yet closed the development of nuclear weapons, but the intention is there, according to the analysts and officials in Beijing. They also state: “We

38 understand that Iran fundamentally desires to develop nuclear weapons, due to issues of pride and history, its security in the region, plus it is watching other powers get them” (Ibid, 2010, p. 3). While the Iranian nuclear weapon is in conflict with China's interests in the Middle East region, there is no reason for China to take hasty measures.

3.3.2. The policies of China & Russia towards the Iranian nuclear program Historically, Russia, China and the United States have an interest in the Middle East. This interest may be geopolitical, ideological, and economical and they may even be competing between them for more power to try to have hegemony and influence (International Crisis Group, 2010). This interest has made the dual policies between countries in the region, especially Iranian nuclear achievement and the interest they have with Iran. The United States is worried about its position in front of China and Russia in the Gulf region, as it means that it limits America's geopolitical interests, power and influential and hegemonic role in these countries. That is why the USA is attempting to play a policy towards these countries to create a cooperative orientation between Turkey, Israel and Egypt and isolate Iran to prevent energy cooperation between China, Russia and Iran. However, due to the political and economic interests between Russia and Iran, the economy and energy interest between China and Iran have not been effective so far. In order to reject the United States from the Middle East, Iran has relied a policy of alliances with the two powerful countries, China and Russia to make the hegemonic position to weaken the U.S. in the Gulf region. Iran has created new trustable and securable alliances against the U.S. in the region and wants to achieve two main goals; Iran has got more political and ideological regional role in Gulf states such as Bahrain and made the U.S’s position and role weaker related to countries in the Middle East (Dobbines at other, 2011; Dunn & Schmidt, 2005, p. 173). At the same time, Iran gained its power supported by Russia and China, which both have a strong vote in the UN security Council (UNSC) to protect and be shield for Iran from one side against Saudi-US security agreements in the Gulf region and even to shield Iran from economic sanctions from Western countries (Smith, 2007).

3.4. The position of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCCS) It has been for more than two decades that the relation between Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCCS) is not friendly and there has always been tension both ideologically and politically (Al Kaabi, 2011, p. 6). The conflict between Iran and the Gulf States, specifically Saudi Arabia, has been something from the past. For example at June 25, 1996 a 39 Shia group who is linked to (IRGC) has detonated the U.S. military facility in Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia from Dobbins to another (2011, p. 7). On one hand, Iran is ideologically trying to play a leading role in the Shiite Muslim fraction in the world, especially in Arab Sunni neighbors. For example, in Bahrain and Eastern Saudi Arabia where Shiite live, there is Saudi Arabia's largest oil reserves. They are fighting against the Sunni Muslim majority with the help of Iran (Al-Kaabi, 2011, pp. 2-3). As Mazel (Mei 14, 2010) says “Eastern Saudi Arabia, where the country’s largest oil reserves are located, contains a sizable Shiite minority. Their incitement by Iran could trigger a civil war and inflict mortal damage on Saudi oil resources and exports, the cornerstone of the Saudi economy and the royal family’s power”. The circumstances are unacceptable for Sunni countries and in particular for Saudi Arabia. As Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia ambassador to Washington, a former Saudi intelligence chief says that Iran is a “paper tiger with steel claws” and it is “meddling and destabilizing across the Middle East region” (Burke, The Guardian 29 June 2011). The same political tension exists between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) about three Islands also; Abu Musa and Greater & Lesser Tunbs, which UAE realizes belong to them and Iran occupied those; stated in UAE Interact (30 November 2013). As the UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan by the meeting of the 68th Session of UN General Assembly said: “that all actions and measures taken by the Iranian occupation authorities are null and void, and are contrary to international law and to all norms and common human values” (UAE Interact, 30 September 2013). But from the counterclaims of Iranian regimes appeared that Tehran argues that these three Islands belongs to Iranian territory and as the Iranian spokesperson said that “the Emirates states belonged to Iran and when the time came, they would come under Iran’s control”, Zvi Mazel (May 14, 2010). That is why Saudi Arabia says that the Iranian government tries to destabilize its neighbors and does not have any respect for territory and sovereignty of its neighbors such as Bahrain and UAE. Furthermore, Turki said in one of his speeches: Iran […] is very sensitive about other countries meddling in its affairs, But it should treat others like it expects to be treated” (Burke, The Guardian 29 June 2011). The tension keeps growing between Iran and the Gulf states, day after day for the past few years due to the development of Iran's nuclear activities. GCCS is getting more worried about their safety with respect to such a development. Saudi Arabia has continued a nuclear-free zone to UN Security Council in Middle East, which it should include both Iran and Israel, the alternative, there must be an agreement on sanctions against Tehran’s regime until Iran accepts G5 +1 terms (Khan, 2012). 40 The outlook of the nuclear program of Iran has raised concerns at GCCS (Mazel, 2010; Al Kaabi, 2011). Saudi’s ruling royal family believes that if Iran comes close to attaining a nuclear weapon, they bring more tension and this raises the conflict in Middle East (Ibid). This will be unacceptable for GCCS and Saudi Arabia as a leader of the region. Connections with this Al-Faisal in June 2011 warned senior military officials “that nuclearization of Iran would compel Saudi Arabia […] to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences” (Burke, The Guardian 29 June 2011). While Saudi Arabia does not clearly and explicitly say what they mean by dramatic policies consequences, but Al-Faisal and even Saudi Arabia’s intention towards nuclearization of Iran is clear. One of Saudi Arabia’s influential officials argued “we cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don't. [...] If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit” (Burke, The Guardian 29 June 2011; Landler & Sanger in , July 22, 2009). The essential conflicts between Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Iranian nuclear weapons is a security dilemma. The states do not trust each other and this will often lead to cheating and deception of each other according to realism and neo- realism (Grieco, 1998, pp. 487-488; Baylis and smith, 2010). Considering this tension and security, a trend of cheating and deception of states towards each other is mutual. On one hand, Iran is afraid of GCCS’s antagonistic policy against Iran and existence of US military in the Gulf such as American military bases in Qatar and strong partnership and shared policy between the Gulf States and Washington (Cordesman, 2004; Mazel, 2010). Iran’s regime is not certain about the policy of other Gulf states like Bahrain because of the “long standing U.S. naval headquarters presence in Bahrain, the two countries signed a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1991” and further in March 2002, stated by president Bush: “designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation that qualifies Bahrain to purchase the same U.S. arms that NATO allies can purchase” (Katzman, 2012, p. 21). Agreements between Gulf countries with NATO have made Iran anxious. Where the Iranian regime began military maneuvers with spearheaded IRGC, the use of missiles in the maneuver shows that the goal is the Gulf States (Cordesman, 2004, p. 35). This exhibition, according to Cordesman (2004, p.35) “can carry out extensive raids against Gulf shipping, carry out regular amphibious exercises with the land branch of the IRGC against objectives like the islands in the bay, and could conduct raids against Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Southern Gulf Coast”. In 2010, the official Iranian news agency has warned GCCS for the existing U.S. military in the region and for more confrontation: “There is no lion in the 41 region save for the one that crouches on the shore opposite the Emirate states. He guards his den which is the Persian Gulf. Those who believe that another lion exists in the vicinity [meaning the U.S.] well, his claws and fangs have already been broken in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine” (Mazel, Mei 14, 2010).

Iran's nuclear activities and the US’s military presence in the region is creating tensions between powerful countries such as China and Russia on one side and EU, U.S. and Israel on the other side.

3.5. Iranian nuclear program and US Since 1979, the U.S. foreign policy has been addressed, to prevent and expand its hegemony and secure energy resources from other powers in the region such as Iran, Russia and China (Amineh & Houweling, 2007, p. 358). The tension and conflict between the U.S. and Iran do not only have a historical and ideological background, it is even geopolitical too (Dobbines at other, 2011, p. 7). Iran’s regime expands its high military capability so that the U.S. cannot militarize the other Gulf States similarly. The U.S. is afraid that the people of the region would be ideologically opposed to the West and create an anti-American and Israeli atmosphere and even pro Shia sentiment (Dobbines at others, 2011, p. 7). In 1980, the U.S. stopped Iran’s nuclear support, the Iranian regime was then changed and the Islamic regime headed by Khomeini came to power (Sadjadpour, 2009). The Islamic Revolution in Iran collapsed and was established entirely different with a completely other policy as well. The relationship and diplomacy between Iran and United States ceased. U.S. Embassy with 52 diplomats and officers were taken into hostage (Thaler, 2010, p. 9). The U.S. stopped giving Iran nuclear equipment to develop its nuclear program. The United States from Reagan’s term made it clear that if countries achieve nuclear facilities, they will become a global threat (Ibid). The Unite States divided countries into a list of enemies or friends. For example, Bill Clinton called enemies “rogue states” and George Bush described the Iranian “”. America considered for example Iran as a rogue state because they have some kinds of weapons which will be a major threat to the region's security and also for U.S.’s geopolitical interests in Middle East (Dunn & Schmidt 2005, p. 174). America actually makes such a policy and fights mainly for its own survival in the world. Such policy clearly belongs to realist states that can stay in power this way and can survive from other threats (Ibid). According to (Dunn & Schmidt, 2005, p. 173-174) the United States right now plays a major 42 role in the Middle East and especially with GCCS. The region has a geopolitical interest such as natural resources, for example oil and gas. America is concerned about the nuclearization of Iran. If Tehran becomes a nuclear power, they will become an opponent of U.S. interest in the region and maybe they can replace the U.S.’s role in the future. This means that the U.S.’s policy and influence in the region weakened to Iran’s advantage (Dunn & Schmidt, 2005, p. 173). Washington has made it clear that they will stand behind the Gulf, support and protect them from any threat. As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has warned the government of Iran that “the United States would consider extending a “defense umbrella” over the Middle East if it continues to defy international demands to halt work that could lead to nuclear weapons” (Landler & Sanger, New York Times, July 22 2009). USA's main target in the Middle East is containment, deterrence and national security; they form a threat to the Iranian regime (Rakel, 2009: 17-19). So far it has been a struggle of America's survival in different ways against Iran. The U.S. uses different measures and policies against Iranian government, for example economic and technological sanctions including: trying to boycott Iranian oil and keep the Iranian regime more isolated from the rest of the world (Ibid). This type of U.S. policy towards Iran has been more or less the same trend since Ronald Regan, George Bush and now Obama (Dunne 2005, p. 200-201). America tried to undermine Iran's expansion power and influence in different ways in the region. According to The Guardian (August 15, 2012), the U.S. tried to Iran's nuclear program by sending a virus to Iranian nuclear facilities and convince EU to use 's oil embargo (Katzman, 2012, p. 38-39). Regime change, military operation and diplomacy were among the U.S.'s attempts to counter Iran (Aydin, 2009). Khamenei warned that any threat from inside and outside should be combated. It seems regime change and military options will not be easy right now, and even perhaps impossible, because the regime is alert and has advanced security measures, both nationally and internationally (Ibid). For example arresting the leaders of the Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, and many other reformists are one of their measures; most of them are still serving a sentence (Cordesman, 2004; Jones, 2012). And the other reason will be U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which is inflicted the U.S.’s economy in crisis. So it appears that the only effective way will be diplomacy with Iran if it works it other ways the harder sanction.

43 Political conflicts in Washington between Democrats and Republicans for a military operation against Iran will not be easy for the United States because it runs the U.S. in an even worse economic and political crisis. That is why, the USA attempt to resolve the tensions primarily through punishments when that is not possible by diplomacy (Sabri, 2009). The USA also adds that they want to establish a secure and peaceful region where all nations and people can live in freedom and security. As President Clinton says: “Our vision for the future of the Middle East is simple. We want to see the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous region in which all nations and peoples can live in freedom and security. There is much work ahead, but we are making real progress towards our goal” (Nader, February 01, 1996, p. E134 in Interview with President Clinton). The US claims that if Iran attains nuclear weapons and gets a strategic power, then it will expose other countries' safety in danger (DeSutter, 1997). Some researchers argue that Iran's radical view and unethicality has tendencies for a nuclearized Islamic Republic, which would be an aggressive, confrontational state and be able to use the weapon for terroristic purposes. For example, Paula DeSutter (1997) believes Iran's Shiite is so unthinkable and irrational. In fact, they are “terrible “believers” who are willing to die for their faith”. She believes that if you have the will to die for a higher purpose, one can expect the worst. Therefore, there should be deterrent strategies which are less likely to be effective against such a country (DeSutter, 1997, p. 10). She warns the U.S. and the West that it is the worst scenario with Iran's radical Islamic Republic, which is preparing to attack its enemies if they have nuclear weapons. But she is not certain about this, because there is no evidence up to now that it must be the case. Iran develops its nuclear activities until they reach nuclear weapons. With that position, they could use it as leverage against the Gulf States and U.S. military base in the region and Western countries. Therefore, United States, Gulf States and the Western countries, mainly E3, take a strategy stand against Iranian regime to deter Iran's development of nuclear activity.

3.6. Iranian nuclear program and EU

The European countries have a long history with the Middle East region, because of many reasons such as political and economic interest that they have there and their colonial background with the region. The economic interest of European Union (EU) and political influence that they want in the region has made EU in alliance with the U.S. towards each other in the Middle East. Economical and financial interest and the huge oil companies in 44 different parts of the Middle East and mainly with the Gulf states such as UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain have made the EU concerned about the security and stability of the region. That is why the EU gives priority to security, stability and peacekeeping in its foreign policy toward the Middle East region.

In the last decade one of the main concerns of the EU in the Middle East region can be the proliferation of WMD by some countries and the ambition of Iran to develop its nuclear program. Iran as a member of NPT has the right (NPT Article IV, nr 1 and 2) to pursue peaceful nuclear developments for domestic energy uses and can pursue all information and nuclear technology about it (IAEA, 22 April 1970). But Iran also has obligations to do all activities and developments related to its nuclear program under control of IAEA and according to the NPT agreement (Mousavian, 2012). Iran’s government frequently refers to this unalienable right and they have argued that such right gives them authority and permit to develop their nuclear program in each negotiation. However, due to the secret developments and violating NPT rules, the western countries and E3 are now doubtful about the peaceful and domestic energy uses of Iranian purpose about the nuclear program (Ibid).

Considering information from the IAEA inspectors (IAEA, 10 November 2003; Kerr, 2013), they observed that Iran has secret nuclear activities and evidences show that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. And because Iran violated its nuclear safeguards obligations and evidences show that Tehran tries to get nuclear arms, the EU states are concerned about it.

The nuclear program of Iran and developments hereon has become a heated debate by all of the major powers. This debate is becoming harder day-after-day and many more difficult issues are formed on a regional and international level. Not only GCCS, the U.S., United Nations and Israel are afraid of it but this has also brought difficulties and concerns for the powerful countries of the European Union (EU), France, Germany and United Kingdom (known as the E3). The issues and difficulties in this sense is that they are afraid about the security and stability of the Middle East in the future when Iran will be one of the nuclear powers. This concern and debate about it has brought E3 to a solution and in a new way, now they can respond to Iran’s nuclear activities in the best way. The concerns of the EU about the nuclearization of Iran have been growing after the terrorist attack of September 11th 2001 on the Twin Towers in the U.S. This has made the EU really concerned because after this attack, they have a conscious link between proliferation and terrorism. Although the relation between Iran and the Western countries at that time was not pleasant, but later the relation between

45 them has become even much worse, when it became known that Iran has been busy with the enrichment of uranium secretly. Since then, the EU decided upon a new policy towards Iran. In October 2003, the EU started negotiations with Tehran (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 25). The ministers of foreign affairs of E3 saw this negotiation as an opportunity to create a new stage with Iran and can find a solution to solve nuclear problem with Iran in this way and maybe this will even be the first steps towards developing normal relations with Iran (Baktiari, 2010, pp. 28-29). At the end of 2003, Iran made an agreement with E3 that Tehran would stop suspending its uranium enrichment program and will respect it according to the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement and rules of NPT. But in the same year IAEA has reported that Tehran has never ratified this Additional Protocol (IAEA, 21 October 2003).

After marathon negotiations with Tehran, it appears that the approach of E3 has not worked. The reason was that the Iranian regime has argued that the nuclear development of Iran will be just for domestic peaceful purposes and Iran has the right to further enrichment of uranium. According to Chubin (2010), because of the influence of conservative faction at that time the negotiation with E3 did not bring any compromise or positive results.

From 2003, the EU has taken a serious position towards proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The EU believes and considers the WMD to be the main threat for international peace and world security; “proliferation of WMD is a threat to all,” (The European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2008, p. 14). The EU also argues the Iranian nuclear development to be a possible threat for the Middle East and for stability of the Gulf region. Since that time, the assumptions based on the realism theory, according to (Dunne & Schmidt, 2005, p. 176-177; Baylis and Smith, 2008) which states continuous struggle to self-help and survival has been confirmed. We can see that the EU survival has been the primary purpose towards nuclear powers such as Iran. Till this time the approach of the EU has mainly spread by liberalism around the world, but since 2003 because of survival and threats from other states (such as Iran and North Korea) and considering threats from nuclearization of Iran, EU and mainly E3, the approach towards Iran has gradually shifted toward realism (Dunne & Schmidt, 2005). That is why in the EU strategy fight against the proliferation of WMD, we can see that the EU argues that all kinds of options must be used (including military option) towards the countries which continue to attain WMD. And nuclear materials and technologies must not be accessible for the terrorists: “We need to work on prevention; it is important to prevent the threat from becoming a reality. Therefore, we need to make sure that terrorists do not get access to materials and 46 technologies which can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction” (The European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2008, p. 15). On 12 December 2003, the EU Council adopted “A Secure Europe in a better world” (Ibid). To obtain such goal the EU has made a new strategy with the five key challenges: “terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, State failure and organized crime” (Ibid, 2008, p. 3). But the EU believes that the proliferation of WMD will be the greatest and main threat to European security and to resolve the possible threat from some countries who seek nuclear weapons, the European Union must take an effective multilateralism, prevention and international cooperation.

After the negotiations with E3 and lack of trust coming from both sides, the Iranian regime has started its uranium enrichment again efficiently. This has been growing during Khatami’s regime. Then Khatami and proponents of nuclear negotiations (Farhi, 2012, p. 34) tried to solve the nuclear issue with negotiations and they chose the temporary cessation of uranium enrichment and other related activities (Chubin, 2010). But because of interference of IRGC and conservative factions who did not trust the western side and did not want to stop enrichment, it becomes clear that reaching a potential deal was not feasible (Ibid). In August 2005 Iran decided to proceed with the enrichment of uranium in different nuclear installation such as Arak and Isfahan. The main reason to start again with nuclear enrichment had to do with getting no settlement with the Western side and dissatisfaction with the progress of the negotiations in 2004 (Chubin 2010; Farhi 2010, p. 10-12). The Iranian regime argued that they are dissatisfied with skeptical western countries and European intentions.

Iran’s negotiators team officially said that the intention of Iran for the temporary cessation of nuclear activity in 2004 was to create and build confidence and trust with the west (Farhi, 2010). But the western side argued that Iran did not stop officially. During negotiations with E3 in 2004, the Iranian negotiating group refused definite cessation of nuclear activity in large installations such as Arak, Natanz and Isfahan (Ibid). Iran argued that the activity in the Isfahan plant falls under NPT regulations and Iran did not violate any rules. Meanwhile, the Iranian negotiation team warned that they will not accept to stop the development of the peaceful nuclear activities; it was a major drawback to Iran (Ibid). This disadvantage was with a lever that Iran abandoned nuclear activities, but if other countries would drive exact similar activities and were a member of The Agency, there shall be no equal treatment of E3. NPT (Iran Review, June 22, 2012).

47 The negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program ended in 2004 and from August 2005, they did not resolve anything or made agreements with E3. This was because of two main reasons: First Conservative faction spearheaded Ahmadinejad won the election on 03 August 2005 as a religious-conservative president of Iran (Hinnebusch, 2012). And even new pressure toward Iran from outside like U.S. and other powerful western countries. The western countries and U.S. called the Iranian state as a rogue States and U.S. has described Iran as “axis of evil” (Dunn & Schmidt 2005: 174). Since then the relations and diplomacy between them and EU, mainly with E3 has been growing apart and dropped. Whereas, Iran became isolated from many countries such as the U.S. and E3, Tehran preferred to build relation with other alliance such as China, Russia, India and Brazil (Jones, 2012, p. 201-202; Hinnebusch 2012, p. 25; Dobbines at other, 2011; Sadr 2005, p. 64). While U.S. and the European countries, mainly E3 had a common interest towards Iranian nuclear program, whether for domestic energy uses and peaceful purposes or even for the attainment of nuclear arms. Both parties took a different approach and policy, how to prevent Iran form the developing nuclear activity. U.S. in its major policies towards Iran tried to use different pressure such as economic and political sanctions and even if possible uses military forces to prevent Tehran from developing its nuclear activity (Bahgat, 2006). But EU states with spearheaded E3 thought that such policy and isolation with such sanction doesn’t have a real effect on Iran (because Iran is alliance with other impressive actors such as Russia and China). This will make Middle East region more destabilized (Ibid). When the sanctions did not affect Iran’s economy and politics E3 tried to make a deal with Iran through diplomacy and soft power. This approach of soft power from EU mainly from E3 can be ‘conditional engagement’ which gives the both sides an opportunity to find a solution and finally reach an agreement about developing the nuclear program of Iran. So far, they didn’t have a complete agreement and this conditional engagement doesn’t have a real effect. The main reason behind this is that Iranian regime was concerned about its security and wasn’t sure if its security will be guaranteed by Western countries, U.S. and Israel. There were signs of military existence and American troops in the Gulf region. Iran was in this sense more realists, who argued that states must survive in a characteristically anarchic world system where safety is not guaranteed by other states. And that is why, in such circumstances, it is rational for states like Iran to compete to secure its own power and security (Baylis and Smith, 2008).

48 It appears that negotiation between Tehran and E3 and later G5+1 didn’t brought agreement and couldn’t change the mind of Iranian regime and deter them from development of nuclear program activity. Therefore, EU and U.S. referred Iranian nuclear case to United Nation Security Council (UNSC) (IAEA, 2 June 2008). The main reason behind this was that Iran violated Article II and Article III of NPT and the rules of IAEA (Ibid). Since EU took extreme measures against Tehran and was disadvantaged both politically and economically the relationship breaks down. According to Katzman (2012, p. 38-39) U.S. convinced EU to use sanction against Iran’s Oil (embargo).

In 2009 the Iranian negotiation team with G5+1 did not get to any agreement again. But later Tehran decided “to increase its enrichment capability from below 4 percent to around 20 percent” to produce fuel for the Tehran reactor (Mousavian, 2012). According to Iranian authorities, the Western side had refused many times when cooperating with Iran regarding developing its nuclear activity which is according to the NPT rules. For example in February 2010, Iran suggested the western countries that “Iran would keep its enrichment activities below 5 percent in return for the West providing fuel rods for the Tehran reactor” (Ibid). But the western countries and E3 refused.

In 2012 after the negotiation in Baghdad and Istanbul, the Iranian team promised western countries to stop increasing centrifuges and in return they expected the removal of different economic and political sanction such as the oil embargo. But the relation with the west hardened and they isolated Iran. Iran decided to progressively continue its nuclear program.

Since 04 August 2013, when Hassan Rouhani came to office, he tried to find a new way for Iran’s isolation and solve nuclear issue and end the embargo. He had two plans: first, he wanted to remove all devastation of economics and eventually reduce military attacks by U.S., and Israel and second, develop nuclear capability within short time to become a nuclear power. But to satisfy the concern of western countries, the Iranian regime agreed to stop increasing centrifuges for more than 20 percent. This approach was an agreement for the next six months between Iran and G5+1, while it was a needle in the eye for Israel anxiety. Israeli government thought that Rouhani tried to buy time for rebuilding the economic crises. Below will be noted how Israel thinks about Iranian nuclear program.

49 3.7. Iranian nuclear program and Israel

Khomeini since the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in 1979, pointed Israel as enemy number one. Iranian regime still has not recognized the State of Israel and believes that Israel has no root in the Middle East. As Ahmadinejad said, reported by “Israel has no roots in the Middle East, and would be eliminated” (Staff, September 25, 2012). This tension and hostility between the two states remain, Tehran versus Tel Aviv and vice versa, and many times they have threatened to destroy each other.

Iranian regime decided to use different types of policies against Israel to prevent Israeli threat. Israel has threatened to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran supports the anti-Israel groups like Hezbollah and Hamas to repel Israeli threat (staff, September 12, 2012). The issue of the peace process between Israel and Palestine is the most important foreign policy topic for the Iranian regime. Khamenei and IRGC are opposed to any compromise with Israel on the Palestinian question. They believe that the only way to resolve the conflict is just to give back the occupied lands to the Palestinians. The threat of Iranian nuclear weapons is understandable for the U.S. and Israel due to anxiety and fear. The intimidate image is the most rhetoric language of Iranian Leader Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. The chance is great that is primarily used against Israelis (Waltz, 2012, p. 4). It was declared by Khamenei a couple of times in 2012. For example, he warned Israel about the need to destroy the city of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and they intend “to wipe Israel of the face of the earth”.

Ahmadinejad emphasized in his speeches and statements that the Iranian policy towards Israel is: “eliminate the Zionist regime” or “World without Zionism” (Sean Yoong, Washington Post, August 3 2006). As I mentioned in previous chapters Rouhani tries to polish Iran’s image through soft policy to convince the international community that the purpose of Iranian nuclear program is just for peaceful and domestic energy use. Rouhani’s posture is unreliable for Israel, Prime Minister said: “Ahmadinejad was a wolf in wolf’s clothing. Rouhani is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, who thinks he can pull wool over the International community’s eyes” (Connolly, 2 October 2013 on BBC News). Iran’s main critical point against IAEA is that Israel was not and is not a member of IAEA so far and did not ratify the NPT agreement. Despite Israel not accepting international community regulations, they can have other intentions with their capacities. This makes Iran to distrust Israel. Some of the scholars, such as (Khaler, 1998, p. 921), argued that the Iranian

50 regime searches to nuclear capability are a rational actor model response and it is an answer to threat from U.S., Israel, the sanctions and eventually the U.S.’s military actions against Iran’s nuclear facility. The Israeli government and the Israeli lobby play an important role in American foreign policy, especially on Iran's nuclear issue (Bill, 2001, p. 95). For example, note in September 2013 in Geneva, which was finally brought to an agreement between G5+1 and Iran, the Israeli lobby in U.S. has opposed strongly against such an agreement. Israel believes that such an agreement is perhaps an oscillation in the USA’s politics to approach both states. This makes Israeli state more nervous for USA’s policy towards Iran in future. The reason is that Israel is trying to convince the United States to make more pressure and sanctions against Iran to cease Iran's nuclear program. Sadr (2005) in his article: “The effects of Iran's nuclearization on Israel," the enrichment of uranium can threaten the existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish land in three different ways: “First, Iran might launch a nuclear weapon directly at Israel. Second, Iran might transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist organization such as Hezbollah that would launch them towards Israel. Third, Iran might be emboldened to attack Israel by conventional means or through terrorist proxies without fear of retaliation” (Sadr, 2005: 62). In case Israel will attack Iran it would not be a successful idea, because Iran's nuclear facilities are scattered in various parts of the country. Iran's ability is great to build new nuclear structures of its experience for over 20 years of nuclear activity. In addition, the Iranian strong military defense can pose any threat and various missiles such as the Shahab II and Shahab III missiles (Bahgat, 2006). The Iran militarization could be a threat against Israel. As Falk (2006) says: “Iran has the means to launch a devastating retaliation with conventional weapons, including its Shahab-3 missiles, which can reach targets in Israel with reasonable accuracy” (Falk, 2006: 5).

The USA and Israel would take attention that it is not a cleaver decision to attack Iran´s nuclear facilities as Falk says:

“Iran could also vastly increase its support to Islamic resistance forces in the Palestinian territories and to Hezbollah in Lebanon…As the world’s fourth largest oil producer, Iran could plunge the world into an immediate deep recession by embargoing its oil if it is attacked, or if an attack appears imminent…an Israeli or US attack on Iran would almost certainly strengthen Islamist tendencies throughout the region as well as put intense pressure

51 on Arab governments to react much more strongly against the United States and Israel” (Falk, 2006: 5). Israel constantly claims that the international community takes harsher sanctions against Iran to pressure it to end its nuclear weapons program.

3.8. Diplomacy and Sanctions What options are there for solutions to the Iranian nuclear program crisis? Diplomacy coupled with harsh sanctions will persuade Iran to stop its nuclear program. Some scholars such as Waltz (2012) does not believe diplomacy and sanctions can prevent Iran from reshaping its nuclear technology, for that if a country feels threatened and believe that their security lies in access to a nuclear bomb; sanctions would be meaningless (Waltz, 2012, p. 2). Second solution is that Iran suspends its testing of nuclear weapons for a short time. This can have its drawback, thus Iran’s hard lines have profit as quickly as possible to achieve a nuclear bomb. It is true that it is to fade west but it is unacceptable for Israel because they feel the threat is imminent (Ibid). The third is to let Iran continue its current course and publicly test a nuclear bomb. The third is an impossible option, for the U.S. in particular and Israel opposes, including other Western countries as well (Ibid). In fact, during the last decade, it seems that after constant negotiations with the West lead by E3, it has not worked on the Iranian regime effectively. The Iranian nuclear program was referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the support of European countries. Iran’s nuclear case is referred to UNSC, for that the Iran policy did not change anything about the development of nuclear program to enrich uranium. According to IAEA report (IAEA, 2 June 2008), Iran has violated rules of NPT Article II and Article III. That is why the EU and U.S. begun the sanctions against Iran. Iran has received sanctions for four times from the UN Security Council including oil, shipping, energy industry, financial and bank embargo. Iran is barred from the global financial system (Rossett, August 29, 2011; Hunt, March 28, 2011). The sanctions have not affected to stop enriching uranium but instead quite the contrary, it caused the process to be complicated and slowed down (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 26). More importantly, the hard pressure and different sanctions on Iran’s economy has impacted Iran’s nuclear policies and decision-making.

52 In recent years, sanctions have been used to pressure on Iranian government to stop its attainment of nuclear program, of which Iran says is for peaceful purposes and domestic energy uses, but the Western countries, Israel and the Gulf States believe their intention is to produce weapons. In 2006, United Nations passed a resolution demanding that Iran stops its program of uranium enrichment. There are several types of articles which impose requirements and sanctions on Iran (UN Charter, 1985). Article 24, which has the main primary tasks and responsibilities for international peacekeeping and security, specific powers granted to the Security Council on the implementation of these tasks (Kerr, 2013). Chapter VII contains three articles related to the Iranian issue and Iran case. Resolutions demand concerns about Iran’s nuclear program invoked Chapter VII. Article 39 states that the council “shall determine the existence of any threat and breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, for international peace and security” (Kerr, 2013, p. 9). West expected that Rouhani could keep the promises!

The effect of sanctions shattered Iranian economy, therefore, president Rouhani “campaigned for persuading the western countries and international community to ease them” (Daily Mail, September 25, 2013, p. 4).

Western countries strategy and policy for sanctions against Iran may be categorized in two main objectives: First, pressure Iran to stop nuclear weapons capability before choosing tough new penalties against Iran. The second is to affect economy to increase poverty of people and the discontent would lead to an uprising against the regime, their incommodity will force regime to give up nuclear weapons activity (Abbott, Oct. 4, 2013, p. 6). But perhaps Iran can use the penalties and pressure from West and Israel as an agenda against Iranian national right for peaceful nuclear energy attainments. It can affect the reconciliation of Iranian national patriotism against a common enemy which does not want Iran to pursue and attain nuclear capability for peaceful and domestic energy (Ibid). Through this way, they can survive the crisis and stay longer in the power.

The historical telephone call on September 27, 2013 between two head of Governments; Barak Obama and Hassan Rouhani took place after almost 34 years. A starting point for negotiations and diplomacy was to find solution and solve the nuclear issue of Iran (China Daily, September 28, 2013). As President Obama said: “while there will surely be important obstacles to moving forward and success is by no means guaranteed, I believe we can reach a

53 comprehensive solution” (Ibid). But at the same time the U.S. also argue that now the ball is in the hand of president Rouhani and he has to decide how he wants to convince the world that Iranian nuclear activity will be just for peaceful purposes and domestic energy uses. On the 25th of September 2013, the U.S. president said that Iran could find a historic reconciliation with the western countries if Rouhani is serious about a nuclear deal (Daily Mail, September 25, 2013). But the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned the world “not to be fooled by Iran’s ‘smile offensive’ as it masked acceleration of its disputed nuclear weapons program” (Daily Mail, September 25, 2013, p. 4).

The main reason for Iranian regime to accept the agreement versus G5+1 condition regarding the nuclear program is the need of the sanctions such as, Iranian car industry, oil, petrochemical exports and associated services such as insurance or transport to be removed. Furthermore, the U.S. will ease the trade restrictions on Iran’s car industry and cars spare parts (Blair, D. in The Daily Telegraph, November 25, 2013). The negotiation agreement on Monday November 25, 2013 which took place in Geneva required mutual responsibility for G5+1 from one side and the regime of Rouhani on the other side. When Iran has benefit in such circumstance from removing hard pressures and different sanctions, they have to give up on many other benefits. The Regime of Rouhani complies the condition towards developing nuclear program such as, stopping uranium enrichment more than 20 percent which is close to weapons grade (Blair, D. in The Daily Telegraph, November 25, 2013). Furthermore, they must idle the 9,500 uranium centrifuges and stop the development of uranium enrichment in different locations and they will not increase uranium processed to 5 percent level which is needed for power plant installations (Ibid). And as a final condition Iran must allow inspectors from IAEA to visit Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Despite sanctions on Iran by west, China and Russia, two veto right member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) indirectly support Iran in the question of the right to the nuclear program. Support rescued Iran from the penalty of sanctions from the West. Harold and Nader (2012, p. 1) says: “So far China has been reluctant to support meaningful sanctions against Iran, in large part because of the broad and deep partnership that the two countries have developed over the past three decades”.

On 2011 the U.S. Congress did a new legislation about the Iranian nuclear program (, January 2, 2012). The U.S. has targeted the (Bank-e-Markazi

54 Iran). The purpose of the legislation is to disrupt Iran's economy by prohibiting any U.S. or foreign companies that have deals with Iran and they could be punished by America. The Legislation is: “Any foreign company or country that deals with the Iranian Central Bank, which serves as a clearinghouse for Iran’s oil sales, could be barred from the U.S. financial system” (Voice of America, January 2, 2012). As soon as the legislation voided many Iranian oil customers, they tried to make new oil contracts with other Arab Gulf States such as EU, Japan and China. This had brought greatest damage on Iran’s economy and reduced purchases of Iranian oil (Bagchi, January 14, 2012).

Iran has relied on China and made China as a shield against sanctions and nuclear program. Immediately, Iran’s suffers of sanctions accelerated China and expanded its economic influence in Iran. Chinese foreign policies analysts believe that China recognizes expanding its economic relationship with Tehran. Although China voted against Iran in the UN Security Council Resolution 1929, but with its financial assistance to Iran seemed to "cast a supporting vote” (Jingjing at all, 2011, p. 29).

It seems that Iran is exploiting China for its shelter against pressure from the West. Economic partnership and cooperation with China neutralize the penalty of the effect of sanctions and the threat from outside. From here, Iran ignores the international pressure: “Iran has blunted the impact of the regime on the country” (Lasseter and Hall, January 16, 2012).

3.9. Conclusion Marathon negotiations were and are going on either by force or diplomacy to convince Iran to cease its nuclear enrichment. Can force or diplomacy change Iran to give up its enrichment? Despite the existing concrete regulation NPT, Iran realizes that they did not break the law and the opponents: the West, Arab Gulf States and Israel speculate and even definitely say that Iran´s intention is to reach an atomic bomb and in this way violates the rules. IAEA accused Iran that they violated article 2, 3, NPT and the roles of IAEA. So far the sanctions could not stop Iran from its aim, but the effects slowed down. One of the main reasons the sanctions cannot be effective is Russia and China’s policy on the issue. On one hand they vote against Iran however on the other hand they support Iran and rescue Iran to go down. Rouhani is a new icon in the negotiation process and he will give a new life to create friendly atmosphere with the West, but the sign tells Khamenei and IRGC have backed him

55 up with limited power in foreign policy, especially regarding negotiations of nuclear issues. It seems that Rouhani probably cannot keep his word and the aim will mainly be to buy time.

Conclusions and General Findings

I have referred to Iran, specifically stating that their intention is peaceful and for energy use. To prove their honesty, they refer to the letter to the IAEA that they, as an active member of the organization, have the utmost respect for the rules and that they expect mutual respect and some experts’ opinions from countries like China and Russia and etc.

Nuclear technology agreement allows Iran to run the program for peaceful purposes, but there is a pretty extensive assumption that Iran has a different intention, where states interpret it in their own opportunistic interest. The Eastern states Russia and China are on the side of Iran and they are not convinced that Iran is close to owning a nuclear weapon.

Opponents accuse the Eastern countries for their economic interests and therefore they would defend Iran in that reason. There is plenty of evidence that Iran has a fairly large trade with them, and above all, China is Iran's main trading partner. China believes that it is not about trade; Iran’s case is not a technical issue but a political.

The West, Gulf countries and Israel portray Iran as a major threat to its surroundings for its nuclear program and reported Iran to the IAEA because Iran would have violated the non- . The West mentioned that Iran did not report the construction of new facilities in different location in Iran. Marathon negotiations are still going on between Iran and the West on several opinions. Iran's nuclear program is an issue for decades, without any concrete results yet. The West has threatened Iran with sanctions and military attacks if Iran continues its program.

Experts argue differently and they split into two groups; the rationalism and irrationalism. Rationalism refers to experience and research and irrationalism refers to different theories. Theoretically, one can speculate about certain violation, but surveys can show signs that there may be not.

Iran is geopolitically vital and experience suggests that economic and political interests can mislead Iran's issue from being a technical issue instead of a political.

56 Iran is located in a region with the world's largest oil resources and both the West and East have economic and political interest. The political climates lead to powerful countries invading countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and . Experience convinces countries to create their own defense and means should be acquired to neutralize potential threats. Iran is one of the countries that were designated (evil of axis). Rationalists believe that in a world in which great powers interpret the laws of its national interest; Iran should have the right to be vigilant. At the same time this may not be right for its statement and it may exterminate Israel and use it against USA. The empirical Iran has militarized them and supports foreign terrorist organizations that are opposed to Israel. Their developed long range missiles suggest that they will expand their power in different contexts and it can be a sign that the West at the forefront, the USA, Gulf countries and Israel should be concerned about Iran’s plans. One can suspect Iran’s nuclear program for not being peaceful.

Given the proclaimed assertion, the West has wanted to punish Iran through various means, including sanctions and eventually the military force. Iran has been the subject of international punishments such as an embargo on oil, automotive, , insurances and transportation. The sanctions have not had real effect on Iran quitting its program but slow down the nuclear activity and press Iran to negotiate.

So far Iran has had several presidents. The presidents were not successful with the agreements with the West, but the new president Rouhani with a “literary language” and diplomacy, at least made an agreement with the West since its entry. What goes on behind the curtains remains unknown but the West and Israeli governments’ ministers are skeptical and believe that Iran only wants to buy time.

Since Iran is a member of the NPT and signed NPT international agreement, the statement obligates Iran to pursue the NPT and international community regulations. What would be Iran’s task towards NPT and IAEA is to follow the complete rules of NPT and IAEA. Iran must fully cooperate with IAEA investigations relating its nuclear activities and stop its uranium enrichment program and constructions of a heavy water reactor. Further the Iranian government has an obligation to give all update information and constructions of its nuclear activities in different places of Iran like Arak, Darkhovin to IAEA.

Should Iran not pursue NPT rules then international community has a responsibility in an anarchist world by diplomacy to create understanding between states to neutralize the threat and conflict. 57 In this thesis, I want to focus on two options, namely, tougher sanctions beyond previous sanction’s content, total trade stop (except medicine and food) and recall ambassadors from Iran, despite the negative effects and even there is risk that Iran withdraws from NPT if they are charged with tougher sanctions as North Korea did. Unfortunately, there is enthusiasm for tougher sanctions in the current political climate as it happened to Iraq and it caused millions of children to die. But the second one so far, has not been focused on, is mutual reliance. Diplomacy which is seen to be more important and reason which should replace the threat is much weaker in this context. As waltz says; the more states have nuclear weapons the safer the world will be, because the states will have more respect for each other considering the consequences. Waltz does not say that states should respect and implement the NPT mandate by trying to reduce and disarmament their nuclear arsenals to create confidence and trust for members under the NPT agreement.

States with nuclear weapons are busy modernizing their arsenal and related infrastructure. It can have serious implications for nuclear disarmament. In other words, they invest in expansion, rebuilding and strengthening of their arsenals and its capabilities, rather than contributing to disarmament. Non - nuclear weapon states have expressed concern with these programs and using international venues, including non-proliferation Treaty review conferences to urge the nuclear-weapon states to end those programs, which undermine the objectives of the Treaty with regard to both non - proliferation and disarmament. Upgrades and investment in nuclear weapons would contribute to non - nuclear states feel more threatened and no longer trust the assignment passivity. Non - nuclear weapon states are trying to further promote the conditions for disarmament by negotiating a treaty banning nuclear weapons, highlighting that world’s governments themselves, do not need nuclear weapons to ban them, but the attempt so far was and is striking. Nuclear Weapon States are forcing other nations to cease their nuclear activity, otherwise they persecute NPT regulations. Where states lose faith in the circumstances, they believe the laws apply to them and not the nuclear weapon states. They feel threatened and want to address the threat by creating nuclear weapons. This is the fact that how US tries to ban the states for nuclear activity, but self expand and renew its own nuclear weapons. It may be noted that in the village called Büchel in Germany about 20 B-61 nuclear weapons was installed at the air base. It is the new variation of the atomic bomb known as the B61-12, and is now expected to replace the older types 3, 4, 7 and 10, as well as strategic nuclear bunker-busting B-61-11 and B-83 (Becker &

58 Nassauer, November 06, 2013). When nuclear Council adopted on 12 November 2012 that U.S. nuclear weapons should be held to the middle of the turn of the century, it means that nuclear disarmament should be boundless for decades despite the NATO allies reached an agreement with Russia that the parties reduce tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. still needs time to complete the B-61-12 (Ibid, November 06, 2013).

Finally, Iran is a threat for the region and the world and it should be tackling either with tougher sanctions or mutual respect.

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72 Appendix 1: Text Iranian letter to the IAEA

Monday June 13, 2010

Iran a nuclear fuel exchange based on Tehran Declaration, Monday to Yvkyaamanv, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency was delivered.

According to the website, quoting IRIB, Islamic Republic of Iran "Poormand", the second person to represent our agency on Monday, May 3, in the presence of representatives of Brazil and Turkey to the Director General's residence where he delivered.

The full text of the letter follows:

God

Rev. Mr. Amano

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Excellency

Islamic Republic of Iran as an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in line with the practice of its obligations under the NPT and its always best to engage in broad cooperation with IAEA has been shown to. Collaboration and extensive interaction with the agency, indicating the importance to make these international institutions is the importance of the treaty. Iran is expected to mutually respect the rights provided in addition to the members of the IAEA Statute and the NPT treaty rights set out in Article 4 of the Statute on the one hand and duties of the Agency provided to the member states of the Agency, without No discrimination shall be entitled to all assistance and facilities concerned.

Subject fuel for the Tehran research reactor, which is where the agency is located entirely within the duties and responsibilities of the Agency in this regard is quite clear. Unfortunately, despite almost a year of formal letter, Iran (XII date Khordad 1388) to Agency for reactor fuel Yadh that have medicinal purposes and provide medical services to nearly a million people, not just the fuel has been delivered to the country but also the path to the conditions of the opposite side failed extravagate has been left.

Let's seize the opportunity now count trilateral summit meeting in Tehran attended by the presidents of Iran and the Federative Republic of Brazil and Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, the latter two countries are now members of the IAEA Board of Governors of the co-constructive dialogue nucleated We've had a result, it issued a "Joint Statement on Iran, Turkey and Brazil on May 17, 2010" be sure to attach a copy of your offer to do it officially. Iran agreed with the contents of the joint statement and the individual sections that are contiguous to each section of the importance of the, are announced.

For the implementation of the Joint Statement, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Declaration is hereby Firstly, Iran agreed to in writing content formally especially five- paragraph statement declares its first agency. These clauses include:

73 One. Our commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related materials that we stress the rights of all members, including the Islamic Republic of Iran's peaceful use and without discrimination, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as the nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) are recalled.

Two. We have expressed their conviction that the time has come now to the process forward in a positive, constructive and Ghyrtqably lead to an era of interaction and cooperation.

Three. We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange bed to start cooperation in various fields especially peaceful nuclear cooperation including construction and research reactors is to.

Four. Based on this point the nuclear fuel exchange constructive move forward and provide a starting point for cooperation between nations. Such a move positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities to be conducted. And any such confrontational tactics, threatening actions or statements that Iran's nuclear rights and obligations under the NPT hurts to be avoided and nuclear cooperation can replace them.

Five. Based on the above, in order to facilitate the nuclear cooperation mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran on loan investments 1,200 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey agrees. This material is the property of Iranian LEU in Turkey will be. Iran and the IAEA allows secure storage of these materials to see Gary on the LEU in Turkey.

We expect the Agency in accordance with paragraph 6 of the statement, the Vienna Group (America, Russia, France and the IAEA) informed of its provisions and to reflect our positive response of the Vienna Group. Such a move, according to the statement began negotiations for a more detailed elaboration of fuel swap agreements in writing and will make appropriate arrangements between Iran and the Vienna Group.

We look forward to receiving your response as soon as we are.

Please accept Your Excellency, my best greetings

Ali Akbar Salehi

Vice President and Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

Resource: http://www.iran-embassy.dk/Full%20text%20of%20Iran%20letter%20to%20IAEA.pdf

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