Embedding Reporters Into War: a Military Perspective

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EMBEDDING REPORTERS INTO WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

Drexel University

Tracie Adams

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF SCIENCE

June, 2017

ABSTRACT

The Embedded Media Program was created in 2003 prior to the war in Iraq to allow reporters unprecedented access to the battlefield (DoD, 2003) . As part of the Information Operations

Campaign, t he objectives were to counter disinformation and increase reporter objectivity, strengthen the trust between the military and the media and positively sway public opinion.

Military leaders leveraged the media to counter propaganda and more accurately tell the story to the American people back home (DoD, 2003). In doing so, they rallied support for the troops and enhanced the shaky relationship between the press and the United States Armed Forces.

This study examines the impact on the military-media relationship from the perspective of servicemembers who served in combat zones along side civilian reporters. Six active duty men and women from the Armed Services were interviewed to explore their opinions about what effect having civilian media embedded had on reporter objectivity, counteracting propaganda, mustering support for the troops and the overall relationship between the military and the media.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... iii

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 Statement of the Problem ...... 1

1.2 Background and Need ...... 2

1.3 Purpose of the Study ...... 3

1.4 Hypotheses ...... 3

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 5

2.1 Historical Background ...... 5

2.2 Military-Media Relationship ...... 8

2.3 Misinformation and Public Support ...... 10

2.4 Reporter Objectivity...... 13

3. METHODS ...... 18

3.1 Setting ...... 18

3.2 Participants ...... 19

3.3 Measurement Instruments ...... 19

3.4 Procedures ...... 20

3.5 Data Analysis ...... 20

4. RESULTS ...... 21

4.1 Respondents ...... 21

4.2 Themes ...... 22

4.3 Hypothesis 1 Findings...... 22

4.4 Hypothesis 2 Findings...... 23

4.5 Hypothesis 3 Findings...... 23

4.6 Hypothesis 4 Findings...... 27

4.7 Other Notable Findings ...... 28

5. DISCUSSION ...... 30

5.1 Limitations ...... 31

5.2 Future Research ...... 32

5.3 Conclusion ...... 32

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 34

APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ...... 35

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The relationship between the military and the media has historically been filled with suspicion and mistrust. Clashes from the conflict in Vietnam to the war in Iraq (Oehl, 2004) resulted in contention between those exercising their right to a free press and those fighting to protect that right (Cortell, et al., 2009). In an effort to repair the rift, the Department of Defense (DoD), along with media bureau chiefs, crafted a plan to provide journalists unprecedented access to military operations during the Iraq war. This resulted in the Embedded Media Program, essentially allowing reporters to work side-by-side with military troops “to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of US forces in combat and related operations” from the frontlines (Cortell, et al., 2009, p. 669).

The main objectives of the program were to dissuade disinformation and increase reporter objectivity, strengthen the trust between the military and the media and positively sway public opinion. Military Reporters and Editors co-founder, Sig Christenson, who has covered the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, said “The bottom line is: If you don’t know what’s really happening, what you have is a story that puts their fables into print, and that’s not what I’m here for” (Skallman, 2010, pg. 8).

Since the program began in 2003, more journalists than ever before were able to report live, and in real-time, from anywhere in the battle arena. The immediacy with which graphic images of war reached the American people, and the world, clearly and dramatically influenced public opinion (Starnes, 2004). The reports focused on more than just the battle at hand, they relayed tales of the men and women fighting that otherwise wouldn’t have been told. They helped

1 separate fact from fiction and rallied the support of not only the American people, but internationally as well. This constituted an as yet unseen level of cooperation between the media and the military (Starnes, 2004). Despite the deployment of more than 700 journalists during

Operation Iraqi Freedom (Starnes, 2004), the program’s effectiveness is still in debate.

Background and Need

The problem is extremely important given the environment we live in today. The U.S. Armed

Forces are engaged in multiple peace-keeping operations across the globe. It’s become a way of life for military members. The Department of Defense struggles to justify combat actions to the

American people and thus, relies heavily on the media to do so (Oehl, 2004). The difficulty comes when attempting to balance accountability with operations security. Historically, a lack of any guidelines outlining media involvement in military operations has led to suspicion and mistrust (Cortell, et al., 2009). The inherent characteristics of each organization already make for opposing agendas. The media is taught to question authority, while the military is trained to respect it. The media aim to bring everything out in the open while the military is a closed society, whose mission success depends largely on secrecy. Yet, information supremacy is an essential part of warfare today, so the military needs the press in their operational toolbox

(Starnes, 2004). The irony lies in the fact that each organization relies on the other, to a certain extent, to get their respective jobs done. While both acknowledge this, it doesn’t make their journey any less arduous.

After having been virtually shut-out in Afghanistan (Oehl, 2004), the roller-coaster, tug-of- war between the military and the media came to a head. With the Iraq war on the horizon, the press demanded a plan. And the military seemed to more fully acknowledge that “the American

2 people are not likely to tolerate a military that operates under a veil of secrecy” (Oehl, 2004, pg.

9). In response, Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and her deputy, Bryan Whitman, met with “40 or so national bureau chiefs” (Cortell, et al., 2009, pg.

662) several times to discuss the best way to incorporate the press during combat. Whitman explained the importance of having a strategic plan, “We wanted to neutralize the disinformation efforts of our adversaries. We wanted to build and maintain support for U.S. policy as well as the global war on terrorism. We wanted to take offensive action to achieve information dominance. We wanted to be able to demonstrate the professionalism of the U.S. military. And we wanted to build and maintain support, of course, for the war fighter out there on the ground”

(Shepard, 2004, pgs. 11-12). They developed public affairs guidelines, and as long as journalists followed the rules, they could go to war with the troops, literally.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to determine, from a military perspective, the impact embedding reporters into military missions has on reporter objectivity, deterring misinformation, gaining public support and the level of trust between the military and the media. Unfettered media access is essential to accurate, objective coverage of these missions (Starnes, 2004) to combat misinformation and garner public support for our military servicemen and women. In order to strengthen trust, “the military should embrace the press and leverage the media’s technology and worldwide reach to further strategic goals” (Starnes, 2004, pg. viii). While the Embedded Media

Program is a huge step in bridging the gap between these two diametrically opposed organizations, the overall impact needs to be evaluated.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: From a military perspective, embedding reporters into military missions affects journalistic objectivity.

Hypothesis 2: From a military perspective, embedding reporters affects the spread of disinformation.

Hypothesis 3: From a military perspective, embedding reporters affects the level of trust between the media and the military.

Hypothesis 4: From a military perspective, embedding reporters into military missions influences public opinion.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

Historical Background

It’s not surprising that tactics employed during the conflict in Vietnam led to intense mistrust between journalists and the troops. “As the administration wrestled with the challenge of getting its side of the story out through an increasingly suspicious media, the news rolled on with stories less influenced by governmental input. Throughout the decline of the relationship Americans and the media became more aligned in their view of the war. Their shared skepticism was driven by the feeling that they were uniformed; that the United States Government was keeping something from them” (Oehl, 2004, pg. 4). General William Westmoreland said he felt it was the “first war in history lost in the columns of the New York Times” (Oehl, 2004, pg. 5).

Though reporters were on the ground in Vietnam, they felt the government was spinning the story as there were vast differences between what they were seeing and what was being reported back home. The outcome of the ups and downs experienced by the military and media during

Vietnam resulted in a broken relationship riddled with contempt and uncertainty.

During Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 (Grenade, 2015), there was no attempt at all to incorporate the media, but they showed up anyway. In response, the military physically kept journalists out of the area of operation, fearing leaks would compromise the mission. This served to further the perception that the Pentagon was hiding something (Oehl, 2004). To prevent this type of censorship in the future, a commission was formed to determine the best way to include the media in future military actions. This resulted in the formation of the DoD

National Media Pool, which allows representatives from all forms of media to report on location from a given conflict (Oehl, 2004). While this seemed like a good first step, the press pool was

5 left to fend for itself initially, without military assistance.

When the invasion of Panama kicked-off, the pool of approved reporters from the Pentagon were sent late and missed the initial assault. They had to rely on info gleaned from journalists who went on their own, CNN and Pentagon briefings. This disaster subsequently led to

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, directing his military commanders to get involved with incorporating the media (Oehl, 3004).

While greater emphasis was subsequently placed on Public Affairs planning, continuing negative stories did nothing to improve military-media relations. Yet on the cusp of Desert

Shield/Storm, the Pentagon did activate the press pool. However, Saudi customs restrictions greatly hindered the effort, and once again, reporters made their own way. General Norman

Schwarzkopf, a Vietnam veteran who didn’t trust the media (Oehl, 2004), made known his desire to control the press, rather than allow the agreed-upon pool arrangement. So the military

“managed” the media throughout the Gulf War (Oehl, 2004, pg. 7).

Following the Gulf War journalists once again demanded changes, and another series of negotiations between the Pentagon and the press occurred. An ad hoc committee of Washington bureau chiefs set out to reverse the damage done by the media pool system during the Gulf War.

The result was the DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations, a statement of nine general principles to govern media coverage of war agreed upon by the committee and the

Pentagon, signed by both organizations on 11 March 1992 (STATEMENT OF DOD

PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATIONS , 2008). These principles were to be “followed in any future combat situation involving American troops”

(Hannah, 2007, pg. 14). The DoD and the media wrangled over a 10 th principle regarding

6 security review and landed with the caveat that coverage would be reviewed only if security was an issue (Hannah, 2007).

In August, 1992 “humanitarian relief and suppression of banditry, followed by peace enforcement with international forces under United Nations (UN) command, all accompanied by a nation-building effort.” began in Somalia (Pool, 2005, pg. 1). In 2010 after the earthquake in

Haiti, the U.S. military provided disaster relief and humanitarian aid (Cortell, et al., 2009). In both Somalia and Haiti, the Pentagon didn’t activate the press pool, but allowed the media to cover the humanitarian relief efforts. In Haiti, the military set up the ground rules but basically allowed journalistic freedom. In Bosnia, the media were permitted to embed reporters with several different units, as was the case in Kosovo. But Operation Allied Force was primarily an air campaign and the military was more concerned with operational and personnel security, so coverage was much more difficult. Reporting from Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring

Freedom, was even more restricted. Though the campaign relied heavily on ground forces, the journalists were left to their own devices in extremely dangerous territory (Hannah, 2007).

The press was given extensive access to operations during the Vietnam War, thanks to the fairly good relationship between the military and the media that developed during World War II

(Paul & Kim, 2004). However, critical press coverage led to the military closing ranks during this conflict, and the relationship took a turn for the worse. This increased tension carried into operations in Grenada, Panama, and the first Gulf War (Paul & Kim, 2004). Attempts to repair the trust during the war in the Gulf led to a more positive shift and groundwork was laid for a new kind of press access. This “ultimately led to the embedded press system used at the onset of

Operation Iraqi Freedom” (Paul & Kim, 2004, pg. 57).

The DoD’s Public Affairs guidance on embedding media during military operations, published in 2003, states “We need to tell the factual story-good or bad-before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell the story” (DoD, 2003, 2A). To accomplish this, the program permits journalists to embed with military units. This includes American, foreign (to include non-allied countries), and reporters from Arab countries (Cortell, et al., 2009). The document defines an embedded journalist as “a media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis-perhaps a period of weeks or even months” (DoD, 2003, 2C). The DoD created guidelines to address safety issues, along with a set of ground rules as to what type of information can be released and what cannot. The DoD’s view is that the “ground rules recognize the right of the media to cover military operations and are in no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, negative, or uncomplimentary information” (DoD, 2003, 4).

Fourteen types of information are releasable, and include force strength and friendly-fire casualties, where previous attacks occurred and which military services were involved, and the code name given to any operation. The hometowns and names of individual troops could be reported, with prior consent. Nineteen types of information cannot be reported, including how many troops are in a unit, any future battle plans, where they might occur and when troops are on the move (DoD, 2003). The guidelines encourage “the use of lipstick or helmet-mounted cameras” for covering combat sorties (DoD, 2003, 8).

With the program in place, more than 700 journalists (Starnes, 2004) embedded with military forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. “At the height of the conflict these reporters generated over 6,000 stories each week” (Starnes, 2004, pg. 4). At issue is whether this unprecedented

8 level of access achieved the desired objectives: to dissuade disinformation and increase reporter objectivity, strengthen the trust between the military and the media and positively sway public opinion.

Military-Media Relationship

Attempts to improve the relationship between the military and the media began before the war in Iraq, during preparations for the embed program. The DoD established boot camps which provided training to the reporters to prepare them for working in a combat environment, and to educate them about how the troops go to war. “A better media understanding of the units and missions, coupled with investments in building rapport, paid off for both media and the military due to greater respect for each other’s roles” (Starnes, 2004, pg. 13). This coupled with clear guidelines led to strong working relationships before even setting foot in Iraq. “The cooperation fostered improved relationships between the media and the military. The result was that each party benefited from the relationship and the coverage” (Starnes, 2004, pg. 17). Despite skepticism by the media initially about how much access would actually be provided, both the journalists and the troops indicated being pleased with the results (McLane, 2004).

The majority of the fiery interactions between the military and the media happened not on the battlefield, but at the headquarters or back at the Pentagon (Rodriguez, 2004). The reporters there couldn’t see first-hand what the embedded reporters on the ground had front-row seats to.

As a result, they pushed harder for specifics and details (Rodriguez, 2004).

Once everything kicked off, the deluge of non-stop coverage led to disconnects between the field and what was being reported from headquarters and out of the Pentagon. It got to the point where officials at both locations refused to confirm what was being relayed from the battlefield

(Rodriguez, 2004). This was especially prevalent with incidents that portrayed the military in a negative light and led to an adversarial and tense relationship between officials at both the headquarters and Pentagon and the reporters working there (Rodriguez, 2004). It also led the media to think officials were holding back, or sensitizing what was really happening.

Conversely, NBC’s Tim Russert and CNN’s Wolf Blitzer both agree that embedding reporters with the military was a success for the American people, the military and the media (McLane,

2004). In an NPR interview with one of its own correspondents, John Burnett, who was embedded during the war, says it is an unnatural way to practice journalism. However, he goes on to add that the entire experience helped “bridge the gap of distrust between the military and the media that is going to yield better defense reporting in the future. Because they’re going to be more open with the media, and I think we’ll understand them better” (Nieman Reports, 2003, pg. 89).

Misinformation and Public Support

Public affairs guidance issued by the Department of Defense in 2003 states that “Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region will come in our long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideals. We need to tell the factual story—good or bad—before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do” (DoD, 2003, 2A). Thus, the military recognizes the need

10 to rally public support, most importantly, in times of war. In addition, media coverage that accurately depicts the military’s objectives helps stop the spread of enemy lies.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke told the Washington Post that it’s “in our interest to let people see for themselves through the news media, the lies and deceptive tactics Saddam Hussein will use. He will put military assets next to civilians and blame any casualties on us. It’s better if the Washington Post’s of the world are telling people than us

(Kurtz, 2003).

Reporting from embedded battlefields helped enable journalists to counter disinformation generated by the Iraqi propaganda machine (Starnes, 2004), as well as reports from other sources which were against the campaign, or the U.S. in general. This effort put forth what was actually happening so the American people, and the rest of the world, could decide what was true and what wasn’t (Starnes, 2004). In one instance, the Iraqi Minister of Information used footage from an embedded reporter and alleged that American forces were trapped by the Iraqis in Umm

Qasr. An embedded journalist with USA Today submitted a story the next day demonstrating that Marines were in fact advancing “very slowly in order to make sure no civilians were mixed in with the Iraqi soldiers” (Paul & Kim, 2004, pgs. 56-57).

Dan Rather of CBS News said the Embedded Media Program helped quell the anti-war movement. “The embed reports, carried 24-hours a day on the cable news channels and as lead stories within the standard news agencies, focused audiences on the men and women fighting, and silenced or smothered national dissent. Everyone, regardless of their opinion on the war, developed a “sense of pride and admiration” for those fighting on the frontlines” (Starnes, 2004, pg. 4).

Harvard Professor Nancy Bernhard said, “Support for the troops became the overriding frame for war news in the Unites States media, and television reporters, in particular, partook of the vast public support that poured forth for capable and honorable soldiers” (Bernhard, 2003, pg.

87).

The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, had a different perspective in the program, commenting that wars in the past might not have lasted as long or been fought the way they were had reporters been on the front lines. He doubted “that public opinion in great democracies would have allowed the wars to continue, if they had known the full measure and impact of the horrendous loss of life that occurred in those tragic battles…” (Starnes, 2004, pg. 5).

Colonel Glenn Starnes, a Marine Corp Battalion Commander in Iraq, saw firsthand the impact journalists had on both the troops and the American people. He used a quote from Philip

Knightly to express his support of embedding reporters, “On the home front, information-news-is used to arouse the fighting spirit of the nation, to mobilize public opinion about the war, to suppress dissent and to steel the people for the sacrifices needed for victory” (Taylor, 1992, pg.

18-19) Lieutenant General William Wallace, who commanded the U.S. Army V Corp in Iraq, said that embedded reporters brought home the story of soldiers that otherwise wouldn’t have been told. It gave the American people “something to hold on to at the ‘mom & pop’ level”

(Starnes, 2004, pg. 4).

Major General J.D. Thurman, Operations Officer for the Coalition Forces Land Component

Commander in Iraq, said that reports filed by embedded journalists helped rebuke the propaganda being spread by the Saddam Hussein-controlled media in Baghdad. While the Iraqi

Minister of Information was announcing that coalition forces were nowhere near the city, the

12 embedded reporters simultaneously reported the taking of key locations, like the international airport. “During OIF, the military succeeded in leveraging the media as part of its Information

Operations Campaign. The Embedded Media Program was both a propaganda tool for the strategic war effort and an operational counter-propaganda asset” (Starnes, 2004, pg. 3).

When the invasion began, cable news and broadcast outlets provided 24-hour, real-time coverage of everything from clashes with the enemy to military men and women setting up camp. It was during these moments that “the Pentagon claimed its largest public relations success-the display of American soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors as everyday people in extraordinary circumstances who were dedicated to serving their country and protecting their buddies. These images of bravery and camaraderie combined with the “shout outs” to family and friends back home were priceless in lifting the level of patriotism, appreciation, and support for the troops” (Rodriguez, 2004, pg. 8).

It is important to address the role technology plays in shaping public perceptions. Today, more than ever, terrorists use “crafted media events, designed and intended for an audience”

(Dauber, 2009, pg. v) to psychologically terrorize. Thanks to high quality, affordable cameras, editing software and the ability to upload and disseminate content via YouTube and other internet sites, any terrorist can wage from a smart device or laptop computer. Al-Qaeda in Iraq

(AQI) use media labs to produce videos which are downloaded and taken elsewhere to be uploaded to the internet. Combating this was extremely critical to the success of the coalition effort. “Between June and roughly November 2007 (roughly the period corresponding to the

“surge”), American forces captured eight media labs belonging to AQI. In these labs they found a total of 23 terabytes of material that had not yet been uploaded to the web. Coalition forces

13 made the labs a priority target under General David Petraeus because of their importance to AQI operations, recruitment, and funding. The loss of those labs, according to the Multi-National

Force- Iraq (MNF-I), resulted in more than an 80 percent degradation of AQI’s capacity to get new material on the web as of September 2007, critical because it was the videos that played a large role in bringing in recruits from the larger Arab world” (Dauber, 2009, pg. viii).

Reporter Objectivity

While most agree the coverage by embedded journalists had a resounding impact on public opinion and support for the war, not all believe it was truly unbiased. “Two criticisms were frequently repeated: the embedded reporters were compromised by their relationship with their units, and the focus of their reports was too narrow” (McLane, 2004, pg. 77). Immediately after the war in Iraq began, embedded reporters were overwhelmingly thrilled with such unprecedented admittance to the battlefield, however, once time passed and violence increased, many complained access to information was withheld. Some even claimed they were intimidated into reporting only positive results of the conflict. Moreover, many felt the limited access to multiple sources made it difficult to verify information (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009).

In a study of journalists who were embedded in Iraq, respondents were asked if they felt their reports were censored, and if so, how much (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009). Reporters were assigned to a specific unit, and that limited where they could go and who they could talk to. Some journalists felt this was by design, so the military could control how the war was relayed in the press. Interviews had to be “on the record” and more junior service members were less likely to be forthcoming as they feared reprisal. Additionally, senior ranking officials had the authority to censor reports they thought violated operational security (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009, pg. 57).

Many felt this was intended to ensure only positive coverage, however; one study indicates that

“embedded reporters had among the highest percentages of neutral stories (91%) of any type of reporter” (Aday, et al., 2005, pg. 15). That same study indicates that most news reports

“achieved a neutral tone…96% of coverage on ABC and CBS” (Aday, et al., 2005, pg. 12).

Neutral was defined as unbiased and adhering to the professional standards of neutrality (Aday, et al., 2005).

Tuosto (2008) asserts that embedding “allows for a pro-war propaganda machine disguised as an objective eyewitness account of the war effort in Iraq” (pg. 2). Many feel truly objective reporting is impossible, while depending on the troops you live, eat and sleep with to safeguard your life (Tuosto, 2008). One journalists said that being embedded was “a flawed experiment that served the purposes of the military more than it served the cause of balanced journalism,” while another says it’s “the best single move the American military has ever made in its relations with the press.” And another embedded reporter says that reporting mishaps can get you blackballed (CJR, 2003, pgs. 42-43).

Additionally, several journalists wrote of their “fear of having succumbed to “Stockholm

Syndrome”: having their work influenced by their close relationship with their units. Reporters from both print and television have recounted how they assisted their units in combat, shared physical hardships, and felt accepted as one of the group. These reporters bonded with their units and felt guilt in returning to the United States while their units were still in Iraq” (McLane,

2004, pgs. 82-83). While this didn’t make it impossible for them to be objective and/or able to report facts (good or bad), many worried about it interfering with their ability to be truly unbiased (McLane, 2004).

Embedded reporters were provided for by the units they were assigned to. This included transportation, security, chemical warfare gear, and basic health care and feeding etc. (DoD,

2003). Unilateral reporters were basically on their own, without military assistance, and had to fend for themselves in the area of operations. Critics argue that in this dangerous environment where the adrenaline is at an all time high, it’s easy to get too close to your subject. Further, it’s difficult to remain objective when you’re relying so heavily on that subject to not only survive, but be able to effectively do your job. A study of the content produced by embedded and unilateral reporters from ABC, NBC, CBS and CNN revealed that stories by embedded reporters were “more favorable in overall tone toward the military” and “more favorable in depictions of military personnel” than those produced by unilateral reporters (Pfau et al., 2005, pg. 468).

This may be due to the fact that embedded reporters were actually in the midst of the battle alongside American servicemen, and their stories reflected that viewpoint. Unilateral reporters didn’t have access to the front-row access during invasion operations, and thus their stories reflected more of the uncertainty of what was happening by the Iraqi people during the aftermath

(Fahmy & Johnson, 2007).

Conversely, many reporters felt the bond and trust they developed with the troops opened the door to even more information about military strategy and planned movements (Fahmy &

Johnson, 2009). One reporter said “What embedding has done is to make it possible for media organizations to better understand what is really happening in the “fog of war,” rather than making guesses and assumptions based on reporters who didn’t witness what happened, but merely arrives two or three days later. The embed experience opened my eyes about how often

16 and easy it has been in the past for reputable news organizations to get it wrong” (Fahmy &

Johnson, 2005, pg. 311).

A Boston Globe reporter, Scott Nelson, was embedded with the First Marine Division.

During a convoy, he spotted an Iraqi sniper that no one else saw. “Nelson informed a gunner, who fired 100 rounds and the killed the fedayeen sniper.” Though he said he felt connected to the Marines, he didn’t feel his reporting would be biased since it would be presented along with reports from unilateral reporters (Bernhard, 2003, pg. 88).

Another reporter noted that “In a perfect world, the media would have full access, no controls, the ground rules that all embedded journalists were required to sign provided sufficient security controls-in essence a requirement for self-censorship on security issues-locations of units, future plans, etc. the media should always seek unlimited access. But the military, any nation’s military, has a legitimate interest in keeping its plans private” (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009, pg. 69).

The military employs a strategy known as “security at the source” (Paul & Kim, 2004, pg.

70). The guidance requires military members to limit discussions with the press to events they have direct knowledge of or that they personally took part in. The idea is to avoid speculation and spreading rumors. “This is noticeably different from “don’t talk to reporters” and is presented in standard public affairs instructions as being responsible with, and accountable for, what is presented to the press” (Paul & Kim, 2004, pg. 70).

ABC reporter Ron Claiborne said, “I do not deny that reporters sometimes go easy on someone they like-or go hard on someone they don’t. That’s human nature. But, I do not think that living among the people we are covering undermines our putative objective” (Ganey, 2004, pg. 25).

With reporters embedded on the ground, on ships, at headquarters in Qatar, at staging areas throughout the area of operations and at the Pentagon, the challenge was to put together all the pieces and provide an objective, overall picture of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The job of putting it all together rested with the media outlets back home. To help with this, numerous military subject matter experts were hired and made available around the clock (Rodriguez, 2004).

Summary

From a military perspective, embedding reporters enabled a close-up, positive look at how successful the American troops were and it helped counter enemy propaganda. However, from a journalistic view, it was felt that objectivity and perspective were lost, despite, or as a result of, the extensive access to wartime operations (Pfau et al., 2004).

With the background stage set, the research now turns to methods for evaluating what impact, from a military perspective, embedding reporters into active war zones has on reporter objectivity, rallying support for the troops, debunking misinformation and the overall relationship between the military and the media.

CHAPTER 3 – METHODS

This researcher’s goal was to identify what impact embedding reporters into active warfare has on combating disinformation, reporter objectivity, trust between the military and the media and swaying public opinion. In-depth interviews were conducted with six members of the Armed

Forces who worked with embedded journalists during a military wartime operation. Interview questions were designed to address the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: From a military perspective, embedding reporters into military missions affects journalistic objectivity.

Hypothesis 2: From a military perspective, embedding reporters affects the spread of disinformation.

Hypothesis 3: From a military perspective, embedding reporters affects the level of trust between the media and the military.

Hypothesis 4: From a military perspective, embedding reporters into military missions influences public opinion.

This qualitative study described the environment in which military members interacted with embedded civilian reporters during combat, and what impact it had on the behavior, the mission and coverage of the conflict. The narrative data was transcribed and categorized into four sections related to each hypothesis.

Setting

This study took place electronically, using the internet to solicit respondents and receive results. This researcher utilized social media sites, including Facebook, and electronic mail

(email) to locate current and former military personnel who served in combat zones with

19 embedded reporters. All interviews were conducted via email and Facebook messenger. The respondents were from the United States Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corp.

Participants

The convenience sampling procedure used by this researcher was restricted to current and former military veterans who served in combat zones with embedded reporters. Participants included an Army Major, two Air Force Master Sergeants (MSgt), one Air Force Technical

Sergeant (TSgt), a Navy Petty Officer First Class (JO1) and a Marine Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt).

This purposive sample included respondents from diverse backgrounds, both male and female, who served varying lengths of time in different combat zones in various job specialties in the

Armed Services.

Measurement Instruments

Researcher-made interviews were used as the measurement instrument in this qualitative study. Eight questions were asked of each respondent and included the following:

Q1. Where, when, and for how long were you deployed with a civilian, embedded reporter?

Q2. How were you advised how to deal with the embedded reporter?

Q3. In what way, if any, did your behavior change around the embedded reporter?

Q4. In what way did having an embedded reporter impact your mission?

Q5. How did having an imbedded reporter impact trust in the relationship between the military and the media?

Q6. Did the reporter’s coverage accurately depict your mission? Was it factual and unbiased?

Q7. How did the coverage help deter misinformation?

Q8. How did the coverage rally support for the troops from back home?

Each question on the researcher-made interview was crafted to investigate, from a military perspective; the impact embedding reporters into active warfare has on combating disinformation, reporter objectivity, trust between the military and the media and influencing public opinion.

The accuracy and credibility of the findings is valid as all respondents served in combat zones while interacting with embedded reporters. The data collected investigates the impact and results of that interaction, from a military perspective. Personal bias was not a factor as this author was not deployed with any of the servicemembers interviewed.

Procedures

The data collection process took place over an eight week period. This researcher sought out respondents using email and Facebook. Interviews were then sent to participants who met the criteria of being active or former military, and having served in a war zone with a civilian embedded reporter. Each participant was given a week to complete and return the interview, via email or on Facebook.

Data Analysis

The data collected was transcribed and organized into groups corresponding to each hypothesis. Specific answers to the interview questions were then categorized into themes, also correlating to each hypothesis.

CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS

This researcher investigated whether embedding reporters in military missions deters misinformation, affects journalistic objectivity and public opinion. This author also expected to find out if the embedding program helped strengthen the trust between the civilian journalists and the military. The research was conducted with military servicemembers only and is representative of their perspective.

Respondents

Interviews were conducted with six military members who worked with embedded reporters during an active conflict. One female active duty Air Force MSgt, Erin Roberts, who worked as a broadcast journalist, was deployed with a civilian reporter for two weeks in Iraq. A male Air

Force MSgt, Todd Kabalan, who worked in the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) in

Baghdad, was deployed with numerous civilian reporters from September 2004 to March 2005 and then again at Camp Prosperity in Iraq from September 2008 to March 2009. A male Air

Force TSgt, Dan Velez, who worked as a broadcast journalist, was deployed onboard the USS

Kitty Hawk for six days in May, 2003 with a civilian journalist. The ship traveled from Okinawa to Yokosuka, Japan in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A male Army Major, T.G. Taylor, who worked in Public Affairs, was deployed to Jalalabad, Afghanistan from June 09-June 10 with approximately 250 embedded journalists. A male Marine GySgt, Tim McGough, was deployed with to the U.S. 5 th Fleet in Bahrain with several embedded reporters in support of

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom from 2002-2005. A male Naval JO1, Scott

Cohen, was deployed to Afghanistan from 2006-2007 with various civilian reporters for several days at a time and for periods up to more than four weeks continuously. The embedded reporters

22 were from various networks, including CNN, ABC, NBC, and the BBC, as well as newspapers such as the NY Times, Stars & Stripes and The Wall Street Journal, to name a few.

Themes

Analysis of the data gathered from the interviews revealed findings corresponding to each hypothesis. Hypothesis 1 examined whether embedding reporters into military missions affects journalistic objectivity, from a military perspective. Findings indicate that all but one respondent had access to the coverage, and found it to be factual and unbiased. TSgt Velez said, “The article written by the Stars & Stripes was an accurate portrayal of the USS Kitty Hawk’s mission.” GySgt McGough indicated that the reporters showed the mission from various levels, stating that “Overall, the media reported the information they saw and what we provided to them.

I don’t remember any instances where they reported inaccurate information.” Major Taylor said there were very few issues with accuracy, and when there were, he would address it with the reporters directly to provide clarity. “If I felt strongly that something had been mischaracterized,

I would engage the reporter, express my perspective and almost always, they would change their reporting to make it more accurate or at least more in line with our perspective. I think this was unique to my unit though because of all the hard work and effort we put into our embed program, training troops and leaders on it, and adjusting expectations so that our units never felt that the press was the enemy.” MSgt Webb stated that the civilian broadcaster embedded with her was well-known and trusted by the military members to report the facts accurately. “Yes, she was very professional and many Army officers had worked with her previously.” JO1 Cohen felt that the civilian coverage was likely more believable than that of military reporters. “It allowed for a true capture of combat and war through the eyes of a civilian. When military combat

23 photographers and journalists write and capture the stories they will always have the taint of government, true or not. However the civilian reporter capturing the events unfolding next to you telling the same story will have more credibility. Back then they did.” MSgt Kabalan reported that he did not have direct access to the coverage.

Hypothesis 2 examined whether embedding reporters impacted the spread of disinformation, from a military perspective. Five of the six respondents stated that the embedded journalists were a key part of countering enemy propaganda and rumors. GySgt McGough remarked that

“the credibility of the coalition was elevated because there were so many voices countering what

Saddam Hussein was putting out.” TSgt Velez said, “By putting out a story and letting the public know what their mission was and how they accomplished it, we the media are able to combat rumors and misinformation about deployments.” Major Taylor stated that there were times when the embedded reporter’s coverage led to positive change. “Even when something went horribly wrong…, we had press who understood our perspective and understood what happened and why it happened. What went wrong was there was a large taliban attack. Taliban claimed that they'd killed hundreds of Americans, but the number was actually eight. Had reporters reported what taliban claimed, it would have been a major win for them. However, by working with reporters, we were able to prevent this misinformation from becoming the "truth.

Often, they helped us to make the argument to our higher commands that something needed to be done.”

When asked how having embedded reporters in the combat zone impacted the mission, GySgt

McGough said the biggest impact was countering enemy propaganda. “The numerous reporters definitely helped us discredit and overwhelm Saddam Hussein in the beginning phase of OIF.

There was popular support, but the region also saw how quickly we secured Iraq and Saddam

Hussein’s propaganda machine was exposed and countered with hundreds of media embedded throughout the battlefield.”

Hypothesis 3 explored whether embedding reporters into military missions affected the level of trust between the media and the military, from a military perspective. All respondents stated emphatically that having journalists embedded positively impacted the relationship. When asked how they were advised to behave around the embedded reporters, two respondents indicated they were not given specific instructions concerning interaction with them. The remaining respondents all received guidance from command levels. GySgt McGough said, “We were directed to facilitate the media to report on the good, the bad and ugly of combat ops. However, the media escort was directed to provide “security at the source,” as reporting occurred, if there was anything that may harm OPSEC or future missions, we would work with the reporter to not report. This was also a trust and rapport relationship that built over time.” MSgt Kabalan stated that he was directed to give reporters as much access as possible. “We were advised to treat all reporters from the standpoint that they were on location to help tell the unit story, so we should do everything in our power to escort them to authorized areas and try to connect them with subject matter experts so that they could get the information they were looking for. I was mostly in an escort role, so that meant walking them to locations on the camp, arranging for access badges, making sure their basic needs were met.” Major Taylor, who worked in Public Affairs while deployed, was responsible for advising both the troops and embedded reporters how to interact with each other. “I always met with the reporters before sending them out, I reminded them of the ground rules, specifically, that they cannot report anything that would put troops in

25 danger, I advised them for their own sake to get along with their hosts and to be as low maintenance as possible and to follow the direction of the leaders they were embedded with. I advised leaders to let the journalists see what they were doing and to let them get to know them.

I always reminded leaders that if their troops are doing things they wouldn't want a reporter to see, then they probably shouldn't be doing whatever that is. My commander and I looked at it as an opportunity to remind our troops that they needed to remain disciplined at all times.” JO1

Cohen said he was told not to try and influence the coverage in any way, but to ensure security was not breached. “We briefed reporters on security requirements and the need to make sure any sensitive photos in the field be cleared. This was not much of an issue since working with

Afghan security forces in the field did not require classified material in plain sight. We were advised to stay away from shaping the narrative of the reporter, but we were advised to brief the unit on what to expect.”

Respondents were also asked if their behavior changed at all around the embedded reporter(s). Two respondents stated that their behavior was no different, while the remaining four indicated being more guarded at the onset of the relationship. MSgt Kabalan said “My behavior didn’t change much, although the reporter(s) I was escorting around sometimes wanted to know what my opinion was on the overall war effort or specific missions. Sometimes his questions would be geared towards eliciting a negative response, but after he realized that I wasn’t going to give him what he wanted- he quit asking those types of questions.” Major

Taylor felt it was important and much more beneficial to be himself. “I let them see my frustration when I was frustrated. I shared with them my disappointment and sadness when something went wrong or when we lost a Soldier. These things led me to grow very close to

26 many of the reporters and to build relationships that I could and have called on many times later on. When I had units that would put on a bright and shiny face with reporters, I would correct them and tell them to be real and honest. When my commander had interviews I encouraged him to open up about frustrations and about things he felt we could be doing better. In fact, in one instance, he brought a Pulitzer prize winning journalist to tears when he was expressing just how frustrating and difficult our mission was and how hard our troops and leaders were trying to accomplish it.” GySgt McGough stated that the better he knew the reporter, the more he could be himself and focus on the mission. “With one reporter, in particular, whom I embedded many times, as rapport was built I didn’t feel I had to be with them every second. A degree of trust developed because I know the reporter would not do anything to harm the troops he was embedded with through his reporting. The reporter also trusted me that I would do my utmost to give him access to events that could be reported on even if some of them were logistically difficult.” JO1 Cohen stated that he was cautious at first, but behaved more naturally as the relationship grew. “I would be more guarded with what I would share with the reporter when he asked me about what was really coming up. I know during the longer embeds both myself and the units in general became more and more comfortable with the reporters. On the longest embed, lasting over one month in Andar, the reporter who I can’t for the life remember the name of, even pitched in for a live goat because he was tired of MREs.” MSgt Roberts and TSgt Velez indicated no change in behavior while working with the embedded reporters. GySgt McGough responded by saying that the reporters became a part of the military team. “The units themselves eventually adopted the media as peers. They didn’t mistrust them as much and invited them into their units. Overall, the media embed program made the military as a whole less adverse or afraid

27 to provide information and access to the media.” Major Taylor recalled seeing instances where trust was eroded because the unit would not allow the embed to properly do their job. He relayed an incident wherein a reporter captured a safety lapse that helped the command address a life or death issue in combat. “I had one time when an embed had photographed mortarmen firing out of uniform. The battalion commander was very upset that the photograph was published, but I spoke with the journalist and the commander and frankly the mortarmen were in the wrong and if the embed wasn't there to capture this, the battalion commander never would have known about their dangerous lapses in discipline.” JO1 Cohen stated that the more time he spent with embedded reporters, the more he felt they understood the fighting force. “As my deployment went on and the more embeds I did, six total, I gained more and more trust for the media I was working with in austere and harsh environments. I also knew I could count on them to filter out what needed to be “filtered” out for public consumption. They understood the nature of war and the ugliness and filth. They self-censored in order not to tarnish our troops.”

Hypothesis 4 examined whether embedding reporters into military missions influenced public opinion, from a military perspective. TSgt Velez said the news stories helped the American people understand the hardships faced during deployments. “Their coverage…let the public know how long the sailors aboard the U.S.S Kitty Hawk were gone, what their mission was in the Gulf and what life was like for the sailors during their deployment.” Major Taylor expressed mixed feelings about the embeds impact on public opinion, stating that, “From a political standpoint, I don't think it necessarily did rally support for the troops. I never thought that my job was to build support for the war effort. My job was to make sure the truth was told back home. If anything, my job was to tell the truth so that we would have more operational support

28 to complete our mission. That being said, having those embeds really communicated well with our families and supporters back home to let them know how important our work was and how hard our troops were working and how well they were being cared for. So, it rallied support for our troops from our families and supporters, but not necessarily with the general public. In my opinion, that is the job of politicians not the military. Public Affairs is by law not supposed to influence the American public; rather it should inform the American public.” GySgt McGough credits the use of various social media platforms for inspiring support for the military. “Initially, we gained popular support in the beginning phase. However, once the insurgency started it decreased steadily. It was won back to a large degree because of the emergence of social media.

Information was provided directly through detailed engagement to hometown news media. This medium had not been as easy to reach before due to the volume of hometown media and their geographic dispersal. Social media, however, allowed for a new type of media relations that was conversational in nature. This is really the state of play in today’s media environment. The large national and international media outlets are not the only information nodes that can determine a narrative.”

Other Notable Findings

Respondents were also asked what impact embedded reporters had on mission accomplishment. MSgt Kabalan had to accompany an embedded reporter during his deployment. “Well we were sometimes short-handed. My other mission was to document missions and internally report on what our troops were doing- for command information and documentation purposes. Having to escort a reporter around definitely takes time away from that, but in the long term I believe that if you treat the reporter respectfully and ensure their basic

29 needs are met, they generally helped my secondary mission (inform the external public) in the long term.” MSgt Roberts said it was helpful having an embedded civilian reporter. “She actually was able to accomplish more high visibility interviews than the general military reporter would have been able to get. We traveled around Baghdad and outlying areas and interviewed

Iraqi officials, Iraqi military members, American military members, General Petraeus, Lt

General Odierno, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker.” For Major Taylor, managing the embed program at his location was one part of his mission. “My mission was to tell the story of my unit, to keep the public at home and in Afghanistan informed about our mission, why we're doing it and how we we're doing it. Our embeds were essential to accomplishing that mission, because not only could we tell them those things, but they could see with their own eyes how we were doing those things.” TSgt Velez reported no impact at all on his mission, but did relay that the embed reporter was given special treatment aboard the USS Kitty Hawk. “The Stars and Stripes civilian reporters got some preferential treatment over me a military reporter. As an E-6 my quarters were not as accommodating as the Stars and Stripes reporters. They were authorized E-7

(Chief) privileges despite their much younger age.”

Overall, from a military perspective, the findings indicate a positive response to the

Embedded Media Program. Direction was given to the military members to allow the media full access and to behave as normal as possible, despite the presence of reporters. The mission was not negatively impacted by the media and though some respondents were guarded at first, more trust developed over time between the servicemembers and journalists. Those with access to the coverage felt it was accurate, that it helped counter enemy propaganda and it rallied support for

30 the troops. As expected, embedding reporters helped take the relationship between the military and the media a step in the right direction.

CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION

The relationship between the military and the media has been plagued with mistrust. In an effort to repair the bond and strengthen trust between the two, the DoD created the Embedded

Media Program, essentially allowing reporters to work side-by-side with military troops “to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of US forces in combat and related operations” from the frontlines (Cortell, et al., 2009, p. 669).

The main objectives of the program are to dissuade disinformation and increase reporter objectivity, strengthen the trust between the military and the media and positively sway public opinion. The purpose of this qualitative study was to determine the effect embedding reporters into military missions had on the stated objectives. In order to strengthen trust, “the military should embrace the press and leverage the media’s technology and worldwide reach to further strategic goals” (Starnes, 2004, pg. VIII). While the Embedded Media Program is a huge step in bridging the gap between these two diametrically opposed organizations, the overall impact needed to be evaluated.

The interview questions were designed to address four hypotheses. The first being that from a military perspective, embedding reporters into military missions affects journalistic objectivity.

From the respondents perspective who had access to the coverage, the results indicate that they felt it was objective, unbiased and factually correct, and likely a result of the level of access granted to reporters.

The second hypothesis states that from a military perspective, embedding reporters affects the spread of disinformation. Data collected from respondents reveals that they feel the credibility of the American military was elevated because so many reporters were on hand to counter any

32 enemy propaganda. The media also served as a conduit to dispel internal rumors amongst the troops.

Hypothesis three posits that from a military perspective, embedding reporters affects the level of trust between the media and the military. Information gathered points out that the respondents feel that the longer the reporter was embedded, the greater the bond of trust that developed with the troops. They also expressed that as media members became more completely integrated with the military units, confidence in one another grew.

The fourth hypothesis postulates that from a military perspective, embedding reporters into military missions influences public opinion. Respondents indicated they felt that the civilian reporters ability to provide detailed information about the daily trials, tribulations and successes of the men and women while they are fighting, helped the American people better understand what it is like to be at war. Technological advances in social media enabled stories to reach more people in more places than ever before.

Limitations

This researcher faced two limiting factors to the study. Though an intense search for respondents was conducted through numerous military and social media sources, the sample size is small. There was difficulty finding military respondents, who had been deployed in active combat zones with civilian reporters, willing to complete the interview questionnaire. Second, not every respondent had access to the coverage produced by the civilian reporters; therefore one individual was unable to address how factual the reports were and/or how much they countered misinformation. Additionally, three respondents could not gauge how much the media coverage rallied support for the troops.

Future Research

Given the results of the study, there are several opportunities for future research that would be greatly beneficial. First, interviewing more military members who served with civilian embedded reporters in times of war would improve the accuracy of the data. Second, having full access to the stories produced by the reporters would better enable respondents to evaluate its impact on countering propaganda and rallying support for the war effort. Lastly, interviewing and including data from the perspective of civilian embedded journalists would contribute greatly to the findings.

Conclusion

The Embedded Media Program was crafted to help repair the rift between the military and media that resulted from clashes during past conflicts. It allowed reporters to work side-by-side with military troops “to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of US forces in combat and related operations” from the frontlines (Cortell, et al., 2009, p. 669). From a military perspective, this impacted their ability to dissuade disinformation and increase reporter objectivity, while strengthening the trust between the military and the media and positively swaying public opinion.

34 supremacy is an essential part of warfare today, so the military needs the press in their operational toolbox (Starnes, 2004). “If the presence of the media within units in combat at all levels ensures the trust of the American public and strengthens their support, the military should look for ways to further improve the Embedded Media Program for the future (Starnes, 2004, pg.13).

From a military perspective, embedding reporters is a way to fortify what has historically been a tenuous relationship between journalists and servicemembers. While there are still issues which impact its effectiveness, improvements to the Embedded Media Program have the potential to more positively impact the country’s ability to wage war in the future.

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Appendix A Interview Questions