1 2 3x 6 4 5 6 The German-Japanese-Italian Axis 7 8 as Seen from Fascist Italy 9 10 1 ISHIDA KEN 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1 The Stance of German-Japanese-Italian Axis 1 2 East-Asian Crises and Globalization of the Axis 2 2.1 The Brussels Nine-Power Conference 2.2 The Conclusion of the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact 3 2.3 Italian Recognition of ‘Manchukuo’ and German Mediation of the 4 Sino-Japanese War 5 2.4 Italian Withdrawal from the League of Nations 6 3 Three Types of Images for Designing the New Order 7 3.1 Counter Image: Countervailing Ideology 8 3.2 Parallel Image: The ‘Realist’ Chain Reaction of Aggression 3.3 Mirror Image: The Expectation of Appeasement Reflecting on the 9 Decision-Making Process 30 4 Conclusion 1 2 3 1 THE STANCE OF GERMAN-JAPANESE-ITALIAN AXIS 4 his chapter covers the whole Tripartite Axis through a comparative 5 Tanalysis on the decision-making processes of the three countries. It 36 deals with multilateral interactions rather than German-Japanese rela- 37 tions alone. From November to December 1937 after the outbreak of the 38 Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 there occurred five important interna- 39 tional events, namely the Brussels Nine-Power Conference, the Anti- 40 Comintern Pact (Nichi-Doku-I Bo–kyo– Kyo–tei signed by Germany and Japan 41 on 25 November 1936 and extended in November 1937 to include Italy), 42 Italian recognition of ‘Manchukuo’ (Manchuria), German mediation of 43 the Sino-Japanese War, and Italian withdrawal from the League of 44 Nations. This chapter scrutinizes these five events as seen from Italy.1 In 45 doing so it gives careful consideration to the ideological background, 46 international environment and decision-making structure in the three 47R countries. The German-Japanese-Italian Axis as Seen from Fascist Italy 263

The following statements were from 6 November 1937 by the signers 1 of the Anti-Comintern Pact, now extended by Italy. The gap between 2 their formal statements and informal discourses behind the scenes 3 reflected the characteristics of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and ultra- 4 nationalist Japan, which previous analyses point out.2 5 6 Galeazzo Ciano (Italian Foreign Minister): 7 8 The pact is a realistic instrument to serve the interest of peace and civ- 9 ilization, which Fascism intends to defend against any threat. 10 1 Joachim von Ribbentrop (German Ambassador to Britain): 2 3 The internal propaganda and the external armed intervention are 4 aimed at destroying nation states so as to fulfil the original purpose of 5 the Comintern. 6 7 Hotta Masaaki (Japanese Ambassador to Italy): 8 9 The pact successfully brings fruitful results since the three countries 20 have the most antique traditions, the most youthful aspirations and 1 the most industrious national characters.3 2 3 Ciano wrote in his diary on the same day: 4 5 Three nations are embarking together upon a path, which may perhaps 6 lead them to war. A war necessary in order to break through the 7 crust, which is stifling the energy and the aspirations of the young 8 nations.4 9 30 War instead of peace was often mentioned in the statements of Benito 1 Mussolini during this period. Such double-dealing underlies the classic 2 interpretation of the Fascist Italian foreign policy, which emphasizes its 3 ‘fraudulent’ character, that they baffled other countries by saying things 4 contrary to their intentions and then acting in accordance with their real 5 objectives.5 36 While Ciano was officially stressing peace, Ribbentrop was maintain- 37 ing his offensive attitudes. He was conscious that the Tripartite Pact 38 should be considered as ‘the alliance of the aggressive nations against 39 the satisfied nations’. Ribbentrop as Ambassador to Britain informally 40 said to Mussolini on the day the pact was signed that the British side 41 would react vigorously against such a provocative alliance. In terms of 42 the classic interpretation, Adolf Hitler was consistently more ideological 43 than Ribbentrop and thought that he could achieve German living space 44 (Lebensraum) through continuous threats.6 45 According to Hotta’s comment after the war, the pact with Italy seemed 46 to him ‘mere nonsense’. He said that he had concluded the pact because 47R