REPORTERS OR CHEERLEADERS: EMBEDDED VERSUS UNILATERAL REPORTING DURING TASK FORCE ORION Major K.L.A. Dunlop JCSP 39 PCEMI 39 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2013 ministre de la Défense nationale, 2013. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 39 – PCEMI 39 2012 – 2013 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE REPORTERS OR CHEERLEADERS: EMBEDDED VERSUS UNILATERAL REPORTING DURING TASK FORCE ORION By Major K.L.A. Dunlop Par le major K.L.A. Dunlop “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College in stagiaire du Collège des Forces fulfilment of one of the requirements of the canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author alone contient donc des faits et des opinions que considered appropriate and correct for the seul l'auteur considère appropriés et subject. It does not necessarily reflect the convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas policy or the opinion of any agency, nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion including the Government of Canada and d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le the Canadian Department of National gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Defence. This paper may not be released, de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est quoted or copied, except with the express défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de permission of the Canadian Department of reproduire cette étude sans la permission National Defence.” expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.” Word Count: 19 169 Compte de mots: 19 169 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents i Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Chapter 1 – Introduction 1.1. From Vietnam to Iraq: The Evolution of the Modern 1 War Correspondent 1.2. The Debate over Embedded versus Unilateral Conflict 5 Reporting Chapter 2 – Embedded versus Unilateral Conflict Reporting from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 2.1. Background 8 2.2. The “Marine Grunt Truth” 11 2.3. “The Redder the Better” – Dying for a Great Story 12 2.4. Sleeping with the Enemy: A Soldier’s View of the Military 14 Embed 2.5. The Criticality of Democratic Debate 16 Chapter 3 – Canadian Conflict Reporting and the Canadian Forces’ Military Embedding Program (MEP) 3.1. Brief History of Canadian Conflict Reporting 17 3.2. Operation ATHENA MEP 23 3.3. The Ground Rules for Embedded Journalists 25 Chapter 4 – Task Force ORION and the Battle for Afghanistan 4.1. Waning Public Will: A Tenuous Centre of Gravity 27 4.2. Mullah Dadulla: Orchestrating a Taliban Resurgence, 29 Nov-Dec 2005 4.3. The Government, TF ORION and the Media: Preparing 31 For War 4.4. Cracking the Codex on Military Operations 39 4.5. Canadian Embedded versus Unilateral Reporting 44 4.6. The Battle of Panjwai 51 4.7. Beyond the Battle of Panjwai and Task Force ORION 59 Chapter 5 – The Canadian Forces, Military Embedding and Public Affairs into the Future 5.1. Media “Management” 63 5.2. The Canadian Forces: In Need of a Narrative and a Voice 64 5.3. The Canadian Forces and Embedding – The Way Ahead 66 Bibliography 75 ABSTRACT The debate over embedded versus unilateral conflict reporting remains a heated one normally focused on the issue of objectivity, with many critics of embedded journalism arguing that it is simply impossible to maintain objectivity when your life is entrusted to the military. This thesis argues that both embedded and unilateral journalists – while providing different views of conflict – are essential to the provision of a comprehensive and factual view of a conflict to the public they serve. Despite concerns over media management by the military, what is equally concerning is the narrow perspectives offered by embedded or unilateral reporting individually. Evidence for this argument is based on a study of embedded and unilateral reporters’ experiences and coverage of Task Force ORION in Afghanistan from February to August 2006. The Canadian Forces embedding program proved successful through its education of the news media and Canadian citizens regarding military operations in Afghanistan and equally reminded the military about the criticality of the media within a healthy democracy. The embedding program succeeded as a result of its tolerance for periods of unilateral reporting by journalists who chose to embed, allowing for the perspectives of Afghan civilians, the Taliban, governmental officials and non-governmental organizations to be heard by the Canadian public. Together, embedded and unilateral journalists in Afghanistan during Task Force ORION were able to create a much more comprehensive and balanced picture of a complicated war. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Canadian journalists and Government of Canada senior public servants for their participation in my thesis research – your extensive field experience, both in Afghanistan during Task Force ORION and across the globe, lend a legitimacy and credibility that I simply could not have achieved alone. Your fearlessness under fire in more conflicts than I have known and dedication to telling stories of war worlds away to Canadians is truly inspiring. To Dr. Steve Lukits, your encouragement, patience and understanding were instrumental to this achievement. Your enthusiasm for my research made me push ever forward. To my parents, thank you for your encouragement from afar. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my son, Hadrian Connell Dunlop. Hadrian, at eight years old, you have supported your mommy at “Army College” for nearly ten months so that I could learn to “make better plans;” you are my hero, and for your unfailing support I am eternally grateful and humbled. 1 Objectivity and honesty are not the same thing, though, and it is entirely possible to write with honesty about the very personal and distorting experiences of war.1 - Sebastian Junger, War CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 1.1. From Vietnam to Iraq: The Evolution of the Modern War Correspondent “You’re either with us or against us.” An irrefutable warning to the international community as the United States prepared for its 2003 invasion of Iraq, former President George W. Bush’s words may also have served as a warning to the news media. The irreconcilable “Jekyll and Hyde” of the war correspondent – the battle between patriotism and journalistic objectivity – has never been more pointed. This is not surprising considering that the news media was blamed by the United States military and many politicians for the loss of the Vietnam War. Characterized by unfettered media accreditation, free access to operations, leadership, tactical units and local nationals, and the ability to get any story, Vietnam war reporting was revolutionary. Independent and eager to stimulate public debate, over two thousand reporters moved freely around the battlefield interviewing everyone they could as opposed to taking the Pentagon’s press briefings as gospel.2 As Michael Herr, Esquire magazine’s Vietnam war correspondent, stated: All kinds of people have held them [Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) accreditation cards] at one time or another: […] second-string literary figures who wrote about how they hated the war […] syndicated eminences who houseguested with Westmoreland or Bunker […] a lot of hacks who wrote down every word that the generals and officials told them to write […] the press corps was as diffuse and faceless as any regiment in the war.3 Independent and critical reporting in Vietnam was further complicated by the disillusionment of American military command regarding operational and tactical successes; “Vietnam moments” 1 Sebastian Junger, War (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2010), 26. 2 “Press Freedom vs Military Censorship,” last accessed 24 March 2013, http://www.crfforum.org/topics/?topicid=3&catid=3&view=document&id=48. 3 Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), 220-222. as Sebastian Junger called them in War. These moments were those “in which you weren’t so much getting misled as getting asked to participate in a kind of collective wishful thinking.”4 The military lost credibility as a result of its provision of a false, yet desperately emphasized, picture of war successes versus a dire combat reality. Walter Cronkite, the renowned anchor of the CBS Evening News, travelled to Vietnam in 1968. Moving away from the basic tenants of objective reporting, “Cronkite concluded his reports on the Tet offensive with a personal commentary in which he voiced his strong belief that the war would end in stalemate.”5 Combine this commentary with the fact that censorship was limited to non-existent in Vietnam and you have a perfect storm for anti-war protests and the undermining of national foreign policy. From Cronkite’s perspective, the war correspondent’s coverage of a conflict is absolutely critical, but only when there is a system in place to ensure operational security is maintained; in his opinion, this is where the American military failed in Vietnam.6 Extreme censorship of the media during military operations ensued as a result of the Vietnam experience. During the Falklands War of 1982, “all the significant news, good or bad, was announced or leaked from London”7 rather than reported consistently by correspondents in the region.