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BEYOND WELTPOLITIK, SELF-CONTAINMENT AND CIVILIAN POWER: UNITED GERMANY´S NORMALIZING AMBITIONS Gunther Hellmann Contents 1. Introduction: Visions, Ambitions, and Order 2 1. A defining moment: German Unification, the Gulf War and “Ultima Irratio” 5 2.1 Visions of Civilian “Weltpolitik” and the Blessings of Constitutional Constraints 7 2.2 “And I fear that this is only the beginning of a new development....”: The Politics of Avoiding War and Evading Alliance Commitments 17 1. Redefining “Ultima (Ir-) Ratio” in the 1990s: Foreign Policy Adjustments between Realpolitik and Idealpolitik 23 3.1 Civilian Internationalism and Swiss Myths 25 3.2 Pragmatic Multilateralism in Elite Perceptions 35 4. The “New” Germany: Still a Reluctant Power, but Increasingly a Normal Ally and a Self-Confident Nation 42 5. Conclusion: Revising Germany 52 Appendix 57 2 IGS Discussion Paper 99/10 1. Introduction: Visions, Ambitions, and Order For many the mere thought of associating Germany with “visions”, “ambitions” and “order” is a nightmare, and even more so when this is done in the context of world politics (or even “Weltpolitik”). Since much of history has shown that German visions and ambitions about the creation of any type of order - world order in particular - have, more often than not, spelled trouble or even disaster, this is a difficult terrain for any author. Accordingly I have defined my task here in a rather restricted sense. In what follows I will concentrate on German debates about the role of the country in international affairs since unification in 1990. Moreover, given that much of the trouble and disaster which German visions and ambitions have caused historically had to do with the exercise of power in general and the use of force in particular, I will focus on these issues. Such a focus, it seems to me, is also well chosen because since unification many German visions have been circulating, which seemed to suggest that a new and German model of international civility was finally making its way into the world at large which was still dominated by “traditional” great powers. In this paper I will argue that, almost from the start, this well-intentioned self-image was an ill-conceived founding myth of united Germany which neither corresponded to the realities on the ground nor to the ambitions of the Germans themselves. The “new” Germany which entered the world stage in 1990 was the old FRG in many ways. In its own self-image the old “Bonn Republic” (as the Federal Republic before unification is referred to nowadays) had become a “civilian” power because it had learned from its own history and the world's history more broadly. I argue, however, that it had been the power which it was because, more than anything else, the allies wanted it to be that way. The nascent “Berlin Republic” similarly remains a power shaped by circumstance and choice, ie. a Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-containment and civilian power: United Germany's 3 Normalising Ambitions power shaped by the environment in which it is located, by the aspirations of its leadership and people, and by the demands of other states. If the German self-image of an avant-garde-type civilian power would have been accurate in 1990, the Germany of March 1999 fighting a war alongside its NATO allies almost exclusively on (at least questionable) human rights grounds probably would have to be ranked as a failure. If, however, the Germany of 1990 was no more (and no less) a power shaped by circumstance and choice than any of its partners in NATO and the EU, today's Germany is equally no less (and no more) a “normal” (or “abnormal”) country thus shaped. In other words, by most standards of “civility”, today's Germany is no more (and no less) “civilian” than any of its allies. Therefore, if the transformation process which German foreign policy has experienced during the last nine years - a process which, as I will try to show, was remarkable indeed - is aptly regarded as a “normalization” process, it is a process of “normalization” which any country experiences at any time. In addressing the question of Germany's global visions and ambitions I had to figure out some way of relating visions and ambitions. “Vision” normally relates to the question of what world we want to live in, ie. a desirable future state of the world. “Ambition” normally relates to the question of how we can get there, ie. what we can and should do in order to realize this desirable future state of the world. In trying to relate these two concepts empirically I have decided to examine not only academic or political visions but also what beliefs the political elites and the public more broadly held with regard to the future. The rationale behind this methodological strategy was that before visions could be translated into active policy, they had to be grounded in the broader beliefs of decision-makers and the people on whom they depend (the voters). As a result, I have focused on three things: (1) explicit visions and ambitions outlined in political speeches and academic books; (2) two prominent foreign policy decisions in 1990/91 and 1999 which should enable us to check the nexus between vision and ambition (here: 4 IGS Discussion Paper 99/10 concrete political steps towards a desired future); and (3) extensive data from public opinion polls among foreign policy elites and the German public more broadly. In arguing that Germany has gone through a process of “normalization” I will proceed as follows. To begin with I will first recount Germany's role during the Gulf War (Section 2). This crucial episode, coinciding with German unification in 1990, reveals that the country was caught largely unprepared for what was to come in January and February 1991. Still, even at that time decision-makers were seriously (if only briefly) considering sending German troops alongside the anti- Saddam coalition. The reasons for considering such a decision, and for finally deciding against it, had nothing to do with either “Weltpolitik” in the tradition of the Kaiserreich or the Third Reich or with a presumed mistrust among Germans themselves that their country had to somehow “contain” itself, or with a more fundamental transformation of the country towards a new type of “civilian power”. Rather, in addition to securing safe ratification of the “Two-plus-Four” treaty (which was only completed in March of 1991) it was a specific West German foreign policy tradition, the tradition of exercising “restraint”, which prevailed over some of the more ambitious designs by the American allies in particular. The Gulf War experience, setting off a new world order where similar regional conflicts and civil wars were starting to proliferate, had a sobering and lasting effect on German minds. Far from sharing some of the more visionary “internationalist” designs of a segment of German intellectuals and academics, the German public slowly but steadily adjusted to the new realities of an increasingly conflictual world. An even more accelerated speed of adjustment was noticeable among the foreign policy elites more broadly (Section 3). As a result, nine years after the Gulf War, Germany's “normalization” process has carried the country in a direction which few observers had expected in 1990. In security matters - be it regionally or globally - the “new” Germany still envisioned itself as reluctant a Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-containment and civilian power: United Germany's 5 Normalising Ambitions power as the old one. Yet given that the environment of its alliance has changed dramatically during these years, Germany has more continued to develop into the “normal” ally its partners had hoped for (Section 4). Irrespective of whether this process of “normalization” is applauded or criticized, it is something with which Germany as well as its allies have to live. In security matters Germany is having a harder time living with it than its allies. In European matters (defined more narrowly in the context of the European Union) it is vice versa (Section 5). As Germany's European visions fade, Germany's EU partners will increasingly be faced with “normal” German ambitions - ambitions much more similar to their own. I doubt that they will like it. In the end, therefore, a shade of nightmare might reappear at a very distant horizon - but, as yet, it is only a shade. 2. A defining moment: German Unification, the Gulf War and “Ultima Irratio” 1990 through 1992 were the formative years of Germany's “new” foreign policy. At the time of unification (ie. between September and December 1990) the political rhetoric about Germany's global visions and ambitions was filled with sentences redeploying certain key terms in varying contexts. What was least surprising for the experienced observers of German foreign policy was that these visions were primarily couched in terms of “Europe” and “responsibility”. Hans-Dietrich Genscher's interpretation of the preamble of the Basic Law - according to which a united Germany would “aspire to serve peace around the world as a member with equal rights in a united Europe” - probably best expressed how Germans wanted to see themselves and be seen by others. Although his more far-reaching claims about the “identity” of Germany's national and European interests (which Genscher had 6 IGS Discussion Paper 99/10 so forcefully expressed just the day before the wall came down a year earlier1) were no longer apparent, his judgement that a unified Germany carried significantly more “European” and “global responsibility” was widely shared. Against the

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