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Home , Adolf Hitler, Banat, Banat (1941–1944), Baranya (region), Greater Romania, Invasion of Yugoslavia

Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited competing claimstotheSerbianBanatinspringof1941 ortotheensuingcrisis. over Transylvaniain1940,relativelylittleattentionhasbeen paidtoRomaniaandHungary’s ethnic . Romanian foreign-policymakersinthe1920sand1930s,wasthusjettisonedfavourof The conceptofaRomaniabasedonthelegalityParispeacetreaties,asconceivedby with attemptstoregaintheterritorieslostin1940SovietUnion,HungaryandBulgaria. makers werenolongerconcernedmerelywithprotectingthecountry’sterritorialintegrityor been partoftheRomanianstateorprincipalities.foreign-policy sion ofRomaniaonthebasisethnicprinciple.Afterall,SerbianBanathadnever to theSerbianBanatrepresentedbeginningofapolicywhichsoughtjustifyexpan- Romanian territorywithreferencetotheParispeacetreatiesandinternationallaw,claim argued that,whereasinthepastRomaniangovernmenthadjustifiedpossessionof nationalist sentimentbothwithinRomaniaandintheSerbianBanatitself.Itwillfurtherbe will arguethattheRomaniangovernmentlayclaimtoregion,encouragedbygrowing object ofrivalterritorialclaimsbytheReich’sRomanianandHungarianallies.Thisarticle under thetermsofTreatyTrianonin1920.TheSerbianBanatquicklybecame portion oftheBanat(historicallyknownasTemesvár),relinquishedbyHungary began. AmongstthespoilsofwarwasSerbian(orYugoslav).Thiswestern . WithinaweekBelgradehadsurrenderedandthedismembermentofYugoslavia Hillgruber, ’s foreignpolicy,devotes onlytwopagestothecrisisoverSerbianBanat.See Andreas in thesecondaryliteratureasWestBanat.Hillgruber, his otherwisedetailedstudyofGeneral Yugoslav, Banat,theregionwillbedescribedasSerbianBanat inthisarticle.Itissometimesalsoknown 58. , 1994,p. Burcin in been describedasaschemefor‘anewGreaterRomania’byJipa Rotaru,VladimirZodianandOctavian April61941theGermanslauncheda On themorningof Introduction Central 05W .Mny&SnLdDOI:10.1179/147909605 © 2005W.S.Maney&SonLtd ‘A NEWGREATERROMANIA’?ROMANIAN 2 1 While historianshavepaidconsiderableattentiontothe Romanian-Hungariandispute CLAIMS TOTHESERBIANBANATIN1941 Since inthearchivaldocumentsdisputedareaismostfrequently referredtoastheSerbian,ratherthan The Romaniangovernment’smemorandumofApril231941officially claimingtheSerbianBanathas University CollegeLondon,SchoolofSlavonicandEastEuropeanStudies Mares Hitler, KönigCarolundMarschall Antonescu.Diedeutsch-rumänischenBeziehungen1938–1944 , Vol.3,No.2,November2005 c alul IonAntonescu.Amfa Rebecca AnnHaynes b cut ‘Ra b zboiul Sfântîmpotrivabols c evismului’. Campaniaanului1941 attackonthekingdomof 2 Where x 69374 1 , , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited there isnodistrictinallEuropewheretheracesaresoinextricablymingledasBanat’. (to thesouth).AsR.W.Seton-Watsonwroteattimeofconference,‘ethnographically three sidesbytheRiverMaros(tonorth),Tiszawest)andDanube square kilometresandapopulationofsomeonehalfmillion,theBanatwasboundedon ) at24.5%,theSerbs18%andHungarians15.3%. largest groupsweretheRomaniansat37.4%oftotalpopulation,‘Swabians’(ethnic the Banatwas,asSeton-Watsonsuggested,inhabitedbynumerousnationalities.Thefour Consisting ofthethreeformerlyHungariancountiesTemes,TorontálandKrassó-Szörény, up fordiscussionduringtheParispeaceconferencein1919. Lloyd Georgeissaidtohaveexclaimed,‘wherethehellBanat?’,whenregioncame The Background:ParisPeaceConferenceandRomanianInter-warForeignPolicy change itspolicyandplacetheregionunderdirectGermanmilitaryadministration. and imperiltheirplansfortheinvasionofSovietUnion.TheReichwasthusforcedto that theGermansgenuinelyfearedarmedconflictwouldbreakoutbetweentwocountries intensity ofRomanian-HungariananimosityoverthedisposalSerbianBanat,however, originally foreseenthere-incorporationofSerbianBanatintoHungary.Suchwas offering theSerbianBanattoRomania,AdolfHitlerandGermanforeignministryhad sought togainpossessionoftheterritoryfromdefeatedHungary. enlightened bythefloodofpropagandaproducedbothSerbsandRomanianswho attempted toforcetheregiononareluctantRomania. Banat havenotbeenfullyelaborated,whilesomeevenassertedthattheThirdReich historians havediscussedthequestion,Romaniangovernment’sclaimstoSerbian p 149–59. pp. martie-iunie 1941’inMihaiTimofte(ed.), 94 ,p.417 42.Pvoic’ li srpae yBi:se oa .294. 451–72(462).Pavlowitch’sclaimisrepeatedbyBoia:see,Boia,p. 1964, 4,pp. to ,seeK.StPavlowitch,‘YugoslaviaandRumania,1941’, 1941’, 157.SeealsoOttoTras see ibid.,p. –0 p 1013–27;andOttmarTras 9–10, pp. by D.Cocking), Serbo-Roumainian FrontierProblem C. Bra Eugene B.Boia,‘România s Yugoslavia intheInter-warPeriod,1919–1941 in thedisputeoverSerbianBanatareprovidedbyEugeneBoia see, forexample,A.Simion, 125–26.ForadiscussionoftheTransylvaniandisputeandViennaAward1940, , 1965,pp. 100 358,000 Serbsand240,000Hungarians. See,Spector, 199,243.ShermanDavidSpectorputsthe populationatsome600,000Romanians,385,000Germans, pp. Ersten Weltkrieg.DieGrenzziehung inderDobrudschaundimBanatdieFolgeprobleme 7 6 5 4 3 R. W.Seton-Watson, For theSerbianargumentsforclaimingBanat,see,example, JovanRadonic Quoted inShermanDavidSpector, Tras The statisticsarefromaHungarian censusof1910.See,AndreaSchmidt-Rösler, b tianu Transylvanian Review c ca b , forexample,limitshisdiscussiontotheRomaniangovernmentmemorandum of23April1941: , Ias c ,19,p 101. i, 1995,p. The ProblemoftheBanat , 4,1995,pp.45–59.FortheassertionthatGermanyoffered SerbianBanat c Europe intheMeltingPot i problemaBanatuluiIugoslavînprima Dictatul delaViena , ,1919.FortheRomaniancase,seeGeorgeG.Mironesco(translated c ca c ca b , ‘AspectsoftheRomanian-Hungarianrelationsbetween1940 and b , ‘Diferenderomâno-maghiareînproblemaBanatuluiSârbesc— Rebecca AnnHaynes Romania attheParisPeaceConference:AstudyindiplomacyofIoan I. , Paris,1919. ole O 93 s.p.291–308(hereafter,Boia).Seealso , BoulderCO,1993,esp.pp. Concepte s , Cluj,1972.Notableexceptionstothisgenerallackofinterest odn 99 p 335–37 (337). , ,1919,pp. c Romania attheParisPeaceConference i metodologiiînstudiulrelat 3 Thisarticlewillarguethatfarfrom b vara anului1941’, Journal ofCentralEuropeanAffairs 4 Romania’s DiplomaticRelationswith Hewas,onehopes,quickly 7 5 c Withanareaof28,523 iilor internat , Frankfurt/Main,1994, Revista istorica a Rumänien nachdem .147. , p. , c The Banatandthe ionale , Ias b , 5,1994, c i, 1997, , 21, 6 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited its entirety,theregionwasdivided. threat toresignandallowtheBolsheviksinvadeRomaniaifhedidnotreceiveBanatin military supportfortheAllies.Aftermuchacrimonyatpeaceconference,andBra counties inhabitedbyRomanians(theso-called‘Tiszafrontier’)astherewardforRomanian government theentiretyofBanataswellTransylvania,BukovinaandHungarian side oftheTripleEntente,tojustifyRomania’sclaim.ThetreatyhadpromisedRomanian secret treatyofAugust1916,whichhadbroughtRomaniaintotheFirstWorldWaron criteria, sincetheRomaniansweresinglelargestnationalityinregion.Healsoused the RomaniansfearedthatGermanymightsupportHungary’s claimtoTransylvania.By1940 leadership frombackingHungary’srevisionistdemands at Romania’sexpense.Inparticular, relationswiththeReichinordertoprevent GermanforeignministryorNazi by Romaniain1918.Atthesametime,Romanian foreign-policy makersalsosought against theSovietUnion,whichcovetedformerRussian provinceofBessarabia,gained Reich onRomania’spart.Germanyalonewasseenaspowerful enoughtoprotectRomania the re-entryofSovietUnionintointernationalaffairs necessitatedbetterrelationswiththe however, thegrowthofGermaneconomicandpoliticalinfluenceinEastCentralEurope pating countriesagainstHungarianandBulgarianrevisionismrespectively.Bythemid-, Yugoslavia werejoinedbyGreeceandTurkey).Thesealliancesaimedtoprotectthepartici- (which alsoincludedCzechoslovakia)andoftheBalkanEntente(inwhichRomania Paris peacetreaties.BothRomaniaandYugoslaviaweremembersoftheLittleEntente based onmaintainingthecountry’sterritorialintegritywithinbordersestablishedby the durationofinter-warperiod.Romanianforeignpolicy,likethatYugoslavia,was peace conference,RomaniaandYugoslaviabecamealliesin1921weretoremainsofor .181. p. in drawingupthenewborder.See IvoJ.Lederer, 300–04. describe them.Seeibid.,pp. . thereafter knownastheRomanianBanat)andtwo-fifthstoKingdomofSerbs, south ofSzeged,whilethree-fifthstheremainderwasawardedtoRomania(which quickly madehimunpopular.Bra Liberal premierIoanI.C.Bra Romania werefinalizedinaconventionof1923. Treaty ofTrianon.MeanwhiletheintricatedetailsSerbianBanat’seasternborderwith Banat. Hungarywasforcedtorecognizethesenewfrontiersunderthetermsof1920 portion wasincorporatedintotheSouthSlavkingdomandbecameknownasSerbian kingdom, whilesome65,000SouthSlavsfoundthemselvesonRomaniansoil. which dividedtheBanatintwo.Thus,some75,000RomanianswereleftSouthSlav and Romanianswhoweredestinedtoliveonthe‘wrongside’ofnewpoliticalborder and 1923,wasbasedontheneedtoensurearelativeequilibriuminnumberofSouthSlavs 11 10 9 8 Despite theanimositycreatedbetweenRomaniansandSouthSlavsduring The RomaniandelegationattheParispeaceconferencein1919wasledbyNational A workabledistributionofrailway andrivercommunicationsinbothcountrieswasalsoaconsideration The complicationsoftheSerbian-Romanian borderweresuchthatittakesRöslerafullfivepages to Rösler, For Bra 9 b WhileRomaniathusreceivedthelion’sshareofBanat,remainingwestern in n h ec ofrne e bd,ep p 147–50. tianu andthepeaceconference,seeibid.,esp.pp. Rumänien nachdemErstenWeltkrieg b tianu, whoseaggressiveadvocacyofRomania’sterritorialclaims ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ b tianu basedhisclaimtothewholeofBanatonethnic 8 HungaryreceivedasmallportionofthehistoricBanat .337. , p. Yugoslavia attheParisPeaceConference 10 Thepartition,workedoutbetween1920 , NewHaven,1963, 11 b tianu’s 101 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Pact. between thetwocountriesensued,andonNovember23RomaniaenteredTripartite in RomaniaonOctober141940.Aperiodoffurthermilitaryandeconomiccollaboration The Germanmilitarymission,whichCarolhadfirstrequestedinthesummerof1940,arrived now assumedpowerandbroughtCarol’spolicyofseekingalliancewithGermanytofruition. General IonAntonescu,inalliancewiththeLegionarymovement,headedbyHoriaSima, Carol wascompelledtoabdicateasaresultofpopularindignationattheseterritoriallosses. Romania wasalsoforcedtorelinquishsovereigntyoversouthernDobrujaBulgaria.King 30 1940,RomaniawasforcedtocedenorthernTransylvaniaHungary.InSeptember, claims bytheSovietUnionandHungary.Nevertheless,underViennaAwardofAugust Carol II’smovestowardsanalliancewithGermanyinefforttoforestallfurtherterritorial andthenorthernBukovinainlateJunetoSovietUnionwasfollowedbyKing of Romanianterritorybyherrevisionistneighboursinthesummer1940.Theloss expansion butratherastheReich’seconomichinterland, andasasourceofmilitary .YettheBalkanshadneverbeen envisagedasanobjectofGerman attack onYugoslaviawastheresultofHitler’sneedto secure theBalkansbeforelaunching should haveexercisedthemindsofRomanianforeign-policy makersinApril1941.The It was,however,onlyasaresultoftheReich’sinvasion of YugoslaviathattheSerbianBanat The Background:GermanForeignPolicyintheBalkans obliged thesignatoriestomutual assistanceifanyofthemwereattackedbyapowernotalreadyat . pro-German elementsinRomania, seeRebeccaHaynes, Basingstoke andNewYork,2000. Romanian Banat. part ofTransylvaniastillunderRomaniansovereigntywhileYugoslaviawastoreceivethe had beenreachedaspartofthetreatywherebyHungarywastohaveafreehandannexthat ‘treaty ofeternalfriendship’inDecember1940.Romanianofficialsfearedthatanagreement Romania andYugoslaviawerenotimprovedbythesigningofYugoslav-Hungarian ments tobeinvalid,thusannullingRomania’sallianceswithYugoslavia.Relationsbetween Antonescu declaredallpacts,accordsanddiplomaticagreementsofthepreviousroyalgovern- established diplomaticrelationswiththeSovietUnion.InlateSeptember1940,General in whichtheSovietsinvadedandoccupiedBessarabia,Yugoslavgovernmentfinally Soviets overBessarabiaandwithHungaryTransylvania.Indeed,inJune,themonth 1940 owingtothelackofYugoslavsupportduringRomania’sdiplomaticconflictswith with herformerallies.RelationsYugoslaviahadalreadybecomefrostybythesummerof Union. through alliancewiththeReich,andloyalparticipationinplannedinvasionofSoviet the SovietUnionandHungary. the RomaniangovernmentincreasinglyregardedGermanyasmediatorinitsdisputeswith 102 14 13 12 Economic andpoliticalconcessionstotheReich,however,didnotpreventtruncation The pro-GermanpolicyinitiatedbyKingCarolnecessarilyaffectedRomania’srelations oa p 272–87. Boia, pp. The originalTripartitePactbetween ,ItalyandJapanwassignedonSeptember271940. It For Romania’sincreasinglypro-Germanforeignpolicyunder King CarolII,andtheinfluenceof 13 Antonescunowhopedthathewouldbeabletowinbacktheterritorieslostin1940 14 12 Rebecca AnnHaynes Romanian PolicyTowardsGermany, 1936–40 , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited ht‘trmie atflt ...]theagreementofViennaMarch25’. . that ‘itremainedfaithfulto[. Germans. Hence,onApril3,theYugoslavgovernmentinformedGermansandItalians that theCroatsandSlovenesinYugoslavarmycouldbetrustedtofightagainst the sameproblemsasthatofPrincePaul:itwassurroundedbyAxisforcesanddidnotbelieve anti-Axis wave,wouldbeanti-Naziinitsforeignpolicy. historians, HitlerassumedthattheSimovic unseated PrincePaul’sgovernment.Likemanycontemporaryobserversandsubsequent military coupledbyGeneralSimovic Tripartite PactonMarch251941inVienna.Thiswasfollowedonlytwodayslaterbya allies andtheirtroops.Inthesecircumstances,thegovernmentfeltcompelledtosign preparation forthelaunchofOperationMarita.YugoslaviawasnowsurroundedbyAxis 1941 BulgariafollowedsuitandtheGerman12tharmysubsequentlyenteredin Yugoslavia’s HungarianandRomanianneighboursjoinedtheTripartitePact.OnMarch1 ingly limitedasneighbouringstatesenteredtheAxiscamp.InlateNovember1940, the ,readyforaninvasionofnorthernAegeaninspring1941. diplomatic influenceintheregion.Thedirectiveenvisagedabuild-upofGermantroops with theaimofsecuringItaly’spositioninBalkansandeliminatingBritishmilitary diplomatic leaders.OnNovember121940,HitlerissuedthedirectiveforOperationMarita Mussolini’s actionthusbroughttheBalkansunderdirectgazeofReich’smilitaryand of theRomanianoilfieldsonwhichReichdependedforsuppliespetroleum. fields weremadeavailabletotheRoyalAirForce,withpresumedimplicationsforsecurity reversals withtheGreeksevenpenetratingintoItalian-heldAlbania.Worsestill,Greekair- in theBalkans. to fearthataBritish-backed‘front’includingYugoslavia,GreeceandTurkeycouldtakeshape Prince Paul,headofthegovernment,wasstronglypro-British.Hitlerhad,therefore,reason tion. AlthoughtheYugoslavgovernmenthadmovedclosertoAxisinlate1930s, for theinvasionofYugoslaviahadbeenlaid. government’s declarationcametoolate,however,since bythisstageGermanmilitaryplans ttgr,17,p.9–41. , 1973,pp. Zwischenspiel aufdemBalkan.Die deutschePolitikgegenüberJugoslawienundGriechenlandvonMärzbis Juli1941 58–70,118–25. Darmstadt, 1966,pp. W. Fabry, via inCrisis,1934–1941 History dismember Yugoslavia. placed Hitler’splansforOperationBarbarossainjeopardy. Britain’s supportforGreeceunderthetermsofpoliticalguaranteeApril1939,however, manpower andresources.Mussolini’sinvasionofGreeceonOctober281940,Great 20 19 18 17 16 15 Within thisoverallstrategy,however,Yugoslavia’sattitudetotheReichneededclarifica- Quoted inHoptner, On GermanpolicytowardsYugoslavia upuntiltheinvasionofApril1941,seeKlausOlshausen, Hoptner, 363.ForYugoslavia’sforeignpolicy,seeJ.B.Hoptner, Presseisen, ‘Preludeto“Barbarossa’’’,p. H. R.Trevor-Roper, Ernst L.Presseisen,‘Preludeto“Barbarossa’’:GermanyandtheBalkans, 1940–1941’, 2 ac–eebr16,p.359–70(361). , 32,March–December1960,pp. Balkan-Wirren 1940–41.DiplomatischeundmilitärischeVorbereitung desdeutschenDonauübergangs Yugoslavia inCrisis 17 TheYugoslavgovernment’sfreedomofaction,however,becameincreas- e ok 92 s.p.212-96.ForYugoslavrelationswithBritain,seePhilipp , NewYork,1962,esp.pp. Yugoslavia inCrisis Hitler’s WarDirectives,1939–1945 19 Inreality,however,thenewYugoslavgovernmentwasfacedby .296. , p. ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ a , commander-in-chiefoftheYugoslavairforce,which .284. , p. a government,broughttopoweronthecrestofan odn 96 p 90–92. , London,1966,pp. 18 Hethereforedecidedtoattackand 15 Italianforcesweresoonsuffering 20 TheYugoslav Journal ofModern 16 Yugosla- 103 , , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited action andevenmoreinregardtotheBarbarossaOperationlateron’. Hitler pronouncedYugoslaviatobe‘anuncertainfactorwithrespectthecomingMarita of Yugoslaviathereshallbepermanentpeaceandeternalfriendship’. declared, somewhatbombastically,that‘betweentheKingdomofHungaryand of eternalfriendship’signedwithYugoslaviaon10December1940.Article1thetreatyhad declaration ofindependencewhichwouldsignalthefinaldissolutionYugoslavstate. to theliberationoffellowMagyars’.Thiswas,however,awaitexpectedCroatian ambitions. TheAdmiraldeclaredHungary’sroleinthewaragainstYugoslaviatobe‘limited reaction tothenewsofplannedattack,althoughitdidnotmaskHungary’sterritorial at theSupremeWarCouncilheldonApril1wasthussomewhatmoresoberthanhisinitial Union. decided, wastobelimitedprotectingRomania’sfrontierswithYugoslaviaandtheSoviet in theattackwasnotenvisaged.TheRomanianarmy’smission,Führerhadalready andHungaryweretobeaskedprovidemilitarysupport,Romania’sparticipation coastline toItaly,MacedoniaBulgaria,andtheSerbianBanatHungary.While decision todestroyYugoslaviaandaddedthatheintendedawardYugoslavia’sAdriatic .256. p. Yugoslavia, ,March271941. VA, 1949–76(hereafter offering himtheSerbianBanatasareward.Accordingto thisversionofevents,thegeneral Germans attemptedtobribeGeneralAntonescuassist intheinvasionofYugoslaviaby Romanian militaryinterventionagainstYugoslavia.Indeed, ithasbeenclaimedthatthe of itsunwillingsatellitesis,perhaps,responsiblefortheclaims thatGermanofficialsdemanded against, andproposeddissolutionof,Yugoslavia. Banat. ThisdecisionwastheresultofRomanianreactiontonewsimpendingwar the Germandecision,takenonApril5,topostponeHungarianoccupationofSerbian proclaimed itsindependence,thishadlesstodowithHorthy’sdeclarationsofApril1than Although theHungarianarmydidnotenterYugoslaviauntilApril11,dayCroatia ’s revisionistambitionsandheradherencetotheTripartitePact. British governmentofHungary’sgoodintentionstowardstheWest,notwithstanding Britain andGermany.ThroughthetreatywithYugoslavia,Telekihadhopedtoreassure prompted thegovernment,ledbyPálTeleki,topursueaforeignpolicyofbalancebetween The beliefthattheWesternpowerswouldeventuallydefeatGermans,however,had invade YugoslaviaandawardtheSerbianBanattoHungary‘withunrestrainedenthusiasm’. treaty, itseems,didnotpreventAdmiralHorthyfromreactingtothenewsofHitler’splan In hismeetingwithmilitary commandersonMarch271941,thedayofSimovic Reactions The GermanDecisiontoAttackandDismemberYugoslavia:HungarianRomanian 104 26 25 24 23 22 21 Hungary’s participationintheplannedcampaign,however,wouldcontravene‘treaty The viewoftheThirdReichasall-powerfulinforeignpolicy, andthecynicalmanipulator bd,p.259–62. ThedecisiontotakepartintheattackonYugoslavialedTeleki’s suicideonApril3. Ibid., pp. 229–30,253. Ibid., pp. Thomas Sakmyster, Juhász, Ibid., and Documents onGermanForeignPolicy,SeriesD:1937–1945 22 DGFP, D Hungarian ForeignPolicy1919–1945 o.1,n.26 ürrsdrcien.26,Führer’sheadquarters,April31941. 256,Führer’sdirectiveno. 12,no. , vol. DGFP, D Hungary’s AdmiralonHorseback: MiklósHorthy,1918–1944 ,vl 2 o 217,Minutesofaconferenceregardingthesituationin 12,no. ), vol. Rebecca AnnHaynes uaet 99 .179. , ,1979,p. , 14vols,WashingtonDC,LondonandArlington 23 Theexistenceofthe 21 25 Heannouncedhis Horthy’sstatement , NewYork,1994, a coup, 26 24 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited with MarshalvonBrauchitsch,Commander-in-ChiefoftheGermanarmy,onApril3. a morebelligerenttoneindealingwithGermanofficials.Thisisevidenthisconversation permission bytheGermanstoannexSerbianBanatandthispromptedAntonescuadopt same day,theGeneralconfirmedthistoItalianministerinBucharest. not takepartinanyactionresultingchangestopoliticalstructurestheBalkans.On 31, AntonescuhadalreadyinformedtheYugoslavministerinBucharestthatRomaniawould ment, however,wasclearlyawareoftheimpendingdestructionitsformerally.OnMarch on theeveningofApril51941,daybeforeattacktookplace.TheRomaniangovern- General AntonescuwasonlyofficiallyinformedoftheGermandecisiontoinvadeYugoslavia Serbian Banat. German operationsintheeventofanySovietintervention. Antonescu confirmedthatheenvisionedtheRomanianarmy’smissionasofbackingup Echoing Hitler’sdecisionregardingtheroleofRomaniainattackonYugoslavia, Romania, Antonescuasserted,wouldnottakepartinanymilitaryactionagainstYugoslavia. Yugoslavia inCrisis 295,andHoptner, non-aggression treatybetweenthe twocountrieswassignedonApril6.SeeBoia,p. 17. 1991, p. , thattheywouldtakeactionintheeventofattackson theDanube:Boia,‘Românias Romania totakecounter-measures.ThecrisispassedoncetheRomanian governmentmadeitcleartothe on April3thatYugoslaviaintendedtosabotageDanubetraffic. In thisevent,theGermanswouldexpect Reich appearstohavecomeaskingRomaniaparticipateinmilitary actionwasawarningtoAntonescu .127. p. invasion. 26whichconfirmedRomania’spassiveroleduringtheplanned Hitler issueddirectiveno. Romania shouldremainanon-participantinmilitaryactionagainstYugoslavia.OnApril3, down. Antonescu, however,manfullyresistedGermantemptation,thusforcingtheGermanstoback was threatenedwith HungarianoccupationoftheSerbianBanatifhedidnotcomply. Hungarian troops.SeeKeithHitchins, east ofTimis German plantosendHungariantroopsintotheSerbianBanatbyrefusing totransferRomaniantroopsthe Banatului Iugoslavînprimavara 419.BossywasRomanianministerinBerlinatthetimeofSerbianBanatcrisis. 2,p. vol. via’. See,AlexandruCretzianu, resolute attitudehadthedesiredeffect.TheGermansdidnotinsistfurtherthatwejointhemagainstYugosla- a veryspecialeffortinBucharesttobringAntonescuintothisdastardlyaggression’butthat‘Antonescu’s Alexandru Cretzianu,whohadservedas‘secretary-general’attheRomanianforeignministry,‘theAxismade 294.Accordingtothememoirsof 451–72(462).ThisclaimisrepeatedbyBoia,seep. 21, 1964,4,pp. M.-A. Bossy), 235–36.Inasimilarvein,seeRaoulV.Bossy(editedandtranslatedbyG.H. and Oxford,1998,pp. 32 31 30 29 28 27 The Romaniangovernment,however,wassuspiciousthatHungaryhadbeengiven Such wasthesubordinateroleassignedtoRomaniainGermanmilitarycampaignthat On 1April,theYugoslavgovernment hadturnedtotheSovietUnionforassistance.Afriendship and Ekkehard Völkl, Tras This pointismadebyNeubacher,theReich’sSpecialCommissioner forEconomicQuestions.See DGFP, D For thisview,seeK.StPavlowitch,‘YugoslaviaandRumania,1941’, 27 c ca Inreality,however,thereisnoevidencethatHitlerwaveredinhisdecision b 28 Dfrnermn-ahaeî rbeaBntliSrec—mri-ui 91,p 154. , ‘Diferenderomâno-maghiareînproblemaBanatuluiSârbesc— martie-iunie 1941’,p. c Moreover,heneverwithdrewhispromisetotheHungariansawardthem oara, whichtheReichhadrequestedinordertoimprovecommunications betweenGermanand o.1,n.256,Führer’sdirectiveno.26,headquarters,April31941.Theclosestthe 12,no. , vol. Recollections ofaRomanianDiplomat,1918–1969:DiariesandMemoirs 29 p 276–81. , pp. Der Westbanat1941–1944.Diedeutsche, dieungarischeundandereVolksgruppen Sonderauftrag Südost1940–1945.BerichteinesfliegendenDiplomaten b anului1941’,p.1015.Antonescudid,however,registerhisobjection tothe Relapse intoBondage:PoliticalMemoirsofaRomanianDiplomat,1918–1947 ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ Rumania 1866–1947 xod 94 .470. , Oxford,1994,p. 32 If Hungarian troopswere to IfHungarian Journal ofCentralEuropeanAffairs , 2vols,Stanford,2003, 30 , Göttingen,1957, c i problema , , , Ias 105 31 c , i Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited part inmilitaryactiononlytothewestofriver. troops wouldnotbeallowedtooperateeastoftheTiszainSerbianBanat,buttake including vonRibbentrop,wereatpainstoinformBossyandAntonescuthatHungarian Banat, ‘wasnotdesired’. that deploymentofHungariantroopseastthelowerTisza,inotherwordsSerbian the lastminute.Hence,adirectiveissuedbyGermanHighCommandon5Aprilstated intervention, theGerman-plannedHungarianinvasionofSerbianBanatwascalledoffat totelephoneBerlinwiththisinformation. would beboundtoensue.Accordinghismemoirs,Neubacherthenrushedback Hungary enteredtheBanat,Romaniantroopswouldhavetomarchintoo,andconflict When Neubacherclaimedignorance,AntonescuchargedhimwithinformingHitlerthatif neutral intheconflict.HethenaskedNeubacherwhowouldoccupySerbianBanat. relations withYugoslaviaandhadnoterritorialclaimsagainstherwouldthereforeremain coming invasion.Onhearingthenews,AntonescurespondedthatRomaniahadgood travelled toGeneralAntonescu’svillaintheCarpathiansinformhimofficiallyof of April5,HermannNeubacher,theReich’sSpecialCommissionerforEconomicQuestions, of theSerbianBanatbyHungaryreceivedfurtherconfirmationnextday.Onevening the Transylvaniandispute.RequestsbyRomanians forGermanandItalianmediation , whoserevisionistclaimswerereceivingSoviet backing,andtheRomaniansover In thesummerof1940,Germanshadgreatlyfearedthat warwouldbreakoutbetweenthe Banat Romanian-Hungarian TensionsandtheirConsequencesfortheReich’sPolicytowardsSerbian enter thearea. was ‘notopeningtheproblemofSerbianBanat’,itcouldnotallowHungariantroopsto von Ribbentrop.AlthoughBossyassuredRibbentropthattheRomaniangovernment between theRomanianministerinBerlin,RaoulBossy,andGermanforeignminister, into theSerbianBanatwashintedatagainonfollowingday,duringconversation in Bucharest,April51941,from Bossy; 404. 2,p. vol. foreign ministryinBucharest,April41941.Seealso,RaoulV. Bossy, , April31941,fromGeneralAntonescu. 214–15,unnumberedtelegram,tothelegationsinBerlinand 82,pp. ter, MAE),fond71/,vol. him tointervene. occupy theSerbian Banat,however,theweightofpublicopinioninRomaniawouldforce Ritter, Berlin,April51941. Romania, April51941,fromvon Ribbentrop; 106 37 36 35 34 33 As aresultofthesealarmingindicationstheRomaniangovernment’spossiblemilitary These worryingindicationsofapossibleRomanianmilitaryresponsetotheannexation A,fn 1Grai,vl 82,p.230,telegramno.41193,legationinBerlin totheforeignministry MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. DGFP, D Neubacher, 41187,fromthelegationinBerlinto 224–26,telegramno. 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. Arhiva MinisteruluiAfacerilorExterne(ArchiveoftheMinistry ForeignAffairs,Bucharest),(hereaf- o.1,n.256,Führer’sdirectiveno.26,headquarters, 3April1941,footnote1. 12,no. , vol. 34 Sonderauftrag Südost 33 ThepossibilityofRomanianinterventionintheeventHungary’sentry 36 Onthesameday,representativesofGermanforeignministry, .126. , p. Rebecca AnnHaynes DGFP, D DGFP, D o.1,n.276,theforeignministrytolegationin 12,no. , vol. o.1,n.277,memorandum byAmbassador 12,no. , vol. 37 35 Reflections ofaRomanianDiplomat , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited conversation withtheHungarianministerinBerlin,Do military administrationoftheSerbianBanattobebrief.Indeed,onApril19,duringhis ‘gravest consequences’. mediation intheirdisputeswithHungaryoverTransylvania. right throughtheYugoslavcrisis.TheRomanianscontinuedtorequestGermanandItalian of frictionbetweenthetwocountriesthroughoutwinterandspring1940–41 of theRomanianpopulationinnorthernTransylvaniacontinued,however,tobeasource averred, wouldcause‘bewilderment’amongsttheRomanianpublic. the propectofHungaryjoiningpactafulltwenty-fourhoursbeforeRomania.This,Pop ministry officialonOctober18,theRomaniandiplomatValerPopregisteredhisdismayat affected HungaryandRomania’sentryintotheTripartitePact.SpeakingtoaGermanforeign had beenmurdered. villages ofTra foreign ministry.TheseincludedclaimsthatthewholemaleRomanianpopulationof population innorthernTransylvaniawasquicklybroughttotheattentionofGerman dispute. NewsofatrocitiescommittedbytheHungarianauthoritiesagainstRomanian the ViennaAwardinAugust1940whichhad,officiallyatleast,endedTransylvanian of theextenttowhichRomanian-Hungarianrelationshaddeterioratedsincesigning at2 .12. part 2,p. Bucharest, May131941. 35399,tothelegationsinBerlin andRomefromtheforeignministryin 370–72,telegramno. 82, pp. vol. nians. TheRomaniangovernmentrequestedGermanandItalian mediation. See,MAE,fond71/Germania, northern Transylvaniaandthatastatutebedrawnuptoregulate theorganizationandrightsofRoma- Axis recommendationsthatRomanianrefugeesbeallowedtoreturn totheirhomesinHungarian-controlled foreign ministryinBucharest,October181940,signedValeriuPop. ministry inBucharest,September271940. 148–59. pp. control. tion. OnlytheareawestofTisza,outsideSerbianBanat,wasplacedunderHungarian German HighCommandplacedtheSerbianBanatunderdirectmilitaryadministra- imperil GermanplansfortheinvasionofSovietUnion. aware ofhoweasilyRomanian-Hungariananimositycouldbeenflamed.Thisinturn amidst muchpompinBerlin,onNovember23. signing tookplaceinprovincialVienna.TheRomaniandelegationsignedtheTripartitePact first tosignthepact,onNovember20,Romaniansweremollifiedbyfactthat resolved byacompromise.AlthoughitprovedimpossibletopreventHungaryfrombeing forced theAxistointervenepreventaregionalconflict. 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 Romania andHungarywerenow,technicallyatleast,allies.Thequestionofthetreatment So greatwasthetensionbetweentwocountriesinautumnof1940thatithadeven Accordingly, onApril121941followingthesuccessfulblitzkriegassaultYugoslavia, C. A.Macartney, Hillgruber, On May131941,forinstance,theRomaniansreportedthatHungary wasrefusingtocooperatewith 89–104,‘Romania’sentryintotheTripartitePact,November231940’. 81,pp. MAE, 71/Germania,vol. 345–48,telegramno.40576,fromthelegationinBerlinto 80,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. 235,telegramno.60333,tothelegationinBerlinfromforeign 80,p. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. For theeventsleadinguptoViennaAwardof1940,seeHaynes, 43 TheGermanforeignministrywarnedHungarynottocrosstheTiszaonpainof b Hitler, KönigCarolundMarschallAntonescu snea andIphadbeenmassacredthateighteenLegionariesinTârguMures October Fifteenth:aHistoryofModern Hungary,1939–1945 39 44 Itseemsclear,however,thattheGermansinitiallyexpectedtheir ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ 41 .125. , p. y me Sztójay,Hitlerindicatedthathe 38 TheGermanswerealsoconscious 42 Germanleaderswerethusfully Romanian PolicyTowardsGermany , 2parts,Edinburgh,1956–57, 40 Thematterwasfinally 107 c , Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited state withwhomIliketowork:MussoliniandGeneralAntonescu’. with AntonescuinJanuary1941,Hitlerdeclaredthat‘inallEuropetherearetwoheadsof Hitler explained,hadrenderedimportanteconomicandmilitaryservicetoGermany. Hungarian governmentneededtounderstandGeneralAntonescu’sposition.Antonescu, Hitler explainedthattheSerbianBanatwouldeventuallyreverttoHungarybut for fearofoffendingAntonescu. claim ontheSerbianBanat,butexplainedthatterritorycouldnotbeannexedimmediately meeting withAdmiralHorthyonApril24,HitlerrepeatedthatheacknowledgedHungary’s the SerbianBanatasoriginallyplanned. apparently meantasarebukeforRomania’sroleinpreventingtheHungariansfromentering northern pointoftheSerbianBanatuptoVranjevo-Kikindarailwayline.Thisactionwas of pre-TrianonHungary,approachedtheGermansforofficialpermissiontooccupy times inmypresenceonlateroccasions’,wroteSchmidt. alwaysimpressedme’’,saidHitlermany Award anditsshortcomingsinfrontofHitler. ‘“That 1940, despitetheGermanshavingcategoricallywarnedhimnottomentionVienna northern .ThishadoccurredduringAntonescu’svisittoHitleronNovember22 two-hour rantagainstthetermsofAugust1940ViennaAwardandRomania’sloss interpreter, relatesinhismemoirsthattheFührerhadbeenmostimpressedbyAntonescu’s position whateveristakenagainstlaterHungariandemands regardingthisarea,butisonlya would entertheBanat’.VonRibbentropadded,however, that‘thisdoesnotsignifyany enter theBanatbeabandoned,sinceRomanianswere promisedthatonlyGermantroops Hungarian governmentthat‘theFührerrequestsanyideaofhavingtroops Two WorldWars foreigner toreceivetheIronCrossfromGermans.SeeJoseph Rothschild, footnote 5. 1941–1944 of Romania’sroleinpreventing aHungarianoccupationoftheSerbianBanat.See,Völkl, 156. p. exist becauseGermanywouldnotpermitit’. might becomehostiletowardRomania,itshouldbestatedthatthisdangerdoesnot participant intheattack,headdedthat‘shouldGeneralAntonescuexpressfearHungary of RomaniansensitivitieswithregardtoHungary.ConfirmingRomania’sroleasanon- the directiveconcerningattackonYugoslavia,hemadeitclearthatwasfullyaware when HungarywastoacquiretheSerbianBanat.AsearlyasApril3,Hitlerissued admiration forGeneralAntonescu,forcedtheGermanstoprevaricateonissueofexactly over it. would preparethewayforHungarianoccupationofregionandeventualsovereignty believed theGermanoccupationofSerbianBanatmightlastonlyafewmonths. 108 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 On April14,however,theHungarianarmyleadership,impatienttorestoreboundaries Of Hitler’shighopinionoftheGeneraltherecanbenodoubt.PaulSchmidt, As ittranspired,GermanfearsofaRomanian-Hungarianconflict,andHitler’spersonal It wasapparentlytheBulgarian minister inBucharestwhohadinformedhisHungariancounterpart Quoted inGh.Buzatu, Paul Schmidt, Macartney, Ottmar Tras DGFP, D Völkl, p 18–19. , pp. Der Westbanat1941–1944 o.1,n.26 ürrsdrcien.26,Führer’s headquarters,April31941. 256,Führer’sdirectiveno. 12,no. , vol. etl A 95 .317. , SeattleWA,1975,p. October Fifteenth c ca b Statist aufdiplomatischerBühne1923–1945 , ‘Diferenderomâno-maghiareînproblemaBanatuluiSârbesc— martie-iunie1941’, Mares at2 .13.HitlerapparentlytoldHorthythat‘theBanatisyours’,ibid., , part2,p. c alul Antonescuînfat .21. , p. 48 Rebecca AnnHaynes 51 VonRibbentrop’sresponsewastoinformthe c 46 a istoriei InhisconversationwithSztójayonApril19, on 99 .511.Antonescuwasalsothefirst , Bonn,1949,p. , Ias c ,2vl,19,vl ,dc 7 p 177–80. 1, doc. 27,pp. i, 2vols,1990,vol. 49 Duringhissubsequentmeeting East-Central Europebetweenthe 50 Der Westbanat 45 47 This Ina Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Romania, April211941,Rintelen. Serbian Banat’. in theFührerwillnotbebetrayed’andthatRomaniawouldduecourse‘receive apparently informedBossythat‘thetrustwhichtheRomaniansandtheirLeaderhaveplaced Antonescu hisconversationwithMeissner,theheadofFührer’schancellery.Meissnerhad ing theultimatefateofregion.OnMay21941,forinstance,BossyinBerlinreportedto Serbian BanatfromGermanofficials.Thiswastosowtheseedsoffurtherconfusionconcern- hardly surprisingthattheRomaniansreceivedconflictingstatementswithregardto the RomanianstolayclaimSerbianBanat. the foreignministrywasdeterminedthatGermanofficialsshouldnotactivelyencourage German foreignministry’sofficiallineindealingwiththeRomanians.Atsametime, the conclusionofpeace’. of theregionwasthat‘thefateareasbelongingtoYugoslaviawillnotbesettleduntil The foreignministry’sstandardresponsetoRomanianenquiriesregardingthefuturedisposal never withdrawn,thiscouldclearlynotbeconveyedtotheRomaniansinsomanywords. Although Hitler’s promisetotheHungariansthattheywould receivetheSerbianBanatwas Contradictions inGermanForeignPolicy General Antonescu,May111941, Bossy. 361–64, telegramno.80109,legationinBerlinto foreign ministryinBucharest,May 81941,Bossy,ibid.,pp. foreign ministryinBucharest,May 21941,Bossy. Antonescu’, adefinitedecisionregardingtheSerbianBanat hadnotyetbeenreached. according toMeissner,althoughtheFührerhad‘confirmed hisbeliefinRomaniaunder personally’ and‘asafriendofRomania’ratherthanas theFührer’srepresentative.Thus, and MeissnerlaterinthemonthconfirmedthatonMay 2Meissnerhadonlybeen‘speaking safeguard inordertopreventclashesbetweenHungarianandRomaniantroops’. prevent theHungariansfromcrossingTisza. Romania. GermanArmyCorps41wasnowtooccupythewholeofSerbianBanat Command orderedtheHungariantroopstowithdrawfromareaforfearofaconflictwith ‘depressed’ sectionsoftheRomanianarmy. Manfred vonKillinger,theGermanMinisterinBucharest,hadgreatlyaffectedand troops bewithdrawnfromthearea.Thenewsofoccupation,Antonescuinformed Romania andHungary.Thus,onApril15,GeneralAntonescudemandedthatHungarian keeping HungariantroopsoutoftheBanatentirely,onlyservedtoinflametensionsbetween ’sdecision,whichwasinflatcontradictiontotheforeignministry’spositionof quently, onApril15theHungarianstookholdofavitalbridgeheadinSerbianBanat.The the northofSerbianBanatbecausepossibleresistanceinarea.Conse- Command oftheGermanarmy,nevertheless,decidedtoallowHungarianarmyenter 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 Given theambiguityinforeignministry’sstrategyfordealingwithRomanians,itis A,fn 1Grai,vl 2 p 351–52,telegramno. 41294 fromthelegationinBerlinto 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. 318–19, telegramno.41270,fromthelegationinBerlinto 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. See, forexample, DGFP, D Olshausen, Völkl, DGFP, D Der Westbanat1941–1944 o.1,n.330,Theforeign ministrytothelegationinRomania,April131941. 12,no. , vol. 340,Theforeign ministertothelegationinHungary,Berlin,April141941. 12,no. , vol. Zwischenspiel aufdemBalkan 57 SadlyfortheRomanians,however,twofurthermeetingsbetweenBossy DGFP, D 55 Overthefollowingmonths,andindeedyears,thisremained o.1,n.376,The 12,no. , vol. .19. , p. ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ .110. , p. 53 Consequently,onApril17theGermanHigh dirigent 54 56 inthepoliticaldepartmenttolegation 52 TheHigh 58 109 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited .157;Hillgruber, p. prompted theRomaniangovernmenttomakeanoutrightclaimonSerbianBanat. April 20and22betweentheItalianforeignministerCianovonRibbentropwhich uolvebsyi uhrs.Se alwth Ygsai n uai,14’ .462. Yugoslav embassyinBucharest.See, Pavlowitch,‘YugoslaviaandRumania,1941’,p. their rewardfortakingpartinthe attackonYugoslavia.Atthetime,Pavlowitchwasayoungdiplomat atthe would certainlyexplainPavlowitch’s claimthattheGermanshadofferedRomaniansSerbian Banatas been involvedinencouragingtheRomanianstheirdemands for theSerbianBanat.Suchmachinations It wouldbeentirelyinkeepingwiththecomplicationsofGerman foreignpolicyifvonKillingerhadindeed 1941, Rintelen. Romanian annexationoftheSerbianBanat. journalists’. TheItalianmilitaryandairattachéswerealsoapparentlyopenlysupportinga encouraged tobelievetheycouldgaintheterritoryby‘romanophileattitudeofItalian was responsibleforfeedingtheRomanianssuchhopes.Rather,hadbeen Defending hisstaffinBucharest,vonKillingerretortedthatnoonetheGermanlegation no circumstancesreceiveanynourishmentfromconversationswiththeGermanLegation’. considered’. Theforeignministryconcludedthat‘Romanianagitationinthisregardmust believe thattheywouldeverreceivetheSerbianBanatfor‘innocasewillsuchasolutionbe Berlin totheeffectthatGermanofficialsinBucharestshouldnotencourageRomanians be awardedtoRomania.Thishadprovokedasharpreprimandfromtheforeignministryin German foreignministryonApril17inwhichheapparentlysuggestedthattheSerbianBanat Von Killinger’sallusionto‘Romania’sclaims’referredanearliertelegramhehadsentthe The RomanianClaimtotheSerbianBanatandPossibilityofMilitaryIntervention for Weizsäcker. 1940–1941’, of January1941,seeRebeccaHaynes,‘GermanHistoriansand the RomanianNationalLegionaryState, German stateandNazipartyorganizationsintheNationalLegionary StateandtheLegionaryrebellion an analysisofthe‘structuralist’and‘intentionalist’schoolsthought inconnectionwithinvolvementof Hungarian army’srequesttoenterintothenorthofSerbianBanat onApril14shouldalsobenoted.For Meissner-Bossy case.’ to learnbymyhavingcalledattentionRomania’sclaimsandrecentlythroughthe fact thatRomaniawillnotreceivetheBanat’,wroteexasperatedvonKillinger,‘Ihad German forcesstationedinRomaniaor,worsestill,fromtheRomaniansthemselves.‘The He was,heclaimed,compelledtoreceivehisinformationeitherfrommembersofthe receiving sufficientinformationfromBerlintoenablehimcarryouthisdutiesinBucharest. German ministerinBucharest,complainedtotheforeignministrythathewasnot confused aboutGermanpolicyonthematter.OnMay121941,ManfredvonKillinger, not havebeenawareofHitler’sdecisiontoawardtheSerbianBanatHungary,andwere known. the ThirdReich,andresultingcontradictoryforeign-policypositions,isbynowwell 110 63 62 61 60 59 It hasbeenclaimedthatitwastheGerman-ItalianconferenceheldinViennabetween The confusion prevailingamongstateandNaziPartyforeign-policyorganizationswithin The confusion Ottmar Tras DGFP, D DGFP, D DGFP, D The contradictionbetweentheGermanforeignministry’sandarmy’sresponseto 59 ItseemslikelythatmembersoftheGermanforeignministrymaythemselves Slavonic andEastEuropeanReview o.1,n.382,Theminister in RomaniatotheForeignMinistry,Bucharest,April221941. 12,no. , vol. o.1,n.376,The 12,no. , vol. o.1,n.497, TheministerinRomaniatotheforeignministry,Bucharest,May121941, 12,no. , vol. c ca b Hitler, KönigCarolundMarschallAntonescu , ‘Diferenderomâno-maghiareîn problemaBanatuluiSârbesc—martie-iunie1941’, 60 dirigent Rebecca AnnHaynes inthepoliticaldepartmenttolegationRomania,April21 1 93 ,p.676–83. , 71,1993,4,pp. 62 .125. , p. 63 61 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited o.4/90 .41,Letterfrom IuliuManiutoGeneralAntonescu,Bucharest,April41941. 49/1940, p. vol. nomic blocandthat‘itsdivisionwasonlyacceptedbyusatTrianoninthefaceofforce’. that thehistoricpre-TrianonBanathadalwaysbeenasinglegeographic,politicalandeco- army intotheSerbianBanatifHungariantroopsinvadedarea.Heconcludedsuggestively sation withMarshalvonBrauchitschonApril3.AntonescuthreatenedtosendtheRomanian Banat beforetheViennaconference. of April17suggests,however,thattheRomanianswerealreadymakingclaimstoSerbian the RomaniangovernmentofficiallylaidclaimtoSerbianBanat.VonKillinger’stelegram prompted theRomanianmemorandumofApril23,whichwillbediscussedbelow,in Romania’s frontiersastheystoodbeforetheterritoriallosses of1940. nian foreignpolicy,Maniuconcluded,shouldonlyinvolveitselfwiththerestorationof therein. ManiustressedthetraditionsoffriendshipbetweenRomaniaandYugoslavia.Roma- opposition bothtoGermanaggressionagainstYugoslaviaandanyRomanianinvolvement the NationalPeasantParty,toGeneralAntonescu.Inhisletter,Maniuexpressedparty’s might launchanattack.ThisissuggestedbyaletterofApril4fromIuliuManiu,leader seems thatinsomediplomaticandpoliticalcirclestherewererumoursfearsRomania together ‘withinournaturalethnicborders’. nian populationandconcludedthatinthenationalinterest,allRomaniansshouldbebrought the Yugoslavgovernment’sapparentlymerciless‘serbianization’policiesamongstRoma- claimed thattheRomanianpopulationwaswellinexcessofthat.Thereportalsoenumerated Yugoslav populationstatistics,whichnumberedtheBanatRomaniansatunder100,000,and on theRomanianslivinginSerbianBanat Command oftheRomanianarmyincludeddetailedethnographicalandhistoricalinformation the GermanattackonYugoslavia.Astudy,datedApril41941,drawnupbyHigh already consideringapossibleincorporationoftheSerbianBanatintoRomaniaevenbefore failure tofightretainBessarabiaandnorthernTransylvaniainthesummerof1940,was ters, Bucharest),(hereafter,Arh. Nat.,) FondPres 56. Romanian toenablehimdefend himselfagainstSerbianattackinthenetherworld.Ibid.,p. protect themselvesindeathfrom theSerbs.Apparently,astickwasalwaysplacedincoffinof deceased 42–56.Accordingtothestudy,RomanianslivinginYugoslaviawereevenforced April 41941,pp. vol. 579,‘AstudyoftheJugoslavBanatandTimoc’,HighCommand oftheArmy,Section2–a,Information, April 31941,fromGeneralAntonescu. See Macartney, 21 April1941.On12,Hitlerhadalreadyissuedadirectiveawarding BaranyaandBácska,toHungary. the conversationbetweenReichForeignMinisterandCount CianoattheHotelImperialinViennaon Hungary followingaperiodofGermanoccupation. Bács-Bodrog whichlaytothewestofTisza.TheSerbianBanatwasalsobeaccorded were thesouthernregionsofpre-FirstWorldWarHungariancountiesBaranyaand disposal ofYugoslavterritory,including theawardofBaranyaandBácskatoHungary.These According tothisview,duringtheconferenceCianoacquiescedGermanplansfor 67 66 65 64 Romania’s claimtotheSerbianBanatwasalreadyimpliedinGeneralAntonescu’sconver- Although thearmy’sstudycontainednoplanofmilitaryinterventioninYugoslavia,it It seems,moreover,thattheRomanianarmy,whichhaddeeplyresentedKingCarol’s Arhivele Nat Arhivele MilitareRomâne(RomanianMilitaryArchives,Bucharest), fond948/MareleStatMajor, 214–15,unnumberedtelegram,tothelegationsinBerlinandRome, 82,pp. MAE, 71/Germania,vol. DGFP, D o.1,n.387,Memorandumbyanofficial oftheforeignminister’ssecretariat.Record 12,no. , vol. October Fifteenth c ionale, SediulCentral,Bucures , part2,p.13. ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ c c ti, (NationalArchives[formerly, State Archives],headquar- edint 66 c ia ConsiliuluideMinis . . . The authorofthestudycastdoubtson . . . 64 Newsofthesedecisionsthusapparently c tri: CabinetulMilitar1940–44, 67 111 65 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited growing clamourforannexation. valuable partoftheRomanianBanat’afterFirstWorldWar.OnApril11 Romania hadalwaysbeenloyaltoherformerYugoslavally‘sacrificingforthemost April 9 referred tothewholeofhistoric,pre-TrianonBanatas‘theRomanianBanat’.Hence,on pers begantocampaignfortheannexationofSerbianBanat.Indeed,theynowcommonly had invadedYugoslaviafromRomanianterritoryonApril6.Asaresult,newspa- us initsentirety’.Thedistinguishedhistorian,Gheorghe Bra that ‘theBanatwasandremainsRomanian’demanded that‘theBanatmustbereturnedto Bucharest, Avakumovic Timis Yugoslavia. despite manifestationsofpro-YugoslavfeelinginRomaniaduringtheGermaninvasion erable pressurefromelementswithinRomaniaandbeyondtoannextheSerbianBanat, with publicopinion,whichwasdemandingaRomanianoccupationoftheSerbianBanat. now underHungarianrule.TheNationalPeasantParty,Antonescuargued,wasoutoftouch Maniu ofbeingsolelyconcernedwiththefateRomaniansnorthernTransylvania, applied toallRomanianswholivedbeyondthebordersofRomanianstate.Heaccused In conclusion,theGeneralstressedthatRomaniahadlegitimatenationaldemandswhich believed thattheGermanshadyieldedtoYugoslavdemandsannexRomanianBanat. tions leadinguptoYugoslavia’ssigningoftheTripartitePactinMarch1941,Antonescu Yugoslavia harbouredrevisionistaspirationsagainstRomania.Duringthecourseofnegotia- ally anysupportatthetimeofSovietthreatinJune1940,butGeneralallegedthat Romanian-language schools.Moreover,notonlyhadYugoslaviafailedtogiveherRomanian the YugoslavgovernmentonRomaniansofYugoslavia,includingitsfailuretoprovide Romanian kingdom.Hewentontodescribetheprocessof‘serbianization’metedoutby including thoseofthewholeHungarianBanat,hadallegedlydeclaredtheirunionwith Declaration ofDecember11918inwhichalltheRomaniansHabsburgMonarchy, of theHungarianBanattoRomania.AntonescualsodrewManiu’sattentionAlbaIulia into theFirstWorldWaronsideofTripleEntenteandwhichhadpromisedwhole Serbian Banat.HebasedthisclaimonthetreatyofAugust1916whichhadbroughtRomania armed bands’. so itwasclaimed,inordertoprotectthepopulationfrom theHungarianarmy‘andother Banat, hadrequestedtheunionofregionwithRomania. Thiswasconsiderednecessary, delegation ofRomanianpriestsandteachers,representing theRomaniansinSerbian Serbian Banat.OnApril14,aRomanianforeign-ministry memorandumrecordedthata Yugoslavia. the Romaniangovernmenthadneverintendedtobecomeinvolvedinhostilitiesagainst 112 72 71 70 69 68 It seemsclearthatAntonescuandtheRomaniangovernmentwerecomingunderconsid- The Romaniangovernmentalsocameunderpressurefrom Romaniangroupslivinginthe Responding atgreatlengthtoManiu’sletteronlyinlateJune1941,theGeneralstatedthat Boia, ‘Românias 249–53,MemorandumofApril141941. 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. s Boia, ‘România 461–62. Pavlowitch, ‘YugoslaviaandRumania, 1941’,pp. 42–97. Ibid., LetterfromGeneralAntonescu toIuliuManiu,Bucharest,June221941,pp. c oara intheRomanianBanat,presumablyretaliationforfactthatGermanforces 69 68 OnApril8,theYugoslavairforceattackedRomaniancitiesofAradand Nevertheless,AntonescuarguedstronglyinfavourofRomania’srighttothe 71 condemnedtheYugoslavattacksonRomaniaandwenttoclaimthat Inthisatmosphereofheightenednationalfeeling,theYugoslav ambassadorin c c i problemaBanatuluiIugoslavîn prima i problemaBanatuluiIugoslavîn prima a , fullyexpectedaRomanianattackonYugoslavia. 70 Rebecca AnnHaynes b b aaauu 91,p 1018. vara anului1941’,p. aaauu 91,p 1017. vara anului1941’,p. b tianu, alsolenthisvoicetothe 72 Moreover,given claimed Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited factor inwhetherBuchareststayed outofthisconflictornot’.Boia,pp.299–304(303). avert aRomanianinvasionofYugoslavia. Boiaconcludes,however,that‘Berlin’sattitudewasthe deciding undermine theRomaniangovernment’spositionandthreaten thestabilityofstate. seeing HungaryandBulgariaonceagainbeingrewarded at Romania’sexpensecouldserveto economic sphere.Ominously,itwasalsopointedoutthat theRomanianpublic’sangerat the memorandumemphasizedGeneralAntonescu’sloyalty totheAxis,especiallyin with consequencesforthesecurityofRomaniaandEurope ingeneral.Atthesametime, to HungaryandBulgariahadtransformedthepolitical and racialequilibriumoftheregion made intheregion1940and1941.Thiswasjustifiedongroundsthatcedingterritory Serbian Banatinthememorandum,butalsocalledforarevisionofallterritorialchanges tation of‘theRomanianBanat’.Thegovernment,however,notonlyclaimedthe give thecityofBelgradeastrategicbarrier,claimedmemorandum,hadledtoampu- right tothewholeBanathadbeenrecognizedatParispeaceconference.Onlyneed government madeitsfirstofficialclaimtotheSerbianBanat.ItwasarguedthatRomania’s In itsmemorandumtotheGermanandItaliangovernmentsofApril231941,Romanian The RomanianClaimstotheSerbianBanat(andTimocValley)andGermanResponse troops inYugoslavia,kepttheSerbianBanatproblemalive. nationalist pressurebothfromwithinandbeyondRomania,thepresenceofHungarian German ally,washardlyinapositiontodisobeyhisseniorally’scommand.Nevertheless, province. the SerbianBanatinordertodiffusetensionandpreventRomaniansfrominvading the warandhewas,moreover,preparedtoforestallanimmediateHungarianannexationof of theThirdReich.ByMarch27,HitlerhadalreadydecidedthatRomaniawastostayout war wouldhaveresultedfromanyHungarianoccupationoftheSerbianBanat. youthful belligerenceonthematterofBanat,itseemslikelythataRomanian-Hungarian provoked bythisquestion,cannotbeexcluded’. good relationswiththeSerbs,youngAntonescubelievedthat‘afuturearmedconflict, the daywhenwholeBanatbecomestheirs.’AlthoughRomanianshadalways of theBanat.‘TheRomanianpeople’,hewrote,‘willnotlaydowntheirarmsuntil in 1919,AntonescuhadwrittenapamphletdefenceofRomania’sclaimstothewhole was long-standing.AsayoungLieutenant-ColonelatthetimeofParispeaceconference is indicatedinhisresponsetoIuliuManiu’sletterofApril4.TheGeneral’sbelief,however, Memorandum byanofficialofthe foreignministry,Berlin,April231941. and deliveredtovonKillinger, theGermanMinister,onApril231941; well theYugoslavambassador,Avakumovic 1940. Serbian BanatrepresentedtheonlypossibleterritorialcompensationforRomania’slossesof summer of1940,andwiththemilitarycampaignagainstSovietUnionnotyetbegun, the psychologicaleffectsonRomanianpopulationofterritorialamputations 76 75 74 73 In theevent,RomaniadidnotinvadeSerbianBanatowingtorestraininginfluence Antonescu’s personalbeliefthatRomania’sclaimtotheSerbianBanatwasentirelyjustified A,fn 1Grai,vl 2 p 269–76,Memorandum drawnupbyMinisterMihaiAntonescu 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. Boia stressestheroleofpro-WesternpoliticianssuchasIuliuManiu andConstantinI.C.Bra Lt.-Colonel I.Antonescu, Völkl, 73 75 Der Westbanat1941–1944 OncetheGermanleadershiphadtakenthesedecisions,Antonescu,asaloyal Românii. Origina,trecutul,sacrificiiles .21. , p. ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ a , andtheyoungKingMichaelininterveningwithAntonescuto 74 InviewoftheseindicationstheGeneral’s c i drepturilelor DGFP, D ielc,11,p.74,84. , sineloco,1919,pp. o.1,n.387, 12,no. , vol. b tianu, as 76 113 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited . See Romania’s righttotheSerbianBanat byclaimingthattheRomanianswereoriginalinhabitants ofthe viewed unionwithRomaniaaspreferabletoareturn dominationbytheHungarians.On a definitiveresponseaboutthefateofSerbianBanat. tives werenomoresuccessfulthantheyhadbeenbeforeissuingthememorandumineliciting other immediateterritorialcompensation,itishardlysurprisingthatRomanianrepresenta- June 131941. elements bothinRomaniaandtheSerbianBanattoannexregionRomania. General Antonescu’sgovernment,however,continuedtobeunderpressurefromnationalist difficulties offindingsomethingsuitable’. Romanian compensationelsewhere’forthelossofSerbianBanat,butobservedalso‘the his discussionwithCianoinVienna,vonRibbentropnoted‘thenecessityofgiving government hadnodesiretoseeRomaniadestabilizedinsuchamanneronceagain.During general populationagainstKingCarolanddrivenhimtofleethecountry.TheGerman for hisregime.Itwas,afterall,theterritoriallossesof1940whichhadturnedarmyand clearly awarethatAntonescurequired‘aforeignpolicysuccess’tomaintainpopularsupport Banat toHungaryinduecourse,whatevertheymightsaytheRomanians,were Indeed, althoughtheGermanauthoritieshadalreadytakendecisiontoawardSerbian guished RomanianacademicSextil Pus thing whichcanbeofuse’inthe propagandawar.ArticlespublishedinBerlinincludedthatofthe distin- in Berlinfromtheforeignministry, Bucharest,May161941.Bossywasexhorted‘tocollecttogether every- Council ofMinisters,May141941. the German-Italiandiscussionsonreorganizationofarea Yugoslavia,,April241941. receive indemnitieswhich,asfarGermanywasconcerned,hadnoterritoriallimitations’. rial claims.HeinformedAntonescuonlythat‘aftertheconflictwasoverRomaniawould 11 1941,theFührerwasmorethanusuallyvagueandunspecificregardingRomania’sterrito- Reich itselfputtingforwardRomania’sclaim. with propagandasupportingtheirclaimtotheSerbianBanatorfrompublishingarticlesin same time,theRomaniansdidnotshyawayfrombombardingGermanforeignministry talks betweenvonRibbentropandCiano. Antonescu thatthequestionofSerbianBanathadbeendiscussedatallduringVienna member oftheReichforeignministry’seconomicpolicydepartment,shamelesslydeniedto foreign policysuccessinthisrespectwouldstrengthenthepositionofGeneralAntonescu’. Killinger, ‘primarilyinordertostrengthenhispositionasLeaderofState’.Headdedthat‘a put forwardRomania’sclaimtotheSerbianBanat.Antonescuhaddonethis,wrotevon expansion followingthepartitionofYugoslaviahadbeentopromptGeneralAntonescu the RomaniangovernmentmemorandumofApril23,resultHungarianandBulgarian 114 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 It seems,moreover,thattheothernationalitieswholivedinSerbianBanatmayhave Since theGermanswereunwillingtograntSerbianBanatRomania,andlackedany As vonKillingerexplainedinhislettertotheGermanforeignministrywhichaccompanied A,fn 1Grai,vl 2 p 390–91,telegramno.36455,toRaoulBossy,Romanianminister 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. For themanydelegationsofRomaniansfromSerbianBanatto Bucharest,seeBoia,pp.304–08. DGFP, D 376–82,GeneralAntonescuandClodiusatthePresidencyof 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. Völkl, DGFP, D Ibid., enclosure,fortheforeignministerthroughWeizsäcker,Bucharest, April231941,vonKillinger. Der Westbanat1941–1944 Berliner Monatshefte o.1,n.398,Memorandumbyanofficialoftheforeignminister’s secretariat.Resultsof 12,no. , vol. o.1,n.614,Memorandumbyanofficialoftheforeign minister’ssecretariat,Fuschl, 12,no. , vol. o.1,14,p.406–15. 19,1941,pp. , vol. .29;Rotaru,Zodian,Burcin, , p. c cariu, who,inhisarticle‘DieRumänien aufdemBalkan’,justified Rebecca AnnHaynes 78 80 DuringAntonescu’smeetingwithHitleronJune 83 79 OnMay14,CarlClodius,asenior Mares c alul IonAntonescu p 58–59. , pp. 82 Atthe 77 81 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Banat’ byDrAurelCosma,Timis whole oftheBanat,intoGreaterRomaniaatthattime theParispeaceconferencein1919. Antonescu hadbeenanadvocateoftheincorporation of theTimocvalley,aswell which aRomanianclaimtotheTimocvalleyhadbeen putforward.Indeed,theyoung historic rightsandaffordtheRomaniangovernmentasuccess followingallherdefeats’. The acquisitionoftheselands,concludedAntonescu,‘would bearecognitionofRomania’s Timoc valleyregion,whichlayoutsidetheSerbianBanatandhadaRomanianpopulation. only putforwardRomania’sclaimtotheSerbianBanatonceagain,butalsoclaimed region andplacedRomaniaatadisadvantageinrelationtoherneighbours.TheGeneralnot territories toHungaryandBulgariain19401941had,Antonescuargued,destabilizedthe pointed outtheproblemof‘equilibriumracesinEurope’.ThecedingRomanian the Axisanditswillingness‘toenternewworldofGreatFührer-’but attention ofvonRibbentrop.Antonescuonceagainstressedhiscountry’scompleteloyaltyto General AntonescusentafurthermemorandumtoBerlinonJune111941forthepersonal a Romanianpopulationofsome160,000intheimmediate post-warera.Althoughthe This region,locatedineasternSerbiabetweentheDanube, TimocandMoravarivers,had administration infinitelypreferable. of theregiondidnotdesireareturntoHungarianruleandfoundGermanmilitary the SerbianBanat.SDreportsfromsummerof1941suggest,however,thatinhabitants nationalist, Cosmamaywellhaveexaggeratedtheextentofpro-Romaniansentimentin Antonescu onJune111941. and hadnowjoinedforceswiththelocalRomanianSerbianleaders. the GermangovernmentinBerlinnottoallowHungariansenterSerbianBanat The leaderofthe‘Swabians’inSerbianBanat,JosefJanko,hadspecificallypleadedwith welcome forHungariantroops,whoseentryintotheSerbianBanatwaseagerlyanticipated. Hungarian villagestriumphalarcheshadbeenconstructedandinscribedwithwordsof make mattersworse,pro-Hungarianpropagandawaswidespreadintheregion.Inethnically representatives, servedonlytoaccentuatethe‘no-man’s-landcharacterofthisterritory’.To had littleornopresenceinlargeareasoftheregion.Thisfact,accordingtonational was officiallyunderGermanmilitarycontrol,inpracticeitseemsthatthearmy in whatCosmadescribedas‘acountrywhichbelongstonoone’.AlthoughtheSerbianBanat life’. Thethreenationalgroupshadformedacommonfrontbecausetheycouldnolongerlive Romania. Therepresentativesapparentlyregardedthisas‘theonlywaytoreturnnormal Timis only oftheRomanians,butalso‘Swabians’andSerbsSerbianBanathadcometo intheRomanianBanat.Cosmainformedgovernmentthatrepresentativesnot kingdom duringtheFirstWorldWar.Hehadsubsequentlybeenappointedasagovernment the leaderofRomanianNationalPartyBanatwhenitwasstillpartHungarian May 231941theRomaniangovernmentreceivedareportfromAurelCosma,whohadbeen 87 86 85 84 Antonescu’s memorandumofJune111941didnot,however, signifythefirstoccasionon It wasdoubtlessasaresultofsuchpressures,wellhispersonalinclinations,that Antonescu, 16–24,MemorandumsenttovonRibbentropbyGeneral 83,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. Völkl, Arh. Nat.,FondPres c oara, thecapitalofRomanianBanat,requestingthatregionbeannexedby Der Westbanat1941–1944 Românii .84. , p. c edint c ia ConsiliuluideMinis c oara, May231941. p 24–26. , pp. ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ 85 c r,vl 468/1941,pp.1–12,‘SituationintheYugoslav tri, vol. 84 AsaRomanian 86 115 87 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited natural rights’. Romanian areaofsettlement.Itisnottheresultanytreaty.producthistoryand Letter fromGeneralAntonescutoIuliuManiu,Bucharest,June22 1941. the relevantarticlesoftreatyTrianonwasrejected. InearlyAugust1940,IuliuManiu ter ArmandCa Romanian bordersonethnicgrounds.HenceinFebruary1939,theprimeminis- alongethniclines.Romanianpoliticiansnowrevertedtojustifyingthe Munich AgreementandsubsequentViennaAwardofNovember1938,whichhadpartitioned 1930s, thevalidityoftreatieshadbeenunderminedbyAnschlußand,especially, of thecountry’sbordersbyreferencetolegalityParispeacetreaties.Bylate conference. Intheinter-warperiod,however,Romanianpoliticiansjustifieddemarcation and historiansbeforeduringtheFirstWorldWaratsubsequentParispeace Ethnic criteriahadlongbeenusedtojustifyRomanianterritorialclaimsbybothpoliticians The EthnicPrincipleandRomanianExpansionism inter-war GreaterRomania.Theclaimtobothterritorieswasjustifiedonethnicgrounds. which hadincludedinformationregardingitsRomanian-speakingpopulation. valley wasimpliedinthestudyofApril4drawnupbyHighCommandarmy, the eveofGermanattackonYugoslaviainApril1941.TheRomanianclaimtoTimoc dispute withHungaryinthesummerof1940wasbasedonethnicprinciple. Thus, theRomaniangovernment’sclaimtoretainTransylvaniainitsentiretyduring Rome iftheRomanianargumentwasbasedonethniccriteriaratherthanlegalstipulations. to retainherpost-FirstWorldWarborderswasmorelikelyberecognizedinBerlinand and notinink.Furthermore,RomanianpoliticianscorrectlyperceivedthatRomania’sright p 9–13(11). Bra pp. 48. 1939, p. Europe intheMeltingPot the annexationofdistricttoRomania‘isadvancedbyafew irresponsibleextremists’.Seton-Watson, ibid., p.466.AccordingtoR.W.Seton-Watson,writingatthetime ofthepeaceconference,claimfor 1941 theRomaniangovernmentclaimedthatpopulation oftheTimocvalleywas463,000.See valley. opinion favourednotonlyaRomanianoccupationoftheSerbianBanatbutalsoTimoc in hisreplytoIuliuManiu’sletterofApril4,AntonescuclaimedthatRomanianpublic io’ ihCmado h ry eto –,Ifrain pi 91 p 42–56. Timoc’, HighCommandoftheArmy,Section2–a,Information, April41941,pp. h elt f[ .]nationalunity’. . the realityof[. that ‘RomaniaisnotbasedonthepeacetreatiesordecisionofGreatPowersbut they didnotpursueit. Romanian delegationatthepeaceconferencehadputforwardaclaimtoTimocvalley, 116 93 92 91 90 89 88 Increasingly, therefore,thebordersofRomaniawereregardedasbeingdrawninblood, Haynes, Gheorghe Bra Armand Ca Arh. Nat.,FondPres 579,‘AStudyoftheJugoslavBanatand Arhivele MilitareRomâne,fond948/MareleStatMajor,vol. Rösler, 90 Significantly,theTimocregion,justlikeSerbianBanat,layoutsideborderof Rumänien nachdemErstenWeltkrieg Romanian PolicyTowardsGermany b linescu, 91 b b b tianu wastobeavocalsupporter oftheannexationSerbianBanatin1941. Afewmonthslater,thehistorianandpolitician,GheorgheBra linescu statedthat‘theborderoftheRomanianstateis tianu, ‘RumänienzwischenDeutschland unddemBalkan’, .343. , p. c Das neueRumänien.Ergebnisseeiner königlichenundnationalenRevolution edint 88 Nevertheless,theregionbecameanobjectofinterestoncemoreon c ia ConsiliuluideMinis 92 Rebecca AnnHaynes .151. , p. , p.465.TheRomanianpopulationfigureisfrom1921.In c r:aieu iia 904,vl 914,p.42–97, 49/1940,pp. tri:Cabinetul Militar1940–44,vol. Deutsches Wollen b tianu, declared 93 89 Recourseto Moreover, , April1939, , Bucharest, Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Romania. the SerbianBanat,mostofwhomwerethemselvesLegionaries,andregularlytravelledto La Serbian Banat.TheexiledLegionariesalsoretainedlinkswithRomaniathroughBishop certain DrFilipescunowlivinginthecapital,butformerlyknownasFilipoviciof received fundingandmaintainedlinkswithLegionariesstillactiveinBucharestthrougha had receivedshelterintheSerbianBanatfollowingJanuaryrebellion.Legionaryexiles Legionary activity.AMinistryoftheInteriorreportrecordedthatsome150Legionaries oftheNationalLegionaryState,SerbianBanatremainedanimportantfocus General Antonescu’scrushingoftheLegionaryrebellioninJanuary1941andsubsequent been givensuccourduringtheperiodofmovement’spersecutionbyKingCarol.Despite extensive contactsintheneighbouringSerbianBanatwhere,from1938,hehadfrequently had previouslybeenaregionalleaderintheRomanianBanat.AsconsequenceSima of theLegionarymovementsincemurderitsfounderCorneliuCodreanuin1938, Serbian BanatfortheincorporationofregionintoRomanianstate.HoriaSima,head have beenanimportantfactorinthegrowthofpublicsupportbothRomaniaand Long-standing LegionarylinkswithnationalistRomaniansintheSerbianBanatmaywell The RomanianLegionariesandYugoslavia borders oftheRomanianstatewasagiven. and thuspotentialpoliticalunion,betweentheRomanianswithinwithout the villageswithaRomanianpopulation.Onciuhadalso organizedthecareandshelterof Serbian BanatwasacertainPavelOnciuwhohad established Legionarygroupsinall educational linksbetweenthetwohalvesofBanat.The mostimportantLegionaryinthe amongst theRomaniansinSerbianBanatformany yearsowingtothecommercialand Romania atwill.Moreover,accordingtoSima,‘theLegionary spirit’hadbeenprevalent became an‘unguardedgate’.ThisallowedtheLegionaries inYugoslaviatoenterandleave 1941 andthedisappearanceofSerbianbordercontrol, theRomanian-Yugoslavborder confirmed theRomanians’ethnicandhistoricrights. existence hadneverdependedontheParispeacetreaties.Oncontrary,treatiesmerely ethnic principlewhichjustifiedthebordersofRomanianstateandthatcountry’s Germany etme 99 bd,vl /90 p 102–04,undatednote. 6/1930,pp. September 1939,ibid.,vol. activity inYugoslaviafollowing themovement’smurderofprimeministerArmandCa Inspectoratul GeneralalJandarmeriei. AnearlierMinistryoftheInteriorreportnotedconsiderable Legionary nothing morethanconfirmtheethnicrealitiesofRomanianpeople.’ some wronglyandtendentiouslyaffirm,aconsequenceofthetreatyTrianon,whichdoes retain thewholeofTransylvania.‘OurborderswithHungary’,appealstated,‘arenot,as joined withotherpoliticalleadersinanappealtoHitlerandMussoliniallowRomania 96 95 94 b za In hismemoirs,HoriaSimaconfirmedthatfollowingthedestructionofYugoslaviainApril Members ofthenationalistLegionarymovementhadneverceasedtoarguethatitwas b r.Nt,fn/iitrld nen,Dvre11–97 o.1/90 p 456–58,undatednote, 10/1940, pp. Arh. Nat.,fond/MinisteruldeInterne, Diverse1910–1957,vol. See, forexample,theideologyofLegionaryMihailPolihroniade inHaynes, Ioan Scurtu, rescu ofCaransebes .33. , p. 96 .Activitateapolitica c intheRomanianBanatandthroughprieststeachersfrom ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ b uhrs,19,p 97. , Bucharest,1995,p. 95 FortheLegionaries,ethnicsolidarity, Romanian PolicyTowards 94 b linescu in 117 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Timocul referred towasintheTimocvalleyitself,orsocietybased in Bucharestwhichpublishedthejournal Direct Timocul Timoc region. Belgea, aseniorLegionaryfromtheSerbianBanatkilledin1939,andNistorPopescu Banat andTimocwhohadbeenmurderedbythepreviousroyalregime.TheseincludedIon rule andhopingtobeincorporatedinRomania.TheyhailedtheLegionary‘martyrs’from deportation ofthe150exiledLegionariestoReich.TheGermansdulycomplied. Banat, oncetheGermanshadestablishedtheiradministrationthere,Antonescurequested resistance tohisregime.UnableestablishRomanianmilitarycontrolovertheSerbian success, butalsothepossibilityoferadicatingasignificantoutpostpotentialLegionary Serbian BanatwouldhaveprovidedAntonescunotonlywithanimportantforeign-policy Legionaries clearlyrepresentedapotentialthreattoAntonescu’sregime.Acquisitionofthe of published whentheLegionarygovernmentwasinpowerautumnof1940.Inpages appointed committeemembersofthe‘TimocSociety’wereallpro-Legionary. the TimocregiontoRomania.AsearlyasMarch1935,apolicereportnotedthatnewly Timoc valleyinSerbiawhereitmaywellhaveledtothegrowingcallsforannexationof article publishedonMay11941,forexample,NicolaePopparguedthecaseRomania’s journal cameoutstronglyinfavourofaRomanianannexationtheSerbianBanat.Inan ardour, orprobablyitsLegionaryconnections.FollowingthedestructionofYugoslavia, of itsjournal. . TheSocietyalsodemandedtheregion’sincorporationintoRomaniainpages from 1934to1943alerttheRomaniangovernment‘serbianization’ofTimoc Timoc ValleyandRightBankoftheDanube,maintainedaconstantpropagandacampaign The journal in theBanat. believed thatarebellionagainstthenowanti-LegionaryAntonescugovernmentwouldbegin regime, theMinistryofInteriorreportedthatLegionariesandtheirsupporters Inspectoratul GeneralalJandarmeriei. p 34–35. pp. Regat’, claimed thatattheParispeaceconference theTimocvalley‘shouldhavebeenannexedbyRomanian Timoc regionbecausepro-AxispropagandawasbeingpropagatedtherebyLegionaries. 1940, itappearsthattheYugoslavpolicewerepersecutingRomanianpopulationin Legionaries inexilefollowingtheJanuary1941rebellion. 118 103 102 101 100 99 98 97 The crushingoftheLegionariesinJanuary1941didnothingtocurb It seemsthatLegionaryideologyhadalsoestablisheditselfamongsttheRomaniansof Timocul Florea Florescu,‘GardedeFier s See, forexample,inthejournal’sfirstissue,‘TheRomaniansof theYugoslavTimoc’byM.I.,who 183,CorpulDetectivilorGrupa1–a, nr20,May61940. 251/1940,p. Ibid., vol. Arh. Nat.,fond/Direct Sima, 456–58,undatednote, 10/1940,pp. Arh. Nat.,fond/MinisteruldeInterne,Diverse1910–1957,vol. , c iunea Generala , referredtobelow. ,1 aur 94 ,p.20–21(20). ), 1,January11934,pp. Timocul. Revista Prizonieri alputerilorAxei theLegionariesdeclaredtheirsolidaritywithallRomanianslivingunderforeign Timocul 98 102 TheopenRomanian-Yugoslavborderandconsequentfreemovementofthe 103 Prizonieri alputerilorAxei TheSociety’sLegionaryconnectionsbecamemoreevidentintheedition b aPolit , publishedmonthlyinBucharestbytheSocietyofRomaniansfrom b culturala c c iei, March131935.ItisunclearfromthenotewhetherTimoc Society ia Generala b . OrganulSoc.românilordinvale Timoculuis .32. , p. c i Româniidepestehotare’, Rebecca AnnHaynes b , Timis aPolit c aa 95 p 31–32. oara, 1995,pp. c e 9314,vl 6/95 .3,nt o 1067, 33,note no. 168/1935,p. iei 1903–1947,vol. Timocul 97 OminouslyfortheAntonescu , 7,7–12,July-December1940, c i dreaptaDuna Timocul b ’s nationalist riei 100 (hereafter, ByMay 99 101 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited Macedo-Romanians oftheBalkansand‘aspirations’ oftheTransnistrianRomanians. and TimocforincorporationintoRomaniabutalsoinformation onthesituationof the Führer’sperusalthatincludednotonlyrequestsfromRomaniansofSerbianBanat of boththeSerbianBanatandTimocregion.Healsodespatchedanumberfilesfor dum tovonRibbentropofJune11,GeneralAntonescumadeanexplicitclaimpossession territory inhabitedbyaRomanian-speakingpopulation. .Thismeantthat,intheoryatleast,thegovernmentcouldclaimrighttoany Romania’s territorialclaimshadbeenjustifiedbyRomaniandecision-makersbeforetheFirst Potential acquisitionoftheseterritorieswasnowjustifiedonethnicgrounds,justas abandonment oftheconceptaRomaniabasedonlegalityParispeacetreaties. state, however,theclaimtoSerbianBanatandTimocregionrepresentedfinal ist circlesbothinsideandoutside Romania.Sincetheyhadneverbelongedtothe Romanian By 1941,thecallforRomanianexpansionwasbecomingincreasinglywidespreadinnational- Conclusion its ethnicborders. Now, however,itwastimetobringtheRomanianstate’spoliticalbordersintoharmonywith ’, theRomanianshadbeenforcedto‘sacrifice’Timoc,TransnistriaandBanat. In asubsequentedition,FloreaFlorescudrewattentiontothefactthatdue‘foreignmachi- nteBlasfo io ...]toSalonika’. . in theBalkansfromTimoc[. Banat isRomanian.TransylvaniaRomanian’,butalsothat‘ThewholeregionRomanian however, thatthegovernmentmemorandumofApril231941arguednotonly‘The Romanian demandsfortheSerbianBanatandTimocvalley.Itisinstructivetonote, Antonescu, June111941. Antonescu anddeliveredtovon Killinger, GermanMinister,onApril231941. Gegenüberstellung’, unpublishedPhDdissertation,UEA//, 1991. beckens imzwanzigstenJahrhundertundihreInterpretation angesichtsderungarisch-rumänischen territorial claims.Onthis,seeBruceMitchell,‘FälschungundWahrheit: DieKartographiedesKarpathen- on theethniccompositionofCarpatho-Danubianregion,thereby providing‘evidence’forsubsequent to 1941,historiansandethnographerscontinuedwagewarin printwiththeirHungariancounterparts Serbian andRomanianBanatwereidenticaltothosewholivedintherestofRomania. and othernationalities.Heposited,moreover,thatethnicallytheRomaniansinboth the Banat’soriginalinhabitantswhosesettlementoftheregionprecededthatSerbs acquisition oftheSerbianBanat.PoppclaimedthisongroundsthatRomanianswere with aviewtocreating‘anewGreaterRomania’inthefuture. speaking populationsoftheBalkansveryclear.TheApril23memorandumwasthusdrawnup (and therestorationofnorthernTransylvania),itwasmakingitssupportforRomanian- this stage,puttingforwardexplicitterritorialclaimstoanyregionexcepttheSerbianBanat 109 108 107 106 105 104 A,fn 1Grai,vl 3 p 16–24,Memorandum senttovonRibbentropfromGeneral 83,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. Rotaru, Zodian,Burcin, 269–76(272),Memorandumdrawnupby MinisterMihai 82,pp. MAE, fond71/Germania,vol. Although mostresponsibleinter-warpoliticianssoughtonlytoprotect Romania’sterritorialintegrityup s Florea Florescu,‘Timocul Nicolae M.Popp,‘RomâniiînBanatulOccidental’, 105 Mares c i ’, c alul IonAntonescu ‘A NewGreaterRomania?’ Timocul .58. , p. ,14,2 p 24–26(26). , 8,1941,2,pp. 107 Timocul Althoughthegovernmentwasnot,at ,14,1 p 1–6. , 8,1941,1,pp. 106 Thisarticlehasonlylookedatthe 108 Inhissubsequentmemoran- 119 104 109 Published by Maney Publishing (c) W. S. Maney & Son Limited and Romanianrivalriesinitsowninterest. of policy.Itisundoubtedlytruethatinthe1930sReichsuccessfullyplayedonHungarian Romania’s problemswithitsHungarianneighbourforcedGermanyintounforeseenchanges Balkan militarytheatrein1941ordertosafeguardtheirwiderforeign-policyinterests,so transforming Germanpolicy.JustasMussolini’sadventuresbroughttheGermansinto the Romaniangovernmentwasalsoanactorinunfoldingeventsandcapableof merely abystanderinthestrugglebetweenAxisanditsenemies.Oncontrary, on thesuccessofGermanarmy,thatdidnotmeanRomaniangovernmentwas Nevertheless, althoughRomania’sopportunitiesforexpansionwereultimatelydependent Banat ortheTimocregion,wereitnotforGermandismembermentofYugoslavia. unlikely thattheRomaniangovernmentwouldeverhaveputforwardclaimstoSerbian German foreignpolicy,ratherthanadirectresultofRomanianpolicy.Itseemshighly one historianhasdescribedasanunsatisfactory‘provisoriumperpetuum’. allies. TheGermanswerethusforcedtoremainincontroloftheregionuntil1944what to theSerbianBanatproblemthatwouldsatisfyboththeirRomanianandHungarian divest themselvesoftheregionasquicklypossible,Germanleaderscouldnotfindasolution region inwhichithadabsolutelynodirectforeign-policyinterest.Althoughtheyhopedto region. Germanysubsequentlyfounditselfdivertingitsmilitaryresourcesintoadministeringa intervention againstHungary,forcedtheGermanstoforestallHungary’sentryinto occupation oftheSerbianBanatinApril1941,andpossibilityRomanianmilitary Hungary’s side. in 1940,contrarytotheiroriginalintention,orderpreventSovietinterventionon countries, however,compelledReichleaderstointerveneintheTransylvaniandispute Historische Zeitschrift Entwicklung undGrundfaktoren nationalsozialistischerHegemonial-undBündnispolitik,1938–1941’, 1–147(115–16). (Occasional PapersinRomanianStudiesno.3),London,2003,pp. see RebeccaHaynes,‘HistoricalIntroduction’,inHaynes (ed.), was short-livedandtheRomanianswereforcedtoretreatasfortunes oftheirGermanallywaned.Forthis, their soulpartofthegreatRomania’.Asitturnedout, the RomanianoccupationofTransnistria on ethnicgrounds.Thus,in1943,VasileNeteawrotethat‘the Transnistrians arebloodofourand number ofworkswasproducedduringtheRomanianoccupation justifyingaRomanianclaimtothearea during theGerman-ledinvasion,RomanianarmycrossedDniester riverandoccupiedTransnistria.A disposed tolayclaimotherregionsoftheBalkansandTransnistriaonethnicgrounds. This suggestedthat,givenasuitableopportunity,theRomaniangovernmentmightbe 120 113 112 111 110 Romanian expansionistambitionswere,however,contingentonthesuccessfulresultsof Olshausen, On thisseeHaynes, On thedynamicsofthistriangular relationship,see,MartinBroszat,‘Deutschland-Ungarn-Rumänien. In theautumnof1941,havingsuccessfullywrestedcontrolBessarabia backfromtheSovietUnion Zwischenspiel aufdemBalkan 112 0,Fbur 98 p 45–96. , 206,February1968,pp. Inasimilarmanner,thestrengthofRomanianoppositiontoanHungarian Romanian PolicyTowardsGermany Rebecca AnnHaynes .209. , p. 111 Fearsofpotentialconflictbetweenthetwo p 151–58. , pp. , Bessarabia,Transnistria 113 110