Fields of Governance: How Social Forces Shape the Implementation of India’s Basic Services for the Urban Poor Scheme
By
Jamie Lynn McPike
B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 2005
M.A., Brown University, 2012
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Sociology at Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island
May 2017
© Copyright 2017 by Jamie L. McPike
This dissertation by Jamie L. McPike is accepted in its present form by the Department of Sociology as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Date ______Dr. Patrick Heller, Advisor
Recommended to the Graduate Council
Date ______Dr. John Logan, Reader
Date ______Dr. Josh Pacewicz, Reader
Date ______Dr. Ashutosh Varshney, Reader
Approved by the Graduate Council
Date ______Dr. Andrew G. Campbell, Dean of the Graduate School
iii
CURRICULUM VITAE
Jamie L. McPike Department of Sociology, Brown University 108 George Street, Box 1916 Providence, RI 02912
EDUCATION
Brown University , Department of Sociology, Providence, RI Ph.D., Expected May 2017 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Patrick Heller (Chair), Dr. John Logan, Dr. Josh Pacewicz, and Dr. Ashutosh Varshney (Political Science) Preliminary Exam Areas : Political Sociology (with “Distinction”) and Urban Sociology
Brown University , Department of Sociology, Providence, RI M.A., May 2012 Thesis Title : “Does Location Matter? Assessing the Nature and Degree of Child Health Differences in Rural, Urban, and Slum Locations in India” Thesis Committee : Dr. Nancy Luke (Adviser), Dr. Susan Short (Reader)
University of California, Santa Cruz , Department of Sociology, Santa Cruz, CA B.A, June 2005 Honors and Awards : Highest Honors in Sociology, College Nine Honors, Distinction for Research and Scholarship, UCSC Chancellor’s Undergraduate Intern, and Santa Cruz Center for International Economics Undergraduate Research Award
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION
Political Sociology Urban Sociology Globalization and International Development Social Inequality South Asia Qualitative Methods
iv PUBLICATIONS
Peerreviewed Publications: Crow, Ben and Jamie McPike. 2009. “How the Drudgery of Getting Water Shapes Women’s Lives in Lowincome Urban Communities.” Gender , Technology and Development 13(1): 4368.
Manuscripts in Progress: McPike, Jamie. “Constructing the (Neoliberal) Urban Agenda: How Political Actors Shaped India’s National Urban Renewal Mission.” In preparation.
Graizbord, Diana and Jamie McPike (equal coauthors). “Doing Digital Ethnography: Sociological Accounts, Reflexivity, and Public Intervention.” In preparation.
OTHER WRITING
Diana Graizbord, Jamie McPike, and Nicole Pollock (equal coauthors). “Engaging Students, Engaging Communities: How Students Enhance CityUniversity Collaborations.” November 20, 2016, The Huffington Post
Diana Graizbord, Jamie McPike, and Nicole Pollock (equal coauthors).“Little Data, Big Solutions: How Cities and Universities Can Create More Meaningful and Equitable Policy.” September 6, 2016, The Huffington Post
Diana Graizbord, Jamie McPike, and Nicole Pollock (equal coauthors). “Communicating Innovation: Why Cities and Universities Need a New Kind of Dialogue.” August 15, 2016, The Huffington Post
FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS
20152016 Brown University Interdisciplinary Research Graduate Fellowship 2015 Brown University Graduate School International Travel Fund Grant 2015 Joukowsky Summer Research Fellowship 2014 Beatrice and Joseph Feinberg Memorial Fund Research Grant 2014 National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant 2014 Brown University Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2014 Brown University Graduate School Doctoral Research Travel Grant 2013 Watson Institute Graduate Fellowship 2013 Graduate Program in Development Summer Fellowship 2013 BrownIndia Initiative Summer Fellowship 20112013 National Science Foundation/IGERT Graduate Fellowship 2011 Framework in Global Health Summer Fellowship
v CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
2017 “ Fast Policies, Slow Governance: How State and Civil Society Actors Contest and Shape Developmental Policies in Urban India”, paper (to be) presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association , Montreal, Quebec 2017 “ Doing Digital Ethnography: Sociological Accounts, Reflexivity, and Public Intervention ”, paper presented (with Dr. Diana Graizbord) at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Association , Philadelphia, PA 2016 “Understanding the Field of Urban Governance in India”, paper presented at the Going Beyond Governance miniconference, Providence, RI 2015 “Creating Space for the Formal Amongst the Informal”, paper presented at the biennial conference for the Research Committee on Urban and Regional Development, Urbino, Italy 2014 “Constructing the (Neoliberal) Urban Agenda: How Political Actors Shape India’s National Urban Renewal Mission”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association , San Francisco, CA 2012 “Rethinking the ‘Urban Advantage’: Differences in Shortterm Morbidity for Children in Rural, Urban NonSlum, and Urban Slums Areas in India”, poster presented (with Dr. Nancy Luke) at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America , San Francisco, CA 2012 “Unpacking the Growth Machine: Exploring Urban Development Politics in Providence through the Greening of the Knowledge District Project”, paper presented (with Marcelo Bohrt) at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society , New York, NY 2011 “Gender, Timeuse, and Health Outcomes in Rural India”, poster presented at the Br own University Global Health Framework Summer Research Symposium , Providence, RI 2010 “Gender Relations, Access to Water, and Health in Urban Slums of Developing Countries”, poster presented at the Brown University Global Health and Water Symposium , Providence, RI
INVITED PRESENTATIONS
2016 “Fast Policies, Slow Governance: Understanding the Politics of India’s National Urban Renewal Mission”, presenter for the W atson Institute Urban South Asia Reading Group, Providence, RI 2014 “What Can Sociology Do for Design(ers)?”, presenter for Bangalor e Design Evenings , Bangalore, India 2014 “HumanCentered Design 101”, presenter for Bangalor e Design Evenings, Bangalore, India 2013 “Negotiable Cities: Understanding the Politics of Urban Policy in India”, paper presented to the BrownIndia Initiative, Watson Institute for
vi International and Public Affairs , Providence, RI 2013 “Negotiable Cities: Understanding the Politics of Urban Policy in India”, paper presented to the Graduate Program in Development, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs , Providence, RI 2013 “Contingent Urban Futures: Understanding the Politics of Urban Policy Implementation and the Translocality of Urban Governance in India”, presenter for the Br ownIndia Initiative Urban Politics Reading Group , Providence, RI 2013 “Health and Slums in the Global South”, presenter for the Br own University Social Innovation Initiative Annual “Changemaker Day” , Providence RI 2012 “Who Is In Charge of this City?: Examining Urban Policy and Politics Under India's National Urban Renewal Mission”, paper presented to the Graduate Program in Development, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs , Providence, RI 2012 “Education and Social Innovation”, panel moderator for the Better World by Design Conference , Providence, RI
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant 20122013 Comparing Inequality in Urban China and India Dr. Ashutosh Varshney, Principal Investigator A collaboration between political scientists at Brown University and Harvard University to compare urban governance structures and social inequality in India and China. The data collected in this research assistantship would provide the authors with evidence to inform arguments for an academic publication. Tasks included: ● Evaluated and synthesized literature on local governance, political regimes, and measures of social inequality ● Assisted in drafting content for academic journal article comparing governance regimes and urban policy outcomes in India and China
Research Assistant 20112013 Urban India Initiative – Measuring Citizenship in Urban India Dr. Ashutosh Varshney and Dr. Patrick Heller, CoPrincipal Investigators A collaboration between political scientists, sociologists, and civil society leaders to measure urban citizenship and civic engagement in Bangalore, India. This data would be used by Janaagraha—a local civil society group—to enhance citizen participation and improve government services in Indian cities. Tasks included: ● Evaluated literature on citizenship to inform the creation of a unique quantitative index measuring several aspects of urban citizenship ● Assisted in the design and iterative evaluation of quantitative survey instrument (to be administered to 4,000 urban households)
vii Research Assistant 20112012 Gender and Timeuse Patterns in Rural India Dr. Nancy Luke, Principal Investigator A National Institute of Healthfunded study to examine gender differences in timeuse in Vellore, India. ● Developed and pretested timeuse questionnaire with men and women in Vellore ● Conducted literature review on timeuse and gender in the Global South ● Led 10 informal focus group discussions (with ~80 participants/50 women and 30 men) to test the relevance and cultural validity of the timeuse survey instrument ● Trained five local field staff to administer timeuse surveys
Research Assistant 20102011 South India Community Study Dr. Kaivan Munshi and Dr. Nancy Luke, CoPrincipal Investigators A National Institute of Healthfunded collaboration between economists, public health officials, and sociologists to measure how social networks and community participation can help to improve health systems and health outcomes in rural India. Tasks included: ● Assisted in the development and testing of household survey questionnaire (to be administered to 10,5000 households) ● Pretested viability and cultural relevance of survey instrument
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
2016 Course Designer and CoInstructor Brown University, Public Policy Undergraduate Course, PLCY 1802 “Engaged Research/Engaged Publics: The Science and Craft of Applied Policy Research”, Spring 2016 2013 Course Designer and Instructor Brown University, Development Studies Undergraduate Course, DS 1600 “Tools for Development”, Spring 2013 2013 Teaching Assistant Brown University, Development Studies Undergraduate Course, DS 1980, “Senior Seminar”, Fall 2013 2011 Guest Lecturer Brown University, Sociology Undergraduate Course, SOC 0010 “Perspectives on Society”, Spring 2012 2007 Teaching Assistant University of California, Santa Cruz, Latino and Latin American Studies Undergraduate Course, LALS 126A/B, “Voices from the Watsonville Community” & “Community Field Research Methods” 20042005 Course Designer and CoInstructor University of California, Santa Cruz, Sociology Undergraduate Course, SOC 30 A, B, C, “Global Information Internship Program”
viii PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
2015present Research Committee on the Sociology of Urban and Regional Research (RC 21) 2014present Association of American Geographers 2013present Watson Institute for International Studies Graduate Fellow 2013present BrownIndia Initiative Fellow 20112013 Population Association of America 2011present Brown University Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences Fellow 2010present American Sociological Association 2010present Brown University Graduate Program in Development Trainee 20102012 Brown University Population Studies and Training Center Trainee 20102012 Brown University Global Health Scholar
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
RC21 Comparative Urban Studies Summer School (Summer 2015) ● Twoweek, intensive urban research methods summer school.
Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences GIS Institute (Winter 2011) ● Twoweek, intensive geographical information systems course. The course covers basic mapping, spatial data analysis, and spatial research design.
Brown University Sheridan Center Teaching Certificate #1 (Fall 2011Spring 2012) ● Yearlong certificate program on syllabus design, reflective teaching practices, classroom engagement, and student evaluation.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
2013present Cultural Consultant, Brown University Institutional Review Board 2013 CoEditor, Studies in Comparative International Development 2013 CoOrganizer, “Questioning Marginality: Dalits and Muslims in Urban India” Conference 20122013 CoOrganizer, Caste & Inequality in Urban India Colloquia 20122013 Sheridan Center Liaison, Brown University Sociology Department 20112012 Professional Development Committee, Brown University Sociology Department
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
When I began my studies at Brown, I knew the experience would be transformative. Reflecting on the past several years, I realize now that I underestimated just how meaningful this time would be and how many inspiring people I would encounter along the way. This dissertation, and my thinking as a sociologist broadly speaking, has been molded in various ways by my relationships with these numerous individuals. I am deeply indebted to my dissertation committee whose wisdom and feedback shaped this work and my evolution as a scholar in innumerable ways. As my dissertation adviser, sounding board, and enthusiastic supporter, Patrick Heller deserves special thanks. While I cannot recall the specific contents of every meeting with Patrick, I know for certain that I always left our meetings feeling energized and more convinced that the knowledge I produced was interesting, innovative, and meaningful. Patrick’s critical feedback, encouragement, and confidence in my work was the muchneeded fuel to move this dissertation to its completion, and for this I am extremely grateful. I would also like to thank John Logan for shaping my thinking not only as a sociologist, but also as an urbanist. His thoughtful questions always pushed me to reflect on the direction of my research and its broader contributions. While this reflective process was not always easy, it was critical for the evolution of my research. Thank you to Josh Pacewicz for always offering incisive commentary on this dissertation and for providing a comparative lens through which to interpret my findings from India. Ashutosh Varshney also deserves many thanks not only for his guidance on this research project, but also for inspiring and bolstering the work of the next generation of South Asian scholars through the Center for Contemporary South Asia at Brown. I would also like to thank several other faculty that have helped me during my time at Brown, including: Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Keith Brown, Nitsan Chorev, Dennis Hogan, José Itzigsohn, Margot Jackson, Nancy Luke, Kaivan Munshi, Susan Short, Richard Snyder, and Barbara Stallings. These scholars challenged and inspired me throughout this process. As well, I want to give special thanks to Stephanie AbbottPandey, Karl Dominey, Amanda Figgins, Shane Martin, Joan Picard, Laura Sadovnikoff, and Kristen Soule who provided countless hours of support that proved crucial for my progress in graduate school. Thank you to the numerous undergraduate and graduate students at Brown with whom I had the fortune to collaborate, celebrate, and commiserate during my time in the program. I could never have imagined the influence of these individuals on my understanding of the world and my place in it. First, I want to thank my cohortTatiana Andia, Marcelo Bohrt, Weeam Hammoudeh, Meghan Kallman, Tania Jenkins, Juyoung Lee, Irene Pang, and Heather Randellfor the wonderful discussions, abundant laughs, and occasional grumbles that shaped my early years of graduate school. Second, I would like to thank the many other students both within and outside of the sociology department
x who I have had the extreme privilege of knowing and learning from, including: David Adler, Aisalkyn Botoeva, Benjamin Bradlow, Poulomi Chakrabarti, Jen Costanza, Diana Graizbord, Rici Hammer, Sukriti Issar, Mike Johnson, Peter Klein, Johnnie Lotesta, Erica Mullen, Michael RodríguezMuñiz, Stephanie Savell, Gayatri Singh, Rama Srinivasan, Megan Turnbull, Carolyn Vincent, Trina Vithayathil, Andrea Wright, and Myungji Yang. In particular, I want to thank Irene, Marcelo, Megan, and Poulomi whose friendship has energized me throughout graduate school and even more so during my final year of writing. I want to give special thanks to my friend and collaborator, Diana Graizbord, who helped me tap into creative energies that were largely dormant until our collective work. I am so thankful for this, our friendship, and for the ways in which she has pushed me to reimagine what it means to be a sociologist. There are several others who have provided inspiration during various stages of this process. In particular, I want to thank Lisa Choi, Natalia VillamizarDuarte, and Melissa Valle. I had no idea that a twoweek summer school in Urbino, Italy would prove to be such an unforgettable experience, and I am happy to have forged such a strong bond with these amazing, smart, and strong women during this short time. Thank you to my Bangalore buddies: Becky Bowers, Mitch Cook, Sonali Gupta, Paul Neenos, Preeti Prakash, K.V. D. Praveen, Emily Stevenson, Scott Sorrell, Priyadeep Sinha, Bala Vijayan, and Ute Wiemer. You helped to make my time in the field both productive and incredibly fun. I am also incredibly grateful to my dear friend Jackie Hunt who, very sadly, passed away only months before I completed this lifelong goal. As a fellow educator, Jackie knew the importance of higher education and was always one of my strongest advocates. My research in Bangalore would not have been possible without the institutional support of the Institute for Social and Economic Research and the Centre for Law and Policy Research in Bangalore. As well, I am grateful for the assistance and guidance of numerous individuals who I met during my time in the field in Bangalore and New Delhi, including: Vinay Baindur, Gautam Bhan, Lalitha Kamath, Partha Mukhopadhyay, Narendar Pani, Aparna Ravi, Lavanya Suresh, Siddharth Swaminathan, and Sudhir Krishnaswamy. These individuals helped me to refine my research ideas and to forge connections in Bangalore. I would also like to thank my research assistants in Bangalore, Devin Pearl and Preeti Prakash, without whom I would have been completely lost. In particular, I want to thank Preeti not only for her assistance with interviewing, transcribing, and navigating Bangalore, but also for our friendship that grew during our time working together. This dissertation would not have been possible without the love and support of my three families, the Runcos, the Richters, and the McPikes. When I arrived on the front steps of their house hoping to rent an apartment, I had no idea that Hollybeth and Tom Runco would become such an important part of my life. I am so thankful to know these two incredibly compassionate, funny, and loving people (and their amazing kids and dogs!), and I am so grateful for the support and encouragement they have given me throughout these years. To Bill and Betty Richter, I am forever indebted. They have truly been on the frontlines of this process, and their generosity, humor, reliability, and patience has been critical to helping me achieve this goal. I would be remiss if I did not also thank the Richters for raising an incredible son who inherited these characteristics.
xi Thank you to my parents, Kate and James McPike, who fostered my love for writing and learning, and who taught me to question and to persevere. My mom, in particular, is the reason I became a sociologist. I want to thank her not just for this source of inspiration, but also for always pushing me to clarify my writing, to work hard, and to take pride in the smallest aspects of my craft. I have a feeling that my mom acquired these latter characteristics from my grandparents, Dorothy and Bud Hickman, whose hard work, grit, and love created the foundation upon which I now stand. I also want to thank my older sisters, Abbey, Eva, and Emily, who continue to serve as role models to their little sister. They treaded a path so that my twin sister and I could walk with ease, and for this I will always be thankful. I owe so much to my best friend and twin sister Bonnie. She has inspired me to explore and experiment and she has served as a model of strength and courage that I can only hope to emulate. She has always been my compass, guiding me through difficult decisions and helping me find the road to achieving my goals. Sam deserves special thanks not just for helping myself and a few others endure a hellish trek through the Himalayas, but also for his intellect, his sense of adventure, and his ability to always make those around him smile. Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to Chris. He followed me to India on a whim in 2011 and decided to stay with me forever after. Chris always reminds me to appreciate the beauty in life and to laugh, two things that are often hard for this sociologist who finds herself regularly preoccupied with social problems, inequities, and injustices. I have depended the most on his love, kindness, consideration, patience, support, and humor throughout this process, and for him I am forever grateful.
xii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures xv
List of Acronyms xvi
Introduction 1
Chapter One 40 The Social Fields of BSUP: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 1.1 Introduction 40 1.2 Development Solutions and State Capacity 43 1.3 StateSociety Relations and the CoProduction of Development Policies 52 1.4 “Civil” and “Political” Society in India 55 1.5 Sociological Theories of Urban Governance 58 1.6 The “Sociology of Striving” in Urban India 60 1.7 Conclusion 64
Chapter Two 66 “The Social Aspects”: Defining and Disputing the Field of Policy Intervention 2.1 Introduction 66 2.2 “The Social Aspects” 71 2.3 Constructing and Contesting Knowledge about Urban Land 75 2.4 The “SoCalled Space Crunch” of Urban Land 82 2.5 The “Bombay Model” and the Boundaries of State Reach 89 2.6 Adopting and “Urban” Mindset 100 2.7 Conclusion 106
Chapter Three 110 “A Formal Program of the [ Central ] Government”: Constructing and Navigating the Bureaucratic Field 3.1 Introduction 110 3.2 A Role for the Centre in Urban Governance 114 3.3 The ScalarTechnical Bureaucratic Field 118 3.4 Mapping the Institutional Terrain of BSUP in Bangalore 127
xiii 3.5 The Logic of the Bureaucratic Field Under BSUP 145 3.6 Conclusion 169
Chapter Four 171 “For the People’s Sake, We Compromise”: Delineating and Contesting the Civil Society Field 4.1 Introduction 171 4.2 A Dwelling or a Home?: The Social Expertise of Civil Society 177 4.3 Boundarywork and Classification Struggles Within and Between Fields 182 4.4 The Logic of the Civil Society Field Under BSUP 185 4.5 Engaging with Slums: IssueBased or Questioning? 186 4.6 Engaging with the State: Confrontation or Implementation? 197 4.7 Transgressing the Boundaries of the Civil Society Field 202 4.8 Conclusion 206
Chapter Five 209 “At Breakneck Speed”: Tracing a Policy Object through the Bureaucratic Field 5.1 Introduction 209 5.2 Controlling Bureaucratic Discretion through Policy Techniques 214 5.3 The Essential Role of the Detailed Project Report 217 5.4 The Components of a DPR 222 5.5 A Lack of Guidance Coupled with Immense Pressure from the Centre 224 5.6 DPR Processes at the Municipal Level 230 5.7 DPR Processes at the State Level 236 5.8 DPR Processes at the Central Level 240 5.9 Conclusion 244
Chapter Six 246 “Go Back, Assemble, Get NGOs”: StateSociety Partnerships in the Policy Intervention Field 6.1 Introduction 246 6.2 The Byrasandra Community BSUP Project 250 6.3 The Deshyanagar Community BSUP Project 259 6.4 Conclusion 268
Conclusion 271
References 290
xiv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Urban Governance Structure in India 19 Figure 2.1 BSUP Project Location (Deshyanagar Community) 95 Figure 3.1 Official JNNURM Implementation and Approval Structure 119 Figure 3.2 BSUP Policy Structure in Bangalore and Karnataka 128 Figure 3.3 Citylevel Agencies Involved in BSUP Implementation 128 Figure 3.4 Statelevel Agencies Involved in BSUP Implementation 134 Figure 3.5 Governance and Service Delivery Agencies and Scope of Work 138 Figure 3.6 The ScalarTechnical Bureaucratic Field 144 Figure 5.1 Format and Components of Detailed Project Reports 224
xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACS Additional Chief Secretary APSA Association for Promoting Social Action AVAS Association for Voluntary Action and Service BBMP Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (ULB) BDA Bangalore Development Authority BESCOM Bangalore Electricity Supply Company BIAAPA Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority BMP Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (ULB preBBMP) BMPC Bangalore Metropolitan Planning Committee BMPTC Building Materials and Technology Promotion Council BMRC Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation BMTC Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation BSUP (NURM) Basic Services for the Urban Poor (NURM Submission) BWSSB Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board CDP City Development Plan/Comprehensive Development Plan CLRMC Citylevel Review and Monitoring Committee CSMC Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee CVTC City Volunteer Technical Corps DMA Directorate of Municipal Administration DPR Detailed Project Report DU Dwelling Unit ED Executive Director EWS Economically Weaker Sections FD Finance Department, Government of Karnataka GoI Government of India GoK Government of Karnataka GM General Manager HD Housing Department, Government of Karnataka HIG Higherincome Groups HUDCO Housing and Urban Development Corporation IAS Indian Administrative Services IEC Information, Education, and Communication INC Indian National Congress JNNURM (NURM) Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
xvi KUIDFC Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Finance Corporation KSCB Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (former name of KSDB) KSDB Karnataka Slum Development Board LDA Lake Conservation and Development Authority LIG Lowerincome Groups MCC Mysore City Corporation MD Managing Director MIG Middleincome Groups MIS Management of Information Systems MLA Member of Legislative Assembly MOA Memorandum of Agreement MOF Ministry of Finance MOHUPA Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation MOUD Ministry of Urban Development MM Mission Mode MP Member of Parliament NTAG National Technical Advisory Group PIU Project Implementation Unit PMU Project Management Unit PPP Publicprivate Partnership PRIA Society for Participatory Research in Asia RAY Rajiv Awas Yojana SC Scheduled Caste SLEC Statelevel Empowered Committee SLNA Statelevel Nodal Agency (KUIDFC) SLSC Statelevel Steering Committee SPV Special Purpose Vehicle SRS Slum Rehabilitation Scheme ST Scheduled Tribe UC Utilization Certificate UDD Urban Development Department, Government of Karnataka UIG (NURM) Urban Infrastructure and Governance NURM SubMission ULB Urban Local Body (BBMP)
xvii
INTRODUCTION
A “BANKRUPT” GOVERNANCE FIELD EXAMINING STATE PRACTICES AND STATE CAPACITY IN URBAN INDIA
“If the urban system was capable of effective governance, you would not have needed a NURM. NURM emerged because the field was bankrupt. Somebody had to take the initiative because most of the cities did not have the planning or the execution competence for a variety of reasons. Most of the cities did not have a clue.”1
India’s “Bankrupt” Urban Governance Field
In 2005, the Government of India unveiled one of the most comprehensive urban policies in the country’s history, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
(JNNURM or NURM). Attempting to rebuild a “bankrupt” urban governance field fueled by decades of urban neglect, NURM provided cities and states with the technical and financial resources to strengthen local governing capacity and improve urban infrastructure. With a $20 billion price tag, targeting 67 cities, the scheme not only represented the largest investment in India’s urban areas at the time, but also signified a drastic shift in the central government’s stance on cities. If cities were “rarely at the centre of development planning” (Sivaramakrishnan 2011, p. 1) before NURM, the
1 Personal Interview, K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, February 19, 2014
1 policy’s scale and scope indicated that the Government of India believed cities were critical to the economic growth and future development of the country.
Despite the initial optimism about the scheme’s potential to transform Indian cities, NURM was plagued with implementation challenges from inception, and evaluations of the scheme have been highly critical. According to a report from the
Government of India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (2012), most cities only superficially adopted the mandatory governance reforms, infrastructure projects were developed with little consideration for longterm development plans, and a large majority of the projects went well over their original budgets and scheduled timelines. For the
Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) submission of the schemewhich aims to improve the living conditions and livelihoods of the urban poorprojects frequently went over scheduled timelines, forcing the central government to extend the final deadline for projects on several occasions. While BSUP was initially to be completed by March 2012, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation recently established March 31,
2017 as the final deadline for project completion, twelve years after the scheme was inaugurated and five years past the original deadline (Ministry of Housing and Urban
Poverty Alleviation 2016).
Effectively meeting the goals of BSUP has been a challenge for participating cities, but in the south Indian city of Bangalore state actors have had some success in developing housing for the urban poor. Approximately 18,000 housing units were developed for slum residents throughout the city, and many of these units remain occupied several years after construction was completed. As well, approximately 90% of
2 the housing units in Bangalore were developed in situ as opposed to being relocated, representing a stark contrast to the outcomes found in other major Indian cities (Pani and
Chidambaran 2013). In Chennai, the majority of slums (78%) were razed and residents were required to move to new housing units constructed on the outskirts of the city
(Mahadevia 2011; Transparent Chennai 2012). In New Delhi, only 22% of proposed
BSUP dwelling units were actually constructed, and only 4% of these units are occupied
(Kamath and Zachariah 2013).
While the impact of BSUP in Bangalore is minimal when considering the intractable problem of slums in the city and throughout India,2 understanding how state actors navigate complex policy processes and overcome significant institutional hurdles to achieve developmental aims still warrants investigation.3 Drawing on sixteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Bangalore and New Delhi, I trace the implementation processes of BSUP at the city, state, and federal level in order to develop a richer understanding of state practices and multilevel governance in India. Specifically, this dissertation is motivated by three, interrelated questions: first, how does the state attempt to impose its definition of the policy intervention field? Second, what strategies does the
2 Estimates of the current slum population range from approximately 10% of Bangalore’s total population (Schenk 2001) to 25% of the roughly 8.47 million people living in the city (RoyChowdry 2011). While estimates of the current population vary, there is widespread agreement that the number of people living in slums is on the rise. For Karnataka, the total number of slum residents rose from 7.8% of the total urban population of the state (according to the 2001 census) to 13.9% (according to the 2011 census). RoyChowdry (2011) is careful to note that despite the large number of slum dwellers in Bangalore, this number is low when compared to cities like Mumbai and Calcutta where approximately 54% and 32% of the urban population lives in slums.
3 In this sense, I am concerned less with understanding the impact of BSUP and more with what Centeno, Kolhi, and Yashar (2017) call “state performance.” According to the authors, “this is what, for good or for ill, the state is able to accomplish. Performance is actually a more analytically neutral category than simple effectiveness, as the latter presumes an agenda” (p. 3, emphasis added). 3 state adopt to navigate this contested terrain and execute its policy objectives? And third, what is the role of nonstate actors in shaping policy processes and how do these statesocietal relationships shape the actions and opportunities of the state?
Extending Bourdieu’s (1984, 1985) theory of social fields to India,4 I argue that the Indian state is a dynamic field whose broader structural composition, differentlypositioned actors, forms of capital, and relations to other social fields shape state capacity and state practices. I find that political, reputational, and symbolic capital strongly shape the work of the state, challenging Weberianinspired notions of state capacity that privilege bureaucratic autonomy, cohesiveness, and rational authority.
Further, the possibilities for state action are mediated by civil society actors whose engagement with (or resistance to) the state is shaped by the internal logic, boundary struggles, and forms of capital that structure the civil society field. This research reveals the relational nature of state capacity and demonstrates how policy outcomes are shaped by the balance of forces between multiple social fields at a given time. This dissertation also advances a new theory of the Indian state by disaggregating state practices and tracing the microprocesses of decisionmaking that shape the policy outcomes of BSUP.
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to expanding on this argument by first situating the claims in relevant literature and scholarly debates. Specifically, I describe
4 At this point, it is worth providing a brief description of Bourdieu’s general theory of social fields. Fields are spaces of social action that organize relations between particular actors within a field. Actors occupy dominant or subordinate positions within a field, and the positions of actors (and the power they hold in the field) is dependent upon their individual h abitus ( or embodied dispositions), their possession of particular forms of capital within the field, and the unique rules of the field (or “rules of the game”). Those in possession of highlyvalued forms of capital will be more powerful within the field. A key contribution of a field approach is that it highlights how individual action is structured by one’s relation to other actors within the field. According to Eyal (2013), “one of the crucial contributions of the concept of ‘field’ is that it requires us to stop thinking in terms of entities, proper names, concrete, individuals, things, and begin grasping all of these as bundles of relations” (p. 158). 4 relevant debates from the literature on the role of the state and statesociety relations in shaping development policy and outcomes as well as theories of Indian political economy. Following this discussion, I expand on the main arguments and contributions of this dissertation. I then provide a more detailed background on the policy that is the focus of this research by tracing the impetus for the National Urban Renewal Mission and the
Basic Services for the Urban Poor submission. I then provide a summary of the research methodology and an outline of the chapters in this dissertation.
Toward a Relational Understanding of State Capacity
This dissertation draws from and seeks to contribute to sociological debates on the state and state capacity. Scholars have long been preoccupied with the reasons for variation in development outcomes, and in particular, the state’s role in fostering (or impeding) economic growth and development. Research on the developmental state highlights how the capacity of the state to execute policy agendas largely depends on the institutional structure of the state (Amsden 1992; Chibber 2002; Evans 1995; Johnson 1982; Kohli
2004; Moon and Prasad 1994; Wade 1990; White and Wade 1984; WooCumings 1999).
From this approach, the most effective states have cohesive and highly technocratic bureaucracies, legalrational forms of authority, and a unified development vision
(Chibber 2002; Evans 1995; Kohli 1987, 2004; Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005;
Rueschemeyer 1986).
Several scholars have also examined the role of statesociety alliances and how the form of these relationships leads to diverse policy outcomes (Abers and Keck 2009;
Agarwal and Ribot 1999; Evans 1995, 1997; Migdal 2001; Shaw 2005; Tsai 2006).
5 Statesociety (or stateinsociety ) approaches emphasize the critical role of societal actors in shaping the possibilities and practices of the state (Evans 1995; Fukuyama 2013; Kohli
2004; Migdal 2001). According to Evans (1997), “statesociety synergy can be a catalyst for development” (p. 178), and effective governance often requires the active participation of various societal groups who “coproduce” developmental processes and outcomes with the state (Migdal 2001). The ability for the state to execute plans, therefore, is not solely dependent upon institutional designs and more often depends on deeply interwoven connections, or “linkages and entanglements” (Coslovsky 2015, p.
1112), with societal actors, resembling Ackerman’s (2004) idea of “cogovernance” or
Evans’s (1997) notion of statesociety “synergy”.
Literature on the Indian state (some of which is also cited above) has similarly focused on the institutional design of the state and statesociety linkages to explain
India’s development trajectory. In his seminal study of Indian political economy, Bardhan
(1984) notes the role of elite interest groups in shaping policy. While the elite classes have some influence over policy, he argues that these classes are highly fragmented, making it difficult to completely dominate policy agendas. This fragmentation provides the state with some autonomy to formulate policy directives “neither at the behest of nor on the behalf of proprietary classes” (1984, p. 38). This also helps to explain why the
Indian state can exercise authority in certain domains, but why it does not exhibit all of the characteristics of a “strong state”.
Others have extended this argument, focusing on institutional makeup of the
Indian state. Specifically, a number of scholars have noted how the Indian state exhibits
6 some Weberian characteristics associated with strong states (e.g., accountability of political leadership, the ability of the state to command authority, etc.), but argue that interest group politics and competition within the state limit the state’s ability to pursue a cohesive development agenda (Chibber 2002; Herring 1999; Kohli 1987, 2004).
Varshney (1999) demonstrates how the success of particular policy agendas is often dependent upon support from the democratic masses. If support for a particular reform is weak, then state success hinges on the “ multiplicity of salient political issues” (p. 258) that can divert attention away from unpopular reforms and toward more politically contentious issues.
While the emphasis of this literature tends to be on nationallevel performance and policies, others have disaggregated the Indian state to capture regional variation in development outcomes (Sinha 2005), bureaucratic norms (Mangla 2015), the “cognitive maps” that shape locallevel bureaucrat’s actions (Mehta and Walton 2012), and everyday state practices (Aiyar and Bhattacharya 2016; Gupta 1995, 2005). By unpacking the state, these scholars highlight the “multiple agencies, organizations, levels, agendas, and centers” (Gupta 1995, p. 392) that constitute the state as well as the various social, cultural, and symbolic factors that shape state practices. This literature also demonstrates the possibility of intrastate variation in capacity and the promise of institutional designs that may not resemble the idealtypical Weberian standard (Amengual 2013; Bersch,
Praça, and Taylor 2017; Morgan and Orloff 2017; Tsai 2007).
This emphasis on diverse forms of governance and state capacity is shared by a number of scholars who argue for a disaggregation of the state and a recognition of the
7 heterogeneous institutions that structure state performance (Abrams 1988; Adams,
Clemens and Orloff 2005; Coslovsky 2015; Morgan and Orloff 2017). To understand this heterogeneity within the state, Sabel (2005) argues that scholars should shift their focus from development “inputs” and “outputs” and instead adopt a “process or bootstrapping view” (Sabel 2005, p. 6). In other words, rather than focusing on inputs like institutional endowments and outputs like GDP, a bootstrapping approach highlights the
“throughputs” (Abers and Keck 2009) that shape development. These throughputs are
“the efficient sequence for building, in any particular national setting, the structure captured in the input/output table ” (Sabel 2005, p. 55, emphasis added).
This disaggregated and processual view of the state moves away from a static focus on particular characteristics of the state and societal actors and toward a more dynamic understanding of the processes and relations that shape state practices.
According to Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar (2017), relational approaches to state capacity have been undertaken by several scholars who examine state power (the authors cite, for example, Dahl 1957; Geddes 1994; Lukes 1974; Mann 1984). The authors argue that this scholarship is relational because it focuses on the power of the state to get others to act according to its will. While this approach highlights the relations that shape state power, it does not go far enough in following the “crisscrossing pressures” (Eyal 2013 p. 158) and “unfolding transactions” (Emirbayer 1997, p. 293) between state and nonstate actors that shape the daytoday work of the state.
Bourdieu’s theory of social fields (1984, 1985) is a useful framework for understanding the relational nature of state capacity. According to Bourdieu, society is
8 divided into a number of social fields. These fields are sites of struggle, and the outcomes of these struggles depend on the position of actors within the field, the forms of capital that are valued within the field, and the broader rules and stakes of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Martin 2003). Field theory has been used to explain a variety of social processes, including: organizational change (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008), global empires (Go 2008), the emergence and role of think tanks in the United States (Medvetz
2007), the colonial state (Steinmetz 2008, 2017), and the politics of international aid
(Krause 2014). According to Steinmetz (2017), however, field theory has rarely been used in studies of the state. He argues “little analytical effort has been invested in understanding states as multifaceted, evolving fields, or congeries of fields riven by internal divisions and axes of domination” (Steinmetz 2017, p. 371). By viewing the state
“as an array of positions whose identities are defined in relation to other positions”
(Steinmetz 2017, p. 372), this underscores how struggles within the state and forces from other social fields shape the possibilities for state action.
In the next section of this chapter I expand upon this argument and summarize the key empirical and theoretical contributions of this dissertation.
Summary of Argument
By examining the processes of BSUP implementation as they unfold, this dissertation offers three main theoretical contributions. First, I build on scholarship of the state and argue for a more dynamic and relational understanding of state capacity and the Indian state. While scholarship on the developmental state has underscored the critical role of the state as an actor, this literature has largely overlooked the everyday practices of the
9 state as it attempts to meet policy aims as well as the forms of state capacity that can exist outside the idealtypical Weberian standards. This dissertation fills this lacuna by advancing a theory of state capacity that acknowledges the balance of social forces (both within the state and civil society fields as well as between them) that shapes the possibilities for the state to execute its will. Second, I move beyond studies of the Indian state that focus on nationallevel political economic and institutional structures by providing an indepth account of the everyday practices and intrastate struggles of the
Indian state. Finally, I expand upon Bourdieu’s theory of social fields by highlighting the interdependence of social fields.
Toward Relational State Capacity
A relational understanding of state capacity moves beyond explanations that privilege institutional endowments or inputs and instead pays closer attention to how capacity is created by negotiations and relations between multiple actors. I find that in Bangalore, the state faced countless challenges to implementation, mainly arising from the refusal of slum residents to comply with the state’s plans for slum redevelopment. Slum residents and civil society groups would often challenge the knowledge advanced by the state about the availability of land, the particular type of housing that should be developed under BSUP, as well as the state’s overall right to intervene in slum communities. This refusal to comply with the state’s plans was not trivial, and in countless cases the state had to abandon projects due to this resistance.
This demonstrates the critical role of symbolic capital in shaping the capacity of the state. In cases where the state’s symbolic power to legitimately pursue policies is
10 widely agreed upon, conflicts between state and societal actors occur “over the mechanics or techniques of state practices” (Loveman 2005, p. 1659). However, in institutional fields where the form of symbolic capital and the “criterion of [its] evaluation” (Bourdieu 2000, p. 52) are unsettled, the conflicts are more foundational; the overall legitimacy of the state’s administrative role and boundaries, its claims to knowledge, and forms of power are questioned (Loveman 2005). This raises the question: in an uncertain institutional environment like urban India, how does the state gain the symbolic capital and overall capacity necessary to execute its will?
I find that to gain the symbolic capital and legitimacy necessary to effectively execute BSUP projects, the state would often enroll the assistance of other actors working in slums who could gain the trust of slum residents. Most commonly these were NGOs or communitybased organizations (CBOs), but also included informal slum leaders and occasionally politicians. While this collaboration between state and societal actors can be interpreted as a form of “cooptation” of symbolic capital by the state [as described by
Loveman (2005)], “statesociety synergy” (Evans 1997) or “cogovernance” (Ackerman
2004), I argue that the relationship between state and nonstate actors in Bangalore is not adequately captured by these characterizations.
Because nonstate actors also have a symbolic reputation to uphold, their engagement with the state is mediated by their own organizational needs to be seen as legitimate representatives of slum residents’ interests both within the local field of implementation, but also within the broader civil society field. More specifically, civil society groups have to balance the requests from the state with their need to also appear
11 distant from the state, lest they be seen by slum residents or other civil society groups as collaborating with the state for nefarious reasons. This results in frequent changes to statesociety partnerships, as civil society groups gauge the sentiments of other actors in the policy implementation field and alter their actions accordingly. For example, in several BSUP cases, NGOs would often collaborate with the state during one phase of the implementation, but when residents got angry that the state was not producing the promised outcomes, they would pressure NGOs to force the state into action. In one case, this resulted in an NGO filing litigation against the state, despite being previously cooperative with the state.
In this sense, statesociety interactions within the policy intervention field and state capacity are mediated by power dynamics within and between social fields. While the end result of this collaboration may resemble something akin to Clemens’s (2017) idea of a “symbiotic state”5 or “statesociety synergy”, or “cogovernance”, the case of
BSUP in Bangalore demonstrates that it is only through an extensive process of negotiation and struggle between state and society actors that this symbiosis emerges.
Further, the outcome of these struggles is temporally variant and depends on the institutional environment and balance of social forces between multiple social fields at a given time.
Theories of the Indian State
This relational perspective on policy processes also advances a new theory of the Indian state. As described in greater detail above, existing literature on the Indian state
5 According to Clemens’s (2017), “the symbiotic state suggests that state power is often expanded by the appropriation of capacities and resources mobilized elsewhere in society” (p. 52). 12 highlights the influence of bureaucratic and business elites (Bardhan 1984; Kohli 2012), mass politics (Varshney 1999), and institutional design (Chibber 2002, 2006; Kohli 2004;
Pritchett 2009;) in shaping the work of the state. In the context of urban India more specifically, scholars have emphasized the strong role of elite classes in shaping developmental policies and outcomes in cities (BanerjeeGuha 2009; Benjamin 2000,
2008; Chatterjee 2004; Harriss 2007; Mahadevia 2011).
While there is extensive literature on the Indian state that examines nationallevel factors in shaping possibilities for state action (e.g., Bardhan 1984; Kohli 2004), few studies unpack the everyday implementation practices of the Indian state, especially at multiple scales of governance. By tracing the dynamics within the state as well as negotiations between state and societal actors, I demonstrate how state action is not solely structured by elite interests or the state’s ability to emulate Weberian institutional designs.
While hierarchical authority, technical capacity, and autonomy from political actors is privileged in the formal institutional design of JNNURM and BSUP, the divisions within the bureaucratic field make it difficult, if not impossible, for implementing agencies to achieve policy outcomes within the existing policy structure. Those agencies that prove most adept at producing outcomes, therefore, are those agencies that develop partnerships with politicians and other nonstate actors, wield significant symbolic capital in the bureaucratic field (due to their strong and positive reputations within the field), and can successfully develop multiscalar coalitions with other bureaucratic agencies. Autonomy from political actors, therefore, actually harms the effectiveness of bureaucrats who rely on these linkages to garner support for policies.
13 In the literature on Indian cities, elite influence over urban decisionmaking strongly shapes urban policies and governance. From this perspective, policies like
JNNURM are indicative of elite efforts to “neoliberalize” cities and foster widespread exclusion of the city’s poorest. By tracing the struggles between state and local actors, I demonstrate the limited reach of “elite capture” arguments. In the case of BSUP, slum residents prove quite adept at capitalizing on the institutional weaknesses of the state and negotiating for particular benefits under the scheme. Further, slum residents are often able to exploit the competition for power to legitimately represent the interests of slum residents that occurs between bureaucratic officials, slum leaders, politicians, and civil society groups in slums. In this sense, there are still possibilities for inclusion even when policies are perceived to privilege only the interests of the most elite.
Social Fields of Governance in Urban India
Using Bourdieu to understand the state and governance in India is a new application of his theory of social fields and one that proves incredibly fruitful for demonstrating the complex institutions, divisions, and practices that comprise state practices. While other studies of urban governance in India have examined the networks that comprise governing coalitions (e.g., Sami 2013; Weinstein 2009), a field approach shifts the focus from specific ties between actors and toward an understanding of the broader environmental factors (i.e., the rules of the game) that structure these alliances.
A key limitation with Bourdieu’s theory of fields, however, is that it often implies a certain level of predictability within the field, with actions structured through individual habitus and the broader homology of the field. Under BSUP, however, the practices of
14 various actors demonstrated much more fluidity in the structure of the field as well as the dynamic nature of interactions between fields. For example, in several cases, slum residentswho would, theoretically, be in a subordinate position within the policy implementation fieldwere able to pressure other actors within the field to make claims on the state and refute its dominance within the field. As well, the dynamics within one field (e.g., the civil society field), strongly shaped how civil society groups operated in other fields (e.g., the policy intervention field).
The case of BSUP demonstrates that while fields operate on their own logic and shape the actions of those within the field, the relationship between fields is also important for structuring action. This resembles Eyal’s (2013) critique of Bourdieu’s theory of fields as discrete, autonomous spaces, and underscores his appreciation of the
“spaces between fields”. In the case of urban governance in India, these in between spaces (e.g., the policy implementation field) allowed actors to engage in various practices that may not have been acceptable given the rules within their field, but were nonetheless critical to effective policy implementation.
With these arguments and contributions in mind, the next section of this chapter describes the motivations for and symbolic importance of India’s National Urban
Renewal Mission and the broader urban governance field in India.
From a Rural Bias to an Urban Awakening
The contemporary challenges facing Indian cities are often linked to the country’s historical indifference to and neglect of urban areas. While scholars like Lipton (1977) and Bates (1981) argue that developing countries often demonstrate a strong “urban bias”
15 in policy priorities and the distribution of resources, a number of scholars claim India defies this trend. Specifically, India’s strong “rural bias” (Varshney 1998) can be traced to social, economic, and political processes occurring in the years shortly after India’s independence. In the 1960s, the autonomous power of the central government became increasingly constrained by the rise of “demand politics” from various interests groups including the agrarian elite (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). As the agrarian elite gained powerby dominating political parties and governance institutions at the state levelthey began to push for the expansion of political powers at the provincial level. According to
Varshney (1993, 1998) these processes were fueled by the introduction of democracy before industrialization. This shifting of political powers to states limited the central government’s powers to intervene in urban affairs and to enforce policies that were counter to the interests of the rural sector (Bardhan 1984; Chatterjee 1993; Rudolph and
Rudolph 1987; Shaw 1996; Varshney 1998). The rise of a new agrarian politics fueled a political and ideological divide between the modern, urban India and its more traditional, rural counterpart Bharat (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987).
Despite this historical rural bias, India’s urban population is on the rise leading many to question this bias and push for greater investment in and attention to Indian cities. The country that, according to Mahatma Gandhi, “lived in its villages” is now experiencing an “urban turn” (Prakash 2002; Rao 2006) or an “urban awakening”
(McKinsey and Company 2010), and, according to some, needs to prepare for a “tsunami of urbanization” (Rao 2013) that is “coming at hurricane speed”6. While some have noted
6 Personal Interview, Amitabh Kundu, March 13, 2014
16 that India’s urbanization is not accelerating as fast as some estimates, the growth of the urban population since the turn of the century has still been steady (Mohan and Dasgupta
2004). In 2001, the urban population was approximately 28% (268 million) and grew to
31% (377 million) in 2011 (Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs 2001, 2011).
This trend toward urbanization is expected to continue, with the urban population projected to reach 590 million by 2030 (McKinsey and Company 2010).
In addition to their increasing demographic importance, Indian cities are also economically vital to the country’s development. In 2008, cities contributed approximately 58% of the country’s GDP, and experts estimate that urban centers will contribute roughly 70% of India’s GDP by 2030 (McKinsey and Company 2010). Due to their increasing demographic and economic influence, cities in India are seen by many as critical to and synonymous with India’s future development. According to a key policy architect for the National Urban Renewal Mission, Ramesh Ramanathan, “there are more people [in cities], and there is more recognition that urban is the way life is going to be in
India”7. To help cities reach their full potential, and undo decades of neglect as a result of the country’s rural bias, would require a largescale policy effort. Such an effort would target cities throughout the country and provide them with the resources necessary to improve the planning and governance of Indian cities and prepare them for the imminent
“urban tsunami”.
India’s Urban Governance Challenges
7 Personal Interview, July 4, 2012
17 Indian cities are characterized by poor infrastructure, the proliferation of slums, and fractured urban planning. Many argue that these challenges can be traced to a variety of governance problems at the city and state level, including: the lack of financial autonomy and weak technical capacity of city governments, poor interagency coordination between governing and planning bodies, and the lack of local democratic accountability stemming from the power that state governments exert over urban affairs (Baud and de Wit 2008;
Mukhopadhyay 2006; Ramanathan 2007; Roy 2009; Sivaramakrishnan 2011).
For NURM policymakers, the control that state governments have over urban governance was seen as the most formidable barrier to improving the situation in Indian cities.8 Figure 1.1 below outlines the urban governance roles and responsibilities of cities, states, and the central government. Decisionmaking over critical issues like economic development, longterm planning, and the provision of housing fall under the control of state governments (or various parastatal bodies whose leadership is appointed by the state government) (Sivaramakrishnan 2011; Weinstein 2009). Municipal governments are also heavily reliant on state government revenues due to their limited ability to raise taxes or revenues independently. While city governments have elected municipal bodies and mayors, municipalities are often beholden to state governments for approvals and funds to execute nearly all functions of city governance (Shatkin 2014; Sivaramakrishnan
2011). Even though state governments have a historical “rural bias” (Varshney 1998), many states prove, quite ironically, unwilling to relinquish their authority over urban governance to either municipalities or to the central government (Ramanathan 2007).
8 Personal Interview, Om Prakash Mathur, July 14, 2012; Personal Interview, Ramesh Ramanathan, July 4, 2012; Personal Interview, K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, February 19, 2014
18 FIGURE 1.1: Urban Governance Structure in India
There have been efforts in the past to remedy the lack of authority and autonomy of municipal governments (i.e., urban local bodies or ULBs). In 1992 the 74th constitutional amendment was enacted to encourage state governments to decentralize governing authority to municipalities. This amendment requires four major changes to municipal governance. First, regular municipal elections are to be held at a minimum of once every five years, or if a municipality is dissolved, elections are to be held within six months of the dissolution (Government of India Ministry of Urban Development n.d., p.
3).9 Second, state governments are to create two planning bodies: one for the
9 Between 2006 and 2010, Bangalore did not have a functioning municipal government and instead was overseen by the Commissionerthe administrative head of the ULB who is appointed by the state governmentduring this period. This was in direct violation of the 74th constitutional amendment, which requires that regular elections are held in cities.
19 metropolitan area and another for the metropolitan regional area.10 Third, states must create a state finance commission responsible for reviewing state allocations to municipalities (e.g., taxes, tolls, fees, etc.). Finally, states are to endow municipalities
“with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self governance” (Government of India Ministry of Urban Development n.d., p. 3). While all state governments ratified the 74th amendment at the time, few have fully transferred administrative, executive, and financial powers to municipalities. Even when state governments have transferred “functional” powers to ULBs (e.g., urban poverty alleviation, waste management, etc.), these powers have not been matched by the devolution of financial resources, thereby limiting the power that cities have to manage municipal finances and urban infrastructure projects (United States Agency for
International Development 2010). According to an urban finance expert from the Indian
Institute for Human Settlements (a Bangalorebased urban think tank), Dr. Amir Bazaz,
“there is no money for the local government. There are few to no sources of money, and those sources are inelastic. They have no authority to design or implement new instruments.”11
10 In Bangalore, the Bangalore Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) serves as the regional/districtlevel development body and oversees planning, coordination, and development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Region (BMR). This region includes the Bangalore urban district, the Bangalore rural district, and the Ramanagara district. The Bangalore Metropolitan Planning Committee (BMPC) is supposed to serve as the municipallevel planning body, but was only recently established in 2014 (The Hindu 2014). Reluctance to create the BMPC is likely due to the fact that Bangalore already has a parastatal organization dedicated to the development and planning of the city [the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA)]. Established under the Bangalore Development Authority Act (1976), the BDA is headed by a stateappointed Chairman and a stateappointed Commissioner. The BDA oversees land use and planning in the city, has the power to acquire land, and is a key agency responsible for the implementation of development schemes (like JNNURM) in the city (Bangalore Development Authority n.d.).
11 Personal Interview, September 30, 2014
20 The lack of full implementation of the 74th amendment was seen by NURM policymakers as one of the key barriers to effective urban governance and economic development in Indian cities. However, history indicated that simply recommending that state governments implement the 74th amendment in full was not enough to ensure effective decentralization. For this reason, all states and cities receiving funding under
JNNURM were required to implement the 74th amendment (and the 12th Schedule12) as a condition of this funding. To ensure compliance, each state had to complete a checklist indicating which functions under the 12th schedule had been incorporated into the state’s
Municipal Act and had been transferred to the ULB (United States Agency for
International Development 2010). According to a key NURM policy architect and the head of the NURM National Technical Advisory Group (NTAG), Ramesh Ramanathan, linking reforms to funds was the only way to ensure compliance on the part of state governments. He describes how:
The lack of traction on implementing the 74th reflected the fact that there was not a lot of political energy to implement it. If you fast forward to 2004 [when NURM was being designed], our conclusion was that in order to get the states to provide political space to local governments, it can’t happen voluntarily, and therefore you need to trigger the energies of a political economy.13
12 The 12th Schedule to the constitution provides a list of 18 functions that should be devolved from state governments to city governments, including: 1) urban planning and town planning, 2) regulation of land use and construction of buildings, 3) planning for economic and social development, 4) roads and bridges, 5) water supply (including domestic, industrial, and commercial), 6) public health, sanitation, and solid waste management, 7) fire services, 8) urban forestry, 9) safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society including the handicapped and mentally ill, 10) slum improvement and upgradation, 11) urban poverty alleviation, 12) provision of urban amenities and facilities (e.g., parks, gardens and playgrounds) 13) promotion of cultural, educational, and aesthetic aspects, 14) burials and burial grounds, cremations, cremation grounds, and electric crematoriums, 15) cattle pounds, prevention of cruelty to animals, 16) vital statistics (including registration of births and deaths), 17) public amenities (including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops, and public conveniences), and 18) regulation of slaughterhouses and tanneries.
13 Personal Interview, July 4, 2012
21 While “triggering the energies of a political economy” was certainly a key motivation for
NURM’s funding and reform structure, this decision was also driven by another important factor. In India, urban development is constitutionally considered a “state subject”, and state governments are responsible for all urban developmentrelated activities (e.g., urban infrastructure, water supply, governance, etc.). Without first passing a constitutional amendment, the central government cannot pass legislation for cities; the
Centre can, at best, recommend planning strategies and provide funds to states and cities
(Shaw 1996, p. 224). Tying reforms to the “largesse from the Centre” (Sivaramakrishnan
2011, p. 13), therefore, was a strategy to encourage change within cities without overstepping constitutional boundaries (Sivaramakrishnan 2011).
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (NURM)
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (NURM) emerged in 2005 out of this context in an effort to improve the infrastructure and governance of Indian cities and trigger the economic growth of Indian cities by making them more “investor friendly”
(Sivaramakrishnan 2011, p. 14). There are four submissions under which all NURM projects fall: including: 1) Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG); 2) Urban
Infrastructural Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT); 3)
Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP); and 4) Integrated Housing and Slum
Development Program (IHSDP) (Sivaramakrishnan 2011).
Prior to receiving funds from the central government, cities and states must first create a comprehensive City Development Plan (CDP), which outlines urban planning strategies for the entire city and serves as the guiding framework for all NURM projects.
22 To obtain NURM funds for specific infrastructure projects, cities and states must also submit Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for each proposed project to the central government, and funds are disbursed only after evaluation and approval from the relevant ministries (either the Ministry of Urban Development or the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation). The cost of NURM projects is divided between the
Government of India, states, and urban local bodies (ULBs) based on the population of the city. For cities with a population of over four million, the cost of NURM projects is divided between the central government (15%), the state government (35%), and the
ULB (50%).14 As the population of the city decreases, so does the contribution from the
ULB; for cities under one million people, the share is 80% for the central government,
10% from the state government, and 10% from the ULB. To avoid the politics and “rural bias” of state governments, funding under NURM flowed primarily through autonomous bureaucratic agencies (at the state and federal level) that were not directly accountable to democratic politics. As described in greater detail in Chapter Three , in the cases where politicians were supposed to play a role in NURM policy processes, bureaucratic agencies at the state level often found a way to prevent their involvement.
While NURM has four submissions, the majority of NURM projects fall under two main submissions, Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) and Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) (Khan 2017). Largescale infrastructure projects (e.g., roads, highways, sewage waste management, etc.) fall under the UIG portion of NURM and these projects are managed at the central government level by the Ministry of Urban
14 Bangalore’s current population is approximately 8.4 million people (Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs 2011). 23 Development. In Bangalore, the majority of UIG projects were managed by state and parastatal agencies with little involvement from the ULB. Under BSUP, state and municipal agencies must provide a range of services to the urban poor, including: housing, water, sanitation, and social services (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005). To date,
BSUP projects in Bangalore have focused primarily on building housing for the urban poor and rehabilitation of slums, and the two main implementing agencies in the city are the municipal government/ULB (the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike or BBMP) and a statelevel parastatal agency, the Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB).
BSUP projects are managed at the central government level by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation.
To effectively implement BSUP projects in Bangalore requires coordination between a range of state and nonstate actors. For example, one BSUP project in
Bangalore brings together actors from the parastatals responsible for water (Bangalore
Water Supply and Sewerage Board or BWSSB), electricity (Bangalore Electricity Supply
Company or BESCOM), land development (Bangalore Development Authority, BDA), and slum development (Karnataka Slum Development Board or KSDB). As well, a variety of statelevel bureaucratic and technical agencies oversee the scheme’s implementation in the city, including: the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation (KUIDFC), the Government of Karnataka Housing
Department (HD), the Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department
(UDD), the Government of Karnataka Finance Department (FD), and the NURM
24 Statelevel Steering Committee (SLSC). Finally, most projects involve some form of land acquisition either from local, state, or federallevel bodies. In the cases where the implementing agencies require land for BSUP developments, it must engage with various actors within the municipal corporation. Further, the active involvement of civil society groups in project implementation also strongly shapes local implementation.
Given the institutional complexity that shapes the work of implementing agencies, it is no surprise that BSUP and UIG have been marred with implementation challenges in many cities, including Bangalore. For the BSUP portion of NURM, implementing agencies have faced numerous challenges attempting to meet the goals of the scheme, but they have also developed a number of housing projects for slum residents throughout the city. The main implementing agency for the scheme (the Karnataka Slum Development
Board) has even been recognized by the central government as a model for BSUP’s implementation.15 While the scope of BSUP in Bangalore is still small considering the estimates of the city’s slum population [anywhere from 10% of Bangalore’s total population (Schenk 2001) to 25% of the roughly 8.47 million people living in the city
(RoyChowdry 2011)], this dissertation does not seek to measure the overall “success” of
BSUP in the city. Instead, I focus on what Centeno, Kolhi, and Yashar (2017) call “state performance” or “what, for good or for ill, the state is able to accomplish” (p. 3). Through sixteen months of ethnographic research in New Delhi and Bangalore, I trace how state actors navigate the complexities of implementation at the city, state, and federal level, and map the ways in which the interests and struggles of state and societal actors
15 Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014; Personal Interview, Senior Official from the Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department, March 18, 2015
25 “converge at the level of the city” (Sellers 2011, p. 136), and, in turn, construct particular forms of urban governance.
I now turn to a discussion of the particular research methodology adopted in this study and describe the rationale behind the use of a qualitative methods for understanding policy processes of BSUP.
Research Methodology
This project seeks to trace the microprocesses of urban policy implementation under
India’s Basic Services for the Urban Poor scheme in Bangalore through an ethnographic research approach. Given the complexity of organizations and actors involved in the implementation of BSUP, the multiscalar policy oversight and funding processes, the myriad nonstate actors involved in the scheme, as well as the fact that bureaucratic officials are frequently transferred to new positions within the bureaucracy16, my research approach needed to be emergent, flexible, and multisited. Several scholars note the value of multisited ethnographies for mapping complex social processes and “following connections, associations, and putative relationships” (Marcus 1995, p. 95) between actors operating in different social scales and spaces of activity (Burawoy 2001; Gille and
Riain 2002; Marcus 1995). For this study, a multisited “mobile ethnography” (Marcus
1995) proved particularly fruitful for unpacking the innerworkings of the state (at the
16 Scholars have documented the frequent shuffling of bureaucrats within the Indian bureaucracy and the ways in which this impacts state capacity (Iyer and Mani 2009). The transfer of bureaucrats not only represents a challenge to fostering effective state capacity and enhancing institutional memory within the bureaucracy, but also makes tracing the work of the state exponentially more difficult for the researcher. For example, several officials that I interviewed during preliminary fieldwork (in 2012 and 2013) who held positions central to the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore had been transferred to new positions within the bureaucracy when I returned in 2014. In some cases, the new positions that these officials held would be related to the position they previously held, but in other cases officials would be transferred to entirely new departments and would be tasked with overseeing agendas not directly related to the policy’s implementation. 26 local, state, and federal level), the broader structural dynamics shaping the practices of both state and nonstate actors, and the role of communities impacted by the policy.
Ethnography is best described as a constellation of methods and data collection and interpretation techniques. A number of scholars highlight the benefits of qualitative methods for mapping the relationships between specific actors and events as they unfold
(Maxwell 2005; Ragin and Amoroso 2011; Small 2009; Wood 2007). Qualitative techniques are ideal for tracing processes, identifying mechanisms, refining theoretical concepts, describing “local causality”, and, more broadly, for uncovering unique data that may not appear in historical documentation or in quantitative analyses (Glaeser 2005;
Lamont and White 2008; Maxwell 2005; Wood 2007). When the microprocesses uncovered in qualitative analysis are connected to the larger context within which these processes occur, qualitative data also becomes particularly useful for the development and refinement of existing theory (Burawoy 1998; Corbin and Strauss 1990; Maxwell
2005).
In this study, I used qualitative research techniques to develop a richer theoretical account of the relational and dynamic nature of urban governance in India, the developmental state, and state capacity. I collected data through four main techniques, including: 1) 110 semistructured interviews with key informants (with bureaucrats, policymakers, and civil society actors), 2) six focus groups with 56 residents (from five communities impacted by the BSUP scheme in Bangalore), 3) participant and nonparticipant observation of meetings on housing rights for the urban poor (typically hosted by civil society groups), and 4) analysis of official policy documents
27 [approximately ~1000 pages of internal documents (obtained from the Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation) and publiclyavailable policy documents] and news articles. Between 2012 and 2015 I visited India on four separate occasions and conducted a total of sixteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in New
Delhi and Bangalore.
In 2012, I spent approximately three months in Bangalore, conducting interviews with five of the six members of the NURM National Technical Advisory Group17 and officials at the city and state level involved in BSUP implementation. During this phase of the research I was largely concerned with mapping the relevant organizations and actors at the city and state level involved in policy implementation. In 2013, I visited
India for approximately two months and divided my time equally between New Delhi and Bangalore. During this visit, I conducted interviews with central, state, and citylevel officials involved in overseeing the policy, and I also collected documentation on BSUP policy processes (mostly at the federal level). During my time in Bangalore, I met with several civil society groups working on housing for the urban poor in the city, and, through these connections, visited several BSUP field sites in various parts of the city to see the variation in implementation around Bangalore. These early visits proved incredibly fruitful for understanding the motivations for NURM (and BSUP) and the broader institutional terrain of BSUP and also for developing connections and rapport
17 This group was critical in the development of NURM as well as its early stages of implementation. The group was a mix of civil society actors, scholars, and senior bureaucrats and included: Ramesh Ramanathan (National Technical Advisor and Chairperson), Om Prakash Mathur, Sheela Patel, K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, M.P. Vasimalai, and R.V. Ramarao. 28 with key officials and civil society groups (at the local, state, and federal level) involved in the policy’s implementation.
The bulk of my fieldwork (~11 months) was conducted between 2014 and 2015
(divided into two trips), and during this time I was based in New Delhi for three months and Bangalore for roughly nine months. My time in Delhi was focused on amassing additional documentation on BSUP policy processes and interviewing officials within the
Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation
(the two ministries responsible for overseeing UIG and BSUP in the country) and civil society actors in Delhi who have been critical to broader conversations around BSUP and housing for the urban poor in India. During this time I also observed and participated in several forums on housing rights and housing policy for the urban poor, led by activists and NGOs based in Delhi. While these groups were based in Delhi, these meetings often involved advocacy groups and civil society actors from around the country, so it provided me with a deeper understanding of nationallevel advocacy and activist networks. In
Bangalore, I conducted numerous interviews with bureaucrats (at the city and statelevel), politicians, members of NGOs, and activists involved in policy implementation. I also conducted six focus groups with 56 residents during field visits to five BSUP project sites in Bangalore. Similar to my time in New Delhi, I participated in several meetings on housing rights for the urban poor facilitated by the Bangalorebased Center for Law and
Policy Research.
To identify interviewees, I relied on snowball sampling and lists of pertinent officials from policy documents. Rapport was essential for connecting with key officials,
29 and for this reason, snowball sampling and references from other interviewees proved more fruitful for connecting with key officials than coldcalling. For interviews with bureaucrats, I asked questions about the respondent’s role in policy implementation, the processes by which he/she seeks to overcome policy hurdles, his/her relationship to and/or interactions with nonstate actors during policy implementation, and his/her overall perspective on the aims of the scheme. For interviews with members of NGOs and activists, I asked openended questions about the respondent’s role in policy implementation, the processes by which he or she (or his or her organization) seeks to influence the work of the state, the ways in which he/she collaborates and interacts with other NGOs, activists, and/or the state, and his/her overall perspective on BSUP in
Bangalore.
Interviews were conducted in English by the author and lasted between 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. In the cases where the interviewee did not speak English, I enrolled the assistance of a local researcher (who was previously trained on the study aims and objectives) to translate during the interview. In many cases new questions emerged after an interview was completed, and in these cases I conducted followup interviews with several interviewees. In a handful of cases, followup interviews were conducted remotely by phone or email, with the most recent interview occurring in early 2017.
Responses from interviewees were triangulated with data from official documents, responses from other interviewees, and news reports.
To identify the five BSUP sites for this project, I relied on a “theoretical sampling” method (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Ragin and Amoroso 2011) where data
30 collected in the field informs subsequent inquiry. This iterative and emergent process of data collection and theory development allows for the selection of cases that represent interesting cases for theory generation. The cases that were selected are geographically diverse (located both in the central part of the city as well as the outskirts) and range in the size of development (with the smallest housing development at 60 units and the largest development at 808 units). In each case, I obtained access to the community through connections with local NGOs or communitybased organizations (CBOs). In some cases my association with the NGO may have influenced respondents’ answers to my questions (due to the powerful role of NGOs in the community). For this reason, once
I gained access to the community, I would often return with my research assistant to speak to residents without the presence of the NGO/CBO representatives. This was not a perfect solution to this challenge, but represented an effort to overcome the bias associated with local NGOs/CBOs. While the subsequent empirical chapters only trace the processes of two case studies in depth (the Deshyanagar and Byrasandra BSUP projects), the other three BSUP projects (Pantharapallya, Hakki Pikki, and L.R. Nagar) provided a useful comparative lens through which to understand how and why processes varied between communities.
To understand the resident perspective on implementation, I conducted oneonone interviews with local NGO/CBO representatives and larger focus group discussions with residents impacted by the scheme. In each community I conducted at least one focus group, and in one community (Deshyanagar), I conducted a second focus group discussion. Focus groups were facilitated by a local researcher (who was
31 previously trained on the study aims and objectives) who was able to communicate with residents in their native language (usually Tamil or Kannada, but sometimes Hindi).
Focus groups ranged in size, with the smallest group attended by seven people and the largest group attended by 14 people. Focus group discussions focused on the BSUP implementation process from the resident perspective, the role of local leaders, politicians, and NGOs/CBOs in shaping implementation processes, satisfaction with the implementation processes and the housing developments, and interactions with bureaucratic officials during implementation. Insights from focus groups were triangulated with internal documents on policy processes obtained through the Karnataka
Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation, responses from interviews, and news reports.
By tracing policy processes at multiple scales and at multiple sites, I was able to effectively map the policy terrain under BSUP, including the relevant actors, their connections and relationships, and the broader field dynamics shaping the struggles and practices of state and nonstate actors. This iterative research design was ideal for theory development as it allowed me to refine the subsequent research phases based on emergent themes and findings. By moving between several field sites, I was able to more accurately capture the range of actors (both within the state and outside the state) involved in the policy’s implementation, rather than a small subset of actors who were identified in policy documents. The selection of Bangalore was not motivated by a need for representativeness or generalization, but rather by a desire to develop a deep
32 understanding of the processes that shape implementation and BSUP outcomes in a major
Indian city that has been recognized as having unique outcomes.
The final section of this chapter provides a brief summary of the remaining chapters of the dissertation and the empirical foundation for the main argument.
Organization of Chapters
Following Bourdieu’s (1984, 1985) theory of social fields, the chapters of this dissertation are organized partly by the key fields that shape the implementation of
BSUPthe bureaucratic field and the civil society fieldand partly by the struggles that emerge both within and between these fields. Following the literature review in Chapter
One , the first empirical chapter ( Chapter Two ) provides an overview of the symbolic struggles that emerge between state and societal actors over the terms of the policy. The next two chapters ( Chapter Three and Chapter Four ) map the organizational structure, key actors, and broader stakes of the two main fields that shape policy implementation.
Chapter Five and Chapter Six examine the relational nature of policy processes and state capacity by tracing processes within the bureaucracy and within slum communities.
Following a description in Chapter One of the conceptual and theoretical framework guiding my analysis, I turn to the empirical foundation of my argument, beginning with an examination of the local field of BSUP policy intervention. Rather than starting at a “higher” or more macroconceptual level of analysis (e.g., the central government where the policy is managed and overseen), in Chapter Two I set the stage for the subsequent empirical chapters by examining the contestations that emergebetween various actors involved in and/or impacted by the policyover the
33 fundamental principles of BSUP’s policy implementation. Specifically, in this chapter I attempt to understand how state and nonstate actors struggle to define the “rules of the game” (Fligstein 2001) in the local field of implementation. I argue that because the state lacks legitimacy in slum communities, residents and civil society actors frequently challenge the state on basic tenets of the BSUP policy such as the availability of the land and the particular type of housing that should be built for slum residents. Understanding the local field of policy intervention is critical because it highlights the struggles (and in some cases the democratic possibilities) that emerge when the state lacks the legitimacy to effectively execute its will and define the parameters of policy intervention. When residents join forces with civil society actors they are often able to resist and shape particular plans put forth by the state.
Beginning the empirical analysis with this look into the local field of intervention sets the foundation for understanding subsequent empirical chapters and the other key fields shaping BSUP policy implementation in Bangalore. In Chapter Three I examine how the “scalartechnical field” (STF) envisioned and constructed by policymakers contrasts with the logic and politics of the bureaucratic field and the forms of capital that shape bureaucratic action. In particular, policymakers imagined a bureaucratic field where power relations were organized primarily by technical expertise, bureaucratic autonomy, and hierarchical authority (i.e., “technical” and “scalar” forms of capital).
From this approach, policy implementation agencies with either high technical capacity and/or proximity to the central government would be able to use their position within the
STF to steer other bureaucratic agencies into compliance under the scheme and solve
34 implementation and coordination challenges with this authority. The vision of policy implementation and authority within the bureaucratic field constructed by policymakers resembles Pritchett and Woolcock’s (2004) idea of “skipping straight to Weber”. In other words, policymakers believed the solution to coordination challenges and poor urban capacity could be found through a “highly centralized bureaucracy” and a “top–down”, technocratic policy structure (p. 193).
There are numerous cases where the highmodernist visions of policymakers conflict with ontheground realities (Scott 1998; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004) and the case of BSUP is no exception. Rather than claiming that BSUP represents simply another example of the failures of high modernism, however, I argue that to truly understand the mismatch between vision and process and how implementing agencies attempt to implement the BSUP scheme in Bangalore, it is critical to understand the broader politics of the bureaucratic field and the forms of capital that shape bureaucratic practice. I argue that while the STF privileges technical and scalar forms of capital, in practice relations between agencies and the ability to meet policy goals depends more on political, reputational, and symbolic capital. Within the field, those agencies with strong reputations and embeddedness with particular political actors are often more adept at overcoming coordination challenges and meeting policy ends than agencies with the authority conferred by NURM. The bureaucratic field is also driven by a politics of urgencywhich policymakers claim is essential to overcoming institutional lethargybut this urgency actually fuels the same kinds of problems within the bureaucracy that the
35 policy attempts to remedy because policy problems cannot often be solved as easily as envisioned by the official framework.
Chapter Four provides an overview of another key field that structures policy processes, the civil society field. In this chapter I outline the stakes, key actors, and boundary struggles that shape the broader field. I argue that boundary struggles emerge because actors within the field seek to define the kinds of acceptable and unacceptable practices for engaging with slum residents and with the state. By articulating these
“symbolic boundaries” (Lamont and Molnár 2002, p. 168)18, and delineating the acceptable practices of civil society groups, these actors seek to occupy a position within the field as the most legitimate representatives of slum residents’ needs and interests. The ability to define the field proves important because civil society groups need to appear legitimate within local slums to sustain their work in these communities, and also because the “authentic” groups are often asked to serve as representatives of slum residents in official meetings and policy discussions (at the state level mostly). In this sense, the ability to define the boundaries of acceptable action within the field can have important organizational and material implications for civil society groups. Power within the field also shapes one’s ability to define and influence broader conversations about urban policy, the rights of the urban poor, and how civil society groups should engage with the state and with slum communities.
18 “Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (Lamont and Molnár 2002, p. 168).
36 Chapter Five provides an opportunity to view the bureaucratic field in action as agencies involved in BSUP implementation and oversight attempt to meet policy objectives through the creation and approval of a key policy document, the Detailed
Project Report (DPR). Pressures on implementing agencies (by the Centre and statelevel oversight bodies) to meet urgent policy timelines forces these agencies to churn out DPRs at the fastest pace possible to quickly obtain approvals and commence construction. To meet this end, they often avoid the timeconsuming process of obtaining feedback from other bureaucratic agencies and project beneficiaries, and they create DPRs with unrealistic implementation timelines, little regard to critical implementation questions
(e.g., can land be obtained for a project?), no input from other parastatal and governing bodies about coordinating efforts, and minimal (to no) insight from local residents. In
Bangalore, this resulted in countless implementation delays, and the majority of projects proposed by the implementing agencies were unimplementable in their original form.
This approach to DPR creation was fueled largely by the desire of implementing agencies to maintain their legitimacy within the bureaucratic field by demonstrating their ability to complete key policy processes in a timely fashion. For the Slum Board, greater legitimacy under BSUP meant that the agency would be given greater responsibility to manage and oversee future housing policies for the urban poor in the state of Karnataka.19
19 Another central government policy that targeted urban slums throughout the country emerged shortly after BSUP. The Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) scheme had the ambitious goal to make India completely slum free by 2022. At the time of my fieldwork, the Slum Board was one of the only agencies to submit DPRs for RAY for the entire state of Karnataka. According to a senior official within the Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department, the call for DPRs was officially open to any municipality, but given the rushed timeline of the scheme and the Slum Board’s experience under BSUP, nearly all of the DPRs were submitted by the Slum Board, effectively making them the only implementing agency in the state of Karnataka. He describes how: “we kept an open slate and we said that anybody can apply. It’s not that the Slum Board itself has to do all the projects. We told the municipalities also that they can submit DPRsthey can prepare the DPRs and submit thebut since the Slum Board had gone through the whole 37 Because of this, implementing agencies were more concerned with producing the internal policy documents, rather than producing meaningful outcomes on the ground. However, as formal documentation of the implementing agency’s intent and plans for slum redevelopment, DPRs became critical objects of struggle both within the state as well as between state and nonstate actors. Oversight bodies within the bureaucracy as well as civil society groups and residents used DPRs to hold implementing agencies accountable to their plans and pressure them into action.
In Chapter Six I trace the implementation processes of two BSUP cases (in
Deshyanagar and Byrasandra) to illustrate the relational nature of policy processes and state capacity. In Byrasandra, I argue that despite the state’s attempts to construct a policy field in which it can then intervene, the local state competes with other powerful actors in slums over the symbolic capital to legitimately represent the interests of slum residents and shape developmental policies in poor urban communities. In this unsettled field of intervention with diffuse forms of power, the capacity of the state to execute its policy plans (hinging largely on its ability to assuage concerns from slum residents about the policy) depends on its ability to mobilize the symbolic capital of other actors within the field. While the struggles between the state and societal actors in the Byrasandra case resemble struggles over the state’s broader symbolic capital in slum communities, in the
Deshyanagar case I demonstrate how the Detailed Project Report (DPR)which is a basic
“check box” document meant for internal policy purposes onlybecomes a key form of knowledge about the state that civil society groups use to influence policy processes.
process of the JNNURM, the BSUP, we wanted to harness whatever was learned by the Slum Board” (Personal Interview, March 18, 2015). 38 Finally, in the Conclusion of this study, I summarize the overall argument, examine the strengths and limitations of this particular approach for understanding the state and state capacity in India, and discuss potential areas for future research. While this study represents an indepth examination of one housing policy at a particular moment in
India’s history, as the country moves forward with more centrallysponsored urban schemes (e.g., the recent Smart Cities program), understanding the dynamics within the bureaucracy at the city, state, and federal level, as well as the ways in which nonstate actors shape and influence policy processes has important implications not only for our understanding of urban governance in India, but also for other largescale national urban policies in various countries of the Global South.
39
CHAPTER ONE
THE SOCIAL FIELDS OF BSUP A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
“The social field can be described as a multidimensional space of positions such that every actual position can be defined in terms of a multidimensional system of coordinates whose values correspond to the values of the different pertinent variables. Thus, agents are distributed within it, in the first dimension, according to the overall volume of the capital they possess and, in the second dimension, according to the composition of their capitali.e., according to the relative weight of the different kinds of assets within their total assets” (Bourdieu 1985, p. 724).
Introduction
With the unveiling of India’s National Urban Renewal Mission (NURM) in 2005, a series of actors and agencies at the central, state, and city level were brought together to meet the ambitious goals of improving governance and infrastructure in Indian cities within a seven year timeframe. Under NURM, states and cities receive funding from the central government for infrastructure projects in exchange for adopting a series of reforms that aim to liberalize urban economies and decentralize governing authority to municipalities.
To ensure this transformation, and to overcome the strong control that state governments have over municipalities, policymakers gave a prominent role to agencies within the central government who were responsible for overseeing and approving all city proposals under the scheme. Policymakers knew that the potential to implement sweeping changes
40 in cities was not an easy taskwith one policymaker even referring to the scheme as a
“total act of faith”20but policymakers still believed that NURM was the only viable option to improve urban infrastructure and governance and transform Indian cities into engines of economic growth.
Despite the hopes of policymakers to fuel investment, encourage coordination amongst diverse urban governing agencies, and improve the overall infrastructure of cities, the policy was marred by implementation challenges in nearly every participating city. In most cases, fractured governance and institutional multiplicity was not resolved as a result of the scheme, cities only superficially adopted governance reforms, infrastructure projects were regularly delayed, and many projects [for both the Basic
Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) submission and the Urban Governance and
Infrastructure (UIG) submission] remained partially complete as of 2012 when the scheme was supposed to come to a close. Policymakers and officials from the central government often blamed the lack of capacity of state and city governments as the primary reason for the scheme’s challenges and delays, while implementing agencies at the state and city level often blamed the central government for not providing enough guidance to successfully achieve the policy’s ambitious aims.
Theories of state capacity and the disconnect between “high modernist” policies
(Scott 1998) and actual policy outcomes provide some answers to the challenges that emerged with BSUP’s implementation, but not all. For the BSUP submission, cities encountered frequent challenges when implementing these largescale housing
20 Personal Interview, K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, February 19, 2014 41 developments, and Bangalore was no exception. In Bangalore, slum residents often resisted or refused the redevelopment of their communities, NGOs and slum activists challenged the legitimacy of the state and its role in assisting the urban poor, politicians complicated policy processes when they felt the needs of their constituents were not being addressed by the policy, and bureaucratic agencies involved in implementation faced many coordination problems. Despite these formidable barriers to success, housing projects were completed throughout the city and remain occupied several years after their completion. Further, roughly 90% of the BSUP housing projects in Bangalore were developed in situ , as compared to similar cities like Chennai where ~78% of housing projects relocated residents from their current location to the outskirts of the city.
While it is a stretch to say that Bangalore represents a resounding success case for
BSUP implementation, implementing agencies were able to overcome formidable barriers to success (and a “lack of capacity”) to ensure that numerous projects were implemented throughout the city. As well, in many cases, slum residents who would be impacted by the scheme were often able to actively shape policy processes and the work of the state when they aligned with political actors and civil society groups. In the urban
India context, the ability of the state to coordinate action toward the achievement of a policy aim complicates descriptions of urban governance as entirely fractured and cities as existing in a “political power and leadership vacuum” (Sami 2013, p. 151).
In this dissertation I draw on scholarship of the developmental state, statesociety relations, Indian political economy, and urban governance coalitions to better understand and explain the policy processes of BSUP in Bangalore.
42 Development Solutions and State Capacity
The unanticipated developmental successes of a number of East Asian countries in the
20 th century sparked theoretical and empirical investigations into the reasons behind these successes. Building on Johnson’s (1982) study of the Japanese “capitalist developmental state”, scholars sought to explain the role of the state in economic development and growth (Amsden 1992; Evans 1995; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; White and Wade 1984;
WooCumings 1999). Drawing from a Weberian understanding of state structure, hierarchy, and institutions, this literature on the developmental state sees the capacity of the state to implement policies as strongly linked to the institutional structure of the state and an autonomous and effective bureaucracy able to meet state objectives (Chibber
2002; Evans 1995; Moon and Prasad 1994). To most effectively meet policy and developmental goals requires a series of institutional and social structures, including: a cohesive political strategy and ideology, a certain level of “embeddedness” on the part of policymakers and technocrats, a bureaucracy with a strong esprit de corps , strong organizational capacity to manage intrastate conflicts, and close linkages to societal actors (Chibber 2002; Evans 1995; Rueschemeyer 1986; Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005;
Kohli 1989, 2004).
While a body of scholarship aimed to uncover the role of the contemporary state in developmental success, others were intrigued by varying developmental outcomes between countries and the historical factors that shape effective economic development.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) investigate the relationship between colonial legacies and contemporary economic development. Specifically, the authors argue that
43 different types of colonial policies led to the establishment of different sets of institutions, which persisted after a country’s independence and strongly shaped exiting institutional structures. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) make a similar claim about the importance of historical legacies in shaping current outcomes, but instead examine the role of property tax systems during the British Raj and the impact of property rights institutions on current economic development. By historicizing the contemporary economic state of a series of developing countries, these scholars sought to break away from an understanding of development as linked to a country’s “natural” endowments (institutional, political, economic, or otherwise).
Despite the promise of embedded (yet autonomous) and strong bureaucracies for producing economic development and growth (Chibber 2002; Evans 1995; Kohli 1989,
2004), others were troubled by the persistent failures of purportedly effective models for development (Andrews, Woolcock, and Pritchett 2012; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).
Andrews, Woolcock, and Pritchett (2012) argue that countries often present a veneer of developmental capacity, but with little development progress occurring on the ground, representing what they call a “capability trap”. Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) describe the problematic tendency for governments in developing countries to “skip straight to
Weber” (p. 193) when designing solutions to nuanced social challenges. This quippy catchphrase captures how governments often follow a common framework for addressing public service provision. They describe this pr oblemsolutioninstrument framework as one in which government technocrats see “ need as the problem, supply as the solution, civil service as the instrument” (p. 193, emphasis original). The authors then divide
44 commonly found service provision “solutions” by their levels of discretion and transaction intensity and identify three categories of “solutions”: policies, programs, and practices. This tendency to “skip straight to Weber” is not only about bureaucratic relations and management, but also highlights the tendency to frame and simplify complex social problems in a way that allows for highly technical solutions. From this approach, the performance of the bureaucracy in Bangalore would best be explained by its current institutional design and the historical factors that shaped this design.
Literature on the Indian state further complicates the notion of an efficient and effective state apparatus that is coherent and distinct from society. In his comparative analysis of developmental outcomes in India and South Korea, Chibber (2002) attributes
Korea’s developmental “success” to strong coordination between state agencies, while competition between state agencies over resources and competing interests between different bureaucratic organizations served to stall or slow developmental progress in
India. Also highlighting the developmental challenges facing the Indian state, Pritchett
(2009) emphasizes the ways in which the union government is unable to maintain the control over the “administrative apparatus” at the state and local levels that is necessary to implement state programs and provide state services. From his approach, the Indian state is a “flailing” one, characterized by a strong federal government with weak oversight of state and local administrators. The highly politicized nature of the Indian state as well as the strength of interest politics lead to a form of politics that is far from the autonomous and coherent idealtypical Weberian bureaucracy (Chibber 2002; Herring
1999; Kohli 1987, 2004). Varshney (1999) demonstrates how the success of particular
45 policy agendas is often dependent upon support from the democratic masses. If support for a particular reform is weak, then state success hinges on the “ multiplicity of salient political issues” (p. 258) that can divert attention away from unpopular reforms and toward more politically contentious issues.
While the emphasis of this literature tends to be on nationallevel performance and policies, others have disaggregated the Indian state to capture regional variation in development outcomes (Sinha 2005), bureaucratic norms (Mangla 2015), and everyday state practices (Aiyar and Bhattacharya 2016; Gupta 1995, 2005). By unpacking the state, these scholars highlight the “multiple agencies, organizations, levels, agendas, and centers” (Gupta 1995, p. 392) that constitute the state as well as the various social, cultural, and symbolic factors that shape state practices. This literature also demonstrates the possibility of intrastate variation in capacity and the promise of institutional designs that may not resemble the idealtypical Weberian standard (Amengual 2013; Morgan and
Orloff 2017; Tsai 2007). In this sense, in order to better understand the processes of
BSUP in Bangalore, it is more fruitful to treat the state as a disaggregated set of institutions and capacities rather than a unitary entity with either “high” or “low” capacity.
High Modernist Development Schemes
A number of scholars build on the literature of the developmental state and shift the focus from development inputs (e.g., strong institutions) and outputs (e.g., economic growth) to the “rationale of improvement schemes” (Li 2007, p. 1) proposed to address development challenges (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Li 2007; Scott 1998) and the processes that
46 shape development policies. Rather than focusing on the relationship between inputs and outputs in developing countries, these scholars examine how development solutions are created and deployed and to what effect. The authors argue that the “planned institution[s]” of “high modernism” (Li 2007; Scott 1998) that often characterize development agendas simplify complex relations and seek to mask politics and the diverse social, economic, cultural, and political factors that shape social problems
(Ferguson 1994). According to Li (2007) technical and rational solutions emerge because effective and efficient governance inevitably conflicts with politics, and tensions arise between the tendency to simplify society despite its inherent complexity. “Skipping to
Weber” in this sense may appear rational and efficient, but ultimately leads to challenges as local practices are often disconnected from high modernist visions (Scott 1998;
Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). This tension also encourages a variety of “subterranean practices” (Li 2007, p. 2829) or “nonconforming practices” (Scott 1998, p. 261) as state actors seek to maintain a veil of social order despite the inability for “planned institutions” (Scott 1998) to completely attain this order. The ability to introduce largescale reforms or high modernist policies is also often challenged by “the multiplicity of veto players” that are impacted that have a stake in supporting or opposing new policy schemes (Abers and Keck 2006, p. 618).
This literature is not an explicit “policy instruments” approach, but it highlights the power relations embedded in policies and the political and social nature of seemingly neutral, technical policy solutions. In this sense, it resembles Lascoumes and Le Galès
(2007) understanding of a “policy instrument” as an inherently social and technical
47 “device” or “institution” that “organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries” (p. 5).
Similar to discussions on the simplification and representation of complex social issues raised by Ferguson (1994), Scott (1998), and Li (2007), Le Galès (2010) argues that
“policy instruments embody particular policy frames and represent issues in particular ways. They are a form of power” (p . 143 ). While Le Galès (2010) argues that instruments define social relations on their own, he also notes how the “creative use” of these instruments by state and nonstate actors also shapes policies and social relation in varying ways.
The failures of “planned institutions” identified by scholars (Ferguson 1994; Li
2007; Scott 1998) as well as the ways in which social and political dynamics impact the specific “policy instruments” ( Le Galès 201 1) is echoed by Pritchett and Woolcock
(2004) who argue that development “solutions” are laden with contradictions and tensions between a variety of actors that make it nearly impossible to propose a “magic bullet”. The authors claim that the search for one solution is, ironically, where the difficulties in finding appropriate solutions lie. Accordingly, “it is in the tension between the interests and incentives of administrators, clients, and frontline providers that the solutions (plural) lie...these tensions...cannot be escaped; rather, they need to be made creative rather than destructive” (p. 207). The ability for states to experiment with multiple solutions, adapt, and evolve is key to finding better approaches to critical development challenges. This approach also recognizes, rather than resists, that states are characterized by heterogeneous forms of state capacity and complex organizational
48 structures and they often bear little resemblance to idealtypical Weberian bureaucratic state systems. From this approach, largescale development policies are likely to fail in their intended goals, but still serve to structure relations between the state and society.
Under BSUP, the policy has largely failed to meet its ambitious objectives (partly because of the “high modernist” visioning of the central government), but there have been islands of capacity in places like Bangalore. It is therefore important to understand these forms of capacity that emerge and how policies structure particular kinds of statesociety interactions.
Disaggregating the State and State Capacity
A number of scholars argue for a disaggregation of the state and state capacity that acknowledges the complex modes of governance and heterogeneous forms of capacity that comprise the “state” (Abrams 1988; Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2005; Coslovsky
2015; Migdal 2001; Morgan and Orloff 2017; Sabel 2005; Steinmetz 1999). In particular, these scholars argue that state capacity should not be evaluated in terms of how well it resembles the Weberian idealtypical image of the state as a unitary actor, with a clear division of labor, strong bureaucratic cohesion, and autonomy from politics (Morgan and
Orloff 2017). Recognizing the diverse factors that shape development policies and the myriad forms of state capacity, Sabel (2005) argues for a “process or bootstrapping view”
(p. 6) of the state that acknowledges the heterogeneous institutions and differentiated forms of capacity that define governments. A bootstrapping approach traces the varying forms of capacity within states in an effort to understand how organizations learn, adapt, relate, and attempt to correct constraints on development. This moves away from an
49 understanding of development as inputs and outputs (as noted above) and highlights “the efficient sequence for building, in any particular national setting, the structure captured in the input/output table ” (p. 55, emphasis added). In particular, it places the attention on the patchwork nature of bureaucratic capacity, the different modalities of state power
(Morgan and Orloff 2017), as well as how actors seek to overcome institutional fragmentation and overlapping jurisdictional power.
The emphasis on “bootstrapping” and modes of governance challenges an understanding of the state and state power as largely unitary and comprised of a set institutional endowments. While this echoes calls from others who urge for a disaggregated view of the state and state power (Abrams 1988; Morgan and Orloff 2017;
Mitchell 1991), a number of scholars also encourage a form of thinking about the state that emphasizes its myriad symbolic practices. Instead of interpreting and examining the state in terms of its diverse material and institutional aspects, these scholars argue that it is worth investigating the various practices that comprise the “state idea” (Abrams 1988;
Rose and Miller 1992). These approaches place value on the diffuse forms of state power
(Foucault 1982; Steinmetz 1999) and the state’s cultural underpinnings. To these scholars, an understanding of the cultural practices that comprise and bolster the work of the state are essential to the idea of the state’s overall legitimacy (Bourdieu 2014;
Loveman 2005; Mann 1984; Weber 1947), its distinctiveness from societal actors
(Mitchell 1991; Maryl and Quinn 2017), the power of the colonial state and its understanding of colonial subjects (Steinmetz 2008; Wilson 2011), and the state’s forms of scalar authority (Gupta and Ferguson 2002).
50 In this research, I mix Sabel’s (2005) call for a “bootstrapping view” (p. 6) of development policies and processes with calls for an emphasis on the institutional and symbolic factors that comprise the state. I seek to build on a growing body of literature that traces state processes and examines the myriad forms of state capacity that exist within a state. Specifically, I trace the ways in which state actors seek to overcome institutional multiplicity, competing and conflicting institutional hierarchies, and varying forms of state capacity that define the urban Indian context in order to “create relative coherence across official policies in diverse fields of action” (Jessop 2015, p. 18). In a context like India, where the state’s administrative structure has been described as
“porous” [in other words not “as uniform and totalizing as it appeared” (Sinha 2011, p.
49)], and where urban governance institutions are seen as “bankrupt” in terms of capacity, understanding how actors within the state mobilize to solve problems and create policy outcomes is critical to developing a stronger theory of state developmental capacity.
By disaggregating the state, I seek not only to contribute to an undertheorized body of literature that disaggregates state capacity, but also seek to highlight the ways in which Indian cities develop coordinated patterns of governance. In a context where governance capacity is seen as largely absent (Sami 2013; Shatkin 2014; Weinstein
2009), understanding how states seek to generate outcomes and learn from mistakes is critical to a deeper understanding of urban politics in India. Further, theories on the state often treat the presence of state capacity as zero sum, but with a bootstrapping
51 perspective, I am more enabled to understand the patchwork nature of state capacity and the processes that shape this capacity.
I argue that the Indian state is a dynamic social field whose broader structural composition, differentlypositioned actors, forms of capital, and relations to other social fields shape state capacity and state practices. I find that political, reputational, and symbolic capital strongly shape the work of the state, challenging Weberianinspired notions of state capacity that privilege bureaucratic autonomy, cohesiveness, and rational authority. Because the bureaucracy in urban India is not completely autonomous, state actors must effectively manage power relations within the bureaucratic field as well as relations with actors in other fields. Due to the diffuse nature of power within Indian cities, the ability for the state to successfully intervene in slums and produce outcomes not only requires a particular form of technical capacity, but also the recognized authority
(i.e., symbolic capacity) to implement schemes in slums. This ability to effectively wield symbolic capacity relies on synergistic relations between state and nonstate actors.
To better understand the relations between state and nonstate actors and how this shapes state capacity, I now turn to a discussion of the literature on statesociety relations.
StateSociety Relations and the CoProduction of Development Policies
While literature on the developmental state effectively highlights the central role of state actors in policy and developmental outcomes, this approach has been critiqued for its view of the state as largely unitary and its simplification of statesociety relations (Moon and Prasad 1994; Sellers 2011). By viewing the state as a cohesive entity defined by institutions and political actors and as largely autonomous from societal actors, these
52 scholars ignore the fluidity of state boundaries (Allen and Cochrane 2010; Gupta 1995;
Jessop 2002) and the ways in “state” and “societal” actors frequently transgress the boundaries of these categories (Sellers 2011).
Building on this literature, several scholars have examined the particular kind of alliances formed between state and social actors and how the balance of power and various forms of embeddedness between these groups leads to certain developmental outcomes (Abers and Keck 2009; Agarwal and Ribot 1999; Shaw 2005; Tsai 2006). From this approach, effective governance requires the active participation of various societal organizations, although these alliances vary drastically and can be more or less beneficial for society. Abers and Keck (2009) expand on research that, according to the authors, tends to either favor an examination of the “inputs” (e.g., participation) or “outputs”
(effective governance, accountability) of state and societal interactions. In their study of water management committees in Brazil, the authors argue “we should stop expecting that if only the political will existed, state institutions would have the managerial, administrative, technical, and human capacity to do their jobs properly” (p. 292). In this sense, state “outputs” are not solely the result of strong societal actors or the pressures from civil society. Rather, the ability for the state to execute plans often depends on deeply interwoven connections, or “linkages and entanglements” (Coslovsky 2015, p.
1112), with societal actors representing something akin to Ackerman’s (2004) idea of
“cogovernance”. Clemens (2017) describes these relations between state and nonstate actors as “symbiotic” as nonstate actors bolster the overall effectiveness of the state’s efforts and state and civil society groups mutually benefit from their interaction.
53 When examining the policy implementation processes of BSUP in Bangalore, it is clear that civil society organizations were central to helping the state meet policy objectives. These organizations were so central to policy implementation in the city that, according to one activist, “if an NGO was unlikely to cooperate on the [BSUP] scheme, then this particular slum was not likely to be selected for the scheme.”21 Fractured governance structures, poor coordination, a lack of guidance on policy procedures, and the lack of organizational clout of the implementing agencies often stymied efforts to meet policy BSUP goals. For this reason, civil society groups were key in “activating”
(Keck and Abers 2009) the state and helping it to achieve outcomes in slums. The capacity of the state to execute its policy plans (hinging largely on its ability to assuage concerns from slum residents about the policy) often depended on its ability to mobilize the symbolic capital of other actors within the field (mostly civil society groups). While this may be viewed as cooptation of civil society groups by the state, I argue that civil society groups were able to assist the state, but on their own terms. Because nonstate actors have a reputation to uphold in slum communities, their engagement with the state was often mediated by their own organizational needs to sustain (i.e., to be able to continue to work in a community) and be seen as legitimate representatives of slum residents’ interests both within the local field of implementation, but also within the broader civil society field. In this sense, their actions within the policy intervention field are mediated by power dynamics within adjacent fields. While the end result may
21 Personal Interview, Vinay Baindur, May 1, 2014
54 resemble something akin to a “symbiotic state”22 (Clemens 2017), “synergy”, or
“cogovernance”, these cases demonstrate that it is only through a protracted process of conflict between state and society actors that this symbiosis emerges. Further, this process is largely contingent as policy outcomes are shaped by the balance of forces between multiple social fields at a given time.
“Civil” and “Political” Society in India
Because this dissertation focuses on the interactions between state and nonstate actors, it is important to examine the literature on the broader civil society field in India. Several scholars examining the role of civil society in India have attempted to map the divisions within the broader field. In Chatterjee’s (2004) influential work on participation and civic engagement in Calcutta, he finds that elites and middleclass Indians operate as rightsbearing citizens in “civil” society, while the poor largely engage with the state through political parties and officials operating in the “political” society. He argues that elites are viewed by the state as rightsbearing citizens, while the urban poor are seen as
“subjects”, treated as “populations” to be governed through state welfare interventions.
To Chatterjee, “political” society is a space where “the demands of electoral mobilization, on the one hand, and the logic of welfare distribution, on the other, overlapped and came together” (p. 135).
Examining the linkages between state and society actors and the ways in which these connections differentially shape economic processes in Bangalore, Benjamin (2000) finds a similar distinction between elite and poor groups living and operating in the city.
22 According to Clemens’s (2017), “the symbiotic state suggests that state power is often expanded by the appropriation of capacities and resources mobilized elsewhere in society” (p. 52). 55 He argues that elite actors that comprise “corporate” economies engage with the state through a partnership model and deals with highlevel state officials, policymakers, and corporations. “Local” economies, on the other hand, engage primarily with local politicians and have little to no access to elite policy making circles; their inability to penetrate the elite realms of the “corporate” economy leads to various forms of economic, social, and spatial exclusion in the city. This characterization echoes Harriss (2006) who sees civil society in urban India as “distinctly stratified” (p. 445), particularly along class lines as the middle and upper classes engage with state actors via elite civil society organizations, which largely exclude poor groups. Harriss [and Nair (2005) to an extent], however, offers one caveat: the poor engage in social movements often around issues of women’s rights, rights to housing, and informal workers’ rights. Examining processes in
Delhi, Chennai, and Bangalore, Harriss finds that the middle class prefer “rational problem solving rather than democracy” (p. 461) and offers an illustrative quote from an interviewee to support this: “the rich operate while the poor agitate ” (p. 461).23
In their study of civic organizations in Bangalore, however, Kamath and
Vijayabaskar (2014) argue that this characterization of elite versus poor forms of social organization is incomplete. The authors find that the forms of social mobilization as well as the methods of engaging with the state for lower and middle/upper class groups is increasingly converging. In particular, middle class organizations are increasingly engaging with electoral and political processes and actors around key urban issues. For
23 In his article on social mobilization in Indian cities, Harriss (2010) cites Mukhopadhyay (2006) who argues that even the division of JNNURM into two submissionsUrban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) and the Basic Services for the Urban Poordemonstrates a division between the needs of affluent versus poor urban residents (“the rich need infrastructure and the poor need amelioration”) (p. 10).
56 example, to address problems related to urban land, middle class organizations cannot effect change without interacting with statelevel bureaucrats and politicians who exercise some decisionmaking authority over this resource. Any movement for social change around particular issues, therefore, requires new forms of engagement by middle class associations that closely resemble those that haveaccording to the literaturebeen largely relegated to the “political society”.24
Building upon the work of stateinsociety scholarship and social mobilization scholars, I see the role of civil society actors as very much embedded in and interconnected to the work of the state in unique and diverse ways. While several scholars construct a characterization of civil society groups or social mobilization in India as tending to operate through “elite” versus “poor” channels (or “civil” and “political” society), I trace the processes of various groups and find that while there is a tendency to divide the civil society field along similar lines (by those who represent the “authentic” interests of political society versus more elite NGOs), actual practices often overlap and converge [following the work of Kamath and Vijayabaskar (2014)] in unique ways that do not neatly fit into this dichotomy. This is because, in order for civil society actors to
24 During an interview with a key civil society figure in Bangalore, Ashwin Mahesh, he describes this convergence between more elite forms of engagement characteristic of “civil society” and the “local” or “political” realms occupied by politicians and bureaucrats. He describes how: “politics is becoming more local. Earlier, civil society used to claim legitimacy in local issues. I don’t think civil society has any legitimacy in local issues. Only local people have issues, legitimacy. Just because I’m an environmentalist, I don’t get to decide what should happen in a neighborhood on environmental issues. There are people in that neighborhood for that, some of whom are also environmentalists. S o in a way what used to be domainled civil society intervention is now becoming locallyled civil society intervention and therefore it’s actually much more allied to politics. If you don’t listen to me locally, I’ll run for elections. I f all you do is ignore me on domain, there’s not much I can do. So that’s a good thing, local [people] has become the new NGO. People in our neighborhood, everybody. I live in an area, therefore I claim legitimacy to influence things that happen in that area. …The nice thing now is that for the first time the bureaucracy is starting to worry that one day I might be their boss. They have never been confronted by civil society guys who could one day end up as their boss” (Personal Interview, April 28, 2014).
57 meet policy objectives and shape conversations and action around BSUP, they have to pursue multiple channels and adopt a variety of creative strategies. Further, groups must balance their need to appear legitimate within the civil society field with their need to appear legitimate to their constituents by producing outcomes. According to one activist, this balancing act often forces groups to contradict their stated ideologies. He notes how
“sometimes we have to compromise a little bit because if we start opposing everything then the work will never get done.”25 In this sense, the division between “political” and
“civil” society may prove valuable in structuring the boundaries of and divisions within the civil society field, but these categories are less clearly seen in practice as civil society groups realize that policy progress requires engaging with a wide variety of actors and, occasionally, compromising on one’s ideals.
Sociological Theories of Urban Governance
Examining how Indian cities are governed and the ways in which urban policies shape particular forms of governance is of central importance to this study. For some time urban sociologists have studied who governs cities and to what effect. According to Logan and
Molotch (2007), cities are driven primarily by the maximization of exchange value and urban “growth machines”, while Stone (1989) finds that governance occurs through urban governing networks or “coalitions”. Logan and Molotch (2007) examine how diverse groups of actors coalesce primarily around two, contradictory agendas. On the one hand, there is a group of actors that aims to maximize the exchange value of urban space, while another group seeks to preserve the use value of this space. From this
25 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, November 5, 2014 58 approach, state actors often engage with a variety of actors (e.g., businesses, real estate companies, etc.) around the city to promote urban growth and the maximization of urban land values, while other actors (e.g., urban residents, civil society actors, etc.) often push back against the state and attempt to preserve the historical, symbolic, and cultural value of lands. The success of the growth machine often hinges on a coherent state that is able to successfully execute a coordinated development agenda. Examining urban policies in
Atlanta, Stone (1989) argues that governance occurs primarily through diverse networks of actors who are able to coalesce around policies that bring benefits to all those involved. From this approach, the capacity of the state to execute its will often hinges upon its ability to develop governance regimes.
Scholars examining governance in Indian cities have built upon these seminal studies and shown how India’s unique economic and cultural history shapes urban processes that differ from those found in the United States. Building on Stone (1989),
Neha Sami (2013) identifies unique governing coalitions in Pune, India and describes how influential community leaders draw on political and social networks to create effective governing coalitions. She argues that these actors previously played little to no role in urban governance, but have taken advantage of opportunities created by India’s liberalization to shape how cities are developed. Weinstein (2014) notes how fragmented political power contributes to the rise of political entrepreneursin her case a local developer in Mumbaiwho shape governance and development in urban slums, while
Ghertner (2011) notes the power of aesthetic politics in shaping a particular discourse around urban development that is largely elite and exclusionary toward the urban poor.
59 What is consistent in this literature is a discussion about the “contingent” nature of governance and the lack of a coordinated growth regime. Due to the fragmented nature of urban governance in India, elite business groups are not likely to exert a coherent and citywide growth agenda, leading to what Heller, Mukhopadhyay, and Walton (2016) call growth “cabals”; the cabal is effective at the shortterm extraction of rents, but not at the development of a coordinated, citywide growth machine. Because of the fragmented power and opaque governance processes that characterize Indian cities, several scholars argue that Indian cities end up operating largely in the interests of elite actors (Benjamin
2008; Chatterjee 2004) and excluding the poor’s rights to the city (Bhan 2009). What
Heller, Mukhopadhyay, and Walton (2016) argue, however, is that the growth cabal is neither completely exclusionary (with elites completely dominating urban governance) nor inclusionary (because elites still extract rents without improving the infrastructure and overall governance of cities).
I draw on the growing scholarship examining governing processes in urban India, and seek to expand on this literature by unpacking the implementation processes of a federal urban policy in Bangalore. To do so, I adopt a field analysis to trace not only the actors involved in the implementation of the policy and their relations, but also how the broader context of fields influences and shapes these relations.
“The Sociology of Striving”26 in Urban India
Understanding the factors that make institutions so durable and the mechanisms behind their change is a central part of institutional inquiry (Amenta 2005). Some scholars of
26 Martin (2003) 60 political institutionalism emphasize the role of macrolevel political institutions in shaping political interests, identities, actions, and outcomes (Amenta 2005; Skocpol
1985). From this approach, political actors operate under institutional constraints and these constraints strongly influence their ability to influence state policies (Amenta 2005;
Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Skocpol 1985; Streeck and Thelen 2005). When states initiate policy changes or other exogenous shocks occur, opportunities subsequently emerge for political actors to either reinforce the existing institutional structure or press for institutional change (Amenta 2005). While this approach has been critical to understanding the powerful role of state structures in determining political outcomes, other scholars have shifted the focus from structural factors to an analysis of the micro and mesolevel factors of institutional change (Katznelson 2003; Mahoney and
Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2004). By moving from durability to mutability, this scholarship gives primacy to the agency of political actors and elucidates the processes through which these actors can incrementally affect institutional change
(Clemens and Cook 1999; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).
To better understand the mechanisms through which individual and institutional change occurs in societies, a number of scholars conceptualize society as comprised of sociallyconstructed fields (Bourdieu 1996; Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994;
Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Martin 2003). Institutional scholars, in particular, “new institutional” scholars, are concerned with the social processes that lead to the emergence of new institutional orders, the reproduction of existing orders, and the transformation of social order (Fligstein 2001; Powell and
61 DiMaggio 1991). While different scholars use different terms to describe social “field”
(e.g., “organizational fields”, “arenas”, etc.) fields are generally viewed as arenas within which actors negotiate over resources and power. Fields are defined by unequal power relations between actors, a shared understanding about these relations and the broader
“terrain of the field” (Bourdieu 1984; Fligstein and McAdam 2012), and somewhat predictable or widely acknowledged “repertoires of behavior” of actors within the field.
Because fields and institutions are constructed through social interactions, fields are never completely stable and change occurs within fields during moments of crises or drastic change (Bourdieu 1996; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Fligstein 2001). When the resources and/or power of the “incumbent” group is challenged by other actors opportunities emerge for previously inactive (or disenfranchised) groups to contest for power within the field (Fligstein 2001).
While Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of social fields offers greater flexibility for understanding how groups seek to control the social world and shape forms of social action, several scholars have criticized his concept of “fields” and boundaries as still too rigid. Specifically, these scholars argue that Bourdieu’s efforts to capture the dynamic relationship between structure and agency [(a “constructivist structuralism” approach
(Bourdieu 1989, p. 14)] actually reifies essential categories like “the state” and “the economy”, which constitute the powerful “fields” within society (Eyal 2013; McQuade
2016).27 By viewing fields as delineated, autonomous social spaceswhere relations
27 Eyal (2013) goes further in this critique noting a contradiction in Bourdieu’s aims and outcomes: “the irony is that Bourdieu developed the concept of field precisely in order to overcome the limitations of Weberian ideal type methodology...but when it comes to differentiating the fields themselves from one another, he seems to recapitulate Weber’s essentialism” (p. 161).
62 within them are strongly determined by individual habitus , forms of capital, and the broader homology of a fieldthis leaves little room for forms of action that do not occur within fields, or rather, action that occurs between social fields (Eyal 2013; McQuade
2016; Medvetz 2012). Rather than viewing practices that occur in this inbetween space as simply new or emergent fields, Eyal (2013) calls for an approach that takes seriously the
“spaces between fields”, which represent spaces of possibility where “combinations and conversions could be established that are not possible within fields” (p. 178). From this approach, the boundaries of fields constitute meaningful focal points for analysis as important “zone[s] of essential connections and transactions between” fields (p. 162).
According to Stampnitzky (2011), taking seriously these “interstitial spaces” requires scholars to see boundaries as important sites for “hybridization, creolization, and creativity” (p. 3) and not solely objects of rhetorical struggle.
In this study, I follow the work of influential scholars who believe that understanding an organization’s environment and context is critical to understanding power relations between and within groups (Bourdieu 1985; DiMaggio and Powell 1981;
Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott and Meyer 1983, 1994). I map the landscape of social fields that shape BSUP by examining the positions of actors, the logic of fields, and the various struggles that structure this logic. While Bourdieu’s
(1984, 1985) relational theory of social fields offers greater flexibility for understanding how groups struggle to control the social world and shape forms of social action, I extend his theory and draw on the work of others who examine the relations and “spaces between fields” (Eyal 2013; McQuade 2016; Medvetz 2012; Stampnitzky 2011). More
63 specifically, I take seriously not only how various forms of capital shape power relations and practices within fields (e.g., symbolic, political, economic, etc.), but also how relations between fields shape the possibilities for social action. This appreciation for
“interstitial spaces” provides greater flexibility for understanding how and why actors within fields transgress the particular boundaries and homology of a given field.
I adopt a field analysis to explain the relational nature of governance and state capacity as opposed to a network analysis because network analyses tend to map relations between actors without describing the influence of the broader field and the “underlying logic of fields” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). In this study, the context of one field (e.g., the civil society field) strongly shapes how actors interact with other fields, so it is critical not only to map the networks and governing coalitions, but also the divisions that shape actors’ movements within and between fields.
Field analysis offers the flexibility to understand broader contextual factors that shape dynamics between state and nonstate actors as well the relational nature of urban governance in India. By extending Bourdieu’s theory of social fields, I highlight the ways in which state capacity in urban India is achieved through negotiations and struggles between state and nonstate actors whose actions are shaped by the broader context at a given time. In the urban Indian context where power is diffuse and the broader rules of the game are largely unspecified, the ability to successfully mobilize other actors to achieve policy aims is key for success and retaining legitimacy within the broader field.
Conclusion
Drawing on this diverse scholarship, this study seeks to contribute primarily to studies of
64 the state and state capacity as well as the emerging scholarship on urban governance in
India. While theories of state capacity have been instructive for highlighting the important role of the state in shaping development outcomes, the emphasis on Weberian institutional design overlooks the diverse forms of state capacity that exist as well as the ways in which state actors construct capacity to achieve policy aims outside this idealtypical standard. In the Indian case, capacity to execute policy objectives often depends on unique governance arrangements between state and nonstate actors whose roles and terms of engagement are contingent upon the broader field dynamics with the bureaucratic field and the civil society field. In this sense, state capacity is highly relational and depends on the particular balance of social forces at a given time.
In the next chapter, I begin the empirical analysis of this dissertation by exploring how state and nonstate actors seek to shape the policy intervention field in Bangalore. I describe how state and nonstate actors struggle to define the “rules of the game”
(Fligstein 2001) in the local field of implementation. I argue that because the state lacks legitimacy in slum communities, residents and civil society actors frequently challenge the state on basic tenets of the BSUP policy such as the availability of the land and the particular type of housing that should be built for slum residents. For the state to be successful in these cases, it must enroll the assistance of other actors who have the symbolic capital necessary to convince skeptical residents of the value of the scheme. In this sense, state capacity is contingent upon particular constellations of actors operating at the local level.
65
CHAPTER TWO
“THE SOCIAL ASPECTS” DEFINING AND DISPUTING THE FIELD OF POLICY INTERVENTION
“In order for social space to become ordered, actors had to figure out what the space was going to be, what was at stake, who was going to dominate, and how were political coalitions going to be built to construct new rules of the game and define identities” (Fligstein 2014, p. 3).
Introduction
The ability for the state to define the field of policy intervention and effectively implement policies not only requires functional and administrative capacity, a strong bureaucratic ethos, and meaningful linkages to societal actors (Chibber 2002; Evans
1995; Kohli 1989, 2004), but also the legitimacy to execute its policies (Bourdieu et. al.
1994; Bourdieu 2014; Loveman 2005; Mann 1984; Weber 1947). Scholars have examined this question of state legitimacy in various ways, arguing that “infrastructural power” or “reach” (Mann 1984), the power to “dictate the terms of knowledge” (Abrams
1988, p. 62), to impose the “categories of thought” (Bourdieu et. al. 1994, p. 1), and to
“enframe” (Mitchell 1991) the terrain upon which policy struggles take place are equally critical for the state’s ability to execute its will, impose categories, and implement policies (Steinmetz 2008; Weber 1947). To Tilly (1985), legitimacy is defined as “the
66 probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority” ( p.
171 ), and in a policy space like urban India (with fractured forms of authority), the ability to appear as a legitimate authority is crucial for policy success. In the cases where the state’s symbolic power to legitimately pursue policies is widely agreed upon, conflicts between state and societal actors occur “over the mechanics or techniques of state practices” (Loveman 2005, p. 1659). However, in institutional fields that are seen as
“emergent” (Abers and Keck 2013) where the form of symbolic capital and the “criterion of [its] evaluation” (Bourdieu 2000, p. 52) are unsettled, the conflicts are more foundational; the overall legitimacy of the state’s administrative role and boundaries, its claims to knowledge, and forms of power are questioned (Loveman 2005). In these emergent spaces with “limited statehood”28 (Risse 2013) where the state may compete with other forms of legitimacy and power, the state’s “capacity to impose its will”
(Loveman 2005, p. 1662) depends on its successful accumulation of symbolic powers within the broader field.
When attempting to implement the Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) policy in Bangalore, the state engaged in a variety of practices to “enframe” (Mitchell
1991) the broader policy space, but often faced resistance from residents. In Bangalore, numerous projects were stalled or completely abandoned due to residents’ hesitation or
28 Risse (2013) defines “areas of limited statehood” as “those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily. Areas of limited statehood can be parts of the territory (e.g., provinces far away from the national capital), but they can also be policy areas (e.g., the inability to implement and enforce environmental laws). In this understanding, areas of limited statehood are not confined to fragile, failing, or failed states with the latter having completely lost their domestic sovereignty. Rather, this conceptualization implies that even otherwise fully consolidated states might contain areas of limited statehood in which they do not enjoy domestic sovereignty, at least temporarily (New Orleans shortly after the hurricane Katrina being an example)” (p. 80). 67 outright refusal to comply with the state’s requests. The impact of residents’ resistance was deeply felt by bureaucratic actors who nearly always blamed policy failures on “the social aspects” or “social issues” (a euphemism for residents’ resistance to the scheme).
While highly technical development “solutions” often face challenges when encountering the lived experiences and complexity of social life (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004), under
BSUP the symbolic power and broader legitimacy of the state was questioned. Residents, community leaders, politicians, and civil society groups regularly challenged the state’s role as a legitimate actor within the local policy field as well as its claims to dictate “the practices, categories, and cognitive schemes through which the game is understood and experienced” (Loveman 2005, p. 1656). In a field where the rules of the game remain unsettled, how do state and societal actors struggle to impose our particular definition of the field? In turn, how does this shape the particular terms of the policy and the role of the state under BSUP?
In this chapter I focus on the state’s attempts to structure the broader field of intervention in Bangalore and the struggles that emerge as a result. I argue that the challenges faced by the state in attempting to execute its policy objectives under BSUP were largely due to the state’s lack of symbolic power within the policy field. Residents and civil society groups frequently challenged the state’s legitimate claims to knowledge about urban land, its representations of the policy problem (i.e., the proliferation of slums, which is often linked to the “rural” mentality of the urban poor), the policy solution (i.e., multistory, stateconstructed housing and social education for the poor), and its fundamental right to intervene in slum communities that, according to one local
68 activist, “were doing well enough for themselves without the government for donkey’s years”.29
To meet policy objectives, therefore, state actors relied heavily on the symbolic powers and legitimacy of other powerful actors within the policy implementation field
(e.g., slum leaders, politicians, and civil society actors) who often helped the state to convince skeptical and fearful residents to agree to the BSUP scheme in their communities. Loveman (2005) describes this process as the “primitive accumulation” of the state’s symbolic capital, and states accumulate this capital through four main strategies: innovation, imitation, usurpation, or cooptation. While the strategy employed by the state in Bangalore most closely resembles that of cooptationbecause nonstate actors appear to be executing the will of the stateI argue that in the case of BSUP in
Bangalore, the state cannot fully coopt other actors within the field due to the broader power dynamics within the field. In the policy implementation space, civil society groups must also maintain legitimacy with their constituents (i.e., slum residents) and other powerful actors within slum communities (e.g., slum leaders and politicians), so they must balance the needs of the state with the demands of other actors within the broader implementation field. More specifically, civil society groups have to balance the requests from the state with their need to also appear distant from the state as well as other vested interests in the field (i.e., politicians, slum leaders, etc.), lest they be seen by slum residents as engaging in policy practices and collaboration with the state for corruption and rentseeking.
29 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 20, 2014 69 In this sense, the relations between state and nonstate actors could be interpreted as resembling a “symbiotic” (Clemens 2017) or “synergistic” (Evans 1997) relationship as “state power is expanded by the appropriation of capacities and resources mobilized elsewhere in society” (Clemens 2017, p. 52). While these characterizations better approximate the data found in Bangalore, this case demonstrates that while the state may have borrowed or built upon the symbolic capital of other actors within the field, the ability for the state to expand its power and appropriate the capacities of other actors is shaped by dynamics within the broader policy implementation space as well as dynamics within the civil society field itself. In this sense, there may be a mutual benefit that emerges from “statesociety synergy”, but it is only through a lengthy process of negotiation and struggle that these outcomes emerge. Further, these outcomes are highly contingent and depend on the intra and interfield dynamics and balance of social forces at a given moment in time.
Beginning with a discussion of the “social issues” that plagued bureaucrats attempting to implement BSUP, I shift to a discussion about the contentious nature of land in Bangalore. In particular, I explore how the state’s claims to knowledge about land are actively refuted, weakening the state’s ability to legitimately claim a need for particular policy approaches. The next section builds upon the conflicts that emerge over land and examines how this relates to the proposed policy solution under BSUP. The idea of building multistory housing under BSUP is portrayed by the state as the best solution to the problem of urban slums and is connected to ideas about land as well as deeply historical representations of slum communities and the “urban poor”. Despite often living
70 in cities for decades, poor urban residents are still described by the state (and some elite civil society groups) as people with “rural” practices and mentalities, which is then used by certain actors to rationalize the living conditions of the urban poor. Drawing on this representation of slum communities, BSUP is then framed by the state as opportunity to shift this “rural” mentality to an “urban” one through housing and social/educational programs. In an institutional policy context where the state does not retain a monopoly over symbolic violence, various actors compete and negotiate for symbolic capital in the field and the right to shape the future of the urban poor. When the categories and representations that are imposed by the state and its allies do not align with the representations and forms of knowledge privileged in affected communities, this disconnect makes it nearly impossible for the state to implement BSUP projects.
“The Social Aspects”
During her time at the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance
Corporation (KUIDFC),30 Ganga Devi’s official title within the organization was
Manager of Information Systems (MIS) specialist. When we meet to discuss her role in overseeing the implementation of BSUP in Karnataka, she laughs and informs me that her unofficial title within the organization was the manager of BSUP’s “social aspects”.31
30 During the time of our first interview in November 2014, Ganga Devi had recently been transferred from the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) to the Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) within the Government of Karnataka. Under the BSUP scheme, the KUIDFC was designated as the Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA) responsible for overseeing policy processes at the state level. As the state government transitioned from BSUP to the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) scheme (another federal housing scheme to redevelop urban slums), the state of Karnataka decided to shift management of the scheme at the state level from the KUIDFC to the DMA (the rationale behind this decision will be discussed in C hapter Three of this dissertation). At the DMA, Ganga Devi’s role was largely the same as when she was at the KUIDFC.
31 Personal Interview, February 23, 2015
71 To illustrate what she means by “social aspects”, she hands me a document with a bolded heading that reads “BSUP Implementation Delays”. Below this heading are four categories listing reasons for project implementation delays, including: delays in commencement of construction, delays in allotment of dwelling units, delays in completion of infrastructure (e.g., water services, electricity, etc.), and delays in the occupation of BSUP homes or “dwelling units” (DUs). These broader categories for delay were then divided into sitespecific issues, including: litigation over land ownership, lack of permission to construct on certain land, inability to find available land for construction, unwillingness on the part of beneficiaries to vacate existing homes,
32 beneficiaries’ resistance to multistory (or “G+3” ) construction, and refusal on the part of project beneficiaries to pay the required contribution for BSUP homes.33 While officials note that some of these reasons for delay are due to the fragmentation of municipal authority (e.g., delays in completion of infrastructure and allotment of land), institutional multiplicity, and the weak capacity of city governing agencies, officials regularly cited “social aspects”, and specifically, resistance from project beneficiaries, as
32 “G+3” means a fourstory (ground floor plus three additional floors) block construction. Typically, these four story buildings are constructed in blocks with 32 housing units per block (8 dwelling units/floor). The size of units varies, but each unit is supposed to be approximately 27 square meters.
33 According to the BSUP Revised Guidelines released by the Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation “housing should not be provided free to the beneficiaries...A minimum of 12% beneficiary contribution should be stipulated” (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2009a, p. 11). In the case where beneficiaries are members of Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (SC), or Other Backward Castes (OBC), “the contribution should be 10% of the total cost of construction” (p. 11). The beneficiary contribution required for a BSUP housing unit in Bangalore is 18,500Rs (approximately $415 USD in 2011, the time when many projects in Bangalore were being implemented) (Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014; Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014).
72 formidable roadblocks to effective and efficient program implementation. According to
Ganga Devi, “social issues” emerged in nearly every BSUP project in Bangalore:
In most of the slums there were problems. There were so many issues to overcome during the implementation. Under BSUP most of the projects are multistoried. So people [beneficiaries] opposed the multistory buildings, they opposed vacating their huts, they opposed paying the [beneficiary] contribution. Then there are land litigations. People also didn’t agree to shift to the new location because it was far away. There were so many issues.34
References to “social issues” emerged in meetings with several other officials from different agencies involved in the policy’s oversight and implementation in Bangalore.
According to the Technical Director of the main BSUP implementing agency in
Bangalorethe Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB or Slum Board)“the only reasons for project delay were the social issues.”35 Another official within the KUIDFC,
Shalini Karpagam, remarks “the social issues are the key factor...the social, cultural issues are the ones typically which delay these implementations, otherwise building the units is no big deal.”36 Still further, a senior official within the Government of Karnataka
Urban Development Department comments on how “the social aspect is more of a headache. It is more complicated, complex, and it is really a cumbersome process.”37
When asked about implementation processes and challenges, officials involved in overseeing and managing BSUP provided countless examples of the “headaches” that emerged as a result of resistance from project beneficiaries. The issues with project
34 Personal Interview, November 5, 2014
35 Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014
36 Personal Interview, March 31, 2015
37 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department), February 4, 2015 73 beneficiaries were particularly frustrating to some officials given that the structure of the schemewith its multiple layers of oversight and accountability at the local, state, and central levelaimed to eliminate these roadblocks by establishing oversight bodies empowered with the authority to resolve implementation problems. The policy structure of NURM (and its submission BSUP)referred to as “mission mode”not only granted oversight agencies the authority to resolve conflicts between bureaucratic agencies, but also problems with beneficiaries. One official within the KUIDFC describes the “mission mode”38 as an effective structure for resolving issues with beneficiaries:
Slum residents may say ‘we want to stay near this tankbed’, but the tankbed cannot be used for such a purpose. The same with the forest land and even the park land. Under the concerned statutes, their use cannot deviate from the purpose for which they have been earmarked. So the mission mode [of BSUP] takes care of that . As it says in the guidelines, the toolkit, we are not permitted to recommend that site for construction and rehabilitation of slum dwellers. They need to be relocated. The mission mode reduces these issues .39
Despite the purported powers and authority granted to implementation and oversight agencies by the mission mode structure, resistance from project beneficiaries regularly delayed timelines or halted construction altogether, forcing implementing agencies to amend or abandon project plans. Over time, officials became acutely aware that without resident cooperation during all phases of the project’s implementation,
38 “Mission mode” (MM) is a way to describe various development schemes created and managed by the Government of India. According to Routray (2013) this form of centrallysponsored development emerged in the 1980s because the “older ways of doing development were seen as not producing results fast enough, in a timebound fashion” (p. 149). There are numerous schemes in India that operate under this approach, including JNNURM (and its submission BSUP). “Mission mode” implies an organizational structure resembling an idealtypical Weberian bureaucracy in the sense that a MM scheme is characterized by a clearly defined division of labor between implementation and oversight agencies, hierarchical accountability and authority, measurable outcomes, clearly defined goals and objectives (with measurable and trackable outcomes), and predefined (often urgent) timelines.
39 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
74 projects could be temporarily stalled or completely shut down. Effectively addressing these “social issues”, therefore, became critical for implementing agencies in Bangalore.
According to one official, “the cultural, social issues are the key factor. When it comes to how well you manage them, how well you anticipate them, it’s a key factor to success.”40
Yet state officials still struggled to manage and anticipate these issues, which required much more than technical knowledge or bureaucratic capacity. In an institutional context where the terms of policy intervention remained largely contested by multiple actors, the state’s ability to effectively manage these “social issues” required that it first gain the legitimacy to define and intervene in this field. Under BSUP, the state attempts to define and impose a “symbolic order” within the local field and thereby “constitute itself as a powerful agent within this field” (Savage 2011, p. 516), but to do so it must enroll the assistance of other actors who are seen as having particular forms of capital within the local implementation field.
To illustrate this argument, I now turn to a discussion of the contested knowledge surrounding urban land in Bangalore. In this section, I outline how the state’s narratives about land are actively contested by other actors in the field who do not see the state as the sole holder of this form of informational capital.
Constructing and Contesting Knowledge about Urban Land
Despite the fact that land is “the primary piece on which the whole [BSUP] project runs”,
41 there is little consensus about how much land there is in Bangalore and who owns it.
40 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
41 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department), March 18, 2015 75 For bureaucratic agencies attempting to implement urban development programs, knowledge about land, and the ability to be seen as the uncontested holder of informational capital about land, is crucial for effective planning and management of urban space. However, basic land management in Bangalore, like many Indian cities, is fraught with complications, including: poor land ownership records, corruption, unclear laws for land title documentation, competing claims to land ownership (often resulting in litigation over land ownership), and fractured management of urban lands (Azim Premji
University and World Bank 2014; Goldman 2011; McKinsey and Company 2010; Nair
2005). According to a recent report on Karnataka’s land records and planning, “land records, land use and planning are in a state of disarray and in need of urgent corrective actions” (Azim Premji University and World Bank 2014, p. 1). The report goes on to describe how “the extent of public land shown in government records may not reflect the ground reality as the records are not regularly and properly updated ” (p. 10, emphasis added). The confusion over land and the challenges it represents for effective urban planning were particularly frustrating to a local political figure and activist, Dr. Ashwin
Mahesh, who described the state of land titling in the city as “pathetic”:
Land title and records are completely pathetic. I can still sell your house without your knowledge. That should be nearly impossible. No, I’m saying the government doesn’t actually see that as a problem because the government says I’m not really authenticating ownership, I’m only registering a transaction. So I can go sell your house to somebody, collect some amount of money, pay a certain amount as a transaction fee, [and] we’re both happy. How can you allow that? How can you allow a transacting environment in which ownership is not anchored . And that is problem number one; land records and title are pathetic.42
42 Personal Interview, April 28, 2014
76 Mahesh’s characterization of the broader implementation field as unanchored raises a critical question related to the capacity of the state to effectively define and intervene in the local urban policy field. In an unanchored institutional environment, how does the state attempt to monopolize certain forms of informational and symbolic capital that are necessary to legitimately execute its will within this urban policy field?
To address the “pathetic” state of land records, the Government of Karnataka has recently introduced a variety of programs and policies. One such effortthe Bhoomi program43was initiated by the Government of Karnataka in the early 2000s to simplify, digitize, and improve the land titling process and land records throughout the state. While the merits of this program are debatable—with some claiming these programs are simply an effort by the state to eliminate the rights of the poor to make claims to urban land and negotiate their rights to the city (Benjamin and Raman 2011)—it represents efforts on the part of the state to reduce competing claims to knowledge about land. Through Bhoomi , the state seeks to elevate its status within the broader urban policy field by becoming an
“obligatory passage point” (Callon 1986) through which knowledge and inquiries about land in the city must travel. Questions around land ownership and the development of urban lands, therefore, are streamlined with the state dictating the “rules of the game” that other actors must follow in order to compete.
Despite these efforts, the Bhoomi program has not been immune to conflict due to the ways in which data on land was collected and organized in the official database.
According to a recent report by Azim Premji University and the World Bank (2014) “one
43 B hoomi m eans “land” in Kannada (the predominant dialect in the state of Karnataka).
77 weakness of the Bhoomi program is that the manual records were digitized without first determining whether these records reflected the actual details of the land parcel or not. As a result, the data in Bhoomi may not reflect the true situation on the ground ” (p. 14, emphasis added). It is hard to imagine how this program could be celebrated at allthe report also notes that “Karnataka is one of the few states to have made r emarkable progress in the computerization of land records” (p. 30, emphasis added)given that the
Bhoomi database’s key weakness fuels the same kinds of disputes and competing claims over knowledge about land that existed prior to the program’s inception.
While Bhoomi represents part of a larger, statewide effort to aggregate knowledge about land (separate from the NURM/BSUP scheme that is the focus of this dissertation), under the NURM policy specifically, participating cities were similarly required to document the existing state of land in the city through City Development Plans (CDPs).
According to the official NURM Toolkit, the CDP was to serve as the foundation upon which urban development decisions under the scheme were made; projects that were proposed by implementing agencies were required to demonstrate their integration into the broader plans outlined in the CDP (Government of India Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005). The CDPs were supposed to include a variety of specifications about land in the city:
[A CDP should] specifically deal with the availability of land and land use organization. It should indicate the total land availability, allocation of land for different uses and purposes, whether it has been done on the basis of certain identified principles, and the consistency with the broader economic and infrastructural base of the city. The analysis should contain an assessment of the adequacy of land availability and focus on the role of legal and statutory provisions [e.g., the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976] in making land available in the market. It contains a survey and delineation of areas and
78 infrastructure that are in need of renewal, by establishing criteria for identification of renewal areas (Meshram 2006, p. 7).
While cities already engage in the practice of regularly creating regional development plans (or “Master Plans”), the CDP was envisioned to be a cityspecific document and a plan for how to manage urban land and projects proposed under JNNURM.
CDPs and city Master Plans represent additional efforts on the part of the state to claim legitimacy over knowledge about land in the city, but like Bhoomi , these plans have been heavily criticized. In the Bangalore Metropolitan Region Revised Structure Plan for
2031 (Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority and Groupe SCE India
2015), the authors raise several issues related to Master Plans and CDPs:
State [land] holdings are ineffectively protected whereas most of the other types of ownerships get mutated or are otherwise in dispute. This makes the official land registry and cadastres unreliable and often redundant as reference points for development. …Therefore, access to land for development… through lucid Development Plans offers a base on existing and future use of land with or without clear titles. Currently in Karnataka this exercise through Master Plans and ODP’S [Outline Development Plans]/CDP’s [City Development Plans] is weak and time consuming. It enables various sectoral areas of the government to function outside the process; its clauses for appeal are liberal and subject to misuse; and development control rules are ambiguous and overlap with byelaws [ sic ] and are therefore easily violates [ sic ] . Worse still, deterrent penalties for misuse hardly exist and coordination between Development Authorities and Local Bodies is yet weak (p. 189, emphasis added).
Like Bhoomi , the state attempted to anchor the institutional urban governance environment by creating and distributing knowledge about land through official plans and documents and then using these documents as the basis for urban interventions. However, the foundation upon which this knowledge was based is weak, impacting the state’s ability to accumulate the legitimacy necessary to be the uncontested authority over decisions about urban land. Because of this, other actors within the field regularly refute
79 the state’s claims to knowledge about urban land under BSUP, impacting the state’s capacity to execute policies and creating numerous implementation problems.
The disconnected nature of land management in Bangalore is further complicated by the fact that numerous actors often make claims to ownership with various forms of title, which are often difficult to trace and definitively prove. In her study on Bangalore’s development history, Nair (2005) describes the contemporary proliferation of “ilegible” titles in the city. As well, the report on land management in Karnataka describes how
“fraudulent duplicate and overlapping land titles continue to dog the system, especially in urban areas, leading to conflicts and litigation in private land and unabated grabbing of public land” (Azim Premji University and World Bank 2014, p. 20).
The opaque nature of land management in the city means that state actors often have to engage in cumbersome and multistaged negotiations with various landowners and state agencies to obtain knowledge about and access to lands for urban development.
According to one official within the Government of Karnataka, the “tools of handling land are what you call disconnected. So we have to motivate this guy, and this guy, and motivate another man and then it finally happens. ...So it’s like we’re still learning the ropes and we don’t have that capacity.”44 A midlevel official from the Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation (KUIDFC)the statelevel agency responsible for overseeing the implementation of BSUP in the state of
Karnatakaexplained how these “disconnected tools” fuel fraudulent claims to land that are difficult to trace. Describing land negotiations for a BSUP project, she recounts “in all
44 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department), March 18, 2015
80 probability we suspect that the guy who got compensation [for land to build BSUP homes] did not even own the land, he just faked the papers. But then there are no papers available and nobody to contest, so he got compensation of a few crores.”45 In a field where knowledge about land is actively contested by multiple actors, a gap between the
“knowability” (i.e., localized forms of knowledge) and “formal knowledge systems”
(Nair 2013, p. 54) of the urban space emerges. Despite attempts to trace and map land via efforts like Bhoomi, Master Plans, and CDPs, in a context where the state’s knowledge does not conform to other forms of knowledge about land within the city, the “map is not the territory” (Nair 2005, p. 177). When this occurs, “knowledge of the gulf between the map and the territory has become a form of property itself” (2005, p. 177); the state’s ability to monopolize this property is a necessary precondition for its ability to shape the broader policy intervention field.
The case of land in Bangalore resonates with arguments about the symbolic powers of the state and how this impacts the state’s ability to “dictate the terms of knowledge” (Abrams 1988, p. 62). The ability to deploy knowledge about land in the policy implementation field serves as an important form of capital (Bourdieu et. al. 1994;
Bourdieu 2014), allowing actors to shape not only the symbolic dimensions of the urban, but also the material space of the city (Gans 2002; Gieryn 2000). In this sense, this research expands upon the work of influential urban scholars who have examined how a society’s economic mode of production shapes urban processes and politics (Logan and
Molotch 2007; Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997) by articulating the “double state
45 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
81 structuring” (Bourdieu 2005; Wacquant 2008, p. 202) that occurs as the state seeks to structure both the economic and social parameters of the local urban field. Because the accumulation of informational and symbolic capital is essential for the effective accumulation of economic capital by the state, any attempt to shape the economic future of Bangalore requires the state be seen as legitimately able to shape the terms of the policy intervention. In this sense, understandings of urban land or place cannot be understood as separate from the symbolic work of the state (Gans 2002; Lefebvre 1974).
In the next section of this chapter, I outline how the state seeks to construct knowledge about land availability in Bangalore as a means to justify particular policy interventions and housing construction for the BSUP scheme. Given the unsettled nature of knowledge in the urban setting, however, civil society groups regularly disagree with the state’s claims and offer competing knowledge claims which are then used to launch attacks against the state’s policies. The conflicts that emerge around the amount of land in
Bangalore, in particular, shape the state’s ability to effectively convince residents of the benefits of BSUP housing.
The “SoCalled Space Crunch”46 of Urban Land
Unlike other Indian cities like Mumbai and Chennai (which have natural boundaries that restrict urban growth), Bangalore has continued to expand its “porous boundaries” without much restriction (Goldman 2011; Nair 2005). According to the Bangalore
Development Authority’s (BDA) 2015 Master Plan (2007), between 1983 and 1990, the total area of the city went from 202 km 2 to 284 km 2. However, in the early 21st century,
46 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014 82 the city began to grow more rapidly, and between 1991 and 2003 the size of the city doubled, totaling 565 km 2, with current estimates around 696 km 2 (Goldman 2011).
According to the BDA, “this is a considerably significant growth rate and is the highest in the country. In the absence of a defined natural boundary , the city has spread in all directions and along the major roads” (Bangalore Development Authority 2007, p. 11, emphasis added). This growth rate is only expected to continue in the coming decades, with “ambitions to expand to 7,000 km 2 over the next few decades” largely to accommodate urban development projects like massive IT parks and economic corridors that aim to link important economic spaces (Goldman 2011, p. 557).
Despite the projected growth of the city and the absence of natural boundaries to confine growth, city officials and policy documents constantly refer to the scarcity of available lands when discussing BSUP in Bangalore. In the BSUP City Development
Plan for Bangalore (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike and Urban Systems Private
2009), for example, land is described as “absolutely scarce today in Bangalore” (p. 30). A report from the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority and Groupe
SEC India (2015) echos these claims (and simultaneously seeks to refute competing claims) about land in the Bangalore region: “contrary to popular perception, land is a scarce resource. ...As population grows, access to land gets scarcer and more competitive” (p. 188). Land scarcity in Bangalore is also frequently discussed by government officialsfrom the state level and municipal levelsinvolved in the implementation of BSUP and similar housing policies in the city. A senior official at the
Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) (a statelevel organization responsible
83 for overseeing a federal slum housing scheme that emerged after BSUP, the Rajiv Awas
Yojana scheme) described how land scarcity greatly shapes the work of the state when attempting to implement BSUP: “one major challenge with BSUP was land availability.
Land ownership and land availability for these kinds of programs are constant challenges.”47 Another official within the municipal governmentthe Bruhat Bengaluru
Mahanagara Palikeoffers similar remarks:
Finding space is another problem in the city, getting our own space. There is no land available. …Some people, you know, they are very possessive about the land. ...They want to, you know, [to] have a house of their own. They don’t want three floors or four floors, whatever. NURM policy says homes must be a minimum G+3 [construction] to economize the land. Land in urban areas is very scarce , very calculable, very expensive, very difficult to get. ...Even shifting them [the urban poor] to a nearby location, there is no empty location. They require some kind of space. These are the challenges that we are facing.48
While references to the lack of land in the city emerged during numerous conversations with state officials about BSUP projects, the uncertain and contested nature of land and land records within the city makes it difficult to accurately assess the availability of land and the degree of land “scarcity”. According to Nair (2005), claims about scarcity or availability are difficult given the fact that “there was, and indeed continues to be, no agreement on the number of layouts, sites, or vacant lands in the jurisdiction of the BDA
[Bangalore Development Authority]” (p. 179).
One could argue that in a city as large as Bangalorewith numerous agencies involved in city governance and planningit is unfair to expect these agencies to be able to accurately speak on the status of all lands in the city. However, even in cases where
47 Personal Interview, Balakrishan Prasad Mutupuru, October 17, 2014
48 Personal Interview, , K.R. Niranjan, September 26, 2014
84 government agencies are asked to account for and manage lands within their departments or agencies, they are frequently unable to do so. A scholar from a prominent
Bangalorebased think tankthe Bangalore Public Affairs Centrenotes how “the ULBs
[the Urban Local Bodies/municipal government], they don’t even have a record of how much land they have, what assets they have.”49 Despite the fact that the large majority of formally authorized (i.e., “declared” slums50) slums in Bangalore are located on government landswith 21 out of 169 located on private lands (Bangalore Bruhat
Mahanagara Palike and Urban Systems Private 2009, p. 30)the government agencies responsible for slum management (the municipal corporation and the Slum Board) lack comprehensive land records to effectively implement upgrading or slum development policies in these areas.51
Narratives of scarcity are further complicated by official documents of current land use in Bangalore. Due to the sheer size of the city, the total density of Bangalore is quite low when compared to other Indian cities (at 107 persons/Ha) (Bangalore
49 Personal Interview, Kala Sridhar, July 10, 2012
50 A slum that is “declared” has gone through the formal process of declaration by the Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB or Slum Board). The process is as follows: the community requests a formal review by the Slum Board to become a declared slum; the Slum Board conducts a socioeconomic survey of the slum and a land assessment to determine size and ownership of land; the Slum Board then forwards the request to the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner of the Slum Board for final approval. According to the KSDB website, there are currently 597 slums in Bangalore, of which 387 are declared (Karnataka Slum Development Board, n.d.a). When a slum is formally “declared” the Slum Board becomes responsible for providing basic infrastructure and services in this location (which includes the implementation of schemes like BSUP in these slum areas). If a slum is “declared” that does not necessarily mean that slum residents receive title to the lands upon which they reside, and the Slum Board has the discretion to determine whether residents receive land rights. Slums that are “nonnotified” or not “declared” are the responsibility of the municipal government, the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) (Karnataka Slum Development Board, n.d.a; Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 2, 2014; Personal Interview Issac Amrutharaj, November 5, 2014).
51 Personal Interview, Ravi Kumar, December 2, 2014
85 Development Authority 2007). When density is calculated solely for residential areas of the city, this number increases to 300 persons/Ha, attributable both to the high rate of land utilization in the residential areas and the amount of “large vacant public lands in the city” (2007, p. 12). In 2003, there was 187.72 km 2 of vacant land in the city, and an additional 35.26 km 2 of land that was “unclassified” by the Bangalore Development
Authority (BDA) (after accounting for residential, commercial, industrial, open spaces, public and semipublic uses, public utilities, offices and services, and transport and communication). While the BDA does not describe what “vacant” means or where this land is located (in many cases it could be on the outskirts of the city), it fuels questions and debates regarding the oftcited “scarcity” of land in the city. If these plots are vacant and the BDA and other governing bodies have the power to acquire additional landswhich they often do in the name of building more urban housing, particularly for middleincome groups52this leads many activists and other civil society actors working with slum communities to question why urban officials constantly cite the scarcity of lands in the city when discussing housing for the urban poor.
Citing data provided by the BDA and anecdotal evidencewith one activist telling me to “simply look at the satellite maps”53 to see all the vacant lands in the cityactivists and civil society leaders in the city claim that the scarcity of land is “pure fiction”.54
During an NGO consultation meeting about BSUP in November 2006, Anita Reddythe director of a prominent Bangalorebased NGO, the Association for Voluntary Action and
52 Personal Interview, Ashwin Mahesh, April 28, 2014
53 Personal Interview, Vinay Baindur, May 1, 2014
54 Personal Interview, Rajendran Prabhakar, June 22, 2014 86 Service (AVAS) remarked that the “myth” of scarcity was fueled by the government’s lack of transparency around land. She described how “land was at the core of the slum problem. Nonavailability of land was a myth and can be overcome only when information on land owned by municipalities was made transparent” (Bruhat Bengaluru
Mahanagara Palike and Urban Systems Private 2009, p. 5). Other activists claim that this myth is part of a larger strategy of the state under BSUP to relocate slum residents off of valuable lands and to justify particular forms of housing construction. One activist working in slums remarks how:
The “slum free city” [policy] is a verticalization of marginalized communities. …How invisibilization is done is by verticalizing their [the urban poor] existence by building multistoried things in a very small area. The artificial scarcity of land that justifies the multistory buildings is aided by the rulers, governor, planners, and things. See, the invisibilization of poverty and the urban poor is a strategy in itself.55
Another activist working with slum communities echoes these ideas:
90% of the land is being encroached upon by all the real estate agents, you have big multinational corporations, all the big corporate houses are sitting on excess lands, including Tatas, Reliance, everyone possible. There is nothing to take that land away from them. So then you create a socalled space crunch and then you invent multistory buildings [for the poor] as being the only option . That is broadly at least how the entire multistory structures came in over there. Bangalore doesn’t need multistory structures.56
The official framing of land as a scarce resource by the state is actively refuted by those who live in and work with slum communities. Despite the claims on the part of the state that scarcity requires specific policy practices, other actors within the field do not accept the state as the legitimate holder of knowledge about land and refute the state’s claims.
55 Personal Interview, Rajendran Prabhakar, June 22, 2014
56 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014 87 According to a scholar of urban governance in India, competing legitimacies are common in urban India and force state agencies to enroll the assistance of other actors to confirm the state’s perspective and its overall legitimacy:
How do you decide that this fellow is a legitimate person? What kind of documents would be necessary? Is the government missionary capable of identifying? The government will say ‘oh we will do it through a slum survey!’ Now, if you send a researcher like me to the field to find out, does my word have any validity? You have to do this survey not by researchers, but by combining some civil society, some government official, some municipal corporation. When all three people sign off and say ‘yes, this fellow is legitimate’, then this will be resolved.57
In this sense, the state’s legitimacy hinges on agreement between several actors because the state lacks a monopoly over the symbolic capital in the field. Because there is no shared agreement as to the legitimate authority regarding land ownership, struggles emerge between the state, project beneficiaries, and civil society groups who have competing understandings of “the terrain upon which such struggles take place”
(Loveman 2005, p. 1656). This raises important questions about the state and state capacity in India: how can the state intervene in slum communities through policies like
BSUP when the fundamental terms and object of intervention are unsettled? When the state lacks the symbolic capital or legitimacy to intervene, what strategies does it adopt to shape the implementation field so that it can then successfully intervene? In this sense, this demonstrates the value of the symbolic dimensions of state capacity (as opposed to simply institutional structures or bureaucratic autonomy). Without a monopoly over the symbolic capital within a policy space, the state must engage in important symbolic work
57 Personal Interview, Amitabh Kundu, February, 13, 2014 88 to shape the broader field of intervention before it can have a coordinated development effort.
In the next section of this paper, I describe how notions of land scarcity are used to justify specific solutions to the problem of urban slums and promote the state’s borrowing of the “Bombay model” for urban housing for the poor. By portraying land as scarce and in need of efficient use and management, the state can present the idea of multistory housing as the only viable option to redevelop slums in Bangalore as well as its broader need to intervene in these communities. However, slum communities and civil society groups often resist these proposed narratives and policy solutions, claiming that multistory construction is both foreign to the urban context and unnecessary for the state to undertake. In this sense, conflicts are not only about the symbolic dimensions of the state’s proposed intervention strategies, but also over the “what counts as legitimate state practice” and the “boundaries of the state’s administrative reach” (Loveman 2005, p.
1659).
The “Bombay Model” and the Boundaries of State Reach
When examining BSUP policy processes in Bangalore, one becomes intimately familiar with the term “G+3”. Used to describe a fourstory building, typically housing 32 dwelling units per building, “G+3” frustrates bureaucrats, residents, and activists alike.
When asked for the reasons behind the resistance to the policy in Bangalore, “G+3” is
58 commonly invoked as a primary reason for residents’ refusal of BSUP homes. The
58 Meeting minutes from the StateLevel Empowered Committee (SLEC) in Karnataka (the agency responsible for monitoring policy progress and resolving issues that emerge in the policy’s implementation) describe the issues associated with G+3 on several occasions. In October 2009, the meeting minutes describe: “the inhabitant slum dwellers are objecting to the construction of G+3 buildings which is approved by JNNURM” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2009b). In 89 refusal on the part of residents is motivated by many factors. Multistory buildings eliminate the potential for families to expand their homes if their families grow, it creates concerns over property (e.g., an auto rickshaw driver may not want to be on the fourth floor of a building away from his rickshaw for fears it may be stolen), and it raises concerns about disrupting community dynamics by placing previously segregated groups in the same housing unit.59
Activists agree with many of the concerns expressed by slum residents, but also argue that the “Bombay model” should be refused because it is foreign to the Bangalore context. To activists, the G+3 model for housing is a replication of the “Bombay model”or slum rehabilitation scheme (SRS)originally proposed in the mid 1990s in
Mumbai (Mukhija 2003; Weinstein 2014). Under this model, the government attempts to incentivize publicprivate partnerships (PPP) in the development of housing for the urban poor. To incentivize private builders, land would be provided to them, upon which they could use part to construct multistory units for slum residents living on the property. The government would then lease the remaining land to the private builder who was free to construct commercial buildings, highrise housing, etc. As outlined in the JNNURM
Bangalore City Development Plan (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike and Urban
Systems Private 2009) “this model would ensure high quality construction for the households and provide the right type of incentive to recover the capital and part of the
July 2010, meeting minutes from the SLEC state “the KCSB expressed that the above slum dwellers are not accepting the construction of DUs in G+3 model and not cooperating with the Board in this regard” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2010a).
59 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
90 operation and maintenance costs (for the first five years) by commercial exploitation of the adjoining land” (p. 30).
The “Bombay model” of multistory housing is seen by many activists working in slums as a onesizefitsall approach that does not match the history and landscape of
Bangalore. One activist remarked, “now Mumbai, they have created one model and they project that this is good for all slum people. This is wrong. ...Because the Mumbai folks have agreed, now they are pressurizing us for multistoried [housing]”.60 Another activist describes this concept of housing as “alien”:
The concept of multistory constructions in slums is an alien concept in that sense . Except for a few housing projects that were there in the 80s for socalled economically weaker sections of the BBMP and the BDA, you will not find any multistoried structures anywhere else. It’s something that we have imported from Bombay. Bombay is a very different context.61
These strong negative feelings about the “Bombay model” are particularly acute due to the program’s association with the recent forced eviction and demolition of the Ejipura slum community. In 2013, the municipal government razed an entire community of 1,512 homes as the result of a “Bombay model”type project. In this case, the municipal government (the BBMP) entered into a publicprivate partnership with Maverick
Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and, in exchange for building housing units for residents, Maverick received 50% of the 15.64 available acres of land. Residents were then to be shifted into multistory units on a much smaller plot of land adjacent to the new development
60 Personal Interview, Anonymous Bangalorebased Activist, March 5, 2015
61 Personal Interview, Anonymous Bangalorebased Activist, December 4, 2015
91 (Housing and Land Rights Network and People’s Union for Civil Liberties 2013).62 When discussing their fears of BSUP and multistory construction, residents living in several communities impacted by BSUP referred to the Ejipura case and their fear that the
63 government was going to demolish their community and “grab” the land. According to the Chief Technical Officer for the Slum Board, Sannah Chittaiah, refusal to vacate lands on the part of slum residents was common and usually tied to the fear that the state would take their land and offer no alternative: “no dwellers have agreed to vacate with the fear
[that] we are grabbing the land.”64
The state’s justification for this type of housing construction is primarily linked to its narrative about land scarcity in the city and its broader mandate to actively ensure that urban lands are used in the most efficient manner possible. According to the Bangalore
Development Authority’s 2015 Master Plan (2007), the role of the government is to foster dense development and the “optimal utilization of land” when it comes to all forms of housing, but particularly for housing the urban poor who should be shifted from “plotted housing to group housing” and “with multistoried housing the preferred option” (p.
62 The report provides an update on the status of families that were evicted as a result of this project. According to the authors “of the total 1,200 tenant families living in the tin sheds, 900 families have been promised alternative accommodation in Sulekunte Village near Sarjapur, 18 kilometres from the city. The Karnataka Slum Development Board is supposed to build apartments for them in a fiveacre plot there but this will be completed only after twothree years. Until then, the evicted families are not being given any compensation or resettlement by the state or the builder. Sulekunte is far away from the residents’ places of work. They would need to spend large amounts of their income daily to commute to the city” (Housing and Land Rights Network and People’s Union for Civil Liberties 2013, p. v.).
63 When discussing their initial fears of BSUP, residents living in several communities referred to the Ejipura case and their general fears that the government was going to demolish their slum and “grab” the land (Byrasandra Focus Group, Bangalore, November 24, 2014; Hakki Pikki Focus Group, Bangalore, March 20, 2015; Deshyanagar Focus Group, Bangalore, March 2, 2015; Pantharapallya Focus Group, Bangalore, October 20, 2014).
64 Personal Interview, December 1, 2014
92 33–34). This is echoed in meeting minutes from the 20th meeting of the Statelevel
Empowered Committee for BSUP from September 2011, where multistory units are referred to as the only option for housing the poor in a place like Bangalore with scarce lands: “the Committee opined that due to scarcity of land and increasingly complex procedure for land acquisition of available land is difficult, vertical development is the only alternative for cities especially in Bangalore” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation 2011, emphasis added). Efficient use of land also encourages greater financialization of urban space. According to the Bangalore
Development Authority, “the concept of land as a resource would be adopted to develop such accommodation with private sector participation and investment to the extent possible” (Bangalore Development Authority 2007, p. 34). The narrative about scarcity as well as the prominent role of the state in determining the future of urban land
(particularly land in urban slums) was underscored in official reports.
Bringing the “Bombay model” to Bangalore, therefore, was justified by state actors in myriad ways. It was seen as a method of alleviating pressures on scarce land, encouraging investment, and also freeing up additional land for slum residents. A senior official in the Government of Karnataka’s Urban Development Department (UDD) describes how this thinking informs the UDD’s approach to housing under BSUP:
The general unwritten, unstated policy is that we go in for G+3, ground plus three. …Whenever [land] rights are not given we are pushing for ground plus three because that means a larger number in a building can be accommodated, they can get more open space, and you get more open space to build.65
65 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department), April 1, 2014
93 However, one activist, Clifton D’Rozario, argues against the purported benefits of this approach when describing the situation in the Deshyanagar BSUP project near Frazer
Town in northern Bangalore:
It’s almost like the state is saying, you [slum residents] actually don’t deserve anything. So we are going to take this land, we will fit you in one part of it, the remaining part we will do what we want, and that is—that seems to be what they are doing, and it’s not going to work. If you build houses like this, it’s really not going to work. If you look at even BSUP, for instance, even that one near Frazer Town, the police station, there is that bridge and they have literally been thrown to the streets. So you go there every evening, people are on the streets over there. There is no space at all, whatever common spaces were there, they have gone. The way it used to be was fantastic, they had a sitout in the middle of the slum. …Previously that slum had nice open space; you had a place where people used to sit together. It was really incredible the kind of social space itself that was—now they have destroyed it. They have built these dingy little places, you can’t go there—you can’t live in those places, it’s almost inhabitable—uninhabitable rather. So they have done this in the name of providing housing, and this is what is being pushed [onto residents].66
Because I only visited and interviewed the community postBSUP construction and could not obtain documents or photos of the community’s preconstruction state, I could not entirely confirm D’Rozario’s statements as to how much space used to be available.
However, during visits to the community, there were several temporary shelters erected adjacent to the more permanent BSUP structures (due to lack of space to build structures for all the residents) and the space for residents outside of the constructed units was restricted due to the community’s close proximity to two busy thoroughfares (see Figure
2.1 below). As well, a study examining the impact of the “Bombay model” on slum communities echoes the general sentiment expressed by D’Rozario, arguing that the amount of land available for slum communities after the construction of Bombaystyle
66 Personal Interview, November 10, 2014
94 housing is often significantly reduced due to developer’s desire to maximize the
“exchange value” (Logan and Molotch 2007) of lands in the area (Housing and Land
Rights Network and People’s Union for Civil Liberties 2013).
Figure 2.1: BSUP Project Location (Deshyanagar Community)
95 Given Bangalore’s projected urban growth, the state’s motivation for building dense, multistory housing follows contemporary urban development practices, even if it is seen as foreign by some in Bangalore. Despite this, these projects were often resisted by residents and civil society groups who contested both the state’s informational basis for this policy approach (i.e., scarce lands) as well as the state’s overall role in determining the future of land in slum communities. According to several activists working in slums, the state should play no role in housing the urban poor. Rajendran
Prabhakar remarks:
Once the government gives them [slum residents] a piece of land for themselves, they will build their houses. The government does not need to give money or loans to build homes. People will build their own homes. Most of the homes that you see [in slums] were built by the people themselves. ...Every family has a dream of their house. They have their own view of their home and they commit everything, all their resources, to build their homes. So the single most important thing that the government can do is just give them their parcel of land and their title and they will build their homes.67
This was echoed by several other activists working in slums who provided similar remarks like “let the family build a first floor, or a second floor, why should we give it to a stranger or a third party? ...The state does not have to go and take loans from some bank and do whatever drama to come and build, you know, multistoried buildings over here.
You give the land to the people and they will do what they want with it.”68. As well, according to another activist working in slums, the state should not directly intervene in land development because the “government is just a custodian of these lands.”69 Another
67 Personal Interview, September 16, 2014
68 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014
69 Personal Interview, Malarvizhi M., March 17, 2015
96 activist describes how the role of the state in producing housing (particularly for the urban poor) is a recent invention [emerging in the 1980s as central schemes emerged to solve the issue of housing for the poor (Routray 2013)] and largely unnecessary:
Now, the interventions of the janaseva 70 have been brought the people to a state of begging by these schemes like BSUP, RAY, and other Yojanas. ‘We cannot build these homes, so the government has to build it for us.’ This is what the government thinks of the poor. It is a statement that represents the social injustice done to the powerless. What our ideal is, the dream that we are working towards is to create choices, create options. Build people’s capacity so that people can build their own houses. You don’t have to go to the government, and the government doesn’t have to build 200 matchbox kind of houses on nine floors. We don’t want such housing, we are completely capable of imagining our houses, imagining how our houses should be, how it should be constructed. So don’t sort of beg and don’t impose this scheme on us saying that ‘you are poor and so you deserve to live 20kms away from the city in nine story buildings.’ We don’t want that. There is no dignity in that.71
Not only do these communities and civil society actors refute the state’s claims that land is scarce in the city (and that multistory housing is the best option due to this scarcity), but they also actively challenge the state’s “reach” (Mann 1984) into the lives of slum communities. In institutional environments where the “rules of the game”
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012) are not completely settled, the state’s legitimate claims to enact particular policies and execute administrative duties are actively challenged by other actors within the broader field. In the case of BSUP, residents and activists frequently challenged the state’s engagement in slum communities, and, according to one activist, “where people have been able to put their foot down, they [the Slum Board] have
70 J anaseva is a phrase in Kannada (the primary language of the state of Karnataka) that translates to “public services.”
71 Personal Interview, Narasimha Murthi, March 11, 2015
97 not gone for multistoried. They’ve had to scrap so many projects because of that.”72
Remarking on the widespread resistance to multistory construction, the Director of a prominent civil society group in Bangalore called Action Aid, remarks how it is strange that the Slum Board still relies on this model for housing development “because there has been a lot of struggle against it. Given a chance, they [the Slum Board] would prefer the
‘Bombay model’, but there has been so much articulation against it, and protests and all kinds of things, petitions and protests.”73
The resistance to the BSUP schemeor, as bureaucrats like to call it, the “social aspects”has created so many issues for agencies involved in the implementation of
BSUP that state actors changed their approach under the Rajiv Awas Yojana scheme
(RAY).74 Despite the claims that multistory housing units were the only option for housing the urban poor, under the RAY scheme, implementing agencies have decided to pursue singlefamily homes whenever possible to reduce the resistance from beneficiaries. According to Ganga Devi, an official responsible for overseeing BSUP as well as RAY in Bangalore:
So initially when BSUP came, the Slum Board was very inexperienced and they took up multistoried projects. Under RAY they learned that it is very highly difficult to vacate slum residents because of all the issues like land litigations and others. So they learned many lessons, then they changed their perception, and then they preferred constructing individual houses. Under RAY most of the
72 Personal Interview, Malarvizhi M., March 17, 2015
73 Personal Interview, Kshithij Urs, March 3, 2015
74 A federal housing scheme that emerged after BSUP, but with similar aims to redevelop urban slums. According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (n.d.), RAY envisages a “Slum Free India” with inclusive and equitable cities in which every citizen has access to basic civic infrastructure and social amenities and decent shelter.” The scheme is similar to BSUP in the sense that it is a “mission mode” scheme with funding provided by the Centre to states and cities who are responsible for implementing the scheme.
98 houses are individual houses, most of the houses are in situ , individual houses. Doing this, you reduce the challengeit is difficultbut it reduces the challenge because the individual person cooperates with you, with the implementing agency, he himself also invests some more. …When we come to the Bangalore city…most of them are individual houses because we don’t want to go against the people’s wishes and willingness. Most of the, about 70%80% in Bangalore are individual houses and singlestoried. Under BSUP 80% [of the homes] are multistoried.75
The case of RAY illustrates not only the flexibility of the state and the learning that it underwent between the BSUP and RAY schemes, but also how narratives about land scarcity and the justification of multistory housing are actively contested by other actors within the policy intervention field to such an intense degree that the state is forced to shift its policy approach.
While resistance to state projects is not always possible (e.g., the case of Ejipura mentioned above), I argue that bureaucratic actors in this case shift their policy approach not solely because of resistance from societal actors, but also due to the broader demands of the bureaucratic field within which these agencies are situated. Specifically, the Slum
Board and agencies within the state of Karnataka are driven to demonstrate success and progress under the scheme so that they can prove their broader capacity and legitimacy within the bureaucratic field. There are material benefits associated with this increased legitimacy, particularly for the Slum Board. For example, due to the Slum Board’s progress under BSUP, officials within the state government encouraged the Slum Board to apply to be the implementing agency for the majority of housing projects under the
Rajiv Awas Yojana. In this sense, the rules within the bureaucratic field incentivized
75 (Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, February 23, 2015). This statement about BSUP multistory housing in Bangalore was confirmed by official documentation from the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (2014a) on “slum wise details”, which outlines each project in the city and whether it was developed as G+3 or single floor housing. 99 bureaucratic actors to address implementation issues and demonstrate progress rather than to create additional issues in the local policy field by ignoring the needs and concerns of slum residents.
In the next section of this paper I discuss how state actors explain implementation challenges (often to their superiors or other bureaucratic agencies holding them accountable) by blaming slum residents and the “social issues” that emerge. Specifically, categories of “urban” and “rural” are invoked to explain residents’ refusal or acceptance of BSUP projects. From this approach, adopting an urban mindset, or the inability for residents to do so, is the primary reason that projects are stalled (according to the state).
This symbolic order promoted by the state represents another attempt to address the array of “social issues” that complicate BSUP implementation by constructing certain understandings of the field at large.
Adopting an “Urban” Mindset
As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, while India is historically known as a country revered for its villages [with the city occupying an “ambivalent place in the
Indian nationalist imagination” (Prakash 2002, p. 3)], numerous scholars have examined how visions of India’s urban futureor, according to a McKinsey and Company (2010),
“India’s Urban Awakening”are becoming equally forceful in defining ideas of India and its future development (Ghertner 2011; Prakash 2002; Shatkin 2014). For Nehru, the
Indian city was associated with ideas of modernization and progress, with rural villages housing India’s most pressing societal issues (Prakash 2002). This idea of the “urban” was also associated with a particular kind of planned city that left no room for
100 improvisation, confusion, or informality. The ability of the state to achieve this modern, planned city, however, has always been challenging. As Prakash (2002) notes, Indian cities are characterized by an “uncomfortable coexistence of the modern and the
‘obsolete’, the intrusion of the rural in the urban, the combined emergence of official and unintended cities” (p. 5).
Under BSUP, it is precisely this “uncomfortable coexistence” between “rural” attitudes and practices existing in an “urban” space that serves as the basis for a number claims made by officials involved in the policy’s implementation. Examining the politics of the urban poor in India, Nandini Gooptu (2001) describes how this narrative has been present throughout India’s history:
The urban poor were frequently seen as erstwhile rural folk uprooted from their simply, ‘traditional’ country lifetheir supposed natural habitatand succumbing to moral and material degeneration in the towns. ...Thus, unlike the rural poor, who were often idealised and romanticised, especially under a Gandhian influence, their urban counterparts were regarded as corrupted misfits in the towns, culpable for thwarting progress, development or national regeneration. The solution to these putative problems posed by the urban poor was sought not simply through control or repression, as in the case of the colonial state, but also through the uplift and improvement of the lower classes (p. 14).
This division between “rural” and “urban” is commonly invoked by officials as both the reason for residents’ resistance to the BSUP scheme as well as the justification for the state’s involvement in slum communities. In addition to the representations of land and housing in the city discussed above, representations of the “urban” and the “rural” prove important to the symbolic work of the state as it attempts to structure the terms that actors within this field must follow.
101 According to some bureaucrats involved in the evaluation and implementation of
BSUP, it is a “rural” mindset among slum residents that hinders the effective implementation of the program in the city. The former BBMP Commissioner for Special
Projects, K.R. Niranjan, invokes the idea of the “rural” to describe the transient nature of slum residents when he remarks “some people go back to their native places and go back to the rural areas for some reason. So it’s not as though people stay, they [slum residents] are not very static people. They are highly moving.”76 Balakrishan Prasad Mutupuru, a senior official at the Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA), emphasized the importance of disabusing residents of a “rural” mindset that is associated with certain practices and inclinations through urban housing policies. He notes:
Conventionally they [slum residents] have a mindset. They are living in the city, but their roots are in the village, they are used to living in a kind of a space, which is ground level, have a front yard, a backyard, other kinds of things. So they come to the city, but still they experience [it] in the kind of a village—and they prefer it that way. So that’s the mindset.77
The need to disabuse residents of this mindset is intimately tied to questions of land and housing and used to justify policies like BSUP. Those with “rural” mindsets are used to larger spaces, to yards, to areas to house their livestock and livelihoods. This is the reason, according to certain officials, that residents refuse to accept the G+3 construction that is proposed under the BSUP policy.
The connection between “rural” lifestyles and attitudes and the urban poor is found not only in discussions with government actors discussing BSUP, but also echoed by prominent NGOs working in slums throughout India. Though based in Delhi, the
76 Personal Interview, September 26, 2014
77 Personal Interview, October 17, 2014 102 Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) is a prominent NGO that has been active in policies for the urban poor at the federal level. In a recent study conducted on the urban poor in Bangalore, the authors identify the urban poor primarily by their association with “rural” affinities. The report describes, “his nature is such that an urban poor pursues the lifestyle of a rural area in an urban area” (Society for Participatory
Research in Asia 2014, p. 16). While these are just symbolic, essentialist representations advanced by certain actors, those involved in the policy’s implementation regularly reference them to justify the BSUP policy and its benefits. Ahmed Ateeq, the Director of the KUIDFC JNNURM Project Management Unit (PMU), is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the scheme at the statelevel nodal agency (i.e., the KUIDFC).
When discussing the BSUP process at the local level, he describes the transformations that occur in communities in Bangalore and Mysore as a direct result of BSUP:
When you go you see the total social change in them. In Mysore I visited one slum. The whole slum was near the city railway station. The slum and the area was uninhabitable, and now, when you go there, the residents are maintaining the [BSUP] property. They have created their own good plantation, they have raised trees, they have raised a grass lawn there. Some of them were very active, they got into a conscious that ‘yes, we need to change, we cannot always be slum dwellers, we have to come to the level of this.’ The structure itself gives them that psychological boost that they require. See we are just building a structure, but there is a social aspect, a psychological aspect into it, that gives that strength to the fellow that goes into that dwelling he wants to improve. Now many of them, once they got into these houses, they come and improve their own, some of them have put marble into their flooring, many of them have fridges, TVs, dish connection, they are all having sort of luxury that average Indian, normal household has, so they feel themselves on par with the other society in the city.78
This “total social change” for slum residents represents not only new forms of housing, but new ways of distinctively “urban” living. Housing, from this approach, brings more
78 Personal Interview, October 16, 2014
103 than shelter; housing can bring a new mentality, new forms of consumption, and in general, a feeling that slum residents are “on par with the other [perhaps “urban” middle class] society in the city.” Not only is this “urban” lifestyle associated with a certain appreciation of urban land (as a scarce resource not to be overused or abused), but it is also connected to particular forms of consumption. According to the a report on the urban poor in Bangalore (Society for Participatory Research in Asia 2014), the consumption patterns of the “urban poor” resemble those of “rural” residents, and the urban poor spend more on food and intoxicants, less on fuel and lighting, less on housing, and more on recreation. This report echoes similar ideas to that of Ahmed Ateeq, where certain kinds
79 of consumption are strongly linked to an urban/rural binary.
Associating the urban poor with particular “rural” attitudes and forms of consumption serves as a means of delineating certain acceptable practices within the urban space. To reinforce these particular attitudes and practices, an Information,
Education and Communication (IEC) campaign was included in the BSUP guidelines and strongly promoted by the StateLevel Empowered Committee (SLEC). According to the meeting minutes from the 13th meeting of the SLEC (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation 2009a):
Solely by building infrastructure for slum community will not uplift them but there is a need for Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) for increased level of awareness among the slum dwellers. These community needs to
79 It is important to note the role of PRIA in the larger civil society field. As a prominent NGO with numerous connections to highranking government offices, they have played a central role in discussions about BSUP and Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) in Delhi. According to Manoj Rai, the Director of PRIA, the organization has close links to secretaries in the Ministry of Urban Development and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (Personal Interview, New Delhi, January 23, 2014). It is not surprising that the ideas of PRIA echo those put forth by government officials given their close connections to those who create these schemes. A more detailed discussion of the broader civil society field will be provided in C hapter Four of this dissertation.
104 be aware not only on skills sets but on general issues/subjects which will help them to improve their lifestyles and surrounding environment.
Though rarely implemented for lack of political will,80 the IEC campaign represents a formalized effort to ensure that newly “urban” residents were aware of the acceptable practices of the city. These ways of delineating acceptable practices within urban spaces represent what Camic et. al. (2011, p. 3) call “normative statements” and serve to justify the boundaries of acceptable action within slums and the state’s overall role in shaping this action. Yet these representations of slum residents and the “problem” of slums that requires the “solution” of the BSUP scheme, more generally, is often refuted by activists and other groups working with slums. During an interview with an activist working with a prominent civil society group called Action Aid, Rajendran
Prabhakar describes how the idea of “rootlessness” is constructed by the state:
So this uprooting, rootlessness is engineered. It is not by chance, it is by planning. The people are made culturally rootless and that makes them vulnerable to stand against the state and the vultures of the private capital, corporate forces. Slums are another form of a village life where they are segregated, where it is like a Dalit kind of a village.81
Several other civil society actors note the long duration that slum residents live in slums
(“30, 40, 50 years”82 or “sometimes decades”83) and how this does not fit with the state’s accounts of these communities as temporary, transient, and “rootless”. In his study of slums in Bangalore, Schenk (2000) estimates that three out of every ten slums in
80 Personal Interview, S. Subramanyam, November 28, 2014
81 Personal Interview, June 22, 2014
82 P ersonal Interview, Malarvizhi M., March 17, 2015
83 Personal Interview, Kshithij Urs, March 3, 2015 105 Bangalore have existed for over 40 years, also contradicting claims about the transience of slum residents. These actors are challenging the “summating concepts” (Nettl 1968) that the state uses to aggregate diverse needs of groups, which is a precursor for general polices like BSUP that seek to solve social challenges through a unitary approach.
Conclusion
While this rural/urban binary for organizing individuals and certain forms of action helps to create a particular ideological order and certain forms of social knowledge within the implementation field, according to Bourdieu (1979), it is only when this symbolic order is accepted by others that it becomes meaningful in structuring action within the field. As demonstrated in other sections of this chapter, residents and civil society actors regularly challenge the state’s claims to symbolic power within the field (over knowledge about land and the appropriate role of the state in constructing housing), often forcing the state to alter its practices and approach to engaging with slum communities. These “social issues” that emerge during implementation have delayed projects, forced the state to abandon construction, or adopt completely new policy strategies (e.g., in the case of
Rajiv Awas Yojana scheme where the state has promoted singlefamily housing from the outset to avoid resident resistance).
Examining the local field of implementation under BSUP highlights the ways in which the state’s ability to implement various “policy instruments” (Lascoumes and Le
Galès 2007) requires not only administrative and bureaucratic capacity, but also the symbolic capital necessary to legitimately implement the will of the state. In the field of
BSUP policy intervention, the symbolic order is largely unsettled, and the state’s actions
106 and terms of engagement with slums is largely contested. This presents a challenge for the state when attempting to implement slum redevelopment schemes like BSUP. In this case, the Slum Board relies on various representations of land, housing, and the urban poor to attempt to frame the policy intervention field, but their ability to effectively establish this symbolic order depended upon the alliances made with other actors who possess symbolic capital within the field (to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six) .
This demonstrates both the need for the state to retain symbolic capital within the field, but also the fact that the state’s “ ambition[s] to become a metafield governed by a form of metacapital” (Steinmetz 2008, p. 607), may not always come to fruition in a fractured space with competing forms of power. Those with the power to define particular kinds of knowledge and promote that knowledge gain a valuable source of capital within this local field. Defining urban lands as insufficient for urban development allows state actors to justify particular forms of development, like multistory housing. Defining urban residence as associated with particular practices and treatment of land is also used as a justification for policy failures and policy successes.
The varying processes and outcomes that are visible under BSUP represent the ways in which the field, and the symbolic order that defines it, are constantly disrupted and negotiated when the rules of that field are uncertain. Buroway (n.d., p. 12) discusses this element of flexibility and freedom in the field, noting how:
Symbolic power implies ‘a margin of freedom’ between habitus and field, a space for interpretation and therefore contestation. This becomes a site of ‘twofold uncertainty’ because the meaning of the social structure remains open to several interpretations, at the same time as the agents are capable of multiple ways of understanding their actions.
107 While Bourdieu’s (1979) theory of fields often implies a certain level of predictability within the fieldwith actions structured through habitus and a broader homology of the field determining intrafield stratification and relationsthe outcomes under this case demonstrate that various actors within the field can and do contest the state’s symbolic power. This is particularly meaningful given that slum residents, who are often the least powerful actors in the policy intervention field, can pressure other actors within the field to makes claims on the state and refute its symbolic order. This highlights the potential for the urban poor to resist the symbolic violence imposed by topdown, exclusionary development policies often created by elite “civil society” actors and their elite corporate and technocratic allies (Chatterjee 2004). As actors engage in debates over BSUP implementation, the grand visions and justifications provided by policymakers must inevitably interact with the interpretations, ideas, and visions of local actors.
As the state seeks to retain its position as a “powerful agent” in the field (Savage and Silva 2013), it must create a field in which it can then successfully intervene.
Because the local urban context in India is still relatively new “developmental” terrain and the practices of this field and the urban state are not yet “taken for granted”
(Bourdieu 2014), the ability to establish the rules of this field is essential in effectively shaping development and governance practices.
In this chapter, I began the empirics of this dissertation with an examination of the struggles over the symbolic capital within the policy implementation space because it is the “symbolic capital [that] underwrites the values of all other species of capital”
(Steinmetz 2008, p. 607). If the terms of that field are largely unsettled, this sets the stage
108 for other processes related to the implementation of BSUP as other actors seek to meet different objectives and shape the work of the state under BSUP. Now that the terrain of the broader policy implementation field has been mapped, in the next chapter I examine the broader bureaucratic field and the dynamics and forms of capital that shape the inner workings of the state under BSUP.
109
CHAPTER THREE
“A FORMAL PROGRAM OF THE [ CENTRAL ] GOVERNMENT” CONSTRUCTING AND NAVIGATING THE BUREAUCRATIC FIELD
“There is no reason to assume that the formal, legally defined structure of organizational positions, the array of offices and job descriptions, corresponds to the distribution of bureaucratic capital” (Steinmetz 2017, p. 373).
Introduction
According to a key architect for India’s National Urban Renewal Mission (NURM) and a vocal advocate for decentralization, Ramesh Ramanathan, the only way to efficiently and effectively address the urgent challenges facing Indian citiese.g., the lack of infrastructure, poor coordination between governing agencies, and weak financial and technical capacity of urban local bodies (ULBs)was through a “formal program of the government” directed and overseen by the Government of India. According to NURM policymakers, oversight by the central government was especially critical to achieving one of the policy’s main objectives“empowerment of the [urban] local bodies”
(Sivaramakrishnan 2011, p. 78)due to the historical reluctance of states to meaningfully decentralize governing authority to municipalities. To ensure that states and urban local bodies complied with the Centre’s vision for urban governance, policymakers created a
110 policy framework with multiple layers of oversight and approval at the local, state, and central levels, with the central government retaining final approval for the use of any
NURM funds. To achieve another aim of NURMthe “quick implementation of the infrastructure projects” (Sivaramakrishna 2011, p. 78)policy processes and funding flowed almost entirely through autonomous bureaucratic agencies and offered few formal opportunities for elected bodies or officials to shape policy processes.84 By structuring the policy in this way, policymakers sought to create a sense of order in a governance environment that they viewed as highly fragmented and disorderly by empowering agencies with the “organizational capital” necessary to “eliminate [the] improvisation”
(Bourdieu 2014, p. 322) that characterized urban governance.85
Despite the grand visions of policymakers to produce this kind of highlevel efficiency and coordination, implementing such a largescale policy in Indian cities within seven years would prove to be near impossible due largely to the mismatch
84 The policy’s designers tried to build in opportunities for local and statelevel politicians to get involved in policy processes at various stages. However, in most states, including Karnataka, the groups that were to include political officials (e.g., the City Volunteer Technical Corps, the Citylevel Review and Monitoring Committee, etc.) were either never created or were largely disempowered (Government of India Comptroller and Auditor General 2012). This does not mean, however, that politicians were not involved in policy processes, but rather that the formal process of implementation and oversight largely excluded these actors.
85 Describing the historical role of legal clerks and jurists, Bourdieu (2014) argues that these actors are endowed with a critical form of “organizational capital.” This capital allows them to “draw on an immense treasury...of techniques, systems of standardized and socially validated procedures for solving problems.” Backed by laws and the legal systems, these actors are able to use their “organizational capital” to eliminate conflict between groups and create systems and protocol to reduce the “friction” characteristic of “competitive situation[s]” (p. 322). To Bourdieu, this “capital of organizational techniques” is critical to ensuring “social agreement” and “social standardization” (p. 322). While BSUP is not a legallybacked policy [and the Government of India is constitutionally restricted from directly intervening in urban affairs], policymakers envisioned the structure of the policy, and the “organizational capital” endowed to oversight and implementing agencies, to be strong enough to overcome urban governance challenges and create some sense of “social agreement” between the myriad of agencies involved in governing Indian cities. 111 between the vision of the policy and the actual logic of the bureaucratic field.
Specifically, policymakers assumed the presence of a coherent, autonomous bureaucratic field with relations between agencies shaped by two forms of capital typically characteristic of Weberian bureaucracies: scalar capital and technical capital. In other words, agencies with proximity to the central government would be more powerful within the field and able to force other agencies into compliance under the scheme (e.g., a statelevel agency could force the municipality to comply, a centrallevel agency could force the state and municipality to comply, etc.). Further, autonomous and highly technical agencies would, in theory, produce the best outcomes at the quickest pace due to their separation from the political field and their technical prowess.
In this chapter, I find that the authority granted to various oversight and implementation agencies under NURM was often insufficient to overcome broader divisions and power relations within the bureaucratic field. I argue that while scalar and technical capital are still important in shaping policy processes and relations within the bureaucratic field, other forms of capital prove equally (if not more) critical in shaping relations within the bureaucratic field and the broader policy outcomes under BSUP.
More specifically, I claim that political, reputational, social, and symbolic forms of capital strongly shape how bureaucratic agencies interact under the scheme, their ability to overcome coordination challenges that emerge during implementation, and their overall success in producing outcomes within cities.
While policymakers’ visions of the “scalartechnical field” (STF) privileged forms of authority and capacity characteristic of an idealtypical Weberian bureaucracy,
112 the ability for agencies to successfully meet policy objectives within this framework was limited due to the logic of the bureaucratic field. This meant that the best solutions were often “out of the box solutions”86 that did not follow the formal policy structure.
Effectiveness of the state was more dependent upon on the ability of bureaucratic actors to successfully enroll the assistance of political and civil society actors, capitalize on the reputations of agencies and their leadership, and effectively exercise various forms of symbolic capital within the broader bureaucratic field.
Beginning with a brief overview of governance structures in urban India, I highlight how failures of urban governance have historically been cast in terms of a lack of political will or “capacity” at the city and state level. Architects of India’s National
Urban Renewal Mission therefore believed that the only feasible way to ensure urban reform was through a “formal program of the government” that relied heavily on oversight and management by the central government. To better understand this “formal program”, I describe the oversight and authority structure created by policymakerswhat
I refer to as the “scalartechnical field” (STF)and describe the broader assumptions about bureaucratic relations and authority that the STF contains. I then map the current institutional structure of BSUP in Bangalore and Karnataka and highlight how this differs from the STF. By examining two agencies that are critical to BSUP’s implementation in
Bangalore in greater detailthe Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development
Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) and the Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB)I detail the broader logic of the bureaucratic field (i.e., the divisions within the field and the
86 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
113 particular forms of capital that are privileged by actors) and demonstrate how this logic structures interagency interactions and the ability to successfully meet BSUP goals.
A Role for the Centre in Urban Governance
According to India’s Tenth Five Year Plan, governance in urban India is characterized by
“fragmentation of responsibility, incomplete devolution of functions and funds to the elected bodies and ULBs, [and] unwillingness to progress towards municipal autonomy”
(Government of India Planning Commission 2002, p. 613). Decisionmaking over critical issues like economic development, longterm planning, and housing largely fall under the purview of state governments who have proven historically unwilling to relinquish authority over cities to either municipalities or to the central government. NURM policymakers believed that the control of state governments over urban affairs represented a critical challenge to improving Indian cities. For this reason, one of the major aims of the scheme was to shift authority from states to cities by incentivizing state governments to adopt governance reforms and by providing cities with the technical and financial resources needed for more effective urban planning and management.
Policymakers knew that they would receive some pushback from state governments regarding plans to decentralize governance to municipalities (given the reluctance of states to fully implement the 74th constitutional amendment as described in the introduction of this dissertation), and so they designed a scheme that was driven and managed largely by the central government. Retaining approval over policy processes not only allowed the Centre to drive governance reforms in cities, but it also aimed to remove political hurdles that policymakers believed were blocking effective urban growth.
114 According to a seniorlevel official formerly within the Government of India’s Ministry of Urban Development, worries about the misuse of funds and poor implementation of the scheme drove the Centre’s decision to structure the policy in this fashion. He describes how “we are acutely aware of the fact that implementation is one crucial thing on which the Centre has to have control. Otherwise money is wasted and it is misused and it doesn’t result in any tangible outcomes. So this is why we were very hardnosed about implementation and monitoring.”87 By directing and overseeing approval processes at the Centre, policymakers envisioned a more effective and efficient implementation process that eliminated some of the political forces within states that they believed were preventing effective development in cities. One of the policy’s designers, Ramesh
Ramanathan, describes some of the political forces at the state level that shape urban governance and why the federal government needed to play a role to overcome these forces:
The reality is that no MLA [Member of the Legislative Assembly], no state elected representative, will ever want to see a mayor that is more powerful than him or her. And we can give a technocratic argument as long as we want, but that is the reality. ...Therefore, how do you address this [the lack of decentralized authority to municipalities] with the legitimate levers of change, which is [to] give the federal government a role? This cannot be done through whispered conversations in the corridors of power, this must be done through a formal program of the government.88
To effectively transfer powers to municipalities, therefore, required a policy that was driven by the “legitimate levers of change” at the Centre.
87 Personal Interview, April 25, 2014
88 Personal Interview, July 4, 2012
115 While policymakers believed the role of the Centre was enough to effectively steer policy processes as envisioned, many have criticized the policy for its weak implementation and inability to force states to meaningfully devolve functions to municipalities (Government of India Comptroller and Auditor General 2012; Kamath and
Zachariah 2012; Mukhopadhyay 2006; Sivaramakrishnan 2011). According to a vocal advocate for decentralization in Bangalore, Ashwin Mahesh, when examining policy processes under NURM, the policy did little to effectively empower municipal governments:
The most effective thing you can do for decentralization is to simply increase the amount of untied funds available to local bodies. Give them money. Just redistribute the access [to funds]. Give them that. You’re trying to do all sorts of other things short of that and call that decentralization. Anybody who uses the ‘follow the money’ thumb rule, they’ll conclude within 20 seconds that JNNURM didn’t decentralize anything .89
In a similar vein, others claim that despite the scheme’s goals for decentralization, the policy processes flowed almost entirely outside of the domain of democraticallyelected bodies at the state and local level, reducing any kind of meaningful political decentralization that could have emerged as a result of the policy (Hazards Centre 2007;
Kamath and Zachariah 2012).
When asked about the reasons behind NURM’s failure to achieve some of its major objectives, policymakers rarely faulted the scheme’s design and more often attributed this to a lack of “capacity” at the state and locallevel. A NURM policy architect, Om Prakash Mathur, describes how challenges that emerged under the scheme were largely due to capacity issues:
89 Personal Interview, April 28, 2014
116 More recently, the enthusiasm over the policy has weakened. States are finding it increasingly difficult to commit funds for their contributions. It’s becoming more difficult to bring money to match. This is due to many things like the constraints at the state and city level to finish projects on time and the capacity of the state and city government. These were problems that we did not anticipate. As a result, some of the enthusiasm has disappeared.90
The narrative that the weak capacity of states and cities fueled the scheme’s poor performance is common amongst policymakers, bureaucrats, as well as scholars of urban governance in India (Sivaramakrishnan 2011). While there is certainly truth to the claims that municipalities lack the financial and functional authority to effectively oversee planning and governance functions, this argument overlooks the ways in which the policy’s design and assumptions about bureaucratic authority shaped the possibilities for success under the scheme. Under NURM, policymakers believed the solution to urban governance challenges could be found through a policy design that privileged
“hierarchical, impersonal, rulebased organization[s]” (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004, p.
208). This policy structure was based largely on Weberian standards of bureaucracy, which assume a particular logic within the bureaucratic field. By assuming the superiority of hierarchical/scalar and technical capital over other forms of power within the bureaucratic field, policymakers ignored key divisions and forms of capital that structure interactions between the diverse bureaucratic agencies brought together under NURM.
In the next section, I outline the implementation structure of NURM and describe, in greater detail, the particular logic of the scalartechnical field (STF) envisioned by policymakers.
90 Personal Interview, July 14, 2012
117 The ScalarTechnical Bureaucratic Field
According to official NURM documentation (see Figure 3.1), there is one agency at the local level and two agencies at the state level responsible for the implementation and oversight of BSUP policy processes: 1) the Urban Local Body (ULB), 2) the Statelevel
Nodal Agency (SLNA), and 3) the Statelevel Steering Committee (SLSC).91 At the central governmentlevel, there are two main agencies responsible for managing funds and approving of projects: 1) the BSUP submission Directorate (headed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation) and 2) the Central
Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee (CSMC). Despite the fact that one of the broader aims of the policy was to decentralize decisionmaking authority to local bodies, authority over projects and policy management was still largely in the hands of agencies operating at the state and central level (Government of India Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005).
The structure envisioned by policymakers brings together existing government agencies (either empowered with funds or expanded authority under the scheme) with agencies created solely for the purposes of implementing and overseeing BSUP projects.
For example, the Statelevel Steering Committee and the Central Sanctioning and
Monitoring Committee are agencies created solely for JNNURM policy oversight and approval. These agencies interact and coordinate with urban local bodies, the Statelevel
Nodal Agency, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, which are
91 In Karnataka, the SLSC only met twice before the Chief Minister of the Government of Karnataka created a Statelevel Empowered Committee (SLEC). A more detailed discussion on the choice to transition from the SLSC to the SLEC is provided below.
118 government agencies that undertake a variety of policy initiatives in addition to managing and overseeing BSUP.
FIGURE 3.1: Official JNNURM Implementation and Approval Structure92
The framework laid out in Figure 3.1 presents a simplified version of policy processes and assumes a relatively fluid oversight, coordination, and implementation process between a handful of agencies. In Bangalore, however, the implementation of
BSUP brought together numerous agencies and actors from within and outside of the bureaucracy, operating at various scales of governance, with differing organizational agendas and orientations. Acknowledging the complexity of organizations involved in
BSUP implementation (and the challenges that emerged as a result), a former official within the Ministry of Urban Development discusses how the central government sought
92 Adapted from the official JNNURM Toolkit (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005, p. 11). 119 to remedy these issues by providing technical resources to implementation and oversight agencies:
Whatever bottleneck, whatever problem that they [implementing agencies] posed, we [the Government of India] always rose to that particular occasion and addressed it because we knew it was a tough call even for them. We provided assistance because it was the first time there was a reformlinked program being launched for urban renewal, and suddenly people were caught unaware.93
Despite efforts by policymakers and officials within the central government to create a structure and provide technical resources to overcome implementation issues, the diversity of organizations involved in implementation created numerous challenges that were rarely solved solely by the decision making and approval process outlined in official guidelines. Challenges emerged as a result of the competing (or mismatched) goals and priorities of implementation and oversight agencies, unclear or contested knowledge over critical aspects related to policy implementation (e.g., which agency can claim ownership to parcels of land in the city needed for implementation), and the broader politics within the bureaucracy. An official formerly within the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike
(BBMP) (the urban local body of Bangalore) discusses how the different agendas of agencies structured the BBMP’s ability to effectively meet its BSUP objectives:
When building houses, we have to coordinate between the local body and the electricity body, and water supply...all kinds of people come into play. So their priorities will be different . Execution may not be their priority, so there will be hiccups in between. Normally you plan for one year [for project implementation], but because of these hiccups, it takes two years minimum.94
93 Personal Interview, M. Rajamani, April 25, 2014
94 Personal Interview, K.R. Niranjan, September 26, 2014
120 Several others describe these competing agendas in terms of “turf wars”95 and remark how these battles limit effective coordination between the agencies involved in policy implementation. One official within the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development
Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) describes how “coordination and collaboration could really make things work so much better, but that won’t particularly happen because everyone is very protective of their turf.”96 She mentions how officials are unlikely to collaborate on key technical and social aspects related to BSUP implementation97, which makes it difficult to measure progress under BSUP. While policymakers sought to provide sufficient resources to overcome the bottlenecks that emerged under BSUP, there were other dynamics shaping relations between agencies that were not so easily resolved by additional funding and technical assistance.
One approach to solving these coordination challenges was to create and empower a Statelevel Steering Committee (SLSC) and a Central Sanctioning and
Monitoring Committee (CSMC) with the authority to vet and approve projects and solve coordination challenges that emerged between agencies at the state and central level. In theory the SLSC would resolve any issues that emerged at the local and state level prior
95 Personal Interview, Om Prakash Mathur, March 20, 2014; Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015; Personal Interview, Ashwin Mahesh, April 28, 2014
96 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
97 An official within the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance corporation, Shalini Karpagam, describes this case in slightly more detail when she remarks: “there is nothing on paper when it comes to how I should do my work or how Ganga should do her work. She is very good at social issues and understanding how it works and I am good at the technical side of it, so typically we share and we collaborate. ...So she has given me a lot of inputs in terms of social issues and how it works. ...So all these things, nobody is telling us that we have to do it like this, so it is something that has happened in the past few, couple of years. So that way coordination and collaboration could really make things work so much better, but that won’t particularly happen because everyone is very protective of their turf” (Personal Interview, March 31, 2015). 121 to forwarding them to the central level. The CSMC would then resolve any remaining issues with proposal development before recommending action on a particular project.
Simply giving these oversight agencies authority under NURM, however, was not always enough to address the larger problems of interagency power inequities and the bureaucratic turf wars mentioned above. According to one official within the Statelevel
Nodal Agency in Karnataka (i.e., the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development
Finance Corporation), certain coordination problems between agencies simply could not be solved by the agency even though it was empowered to do so under NURM: “even the nodal agency is constrained. How can we interfere in something that is totally outside our domain?”98 This limited reach led some to criticize the role of these statelevel oversight bodies:
I think the role of those agencies [SLSC/SLEC] should be more stringent. All these other [implementing] agencies, if they don’t coordinate properly, don’t extend their support properly, then there are chances that things may get delayed. I mean all of these projects are past their deadlines. These agencies at the state level should have attempted to coordinate efforts more. The role played by these agencies was not adequate.”99
While officials were quick to criticize the effectiveness of these agencies, bringing together such disparate organizations under the banner of a large and timebound scheme was bound to face challenges. Policymakers created a structure that brought together numerous bureaucratic agencies (e.g, the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation, etc.), with a variety of statutory bodies (e.g., the Karnataka
Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), and diverse democratic
98 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
99 Personal Interview, Ashok Jain, November 7, 2014 122 bodies and political actors (e.g., the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike or the municipal government), and relied on the authority vested by the Centre to ensure effective management of the entire process. In doing so, policymakers assumed that relations within the broader bureaucratic field were structured primarily by forms of scalar capital. Agencies that had proximity to the Centre and occupied higherlevel positions within the bureaucratic hierarchy would, theoretically, be able to ensure compliance under NURM and resolve disputes. As will be described in greater detail in the next section of this chapter, this form of capital was important in some negotiations, but was not always effective in structuring relations within the bureaucratic field.
Policymakers also privileged forms of technical capital when creating the policy management and implementation framework. Agencies with high levels of technical expertise were empowered to review project proposals, make technical and policy recommendations, and, occasionally, serve as mediators to resolve coordination and other conflicts that emerged between implementing agencies. While these agencies did not always occupy highlevel positions within policy approval hierarchy, their monopoly over particular kinds of expertise, as well as their neutrality from political actors and political processes, was seen as a valued form of capital. For example, the Housing and
Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) reviews proposals from Statelevel Nodal
Agencies (SLNAs) for housing projects under BSUP prior to forwarding these to the
Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee (CSMC) for final approval. While
HUDCO technically is “below” the CSMC in terms of the policy hierarchy (because the
CSMC makes the final policy decision), HUDCO’s monopoly of technical expertise on
123 housing development and constructionrelated issues gives the agency credibility in its recommendations. According to several officials overseeing BSUP projects at the state and central level, the CSMC usually defers to these technical agencies because it does not have the inhouse expertise to “clear projects”100 under BSUP. While the CSMC gives final approval over projects, it rarely disagrees with the recommendations of these technical agencies.
Because of a strong desire to put urban development issues “outside the framework of politics”101 and to move policy processes forward at a quick pace, policy officials privileged the technical expertise of autonomous, third party evaluators and consultants given their perceived neutrality. According to official policy documents, each city receiving funds under BSUP was required to appoint a Third Party Inspection and
Monitoring Agency (TPIMA) to undertake monitoring of projects under BSUP
(Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005). These agencies were responsible for inspecting BSUP projects throughout the construction lifecycle, to supply the Statelevel Nodal Agency with reports on the status of projects, and, occasionally, offer recommendations for action to the SLNA (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005; Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation 2010a). Incremental release of BSUP funds was contingent upon demonstration of progress, so these reports became incredibly important
100 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
101 Personal Interview, Sudhir Krishna, March 13, 2015
124 to implementing agencies and the SLNA who needed them to move ahead with implementation.
The purported neutrality of these agencies helped to bolster the credibility of their reports, and the findings from these agencies often served to resolve disputes that arose between implementing agencies and the SLNA. For example, when issues arose between the SLNA and the Slum Board regarding implementation challenges on the ground, the
SLNA would often send the third party evaluator into the field to provide the final word on a BSUP project.102 Speaking about the role of third party agencies in the scheme’s implementation, an official within the SLNA notes how “these agencies...we usually take whatever they say as firsthand, no matter who says what, whatever these agencies say, decisions are made by this.”103
While neutrality and separation from the political field is seen as an advantage within the policy structure, it is important to note that policymakers did not design the scheme entirely independent from the political realm. As shown in Figure 3.1, at the local level, the democraticallyelected urban local body was to be the starting point from where projects were generated before being sent up the approval hierarchy. As well, policymakers envisioned the involvement of a City Volunteer Technical Corps (CVTC)
(Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2010), a Citylevel Review and
Monitoring Committee (CLRMC), and a Districtlevel Review and Monitoring
Committee (DLRMC), all of which were to serve as oversight bodies and involve
102 Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014
103 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
125 technical experts, members from civil society, as well as local and statelevel politicians.
104 As well, the Statelevel Steering Committee (SLSC), a key oversight body at the state level, was to be overseen by the Chief Minister of the state government, the Ministers of
Housing and Urban Development at the state level, as well as elected officials (from the local, state, and central level) whose constituencies fall within municipal boundaries
(Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005). Despite the inclusion of these oversight committees in the formal policy structure, when these agencies were established (and, in many cases they were not), they were largely toothless and played only a minimal role in shaping policy processes. The need to move policy processes ahead at a quick pace disincentivized oversight agencies from engaging with political bodies and officials, which they claimed would drastically slow policy processes.105
NURM policymakers designed a policy structure that relied primarily on understandings of the bureaucratic field as divided by scalar and technical forms of capital. In creating a “scalartechnical field” that strongly resembled an idealtypical
Weberian bureaucracy (i.e., with high technical capacity, a clear division of labor, and hierarchical authority) (Weber 1947), policymakers believed this would be the most efficient and effective way to achieve policy goals. However, in a context characterized by an array of organizational actors, competing chains of authority, diverse organizational
104 Personal Interview, M. Subramanyam, November 28, 2014; Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014
105 Personal Interview, Bhatan Lal, April 21, 2014; Personal Interview, Anil Kumar, March 18, 2015; Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
126 interests and aims, as well as varying levels of embeddedness with nonstate actors, the forms of capital that proved most successful in achieving outcomes were not always those envisioned by policymakers.
In the next section of this chapter, I outline the organizations that are involved in the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore and their institutional aims and authority structures. After mapping the actors and structure of the bureaucratic field, I describe the various forms of capital that shape dynamics between agencies by examining the practices of two agencies central to BSUP’s implementation in the city. I argue that while the STF privileged hierarchical and technical forms of capital, relations between actors within the bureaucratic field (and state capacity, broadly speaking) are more strongly shaped by political, reputational, social, and symbolic forms of capital within the field.
Mapping the Institutional Terrain of BSUP in Bangalore
As shown in Figure 3.1 above, policymakers envisioned a multitiered system of approvals with a handful of agencies overseeing processes at the city, state, and central level. Because Figure 3.1 serves only as a guide for cities and states, it does not designate specific agencies to fill each role. States are expected to appoint, for example, their own
Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA), and there can be several implementing agencies within a city. Figure 3.2 below (which mirrors the structure of Figure 3.1 created by policymakers) shows the specific agencies at the city and state level responsible for overseeing the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore and Karnataka. Because there are several agencies brought together under this scheme, it is important to describe both their roles under the policy as well as their broader institutional objectives. This helps to map
127 the existing institutional terrain shaping BSUP processes and provides a contrast to the framework of bureaucratic authority proposed by policymakers. I choose to focus primarily on agencies at the state and local level because the majority of the coordination under BSUP occurs at these two levels.
FIGURE 3.2: BSUP Policy Structure in Bangalore and Karnataka106
Citylevel Agencies and Actors Under BSUP
FIGURE 3.3: Citylevel Agencies Involved in BSUP Implementation
106 Adapted from policy documents, SLEC Meeting Minutes, and interviews with local, state, and centrallevel officials involved in policy implementation.
128 While the policy structure envisioned by policymakers only included the urban local body at the local level, in Bangalore there are two main agencies that oversee BSUP policy implementation in the city. The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP)
(the municipal governing body of Bangalore) and a policycreated body comprised of political officials and bureaucrats (at the city, state, and central level) called the Citylevel
Review and Monitoring Committee (CLRMC).
The BBMP was only recently formed (in 2007) after the Government of
Karnataka merged the geographic area overseen by the previous municipal body [the
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP)] with seven municipal councils, one town council, and 111 villages surrounding the city (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike n.d.). Once merged, the BBMP went from 70 elected representatives and 50 electoral divisions to 198 wards (electoral divisions) with one municipal councillor elected to represent each ward in the municipal council.107 The Commissioner of the BBMP is the administrative head of the municipality and is appointed by the state government. The Mayor is elected by the council from among the municipal councilors for a term of one year (Government of
Karnataka Directorate of Municipal Administration n.d.). While the Mayor presides over meetings of the municipal council, and is technically the head of the BBMP’s deliberative
107 In July 2015, the Karnataka legislature passed a bill to divide the BBMP into five smaller municipalities with the aim of easing management of municipal affairs. Proponents of the separation argue that the growth of the city and its geographic size make governance challenging and ineffective; dividing the city into smaller municipalities will ensure more effective urban administration and governance. While a feasibility study was undertaken to assess the impact of this division, as of 2017 there is no concrete plan to implement the plan outlined in the bill. In November 2015, the Government of India’s Ministry of Urban Development informed the Government of Karnataka that its plans to divide the municipality went against the intentions of the 74th constitutional amendment to empower and strengthen local governing bodies. They requested that the Government of Karnataka wait to divide the municipality until the term of the present council ends in 2019 (Chaturvedi 2016).
129 wing, this position is largely symbolic due to the strong role of the state governmentappointed Commissioner in steering the work of the BBMP.
Administratively, the BBMP is overseen by the Urban Development Department
(UDD), and this department approves the BBMP’s budget and serves as a key node through which municipal funds (including funds from centrallysponsored schemes like
BSUP) flow. Within the administrative arm of the BBMP, there are 26 departments whose staff oversee aspects of municipal governance related to accounts, social welfare, sewage, water management, and education (among others) (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike n.d.). Despite being tasked with overseeing these functions, the administration has limited authority to effect change related to their departmental agendas. According to the former
Commissioner for the BBMP, the dominance of the Commissioner and state level parastatals in overseeing most functions of urban planning and development limits the ability for the municipalityboth the deliberative and administrative armsto address problems or make policy decisions related to specific issues. He describes how:
You can’t really call it a local government in that sense because most of the powers under the law, under the Act,108 is with the Commissioner. For example,
108 The Act that this official is referring to is the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act of 1976, which states were required to pass as part of the 74th constitutional amendment. This Act provides municipalities within Karnataka with the powers to oversee numerous functions of city government (Government of Karnataka Directorate of Municipal Administration n.d.). However, the powers of the municipality are often superseded by other statutory (parastatal) bodies created to oversee the same functions of urban governance. For example, while planning should theoretically fall under the purview of the municipal government, Karnataka created the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) (through the Bangalore Development Authority Act of 1976) to manage urban planning and land use for the city. The BDA’s powers under the Act are much broader than those of the municipal government. For this reason, municipal officials often struggle to influence governance processes and must go “wherever the power rests” to create change in the city. Dr. A. Ravindra, the former Commissioner for the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), describes this challenge in greater detail when he says “t he councilor, the mayor, etc. may not have formal powers under the law, under the Act, but still they try to exercise it through the official machinery. That is through those who have or who are vested with legal powers. They go wherever the power rests. I would say this is a contestation between democracy and bureaucracy” (Personal Interview, October 28, 2014).
130 the councilorfor him and for his constituentswater is a very basic thing. So there is a water problem, they [the constituents] go to the councilor. But you know it’s not a function of the municipality at all. Nevertheless, they [councilors] raise issues related to water in the council meetings. But the responsibility is entirely with another agency which is answerable directly to the government of Karnataka, not to this council in Bangalore.109
Despite the limited authority of the municipal council in city planning and governance, under BSUP the council did play a small role in approving projects for the city.
According to several officials within the Statelevel Nodal Agency, the BBMP was required to approve all project proposals under NURM (i.e., the Detailed Project Reports or DPRs) before they were forwarded to the StateLevel Nodal Agency.110 Despite their inclusion in the formal policy approval structure, one official describes their role as still quite limited:
Their role is backward integration. ...They don’t object to these processes. Even though they have to approve projects that go through the KUIDFC, they are often given things at the last minute to simply sign off on. Is there any real deliberation here? No, they do a “faithbased” sign off.111
In this sense, while the municipality does have a formal role in approving certain projects, their limited authority over urban affairs and weak powers within the bureaucratic field reduces the likelihood that they will veto any NURM projects proposed by other agencies.
109 Personal Interview, A. Ravindra, October 28, 2014
110 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015; Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014; Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, February 23, 2015; Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014; Personal Interview, Ashok Jain, November 7, 2014
111 Personal Interview, T.R. Raghunandan, February 17, 2015
131 While some officials argue that the powers of the municipality to shape processes under BSUP are very limited, other officials claim that the municipality had “maximum powers”112 to approve or reject proposals under the scheme. Though contradictory to the statements offered from other officials, both sentiments are actually true to a degree. The
BBMP is quite limited in its legal powers to effectively govern and implement urban development initiatives within the city, and it has little authority to change project proposals that are created and approved by state and centrallevel agencies. However, the
BBMP does not always occupy this subordinate position within the broader bureaucratic field. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the BBMP’s refusal to cooperate with other implementing agencies under BSUP proves a formidable barrier to policy success, and their compliance is not always guaranteed despite occupying a subordinate position within the bureaucratic field. As well, local politicians strongly shape policy processes on the ground and can either help or hinder the work of many bureaucratic agencies (even those agencies that pride themselves on their political neutrality and autonomy).
Under NURM, each city and state that receives funding for the scheme is required to create a Citylevel Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee (CLRMC) . The committee’s membership was to include municipal councilors, Members of the
Legislative Assembly (MLA) (statelevel politicians with constituencies in Bangalore), and Members of Parliament (MP) (centrallevel politicians with constituencies in
Bangalore), and the committee was tasked with overseeing and discussing housing projects within the city. Despite the recommendations to establish this committee, in
112 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
132 Bangalore it was not created until 2013, four years after BSUP implementation began in
Bangalore, and eight years after the policy was inaugurated in India (Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2010b). Despite the potential of this body to bring democratic representatives into the policy processes, the agency remained largely toothless and had minimal impact on the policy’s overall implementation.113 In this sense, while the formal NURM scheme envisioned democratic involvement at the local levelboth through the approval of projects by the municipal council and the involvement of the CLRMCthe power of these agencies to influence processes through the official policy framework was quite limited in practice.
In the next section, I outline the relevant agencies at the state level that managed and oversaw implementation within Bangalore.
Statelevel Agencies and Actors Under BSUP
The official policy framework under NURM included two main oversight bodies at the state level: a Statelevel Nodal Agency and a Statelevel Steering Committee. These agencies were given authority under the scheme to resolve coordination and implementation issues that emerged. However, given the numerous organizations involved in BSUP’s implementation, their varying organizational goals, legal authority, and financial autonomy, the ability of these agencies to ensure coordination and compliance by working through the chain of command outlined in the official policy framework was restricted.
113 Personal Interview, M. Subramanyam, November 28, 2014
133 FIGURE 3.4: Statelevel Agencies Involved in BSUP Implementation
When discussing the policy processes at the state level, it is best to begin with the main implementing agency for BSUP in Bangalore, the Karnataka Slum Development
Board (KSDB or Slum Board) . The Slum Board is a statutory body whose leadership is appointed by the Chief Minister of the state government. The Slum Board was constituted in 1975 under the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act of 1973. The organization has several aims, including: executing slum improvement and redevelopment for “declared” slums in cities throughout Karnataka, providing slum residents with hygienic living conditions, constructing new homes (using state or centrallevel funding), preventing unauthorized construction, declaring new slums, and maintaining records of existing slums (Karnataka Slum Development Board n.d.b). The agency has jurisdiction to work in all declared slums and is responsible for implementing centrallysponsored schemes like BSUP in these communities. The agency is required to conduct socioeconomic surveys of communities and regularly engage with slum residents, but many see the KSDB as a technical agency whose main task is constructing
134 homes.114 The agency’s work under BSUP is overseen by a Technical Director who manages a series of zonelevel engineers who are responsible for overseeing construction of new housing projects and the maintenance of existing projects within their respective jurisdictions.
The Slum Board is overseen and managed by the Housing Department within the Government of Karnataka. While the Housing Department and the Urban
Development Department are now separate agencies in the state government, they used to be one department. The department was bifurcated in 1995 and has since been under the supervision of two Principal Secretaries and operates under separate budgets. The
Housing Department is headed by the Principal Secretary to the Government and is responsible primarily for overseeing the implementation of “public housing for the socially and economically weaker sections both in rural and urban areas” throughout the state and managing three agencies: the Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB), the
Rajiv Gandhi Rural Housing Corporation (RGRHC), and the Karnataka Housing Board
(KHB). The KSDB and RGRHC implement housing schemes primarily for economicallyweaker section (EWS) and lowerincome groups (LIG) living in urban areas (KSDB) and rural areas (RGRHC). The KHB oversees implementation of housing primarily for middle and higherincome groups. The three agencies are statutory agencies, and the statutes empower them with different rights to acquire land, negotiate land sales, and construct homes in various parts of Bangalore and throughout the state.
114 Personal Interview, Sanjiv Kumar, February 26, 2015
135 The Urban Development Department (UDD) within the Government of
Karnataka is is headed by the Principal Secretary to the Government and is responsible for overseeing and managing urban planning, urban service provision, and urban governance. The UDD oversees several agencies including the urban local body [i.e., the
Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP)]. Despite the fact that the Housing
Department oversees the main implementing agency for BSUP, the Slum Board, the funding for BSUP at the state level flows from the Statelevel Nodal Agency to the UDD and then directly to the Slum Board, circumventing the Housing Department. According to the former Commissioner of the BBMP, this bifurcation creates numerous challenges for governance and policy implementation:
Earlier they used to be a single department. It was a mistake to bifurcate [the departments] because there are agencies [within UDD and HD] with some issues in common. Take slums, for example. If the BBMP has a slum and has to do something about it, the BBMP administratively comes under UDD, but slum issues come under the Housing Department. This is an example of coordination issues that can easily be resolved if the two departments were not separate.115
This division between housing and urban development as well as the flow of funding for
BSUP creates challenges for implementing agencies who have to navigate interorganizational power dynamics and differing chains of command. Actors seeking to influence policy processes or overcome coordination challenges, are often unable to overcome these dynamics by relying on formal policy processes alone.
At the state level, many of the urban development functions are undertaken and managed by parastatal organizations whose leadership is appointed by the state
115 Personal Interview, A. Ravindra, October 28, 2014
136 government. There are a number of parastatal bodies that currently oversee various aspects related to urban planning and infrastructure, and these agencies are involved in
BSUP projects to varying degrees. For example, while there are several parastatals in
Karnataka (see Figure 3.4 below), the main agencies involved in BSUP implementation include the Bangalore Electricity Supply Company (BESCOM) and the Bangalor e
Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB) . However, if an implementing agency seeks to develop a BSUP project on lands owned by the Bangalor e Development
Authority (BDA) , it has to communicate with these agencies to obtain approvals.116
Parastatals each have a specific urban governance and planning domain and are seen as highly technical agencies.
While the municipal government is formally responsible for many functions related to the work of parastatals, they often do not complete this work due to the broad legal authority of parastatals and the fact that their leadership is appointed by the state government. This results in a division of labor between parastatals and ULBs as parastatal agencies “take over prime development functions that were previously at the local level, leaving local bodies with maintenance functions” (Benjamin 2000, p. 46). For this reason, ULBs are in a difficult place, forced to manage and maintain various city government functions without the financial support or political capacity to do so (p. 46).
116 In some cases, implementing agencies have sought to construct BSUP homes on lands owned by various federal agencies and have had to negotiate with these actors to obtain approvals (e.g., railway lands or defence lands). 137 FIGURE 3.5: Governance and Service Delivery Agencies and Scope of Work
Agency Scope of Work
Bangalore Development Authority Land use planning, regulation, acquisition, (BDA) and zoning for Bangalore
Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Electricity connectivity and management (BESCOM) for Bangalore
Bangalore International Airport Area Manage international airport land and Planning Authority (BIAAPA) landuse proposals
Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) (BMRC) entrusted with implementing the Bangalore Metro Rail Project
Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Land use planning, regulation, Development Authority (BMRDA) acquisition, and zoning for the Bangalore Metropolitan Region
Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Provide public transportation in Corporation (BMTC) Bangalore
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Drinking water, sewerage collection, and Board (BWSSB) waste water treatment and disposal
Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike Maintain urban governance, planning, and (BBMP) basic service provision
Lake Conservation and Development Maintain lakes and prevent encroachment Authority (LDA) on lands adjacent to lakes
Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) Build housing for middleincome groups (MIG) and highincome groups (HIG)
Karnataka Slum Development Board Slum redevelopment and management, (KSDB) slum declaration, implementation of housing schemes for slums
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Implement schemes relating to urban Development and Finance Corporation infrastructure, provide technical assistance (KUIDFC) to urban local bodies
138 Oversight of BSUP at the state level is the responsibility of the Statelevel Nodal
Agency (SLNA) and the Statelevel Steering Committee (SLSC). Under BSUP, each state is required to appoint a Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA) to complete several policy implementation tasks, including: assisting implementing agencies in the preparation of
Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) and other policy documentation, monitoring physical and financial progress of projects, managing funds and releasing funds to the implementing agencies, and submitting reports to the state and central government on
NURM progress (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty
Alleviation and Ministry of Urban Development 2005, p. 6). In Karnataka, the Statelevel
Nodal Agency is the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance
Corporation (KUIDFC) .
The KUIDFC is a public limited company (created under the Companies Act of
1956) with the objective to “prepare, formulate and implement projects, schemes and programmes relating to infrastructure development in the urban areas of the state and to provide technical, financial, consultancy and other assistance to urban bodies for development, schemes, including implementation of master plans” (Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation n.d.). The members of the Board of
Directors of the KUIDFC are appointed by the Government of Karnataka and most, if not all, of the leadership comes from the nationwide cadre of civil servants [the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS)] who occupy key positions related to urban development in the state (e.g., the Chairman of the Bangalore Development Authority, the Principal
Secretary for the Housing Department, etc.) (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
139 Development Finance Corporation n.d.). The daytoday functions of the organization are overseen by the Managing Director who is also a member of the Board.
Because the implementation of BSUP requires the coordination of multiple agencies at the city, state, and central level, the role of the KUIDFC is critical to ensuring policy processes move ahead as scheduled. A city’s overall success under the policy is directly tied to the effectiveness of the SLNA. The former Managing Director of the
KUIDFC, Darpan Jain, describes this critical role:
Suppose if we were not there, then what would have happened? So different implementing agencies would be directly interacting with the government. It would become very difficult for government to interact with so many implementing agencies, have experts look at what they are asking, what they are saying, respond to them in time, and see if what they are saying is realistic or not. Because government has multifarious roles and responsibilities, it becomes difficult for them to work in a focused manner on this. So having a Statelevel Nodal Agency is beneficial because it provides the focused approach to dealing with a flagship program. You need a focused agency that looks at how the program is getting implemented on the ground, resolves issues faced by the implementing agencies, communicates with the central government or the state government in case the need arises. So there is a need for a focused expert agency. ... Therefore the role of the SLNA is important, and if you have a good Statelevel Nodal Agency, which has experts, which has professionals, which responds expeditiously to whatever is raised before it, it leads to valueaddition in the entire decisionmaking process.117
The efficiency and effectiveness of the SLNA largely depends on its ability to resolve coordination challenges between agencies. While officials within the KUIDFC describe the formal authority of the agency under the policy as somewhat limited under
JNNURMthe agency is described as an “oversight body” with no “veto powers”118 and
117 Personal Interview, March 31, 2015
118 Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014
140 no “discretionary authority”119the actual power of the KUIDFC to influence decisionmaking at the state and central level is quite strong given the organization’s legitimacy and reputation within the broader bureaucratic field.
After projects are approved by the KUIDFC, they are then forwarded to the
Statelevel Steering Committee (SLSC) , which is a policycreated body chaired by the
Chief Minister of the state. The SLSC is tasked with overseeing, approving, and prioritizing projects and placing them for final approval and funding before the
Government of India. The SLSC is also responsible for overseeing the effective implementation of various urban governance reforms that are part of JNNURM.
In Karnataka, the SLSC met twiceonce in April 2006 and again in October 2006
120before the Chief Minister delegated the responsibilities of the committee to a
Statelevel Empowered Committee (SLEC) chaired by the Chief Secretary of the
Government of Karnataka. According to meeting minutes from the second SLSC meeting, “there would be a need for a second tier committee that could meet as often as required at short notice in order to take the initiative further with GoI” (Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2006c). While this committee was referred to as a “second tier” committee, the SLEC essentially took over all deliberation and oversight functions of the Statelevel Steering Committee and the SLSC was responsible only for the final approval of projects. The SLEC has twelve standing members and includes representatives from many of the organizations involved in
119 Personal Interview, Ashok Jain, November 7, 2014
120 The committee was reconstituted in 2013 and met for the third time in July of 2013.
141 implementing JNNURM projects (e.g., the Slum Board, the BDA, the BBMP, etc.) as well as officials from relevant state government departments (e.g., the Housing
Department and the Urban Development Department), among others.121 An official from the statelevel bureaucracy describes the rationale for the “deviation from central
JNNURM guidelines” with the constitution of the SLEC:
The Chief Minister and other ministers are not always available for performing SLSC functions, whereas it is the department heads and secretaries who are involved in the daytoday operation of JNNURM schemes. Keeping this in view, Karnataka has the SLEC, which helps in speeding up the process of proposal formulation, sanctioning and sending for approvals.122
According to another official, the creation of this new approval agency was not only about placing the approvals process in the hands of those involved in the “daytoday operation” of NURM, but also about streamlining decision making processes:
Every time there is a decision, we can’t ask the Chief Minister to chair the meeting because he is so busy. So they [the SLSC] empowered that to SLEC. That is chaired by Chief Secretary, so all the projects will go to SLEC, and then they will approve that project, and then we will send it to MoUD for approval.123
121 As outlined in the meeting minutes from the second SLSC meeting on October 28, 2006, the members of the SLEC were to include: the Chief Secretary of the Government of Karnataka, Principal Secretary of the Finance Department, the Principal Secretary of the Urban Development Department, the Principal Secretary of the Housing Department, the Principal Secretary of the Transport Department, the Principal Secretary of Tourism and Culture, the Commissioner of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike, the Commissioner of the Bangalore Metropolitan Regional Development Authority, the Chairman of the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, the Commissioner of the Bangalore Development Authority, the Managing Director of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, the Managing Director of the Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, the Managing Director of the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation, and “any other officer connected with the mission” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2006c). These are all positions appointed by the state government.
122 Personal Interview, Darpan Jain, March 31, 2015
123 Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014
142 Improving the efficiency of coordination and implementation was crucial given the timebound nature of the scheme, and according to one official, this decision to create a
SLEC greatly “shorten[ed] the entire process of verification by the government.”124
Another official offered similar remarks about the SLEC’s reduced timeline for decision making:
You bring matters before the committee, [they] make a decision quickly, and you move ahead. Typically files would have to move from UDD [the Urban Development Department], it then would have gone to [the] Finance [Department], from Finance then it would have gone to the cabinet, and it would have taken nearly three to four months. The Empowered Committee has compressed this decisionmaking to a month’s time.125
The delegation of authority to the SLEC not only changed the timeline of approvals, but also the composition of the statelevel sanctioning body. As the Steering
Committee transitioned to an Empowered Committee it went from from 33 standing members (with 36 additional invitees) to four standing members (with eight additional invitees). While the SLSC included numerous political officials from the city, state, and federal level, the SLEC did not have any political officials as standing members of the committee. By shifting from a Steering Committee to an Empowered Committee, therefore, this not only reduced the time of approvals, but effectively eliminated the influence of political officials and shifted oversight and management of the scheme to bureaucratic agencies.
124 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department), March 18, 2015
125 I bid.
143 In Bangalore, numerous agencies were tasked with coordinating their efforts to achieve aims under BSUP. Due to the different organizational aims and structures, the diverse chains of command, and the varying scope of work for each agency, effective and efficient coordination between these agencies proved challenging. Policymakers anticipated that coordination would be a formidable obstacle to effective policy implementation, and so they created a structure that privileged hierarchical and technical forms of authority. In particular, those agencies that occupied higherlevel positions within the policy hierarchy and those agencies with strong technical capacity were seen as most capable of pushing projects forward and achieving aims. As shown in Figure 3.6 below, agencies with more scalar capital and technical capital would occupy dominant positions within the bureaucratic field and be able to use this position to shape the actions of more subordinate organizations within the field.
FIGURE 3.6: The ScalarTechnical Bureaucratic Field
144 While hierarchical authority and technical capacity are still important factors in structuring the processes of BSUP, the STF created by policymakers ignores other forms of capital and divisions within the field that prove valuable in shaping relations between agencies. In the next section of this chapter, I outline the particular logic of the bureaucratic field through an indepth examination of two agencies critical to BSUP’s implementation in Bangalore: the KUIDFC and the Slum Board. I show how relations within the bureaucratic field are more often shaped by forms of symbolic, political, social, and reputational capital, requiring that agencies go outside of the formal policy frameworks to achieve aims. In this sense, state capacity is less determined by legalrational forms of authority and technical capacity and more by the ability of bureaucratic actors to wield valued forms of capital within the field.
The Logic of the Bureaucratic Field Under BSUP
“The weakness or strength of the organization depends on how vulnerable the bureaucracy is. If it is a vulnerable bureaucracy, then you can influence the process.”126
From the framework proposed by policymakers, one could assume that policy processes would operate most effectively and efficiently if they moved through a bureaucratic structure that was organized primarily on hierarchical authority and technical capacity.
While hierarchical authority and technical capacity are still valued to a degree within the bureaucratic field, when examining policy processes on the ground, the ability to resolve implementation issues more often depends on other forms of political, symbolic, social, and reputational capital. In the remaining sections of this paper, I examine the ways in which these forms of capital shape the work of two agencies that play a central role in
126 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), April 3, 2015 145 BSUP’s implementation in Bangalore. I begin first by describing the work of the
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (i.e., the SLNA for BSUP). As an agency with high technical capacity, a key coordination role, and autonomy from elected representatives (Baindur and Kamath 2009), the KUIDFC represents an agency that would perform well within the scalartechnical framework advanced by policymakers. However, as I argue below, these characteristics are largely not always sufficient to successfully navigate dynamics within the field, requiring the
KUIDFC to mobilize other forms of capital and enroll various actors to achieve policy aims.
The KUIDFC: An Autonomous Technocratic Agency
As described in earlier sections of this chapter, the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) is the agency appointed at the state level to oversee BSUP and UIG projects within Karnataka. As a government corporation that oversees many largescale development projects funded by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, the agency is seen as efficient and highly technical, with experienced staff and strong leadership. The agency also has a reputation as highly capable due to its perceived autonomy from political influences. Within the scalartechnical field envisioned by policymakers, therefore, the KUIDFC occupies a dominant position due to its high technical capacity and key coordination role.
While the technical prowess and position within the policy hierarchy is certainly important to producing policy outcomes within Bangalore, the authority of the KUIDFC to force implementing agencies into action and resolve disputes between agencies under
146 the scheme is described as quite limited by its staff. Despite being empowered with the authority under NURM to approve projects, manage funds, and resolve conflicts between agencies, staff within the agency describe the KUIDFC as an “oversight body” with no
“veto powers”127 and no “discretionary authority”128 under the scheme. According to one staff member, the authority granted under the scheme is not always sufficient to resolve conflicts between agencies at the state level because “even the nodal agency is constrained. How can we interfere in something that is totally outside our domain?”129
The Managing Director of the KUIDFC provides similar remarks regarding the power of the agency under NURM:
It’s not a discretionary kind of a power. We say whenever a thing is contradictory to the scheme guidelines, so in that we tell if it [a NURM project] is not permissible or it is not acceptable. We give our recommendations to the SLEC, but we are not the final authority. The structure of the scheme is such that KUIDFC is a nodal agency, which is like a secretariat of the state government, so we place our views before the state government.130
While the formal “veto powers” of the KUIDFC may be limited under the scheme guidelines, the agency is still held accountable for policy outcomes in the state.
According to one official, “we [the KUIDFC] are answerable for this because the
Government of India in the CSMC [Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee] meetings, they don’t call the implementing agency, they call us and we have to go and explain why nothing has happened.”131 Another official noted how “we [the KUIDFC]
127 Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014
128 Personal Interview, Ashok Jain, November 7, 2014
129 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
130 Personal Interview, Darpan Jain, March 31, 2015
131 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015 147 are the responsible persons, though we don’t approve it, but we are the persons who assumes the responsibility.”132 In this sense, the KUIDFC may lack discretionary authority under the scheme, but given its key position as coordinator and problemsolver, the agency is still held accountable for policy failures. According to a seniorlevel bureaucrat, this is an “unenviable task”133 because the KUIDFC has no legal authority over the various bodies involved in implementation (e.g., BMTC, BWSSB, KSDB, etc.) and therefore cannot control these agencies, yet the KUIDFC has to ensure that these agencies meet their stated policy goals. This raises the question: without formal legal authority, and given the limited discretionary authority given to the agency under the scheme, how does the KUIDFC influence the broader bureaucratic field?
One of the main factors shaping the KUIDFC’s power within the broader bureaucratic field is the agency’s strong symbolic capital and legitimacy within the field.
The role of the Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA) is critical for any state and city attempting to implement projects under BSUP, but several bureaucrats within the state and central government note the uniqueness of the KUIDFC in particular. The organization has a strong reputation for being a highly “technical” and “professional”134 institution. According to the former Managing Director of the KUIDFC, this has to do with the organization’s organizational structure and staffing:
KUIDFC from the beginning has systems and procedures through which it functions in a very professional way . We don’t have many layers as in any normal
132 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
133 I bid.
134 Personal Interview, Chikkamuniyappa, April 20, 2015
148 government set upwe have very few layers in decision makingso we are quick to respond and the whole culture is good. It’s professional and we take best people from outside also...we take a lot of experts, consultants from outside. We try and get best talent that is available in the market. We are very transparent organization, that is one of the hallmarks of our culture, so that reputation is there of KUIDFC and we have preserved it with a lot of tenacity.135
When asked what makes the KUIDFC different from other administrative departments
(like the Directorate for Municipal Administration which served as the Statelevel Nodal
Agency for another slum redevelopment scheme, the Rajiv Awas Yojana), a staff member who has worked in both agencies remarked that “the difference between the KUIDFC and the DMA is mostly related to the technical aspects. In the KUIDFC there are more technical experts there.”136
This reputation as a highly technical agency is particularly helpful at the state level as well as at the central level when negotiating over various aspects of the BSUP policy. According to an official responsible for overseeing NURM within the KUIDFC,
Shalini Karpagam, the credibility of the organization is extremely important given that many solutions to problems raised by BSUP and NURM cannot be found by working solely through the official policy framework:
Credibility plays a huge role and the KUIDFC stands really tall amongst all the other states. ...Typically when we say something, even [the] Government of India listens. Very rarely are [our] recommendations not taken. ...Credibility plays a huge role because certain things cannot be put on paper. They cannot be put on paper and must be discussed. The solutionsa lot of them are out of the box solutions . ...A lot of things depends on the credibility of the nodal agency. ...When you are dealing with people, this actually matters, this counts to a large extent.137
135 Personal Interview, Darpan Jain, March 31, 2015
136 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
137 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
149 In this sense, because the solutions are often “out of the box”, the broader legitimacy and reputational capital of the organization plays a strong role in how and when they are able to garner support for these solutions that “cannot be put on paper”.
Credibility is not only tied to the broader reputation of the agency as highly technical, but also to the social capital of the agency’s leadership. According to a seniorlevel official within the KUIDFC, the siloed nature of the bureaucracy means that the reputation of key officials becomes incredibly important for ensuring effective policy implementation, almost more so than the agency’s technical capacity. He notes how:
The bureaucracy operates in silos, so the relationship of the nodal officer [of the KUIDFC] with the Ministry in Delhi is important. It is also important that they have good relationships with other officials within other agencies. If the nodal officer has good relations in Delhi, they [officials at the Centre] would usually give enormous use to allow discretionary leeway. For example, if they were slow on the reforms, the nodal officer would give his word that ‘it will be done’ and officials in Delhi would allow this. How the nodal officer manages people is critical.138
Another official (formerly within the KUIDFC) describes how “the nodal agency argues for the state government, and their ability to put forth these arguments and convince actors within Delhi is important. This ability is key to the position of MD [Managing
Director].”139
The reputation and social capital of the Managing Director strongly determines the power of the KUIDFC in Delhi and the agency’s influence over the daytoday implementation of the policy. A juniorlevel staff member (formerly within the KUIDFC)
138 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), April 14, 2015
139 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
150 describes how the role of the Managing Director can strongly influence the ability to coordinate between agencies:
Success depends upon the head of the organization. ...It depends upon the person. ...What happened was that the MD very rarely convened meetings between the agencies. He [instead] asked the GM [General Manager]. I can’t say that no meetings were heldmeetings every month...regular meetings were heldbut because they were under the chairmanship of the GM, a slight difference was there. The power of the group was not as much because the MD was not there.140
In this case, the Managing Director of the KUIDFC was unable (or unwilling) to lead coordination meetings and so this responsibility was deferred to a less seniorlevel staff member within the organization, the General Manager. With this change, “the power of the group” and the ability to resolve coordination challenges was weakened due to the less powerful position of the General Manager within the KUIDFC.
These intraagency power hierarchies prove critical for the agency’s overall legitimacy and effectiveness in shaping policy processes, and can be further divided into two dimensions. First, differences in power between the leaders within the organization often have to do with the particular role that these actors occupy within the broader civil service field. In the case mentioned above, for example, the Managing Director of the organization was a seniorlevel bureaucrat within the nationwide Indian Administrative
Service (IAS) and the General Manager was a civil servant within the statewide
Karnataka Administrative Service (KAS). While both occupied highlevel positions within the KUIDFC, the ability of the General Manager to influence the leadership of other organizations within the city was limited due to the fact he was not an IAS officer
140 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
151 (because the majority, though not all, of the parastatal agencies are also led by IAS officers).141 This contrasts with the power that the Managing Director was able to wield in negotiations due to his highranking status within the nationallevel bureaucracy. An official (formerly within the KUIDFC) describes this when he says:
What happens is the Managing Director, he is a very senior person in the IAS cadre. All these agencies they work with him. When he is speaking about other agencies, they listen. In the IAS bureaucracy, the man is senior and if he says something, then you listen. Occasionally it happens that the Managing Director is at a lower level than the person working on the other side. Sometimes that happens. ...This relationship is important.”142
In this sense, the reputation of the agency and its leadership is further divided by power hierarchies within and between state and national bureaucracies. Speaking on these competing hierarchies outside of the NURM framework, a former bureaucrat notes how
“hierarchies are important in the IAS as anywhere else in the government. It is not only important as a positioning tool within the service, but also to peg oneself against other hierarchies ” (Raghunandan 2016, emphasis added). The ability to mobilize particular hierarchies and forms of capital within the field (e.g., social capital as a member of the
IAS cadre), therefore proves valuable in achieving aims under the scheme.
The second dimension upon which the symbolic capital of leadership depends is the reputation of its leader as “technical” as opposed to “political”. According to a juniorlevel official from the KUIDFC, “ultimately an IAS officer having that integrity and that technical grasp brings a lot of difference to how things are managed or not
141 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
142 Personal Interview, Bhatan Lal, April 21, 2014
152 managed, so that has made a huge difference.”143 While technical capital can be understood in terms of a monopoly over a particular kind of expertise, the term
“technical” is described by others as a euphemism for one’s level of experience and political neutrality. According to a seniorlevel official within the KUIDFC “if an agency is headed by an elected person [then] there is an assumption that this person is in the position unfairly and that they are driven by party politics.”144 He continues by noting how the terms “technical” and “political” serve as euphemisms for describing a person’s qualifications. “Political” people are perceived within the broader bureaucratic field as
“unqualified to do the job in that position” as opposed to “technical” officials who are qualified and obtained their position based on merit.145 This autonomy from party politics is equally important in structuring relations between organizations within the broader policy field because it lends credibility to an agency’s leadership when advocating for particular actions under the scheme.
Similar to the legitimacy of the agency’s leadership, the reputation of the agency as a whole is also deeply connected to status as an autonomous, corporate entity. This reputation stems from the organization’s history as an agency created primarily to insulate development funds (from large international organizations like the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank) from the political process.146 The KUIDFC’s history as
143 P ersonal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
144 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), March 5, 2015
145 I bid.
146 Personal Interview, T. R. Raghunandan, February 17, 2015
153 a neutral agency still lends credibility to the organization today. One official describes this in greater detail:
[The KUIDFC] is more isolated. For example, with ADB [Asian Development Bank] projects, if politicians were unhappy or officials were unhappy, the KUIDFC could always blame the ADB for certain conditionalities that were tied to the ADB funds. They had a good alibi and a scapegoat with these foreign lenders. For this reason, irrational demands were not exceeded because they could always hold people in check by blaming the ADB. Also the money that they were bringing in didn’t go through the same financial processes, they had more of an isolated status from the political sphere.147
While this separation from the political field allows for greater autonomy to implement schemes in their intended form, the agency’s complete isolation from the political process is not always possible, nor effective, when attempting to implement schemes like BSUP. According to several officials within the organization, politicians are often actively involved in shaping key aspects of implementation like the identification of beneficiaries and the location of proposed BSUP projects.148 In cases where politicians stall or interrupt implementation, the KUIDFC is forced to intervene and typically does so by convening multiple actors (e.g., the Slum Board, the MLA, local councilor, etc.) to resolve the conflict.
While the KUIDFC prefers not to engage openly with politicians (likely over fears that this will negatively impact the agency’s autonomous reputation), the organization often times cannot avoid these interactions due to the strength of local and statelevel politicians in shaping BSUP implementation. The strength of politicians can
147 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), March 5, 2015
148 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014; Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014; Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014 154 create numerous implementation challenges, but it can also help to resolve them.
According to a seniorlevel staff member within the KUIDFC, politicians can actually enhance the work of the KUIDFC in areas where the agency has no jurisdictional control, but needs to intervene to resolve policy problems. By politicizing implementation processes and requesting that the KUIDFC intervene, politicians effectively pave the way for the KUIDFC to act, thereby allowing the agency to remain neutral in their actions (by claiming that they were acting at the behest of political officials) while still meeting their policy objectives. It is unclear how often these interactions occur, primarily because they are almost always done covertly, but one official describes this covert collaboration and how it enhances the capacity of the KUIDFC to meet policy objectives:
Interviewee : We don’t do it on record. We don’t do it on record. That’s when politicians are good. Interviewer : To help out with these kinds of implementation issues? Interviewee: Yes. They do the things that the KUIDFC can’t justifiably do, when we can’t justifiably interfere. No, we don’t work with them, not if we can help it. Totally keep away from them, but invariably they get involved. For example, this wall was built four years back. We didn’t know this wall had fallen down, the MLA contacted us, and said ‘this wall is down and it was built under JNNURM, I want a report, I want a study, I want everything.’ We were then able to get involved and the whole thing got resolved.149
By covertly collaborating with this MLA, officials from the KUIDFC were then able to justify their intervention in the field by pointing to the demands raised by the MLA. In much the same way that the KUIDFC scapegoats international agencies to check
“irrational demands” from politicians, the KUIDFC scapegoats politicians as the reason for overstepping their jurisdictional authority.
149 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), November 20, 2014 155 When examining the scalartechnical field envisioned by bureaucrats, the
KUIDFC resembles an idealtypical agency occupying a key coordinating role within the policy hierarchy and characterized by high technical capacity and autonomy from political actors. While policymakers envisioned this dominant role within the STF to be sufficient to shape policy processes and resolve conflicts that emerged during implementation, these forms of capital were not always the most critical to the agency’s effectiveness and overall capacity. Rather, its ability to successfully exercise its symbolic and social capital, enroll the assistance of political actors, and navigate overlapping bureaucratic hierarchies proved more valuable in maneuvering within the policy structure and producing outcomes within Bangalore.
In the next section of this chapter I examine another key implementation agency for BSUP in Bangalorethe Karnataka Slum Development Boardand examine how the agency achieves policy aims within the bureaucratic field. Within the scalartechnical field envisioned by policymakers, the agency occupies a mixed position; it is seen as possessing some technical knowledge of slum communities and slum redevelopment, but the agency has weak legitimacy due to its perceived embeddedness with political and civil society actors. While the agency occupies a more dominant position within the STF due to its position within the policy hierarchy (at the state level), this position is often not enough to force other agencies into action. By tracing the broader structural dynamics that shape the work of the Slum Board, I demonstrate how the work of the agency is structured by competing chains of command and overlapping jurisdictions that make it incredibly challenging to produce outcomes within the official policy framework.
156 The KSDB: An Embedded Technocratic Agency
Within the broader bureaucratic field envisioned by policymakers, the Slum Board represents an agency with some technical capacitygiven its knowledge about slum redevelopment in the stateand somewhat dominant scalar position given its role at the state level. However, there are various divisions within the bureaucratic field that limit the agency’s ability to effectively meet its objectives despite its possession of these two forms of capital. As an agency that engages frequently with political and civil society actors, the Slum Board is seen as less legitimate within the broader bureaucratic field and less adept at meeting its policy objectives. Despite its monopoly of technical expertise related to slum management and development,150 other bureaucratic actors within the field describe the Slum Board as generally “incompetent”151 with staff who are “crooks”
152 due to the agency’s purported embeddedness with politicians. Actors at the Statelevel
Nodal Agency frequently assume that BSUP implementation challenges are the result of
150 It is important to note that other agencies and actors would likely challenge the idea that the Slum Board has a monopoly of expertise about slums and slum residents’ needs. For example, the urban local body (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike or the BBMP) is technically responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of nonnotified slums in Bangalore (Kamath 2012; Personal Interview, K.R. Niranjan, July 16, 2012), and studies in Bangalore have demonstrated the close relationship between municipal councilors and slum residents (Benjamin 2008). As will be shown in C hapter Four of this dissertation, NGOs and activists operating in the city also often claim a monopoly of expertise about the “real” needs of slum residents. I am not disputing these claims, but rather arguing that within the policy implementation field, the Slum Board is seen as the agency with a monopoly of expertise over issues related to slums in Bangalore given its role as the main implementing agency for BSUP and its role as the only statutory body [established under the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1 973] r esponsible for slum development, maintenance, and improving the basic services of slum communities in the state of Karnataka.
151 Personal Interview, Junior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), April 3, 2015
152 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
157 incompetence or rentseeking on the part of the Slum Board rather than administrative structures.
Because of this reputation as an agency deeply embedded with political actors, the
KUIDFC chose to transfer the identification of BSUP project beneficiaries and the collection of beneficiary contributions to the municipal government (despite the purportedly “weak capacity” of the municipality). This was partly due to the lack of trust in Slum Board and also the Slum Board’s reluctance to deal with the “social headaches”
153 (i.e., dealing with resistance from slum residents) associated with this aspect of policy implementation. One official within the KUIDFC remarks how:
The KSDB was doubted by every organization, it was believed that they may manipulate the beneficiaries, they may take bribes from the beneficiaries. So they [the Statelevel Empowered Committee] also thought [in addition to the SLNA] ‘okay, let BBMP handle it. Then there may be a more transparent process.’ That was the internal thinking.154
While officials within the SLNA hoped that transferring these responsibilities from the
KSDB to the BBMP would improve project efficiencydue to BBMP’s transparency and proximity to slum residents’ needsimplementation and coordination challenges frequently occurred between the BBMP and the Slum Board. The coordination challenges between the Slum Board and the BBMP were so common that the former Commissioner of the KSDB remarked that “we [the Slum Board] fail because of noncooperation from the BBMP.”155
153 Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 2, 2014
154 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014
155 Personal Interview, Chikkamuniyappa, April 20, 2015
158 While the position of the BSUP oversight agencies (the Statelevel Nodal agency and the Statelevel Empowered Committee) and the Slum Board as “higher” within the policy hierarchy would, in theory, give them powers to ensure cooperation between the
BBMP and the KSDB, this was complicated by the different oversight structures of the
BBMP and the KSDB within the state government. As described above, within the
Government of Karnataka, housing and urban development are two separate departments with differing chains of command. The Housing Department (HD) oversees the Slum
Board and the Urban Development Department (UDD) manages the BBMP. Due to this separation, if the Slum Board requires action from the BBMP, it is largely unable to directly pressure the agency into action, despite occupying a “higher” position within the scalartechnical field.
Not only is the administrative structure difficult when trying to coordinate issues between agencies operating under competing chains of authority, the funding structure under BSUP reinforces the inequity between agencies and the Slum Board’s broader negotiating power within the field. Under BSUP, funding flows from the Centre, to the
Statelevel Nodal Agency, through the Urban Development Department, and then to the implementing agency. One official within the KUIDFC notes how:
Unless the Urban Development Department agrees to the project from the Housing Department (or the KSDB), the project cannot be totally sanctioned because it is the Urban Development Department that is the agency that receives the funding from Government of India.156
156 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
159 Despite its role as overseeing the operation and budget of the Slum Board, the Housing
Department does not manage or disburse BSUP funding to the Slum Board. According to the Principal Secretary of the Housing Department, this makes his policy oversight and management role largely symbolic:
I don’t know why it [oversight of BSUP funding] was with the Urban Development Department when slum development is a function of the Housing Department. …I am also assessing from as distance as you are. I am not implementing, I am only an observer. I am neither administratively holding that account from which the money comes and goes, nor directly implementing projects. ...My responsibility will be just concrete, constructing buildings. I am accountable for if a building is constructed or not, if the quality of building is right or not, what is given in the schedule of rates or their Detailed Project Reports. These are faults because of a topdown [policy creation] approach.157
Under BSUP policy processes, the Housing Department’s formal authority over implementation is quite limited. It does not manage funds for the scheme nor is it formally responsible for overseeing the work of the KSDB under BSUP. Based on formal policy processes, the SLNA, SLEC, as well as the UDD are the agencies officially tasked with overseeing the work of the Slum Board, despite the fact that the Slum Board is accountable to the Housing Department.
Despite this structure, when issues arise, the Housing Department is frequently called in to address issues related to the Slum Board’s lack of performance and is still largely expected to hold the Slum Board accountable if it is not meeting policy timelines.
In this sense, the Principal Secretary may view his role as “symbolic”, but the Housing
Department does play a critical role in pressuring the Slum Board to act when it is behind schedule or facing implementation delays. While the Housing Department may not play a
157 Personal Interview, Sanjiv Kumar, February 26, 2015
160 major role in official policy processes, it is critical for ensuring that the Slum Board meets its commitments under the scheme.
For example, if the Slum Board goes over budget due to cost escalations from
BSUP housing schemes, the Housing Department is financially responsible for the additional costs accrued by the Slum Board. In a letter from the KUIDFC to the Urban
Development Department dated June 19, 2012 (three years after Bangalore began implementing BSUP projects), there is a section entitled “Time Over Run Projects.” At the time of this letter, out of 14 current projects, the KSDB had only completed one project on time. The remaining 13 projects were delayed for various reasons, and, as a result, projects often went well over their initial budget. Cost escalation was partly due to the fact that implementing agencies were given no guidance by the Centre as to the average cost of dwelling unit construction and therefore drastically underestimated costs in the first round of projects.158 As well, when projects were delayed (e.g., often times for several months due to refusal on the part of slum residents to agree to construction or land disputes), the cost of land as well as construction materials would rise. When this occurred, the Housing Department would be requested (by the Statelevel Empowered
Committee) to prepare a proposal to meet the additional costs in collaboration with the
Statelevel Nodal Agency. Because these additional costs were now to be born by a state government department, they could not simply be approved through the formal BSUP policy oversight channels. Instead, according to meeting minutes the 21st meeting of the
Statelevel Empowered Committee (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development
158 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014; Personal Interview, P. Jayamala, October 16, 2014
161 Finance Corporation 2012), completed proposals were then to be submitted to the
Finance Department through the Urban Development Department. When this occurs, decisions on the part of the Finance Department are subject to approval from the state
Cabinet, effectively opening up BSUP processes to democratic approval. The former
Slum Board Commissioner describes what happens when this occurs:
Regarding escalation issues, we have sent a proposal to the KUIDFC and they have to place the subject before the SLEC. The SLEC has to approve this decision and decide who has to give the funds for that escalation. If its housing department funds or UD [Urban Development Department] funds. Then the budget issue comes and if the state government decides that the escalation needs to come from [the] Housing [Department], then they will cut from our regular budget. So we have a set amount for basic infrastructure of the slums, regular infrastructure, drinking water, drainage, road, and other facilities. If they say you will incur from that expenditure, our work resources as well come down. The people will come, slum dwellers will come, they will stage a dharna [protest] saying that we are not implementing water, we have not provided roads, drainage. So there is a link between one issue and the other issue. A chain of problems will come.159
Even though the policy infrastructure created for NURM aimed to streamline governance challenges, the mismatch between the authority of agencies and their differing chains of command fueled rather than resolved implementation challenges for the Slum Board.
Despite the Slum Board’s position within the field and its role as a key implementation agency, the agency is largely perceived as vulnerable given its embeddedness with political actors and its weak economic and legal authority. According to a former seniorlevel official within the KUIDFC, the power of organizations within the urban governance field is deeply connected to the agency’s financial autonomy and legal authority. In particular, when speaking about the Bangalore Water Supply and
Sewerage Board (a parastatal agency), the official remarks that the agency “is no
159 Personal Interview, Chikkamuniyappa, April 20, 2015 162 pushover.”160 This largely has to do with the fact that the BWSSB, as well as many of the other parastatal organizations operating in Bangalore, are not dependent upon state or central government funding to sustain their organizations. Another parastatal, the
Karnataka Housing Board (KHB), operates in a similar fashion. Despite also being overseen by the Department of Housing (and the requirement to meet the same statutory clearances required of all agencies within the Housing Department161), the KHB operates with more autonomy than the Slum Board because it does not receive budgetary support from the government. Niranjan Nayak, an official within the KHB, describes how “we don’t have any budgetary support from the government, this board. So we generate schemes, we generate funds, this is a selfsustaining organization. If the demand is there, we take up schemes. Otherwise we won’t.”162 According to Additional Director of Town
Planning within the KHB, this financial autonomy strengthens their negotiating power and the agency’s overall approach to work in the city. He describes how:
We do not wait always until the approvals come in to do our work. Most of the time we simply move ahead with our work and then wait for the approvals to come. If we did not do this, then the cost escalation would be quite large for projects and we would no longer be financially viable.163
The financial autonomy of the agency greatly structures its ability to influence the broader urban governance field. Many of the parastatal agenciesthe BMTC, BWSSB,
BDA, etc.are selfsustaining organizations, which (in addition to having IAS leadership
160 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), April 14, 2015
161 Personal Interview, Niranjan Nayak, September 30, 2014
162 Personal Interview, September 30, 2014
163 Personal Interview, K. R. Veerendranath, September 30, 2014
163 appointed by the state government) greatly increases its negotiating power with other agencies in the field. The Slum Board, in contrast, is dependent fully on government funding and so it has little leverage within the broader bureaucratic field. According to one official, this places the Slum Board in a subordinate position within the field because
“with the Slum Board, they are a part of the budget, and the government has to provide them money, and without that money the work suffers. There is always power differentials between those who give money and those who take.”164
The subordinate position of the Slum Board within the field is also related to its legal authority to shape practices within cities. According to a senior staff member within the Housing Board “because of the KHB Act, the Housing Board is able to acquire land, which is more difficult for other agencies...each agency has its own Act that determines the scope of its work and its ability to acquire land.” He goes on to describe how many agencies have their own acts and, while these agencies rarely, if ever, go to court over the legal stipulations in their acts, agencies can use their act to override the authority of other agencies. In this sense, an agency’s broader powers within the bureaucratic field are intimately connected to the legal authority given to the agency. The functioning of the agency depends on “good officers, a good system, the backing of a good Act.”165
When examining differences in the Karnataka Housing Act when compared to the
Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, the power to acquire land is given to both agency. However, the KSDB must engage in a political process of
164 Personal Interview, Jawald Akhtar, April 15, 2015
165 Personal Interview, K. R. Veerendranath, September 30, 2014
164 negotiation before acquiring land, which the KHB is exempted from. Specifically, the
KHB Act states: “the Board may enter into an agreement with any person for the acquisition from him by purchase, lease or exchange, of any land which is needed for the purposes of a housing scheme” (Government of Karnataka Housing Department n.d.).
The Slum Board, on the other hand:
May acquire the land by publishing in the official Gazette, a notice to the effect that it has been decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section: Provided that before publishing such notice, the Government shall call upon the owner or any other person who, in the opinion of the Government, may be interested in such land, to show cause why it should not be acquired; and after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or any other person interested in the land, the Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.
While each act legally provides the agencies with authority to acquire land, minor differences in the “strength” of each act afford agencies with differential powers to meet their stated objectives. When the Slum Board’s somewhat limited ability to directly enter into agreements over land (without public or governmental notification prior to the settling of the agreement) is combined with the fact that the agency is largely reliant upon funding from the state and central government, this greatly weakens the position of the agency to influence the practices of other organizations involved in BSUP’s implementation. This raises the question: without much formal legal authority, and given the weak legitimacy of the agency (due to its embeddedness with political actors), how does the KSDB influence the broader bureaucratic field?
As mentioned above, to achieve several aims of the BSUP scheme, the Slum
Board often has to coordinate with the municipal government (i.e., the BBMP). Due to their differing chains of command and the limited powers of the Slum Board to directly
165 pressure the BBMP to act, the Slum Board often negotiates with multiple officials within the Urban Development Department who oversee the BBMP and employs other forms of capital to navigate these dynamics. The Slum Board Commissioner describes how the agency addresses coordination challenges with the BBMP:
With the BBMP we are always fighting. The BBMP Commissioner, the BBMP officials are not cooperating. ...The Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) of Urban Development, he has to take control. He has to conduct a meeting and try to help us with handing over of a site [for BSUP development] and for the collection of contributions from the BBMP.166
However, the “handing over of a site” for BSUP project development, in this example, was not as as simple as working through the hierarchy of the Urban Development
Department. The Commissioner describes a case where confusion over land ownership led to a complicated scenario ultimately involving the BBMP, the Slum Board, as well as the Bangalore Development Authority (a parastatal agency at the state level). When attempting to implement a BSUP project in Bangalore, the municipal corporation handed over lands to the Slum Board to develop the area for a BSUP project. However, according to the Slum Board Commissioner, the land was “wrongly given to the Slum Board by the
BBMP”167 and the land was actually owned by the Bangalore Development Authority.
Reports from the Government of India Comptroller and Auditor General (2012) and an article from the Deccan Herald (2013) confirm the confusion surrounding this case and describe a chaotic situation:
The inspection also showed that there were deficiencies in the project right from issuance of title deeds to allotment of the completed units. While the detailed project report said the land on which the settlement was proposed belonged to the Palike [BBMP, the municipal corporation], it was found that the ownership of the
166 Personal Interview, Chikkamuniyappa, April 20, 2015
167 I bid. 166 land was with Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), the title of the land with the beneficiaries of the Indira Gandhi Slum while the hakku patras (title deeds) had been issued to the Gangondanahalli slum dwellers.
In this instance, confusion over land ownership required the Slum Board to directly negotiate with both the UDD and the BDA to clarify the BBMP’s role and land ownership status. The Slum Board could not solve this challenge simply by exercising its position of authority within the policy hierarchy over the BBMP and instead had to navigate several different chains of command and build upon the scalar capital of other organizations within the bureaucracy to pressure the BBMP into action.
Despite the Slum Board’s weak legal authority and financial autonomy within the broader bureaucratic field, the agency is still the main BSUP implementing agency within the state and has some powers within the field as a result. For example, if the agency chooses to stall progress or not implement projects at all, this potentially harms the reputation of the KUIDFC and other statelevel officials who are mindful of how their reputation impacts their relations with actors at the state and central level. According to an official within the Statelevel Nodal Agency “since our biggest implementing agency is [the] Slum Board, a lot of our success depends upon the performance of the slum board”.168 As well, due to the Slum Board’s experience creating most of the Detailed
Project Reports (DPRs) for the BSUP policy, the agency is now seen as possessing a unique kind of technical capital that allows them to navigate policy procedures in an efficient manner. This is particularly important as statelevel agencies have an incentive to obtain approvals and produce outcomes within cities quickly given the short timeframe
168 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), March 5, 2015 167 of urban development schemes like JNNURM. One official within the KUIDFC describes the valued expertise of the Slum Board given the timebound nature of the scheme:
We have to take decisions in a very limited period of time and we are mindful of not losing out on the approvals at the Government of India. We need to harness whatever was learned by the Slum Board. ...They are fairly aware of the processes and they have done that exercise.169
In this sense, due to the need to demonstrate progress at a quick pace and show success to the Centre, statelevel agencies had an incentive to let the Slum Board remain the primary implementation agency at the state level, despite the agency’s broader reputation in the field as generally “incompetent”170, with staff who are “crooks”171. Despite the KSDB’s somewhat subordinate position within the STF (due to the agency’s embeddedness with political actors), this enhanced role essentially broadens the de facto veto powers of the
Slum Board within the field due to its increasingly central role in policy implementation around the state.
In cases where the agency was not able to directly pressure other agencies into action within the policy framework, the Slum Board would often employ the assistance of other agencies and build upon the more dominant positions of these agencies within the field to achieve outcomes. In some cases these collaborations involved working with other bureaucrats, but in many cases the capacity of the Slum Board to achieve outcomes
169 Personal Interview, Senior Official (Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department), April 4, 2015
170 Personal Interview, Junior Official (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation), April 3, 2015
171 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015
168 within this field depended on alliance with actors outside of the bureaucratic field, namely civil society actors and politicians (some of these dynamics were described in this chapter, but are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two and Chapter Six ).
Conclusion
NURM policymakers constructed a policy that relied heavily upon forms of technical and scalar/hierarchical authority to achieve policy outcomes. Due to the scope of the scheme, policymakers believed that the most effective way to produce change in cities was to empower agencies at various scales with the authority to resolve coordination challenges and implementation issues. By bringing together diverse organizationswith differing organizational motives, goals, and structuresunder the banner of one policy, however, policymakers failed to account for the ways in which interactions between bureaucratic agencies can shift from being structured primarily by bureaucratic authority and instead be “recast in terms of power” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1979, p. 198). When this occurs, other forms of capital and power within the bureaucratic field become crucial to effective coordination between agencies and successful policy implementation.
By viewing the bureaucracy under BSUP as a “field of force” (Rudolph and
Rudolph 1979, p. 226), this chapter highlights the specific divisions, struggles, and social forces within and outside the bureaucratic field that shape the state practices. By examining the case of the KUIDFC and the KSDB in greater depth, I also demonstrate how various agencies involved in BSUP implementation seek to shape implementation processes within this environment. While others have already highlighted the gaps between the high modernist visions of policymakers and the actual practices on the
169 ground (Li 2007; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Scott 1998), this chapter goes beyond merely acknowledging the “visionpractice” disjuncture and instead highlights the specific dynamics, negotiations, and struggles that shape and constitute these gaps as well as the ways in which state actors strategize to overcome them.
The cases of the KUIDFC and the KSDB, in particular, demonstrate not only that the powers granted to these agencies under the scalartechnical framework were largely insufficient to achieve policy aims, but also how both agencies sought to influence the field in spite of their limited powers within the field. The case of the KUIDFC and the
KSDB demonstrate that while technical capacity and hierarchy are privileged within the
STF, the ability to shape policy processes more often depends on unique forms of reputational, social, symbolic, and political capital. More specifically, state capacity is structured by the social capital and reputation of leaders, the ability to strategically engage with political officials, and an agency’s ability to demonstrate certain kinds of policy expertise within the field. In this sense, state capacity is not solely about hierarchical authority or technical capacity but is the outcome of relationships between differentiallypositioned bureaucratic actors wielding different forms of capital within the bureaucratic field.
In the next chapter, I examine another social field that strongly shapes the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore, the civil society field. In this chapter I trace the broader logic, forms of division, and struggles that shape this field in an attempt to understand how broader field dynamics shape how civil society actors engage with the state.
170
CHAPTER FOUR
“FOR THE PEOPLE’S SAKE, WE COMPROMISE” DELINEATING AND CONTESTING THE CIVIL SOCIETY FIELD
“The balance becomes a little tough. Sometimes we have to compromise a little bit because if we start opposing everything the state does then the work will never get done. ... Sometimes, for [the] people’s sake, we compromise a little.”172
Introduction
On May 27, 2006, Bangalore’s most prominent civil society organizations and activists were brought together for the second of three “NGO stakeholder” meetings to discuss
JNNURM and the implementation of BSUP in the city.173 After a brief discussion on the overall policy aims and policy implementation processes, participants from various civil society groups174 operating in Bangalore were invited to give presentations on their work in slum communities and to raise any questions and concerns about the BSUP policy and its implementation in the city. Three representatives from different civil society
172 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, March 18, 2015
173 The first meeting was held on April 7, 2006 and the third meeting was held in November 2006. During these meetings, participants discussed the overall goals of JNNURM, but did not address the implementation of BSUP because implementation did not commence until 2009 in the city.
174 The definition of “civil society” varies significantly in the literature. I follow Abers and Keck (2009) and use the term to refer broadly to “nonstateness and (usually) publicness” (p. 311). Because I focus on the boundaries of the civil society field in this chapter, delimiting the field upfront goes against the overall aim of this chapter. 171 organizationsthe Association for Voluntary Action and Service (AVAS), the Association for Promoting Social Action (APSA), and the Karnataka State Mahila Milan (a national
NGO)presented their thoughts on the importance of slum resident participation in policy planning and implementation, the need not for “charity, but facilitation”
(Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2006a) by civil society groups, and the desire for slum residents to have legal claim to the land where they reside (which many viewed as essential to enhancing the livelihood of slum residents). After representatives from these three organizations spoke, the floor was then opened to other civil society representatives from around the city. Many expressed similar concerns over citizen participation and slum residents’ legal claims to urban land.
175
While these actors were included in early conversations about the vision and direction of the policy, there was no formal requirement for the state government to continue to include them once the NURMmandated City Development Plan (CDP) was completed. When speaking to civil society representatives about their involvement in shaping the policy agenda in Bangalore, several note that there was little to no effort on the part of state policymakers to engage this stakeholder group in highlevel discussions
175 Consultation for the City Development Plan (CDP) was required under JNNURM. For this reason, five stakeholder meetings were held in Bangalore in the early months of the NURM scheme to discuss the overall aims of the policy, how to effectively meet the existing needs of slum residents and slum communities, how to prevent future slums, and how BSUP plans would fit into the larger City Development Plan. None of these meetings included direct discussions with slum residents whose communities would potentially be impacted by BSUP. The first three meetings were attended mostly by politicians and bureaucrats from the city and state. The fourth and fifth meetings brought together a large number of actors and civil society groups working in slums throughout the city, but there were no politicians or bureaucrats in attendance.
172 about the policy’s aims after these initial meetings.176 This does not mean that civil society actors were not involved in the implementation of the policy after 2006, however.
Many of the organizations that attended these early meetings were actively involved in the daytoday implementation of BSUP in Bangalore. Civil society actors played a central role in shaping policy processes in slums and often served as key mediators between slum residents, slum leaders, politicians, and bureaucrats.
The role of these organizations in the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore was varied, however. In some cases, civil society organizations helped actors within the state to translate their policy goals and convince skeptical residents to agree to BSUP implementation in their slum community. In other cases, civil society groups combined forces to pressure the main implementing agencythe Karnataka Slum Development
Board (KSDB or Slum Board)to meet the needs of residents and deliver on policy promises. Still further, selfdescribed “activists” advocated that the state view slum residents not as beneficiaries of a policy, but as people deserving of a particular right to housing and urban land. These “activists” saw themselves as distinct from “NGOs” operating in the city and viewed their actions as contradictory to the overall “neoliberal” agenda promoted by NGOs and the state under the BSUP policy. While the involvement of these civil society actors was not formally mandated by the Government of India, these groups were quite active in the implementation of the scheme in diverse ways, and their involvement strongly shaped policy processes on the ground.
176 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, November 5, 2014; Personal Interview, Vinay Baindur, May 1, 2014; Personal Interview, Kshithij Urs, March 3, 2015 173 Earlier chapters of this dissertation have described other key “social fields”
(Bourdieu 1979, 1984) that shaped the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore. This chapter continues in this vein and outlines the actors within the civil society “field”, how this field is structured, how the practices of civil society actors are shaped by dynamics within other social fields, and to what effect. I argue that actors within the field regularly engage in definitional struggles over the divisions within and the boundaries of the broader civil society field. They articulate divisions between “NGOs” and “activists” within the field and seek to define forms of acceptable practices for engaging with the state and slum residents. I argue that actors engage in this boundarywork in an effort to position themselves as the most legitimate representatives of slum residents’ interests within the civil society field. They have an incentive to do so for two main reasons. First, in a context where there are numerous NGOs177 competing for the ability to work in slum communities throughout the city (and “turf wars” between some of these groups), the ability for civil society actors to occupy a dominant position within the field helps groups to sustain the work of their organizations by solidifying existing work in slums and possibly allowing for new partnerships in slums throughout the city. Second, power within the civil society field also helps groups to gain access to key policymakers who defer to the “experts” on slums when evaluating and discussing policies for the urban poor within the city.178 Occupying a dominant position within the field, therefore, can
177 “The only ways to radically change arrangements in a social space are to delegitimize old differences or to emphasize new ones” (Abbott 1995, p. 872).
178 In one case, the newly appointed Principal Secretary for the Government of Karnataka Housing Department called a meeting with several “activists” in Bangalore to discuss housing in the city. When I asked why the Secretary would call a meeting with “known activists” (because the term “activist” is portrayed by interviewees as individuals working a gainst the state to reshape policies), an “activist” from 174 bring material gains and meeting organizational ends, but it is also critical to the work of groups who seek to (re)define what BSUP and other largescale urban development policies will mean for the future of the urban poor in the city.
While civil society actors actively engage in struggles over the boundaries of and divisions within the civil society field, I argue that the actual practices of civil society groups under BSUP often contradict their public stance on the BSUP policy. For example, selfproclaimed “activists” help to produce housing under BSUP despite their vocal opposition to the scheme (and the fact that they claim to “hesitate to speak to power”179), and NGOs oppose the work of the state despite their initial support for the state’s plans. I claim that this disconnect between discourse and action is not the result of inconsistent worldviews or false rhetoric, but rather is driven by the dynamics between social fields. Because civil society groups must compete with other powerful actors within slums to be seen as the most legitimate representative of residents’ needs, they must balance their official ideological stance with the need to retain legitimacy within slum communities. In some cases, this means balancing the desire to appear in opposition to the state with the need to produce tangible outcomes for slum residents. One Bangalore activist articulates this delicate balancing act when he says, “the balance becomes a little tough. Sometimes we have to compromise a little bit because if we start opposing everything the state does then the work will never get done. ... Sometimes, for people’s
Action Aid responded “because we are in touch with the community. To understand the perspective of the community, they would definitely call us” (Personal Interview, Malarvizhi M., March 17, 2015).
179 Personal Interview, Issac Arul Selva, March 5, 2015
175 sake, we compromise a little .”180 In this sense, the actions of civil society actors can only be understood by examining the “linked ecologies” (Hirschman and Berman 2014)181 of the civil society field and the broader policy intervention field.
Beginning with a brief description of the role of civil society groups as important social experts for BSUP, I then examine the boundary struggles that emerge within the civil society field and how these struggles create and shape particular kinds of social action and social worlds for actors within the field. Actors within the civil society field regularly engage in “boundarywork” (Gieryn 1983; Lamont and Molnár 2002, p. 168), delineating “sites of difference” (Abbott 1995, p. 869) within the field and between civil society groups and other powerful actors operating in slums (e.g., slum leaders, politicians, and the state). I trace the two main forms of division within the field (over ideology and forms of engagement with the state and slum residents) in an effort to demonstrate how actors seek to position themselves as either powerful or subordinate within the field. Following this discussion, I demonstrate how relations with other social fields shape the actual practices of civil society actors under BSUP.
Because the BSUP policy is a complex policy with wideranging objectives, different civil society actors have different interpretations of what those objectives are and how they should be achieved. The boundaries constructed within the civil society
180 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, March 18, 2015
181 The interconnectedness of fields and the balancing of forces between fields is briefly discussed by Hirschman and Berman (2014) in their examination of the role of economists in shaping public policies. The authors describe how “economists’ actions in the policy domain must also be understood with reference to their professional domain, since the two are partially independent, but linked, ecologies...with their own rules and rewards.” In this chapter, I follow this line of thinking and seek to understand how civil society actors balance the forces within their field with those existing in other fields. Within their field, civil society groups struggle over the ability to be seen as experts or authorities.
176 field and between this field and other social fields, therefore, emerge as civil society groups seek to articulate their stance on the broader policy objectives and the best ways to achieve particular objectives. In this sense, the divisions within the civil society field become “yoked together” (Abbott 1995, p. 860) under BSUP/NURM as various groups seek to define the broader meaning of these schemes for Bangalore’s future.
A Dwelling or a Home?: The Social Expertise of Civil Society
As discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation, a number of bureaucrats involved in the implementation of BSUP regularly cited “social issues” or “social aspects” as the primary obstacles to effective BSUP implementation. “Social issues” was a shorthand to refer to slum residents’ resistance to BSUP, which was often so strong that BSUP projects were regularly delayed, and in many cases, completely abandoned in certain communities.
While state actors often blamed residents for policy issues, a handful of actors within and outside of the state blamed policy challenges on the disconnect between the highly technical nature of the policy and the social complexity of the housing issue.
The Founder and Director of a Bangalorebased NGO called AVAS (the
Association of Voluntary Actions for Society) articulates the inability for bureaucrats and engineers to properly understand the highly social nature of housing by describing the difference between a “house” and a “home”:
They’re [the bureaucrats] are so segmented. If you’re in engineering, you’re an engineer. If you’re in town planning, you’re a town planner. So you don’t see this as a holistic approach to change of a community. A house then is four walls . To really look at the social aspects of housing, which is a home , is what really makes the difference.182
182 Personal Interview, Anita Reddy, March 4, 2015
177 Her comments were echoed by several others working for various civil society groups both within and outside of Bangalore. According to Kshithij Urs, the Director of the
Bangalore branch of an international NGO called Action Aid, “housing, for example, is part of BSUP. It is not just a roof on your head, you know?”183 Still further, an activist in
Bangalore remarks on the importance of taking a more holistic approach to understanding housing for the urban poor:
We are formulating a strong critique of this policy so that the government can plan for the future and develop an understanding of housingbecause housing is not just housing. It is the life of the people. Housing is linked with livelihoods, housing is linked with your dignity, housing is linked with human development, housing is linked with your health, right? There are so many things. Housing is very central. But ‘dwelling’ is the only aspect the government looks at. Residence. So that is a very mechanical way of looking at a house.184
This inability for engineers and other state actors to look beyond a “mechanical” approach to housing, to some, represents a lack of sociological knowledge about the real issues facing the urban poor:
Now the National Buildings Organization is the worst organization of this kind. They have no sociologists , they are not a social scienceoriented organization and consequently the guidelines of the survey methodologies and schedules that they have produced, which are supposed to be used by CBOs [communitybased organizations] and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] are hopelessly technical.185
A researcher tasked with evaluating BSUP and JNNURM in Bangalore echoes these comments and notes how “they [the BSUP project engineers] do not take into account the sociological aspects that are necessary to understand these projects. They are only
183 Personal Interview, March 3, 2015
184 Personal Interview, Rajendran Prabhakar, June 22, 2014
185 Personal Interview, Dunu Roy, March 14, 2014
178 interested in the planning aspects.”186 A civil society actor in Delhi offered similar remarks about engineers when she stated, “what we really saw unfolding was a program that started to create exclusion. ...One reason is the fact that [municipal] corporations are full of engineers and engineers only understand, you know, physical engineering of buildings and structures and all.”187 Even bureaucrats responsible for overseeing policy implementation in Bangalore note how the challenges that emerged under BSUP were due to lack of knowledge on the part of engineers on various “social” topics:
With due respect to the engineersthis policy is seen as an engineering kind of a thing as opposed to social mobilization. It should have been a mixed kind of a thing. ...So as a beneficiary, I need the policy to be explained to me. I need to be given proper awareness as well as my community. So that community mobilization aspect was given less focus than the creation of a structure, a physical structure.188
The theme of technical versus social expertise emerged frequently during interviews with civil society groups, bureaucrats, and policymakers. In Bangalore, because the main implementing agency for BSUP (the Slum Board) was staffed largely with technical experts and engineers, the agency was often heavily criticized for its lack of social expertise, and, in particular, for not anticipating the needs of slum residents or understanding how housing shapes communities. However, according to the Slum Board
Commissioner, understanding various social issues related to BSUP did not fall within their scope of work, but was instead the responsibility of other actors:
The only thing is his [the slum resident] mindset has to change. For that we can’twe don’t have any staff to change their mindset. It is the role of the NGOs
186 Personal Interview, Chidambaran Iyer, September 22, 2014
187 Personal Interview, Renu Khosla, March 10, 2014
188 Personal Interview, Balakrishna Prasad Mutupuru, October 17, 2014
179 and slum associations to enlighten them [slum residents]. They have to enlighten them, they have to tell them the use of the program [and] how others have benefitted. They have to tell them that once a person has a pucca 189 house, his economic and social status, his standard of living will change. Automatically the whole next generation will change. His children’s life will change, his economic situation will change. Housing, we will tell him, will give him mental change, physical change, status change, everything will change. That is the role of NGOs and residents welfare associations and slum dwellers associations. Not us.190
From his perspective, the Slum Board’s role was to construct housing and it was up to
NGOs and CBOs to work with the local residents throughout the process. This perspective is echoed by the Director and Founder of an NGO that worked on several
BSUP projects throughout Bangalore (the Association for Promoting Social Action or
APSA) who notes how it is the role of NGOs to fill this gap in state capacity:
So they [the Slum Board] cannot implement the housing projects alone. That is where educating the people, making them understand and helping them to work out their own method becomes our role. ...They [state officials] won’t take the effort coming to the slum, organizing a meeting, and directly providing information to the community people. That kind of effort is little. But actually they think that is the role NGOs should play. ‘We [the Slum Board] will provide information to NGOs and the NGOs will go and talk to the community.’191
189 “Houses made with high quality materials throughout, including the floor, roof, and exterior walls, are called p ucca houses. Houses made from mud, thatch, or other lowquality materials are called k atcha houses” (Government of India, n.d.).
190 He goes on to remark how “we have no staff. We have to pick up the projects. We have to give the work orders. We have to start the projects and complete them on time. Our main focus is that. We can’t keep on going and doing the road show or conducting residents welfare association meetings and all” (Personal Interview, Chikkamuniyappa, April 20, 2015). In this sense, the need to develop alliances with civil society groups serves not only to fill a gap in the “social” capacity of the implementing agency, but also serves to save the agency time that would otherwise have been spent on negotiating with slum residents. Given the timebound nature of the scheme and the need for implementing agencies to demonstrate progress to the StateLevel Nodal Agency (SLNA) as well as the central government (as discussed in C hapter Three) , the ability to save time on implementing projects was crucial. Because NGOs could convince residents of the values of the scheme (and do so in a much more efficient and effective manner than the state), this was a key strategy for the agency.
191 Personal Interview, Lakshapati Pendyala, October 29, 2014
180 Regardless of whether the state or NGOs should be responsible for the “social issues” that emerge during BSUP policy implementation, what becomes clear from these remarks is that the relationship that NGOs have with slum communities throughout the city is a valuable asset to the work of the Slum Board. The ability of the state to develop partnerships with civil society groups greatly enhances the state’s capacity to overcome key policy hurdles and meet particular policy goals.
While this partnership resembles a form of “statesociety synergy” (Evans 1997) or “cogovernance” (Ackerman 2004), I argue that these synergistic relations are largely contingent upon the broader logic of the civil society field as well as the relationship between the civil society field and other social fields. Within the broader civil society field, actors seek to maintain a dominant position within the field by engaging in particular practices they deem as legitimate for civil society actors. However, in practice, these actors must balance this need for intrafield legitimacy with their need to be seen as legitimate representatives of slum residents by producing outcomes when slum residents demand them. In this sense, civil society actors are frequently caught between their need to appear distant from the state with their need to covertly collaborate with state actors to achieve aims for slum communities. Because of this, the synergistic or “symbiotic”
(Clemens 2017) partnerships that emerge between state and civil society groups are often contingent upon competing social forces shaping the agendas of civil society groups.
In the next section of this chapter, I briefly describe the literature on boundarywork and social fields to inform the broader discussion on the importance of the classification struggles in shaping the work of civil society groups.
181 Boundarywork and Classification Struggles Within and Between Fields
In his seminal work Distinction , Bourdieu (1984) outlines a theory of social organization based primarily on the concept of social “fields”. Central to the ordering of the social world are the “classification struggles” that actors within fields engage in as they seek to create divisions and define particular social groups and social worlds. According to
Bourdieu, social groups (e.g., social classes) do not exist a priori , but rather represent the outcome of a variety of practices and struggles over the definition of society and groups.
By engaging in these struggles, social actors seek to create differences “out of the undifferentiated” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 479) and engage in the “politics of groupmaking”
(Wacquant 2013, p. 1). To Bourdieu (1984), social categories are the site of intense struggle because the ability to define social groups and, in effect, the social world, brings with it the power to further “mobilize” and “demobilize” others around these categories
(p. 479). This theoretical approach is not only a way of understanding how and why particular groups and forms of representation are created (and contested), but also how and why these categories shift and change over time as actors seek to make their perspective the most legitimate amongst competing understandings of society (Bourdieu
1985, p. 728).
Lamont and Molnár (2002) undertake a comprehensive review of scholarship that examines the practice of making and contesting boundaries in society. They argue that boundaries can be categorized as either “symbolic” or “social”. “Symbolic” boundaries represent the forms of language, concepts, and discourse that actors use to “categorize objects, practices, and even time and space” (p. 168). “Social” boundaries, on the other
182 hand, are the largely agreedupon forms of distinction and difference in society. These are the boundaries that structure patterns of interaction and inequality within a society and generally have material and other social effects. Symbolic boundaries are typically the site of intense struggle as the definitions of social reality are contested, whereas social boundaries are outcomes of these struggles. For this reason, “symbolic boundaries can be thought of as a necessary but insufficient condition for the existence of social boundaries”
(Lamont and Molnár 2002, p. 169). The struggle over “boundaries” within society is also central to social movements and the process of “contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), to shaping particular forms of inequality within society Tilly (1998), to creating barriers around forms of knowledge and expertise (Frickel and Gross 2005), and to shaping divisions within professions (Geiryn 1983, 1999, p. 23). Building on
Bourdieu’s (1984) claim that social groups do not exist a priori , this literature highlights how the boundaries erected between social groups are the result of intense struggle and can provide a platform for the “strategic practical action” of groups (Gieryn 1999, p. 23).
While Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of social fields and the boundaries between them offers greater flexibility for understanding how groups seek to control the social world and shape forms of social action, several scholars have criticized his concept of “fields” and boundaries as still too rigid.192 By viewing fields as delineated, autonomous social spaceswhere relations within them are strongly determined by individual habitus , forms of capital, and the broader homology of a fieldthis leaves little room for action that
192 Eyal (2013) goes further in this critique noting a contradiction in Bourdieu’s aims and outcomes: “the irony is that Bourdieu developed the concept of field precisely in order to overcome the limitations of Weberian ideal type methodology...but when it comes to differentiating the fields themselves from one another, he seems to recapitulate Weber’s essentialism” (p. 161).
183 occurs between social fields (Eyal 2013; McQuade 2016; Medvetz 2012). Rather than viewing practices that occur in these in between spaces as simply new or emergent fields,
Eyal (2013) calls for an approach that takes seriously the “spaces between fields” (p.
178). From this approach, the boundaries of fields are meaningful objects of analysis as important “zone[s] of essential connections and transactions between” fields (p. 162).
The literature on “spaces between fields” highlights how dynamics within and between fields shapes the possibilities for social action. The actions of civil society groups, from this approach, are not only shaped by the forms of division and the logic of the civil society field, but also by the logic of other social fields. In interstitial spaces like the policy intervention field (described in Chapter Two ) where multiple actors come together (e.g., state actors, civil society groups, slum leaders, slum residents, etc.), the ability for civil society actors to negotiate and navigate these spaces depends on the particular balance of social forces at a given time.
In the next section, I outline the ways in which civil society actors engage in definitional struggles over the meaning of the field and the particular role that civil society groups should play in shaping policy processes. These struggles emerge between actors who question whether civil society groups should exist in “dynamic tension”
(Heller 2009, p. 126) with the state or whether their role is to execute the state’s will (for the ultimate benefit of slum residents). By defining acceptable and unacceptable practices, actors within the field seek to be seen as the most legitimate representatives of slum communities, which has important symbolic and material benefits.
184 The Logic of the Civil Society Field Under BSUP
Before examining the actual practices of civil society groups under BSUP, it is first necessary to describe the ways in which actors construct differences and boundaries within and around the broader civil society field. In particular, civil society groups working with slum residents often describe their work as distinct from other actors within the field and as clearly delineated from the work of the state. It is common for actors to label or categorize other civil society actors based on ideological differences and/or standards for how civil society actors should be engaging with citizens and the state.
Because “the boundary conditions of a field are essential characteristics of that field”
(Lewin 1964, p. 57), I argue that an understanding of the role of civil society groups in shaping policy processes under BSUP is incomplete without first examining the
“definitional struggle[s]” that take place between actors in the field (Bourdieu 1975, p.
19).193 Because there are numerous civil society groups and actors working with and in slum communities around the city,194 there is a strong desire amongst these actors to be seen as the most “authentic” stewards of slum communities’ needs. This need to maintain legitimacy within the field is essential given an urban context characterized by numerous
193 “The principal stake in any field or fieldlike space is the definitional struggle over the specific form of social power monopolized or otherwise claimed in that social space. This classification conflict is a battle in which every agent must engage in order to force recognition of the value of his products and his own authority as a legitimate producer, what is at stake is in fact the power to impose… definition[s]” (Bourdieu 1975 p. 19, 21).
194 An activist in the city describes the glut of organizations working with slums in Bangalore: “part of the challenge is with the sheer number of organizations working in Bangalore, making it challenging at times to identify who is engaging in acceptable forms with slum residents and who is not” (Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 20, 2015).
185 organizations working in slums and regular “turf” wars between these organizations.195
Beginning with how civil society actors differentiate amongst themselves ideologically, I then examine the ways in which groups internally segment the field based on standards for engaging with citizens and the state.
Engaging with Slums: IssueBased or Questioning?
When speaking to civil society actors working with slum communities in Bangalore, actors often describe their work as ideologically different from (or as directly at odds with) the work and mission of other organizations operating in the city. Several key divisions emerged during interviews with various nonstate actors. Specifically, actors regularly divided the broader civil society field between those who were for and against the “neoliberal”196 urban governance reforms that characterize the Jawaharlal Nehru
National Urban Renewal Mission (NURM) scheme and BSUP. Actors also note key ideological differences between those civil society actors who were part of “NGOs” and those who selfidentified as “activists”. While these groups all see themselves as operating in the same civil society field, some describe a number of key differences that divide them. According to one slum activist in the city, Issac Arul Selva, “everyone wants to do something for the people, that I don’t deny. But the perspective differs. ...The
195 Personal Interview Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014; Personal Interview Lalitha Kamath, June 9, 2014; Personal Interview Bhuvaneswari Raman, March 8, 2014. To illustrate the overlap in services and “turf” for civil society groups in the city, in the community of L.R. Nagar, a resident of the community describes how 30 NGOs have “come and gone” over the past twenty years with each NGO working for a year or two in the community (Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, November 5, 2014).
196 Personal Interview, Rajendran Prabhakar, June 22, 2014
186 perspective of the governance system, the perspective of the social system, perspective of the people’s life is different.”197
When speaking to civil society actors working with slum communities under
BSUP, several describe meaningful differences in the approaches of groups working within the city, particularly related to their views on the reforms associated with NURM.
While some actors see the reforms as detrimental to the future of Bangalore and, in particular, poor residents living in the city, others were far less critical of the reforms and viewed the BSUP scheme as an opportunity to improve the living conditions of slum residents in the city. Those actors who viewed the reforms as detrimental to Bangalore saw themselves and their work as fundamentally challenging the governance approach promoted under NURM and as forcing conversations about alternative forms of urban policy and governance in the city. When speaking about the approaches of “NGOs” in
Bangalore, a selfidentified “activist” and lawyerwith close connections to other organizations working on BSUP in Bangalore (specifically APSA and Action
Aid)describes several key distinctions within the broader civil society field, but sees the main difference as an ideological one:
When JNNURM came, we said that ‘you [NGOs] really have to move away from just being implementing agencies and pointing out holes in the implementation.’ They are not interested in that, that’s not their politics. Their politics is just ‘ tik hai ,198 What is it that we can do?’ And it’s also a lack of ideology . It’s this entire thing of ‘Let’s do something for the poor.’ I mean who the hell are you to do anything for the poor? They were doing enough for themselves for donkey’s years. They know how to deal with their lives, they don’t need any missionary type of charity to come their way. But that is the approach that most of these organizations seem to adopt and that is a very, very problematic way of being.
197 Personal Interview, March 5, 2015
198 The English translation of this common Hindi phrase is “okay” or “it’s okay”.
187 Now you have the flip side also. A lot of these NGOs are trying to use the language of struggle, and resistance, etc. very rhetorically. There is no politicization that takes place. The path to change is extremely tough one, it requires time, it requires commitment, it requires ideology . ... So instead of saying ‘okay, why don’t you get a 10 by 10 house and agree to this stupid policy’, it’s far more difficult to sit and work with the community and say ‘okay, why are you giving into this [BSUP]? What is the right that you are staking on the city? Why is it that you are letting your rights be whittled away by a stupid housing project like this one?’ It’s a housing project, that’s all it is, it is nothing more and in essence it is a stupid housing project, nothing more.199
According to this activist, the lack of ideology is the key distinguishing factor between various organizations working in slum communities, particularly around the BSUP scheme. When asked to elaborate on the meaning of “ideology”, he notes a key difference between those who engage in issuesbased advocacy versus those who take a more holistic approach and examine the structural factors that lead to particular outcomes and forms of inequality in the city:
Is your idea to save land or is your idea to to change, to alter your position in society? ... It cannot be issuebased ; land cannot be [an] issue, housing cannot be an issue. There is a far deeper problem. It is a structural problem, and the lack of a proper housing [for slum residents] is a manifestation of that. …If you were to alter the discourse from ‘give me right over my land’ to ‘everyone has equal access to all natural resources in the city’, that’s a very different discourse. If you were to alter the discourse from ‘I want some small welfare scheme for my slum’ to ‘there will be a proportional reservation of all finances for particular people’, that’s a very different demand. So it’s that. It’s how you frame what it is that you’re working towards. …The point is that it is not about wages or land per se, it’s about how do you move beyond the question of wages and land. ...This is the essential difference between the NGOs [and activists]. Are you issuebased or are you questioning?200
Echoing similar sentiments, one activist notes how “it again depends on your approach. Is your idea just to save land or is your idea to change, is to alter your position
199 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014
200 Ibid.
188 in society?”201 From this approach, a more holistic, structural view of problems within slums can have potentially much longerterm impacts in a community rather than shortterm solutions to specific issues. The Director of Action Aidan organization that serves as a hub for civil society groups and activists in Bangalore (several of which were involved in the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore202)Dr. Kshithij Urs, describes how he has tried to create a structure for the organization that goes against an issuebased or “sectoral” approach to social change and brings activists together from diverse issue areas to foster more widespread, systemic change:
You can call it the superstructure within the organization; it is the culture. You need to develop a progressive culture within the organization that can bring these activists from various sectors. So it can’t be sectoral . So you can have, for example, urban activists coming together...and also get the urban activists to work with tribal activists. So there is synergy, there is crosslearning and sharing as well as cumulative action at the statelevel.203
For these actors, the ideological stance and approach to understanding urban poverty in
Bangalore is an important and quite meaningful distinction within the broader civil society field.
Thinking of issues in a broader, more structural sense was critical not only for understanding the various challenges facing the urban poor and slum communities, but also for organizing mass movements against policies that were seen as antipoor and
201 Personal interview, Issac Amrutharaj, November 5, 2014
202 One of the two cases examined in detail in this dissertationthe Deshayanagar case described in C hapter Six involved a civil society group that is connected to Action Aid through the organization’s BRIDGE network. This network was formed in 2006 and comprises 13 organizations that serve approximately 30 slums in Bangalore. Action Aid works with these organizations and helps them to develop broadreaching strategies to alleviate challenges facing slum communities (Personal Interview, Malarvizhi M., March 17, 2015).
203 Personal Interview, Kshithij Urs, March 3, 2015
189 shortsighted. This stands in contrast to those organizations and actors that describe an ideological stance that is more projectbased, focused primarily on implementing the particular policy vision and goals outlined under BSUP. This contrast between accepting policies (and focusing only on particular issues within existing policy frameworks) and challenging policies altogether is evident in the minutes from early discussions amongst civil society groups over BSUP. During one of the official BSUP stakeholder meetings representatives from two NGOs in the city (known to be “elite” NGOs and working closely to implement the vision of the state204) the Association of Voluntary Actions for
Society (AVAS) and the Karnataka State Mahila Milan spoke primarily about “land” as being the key issue under BSUP. While Kshithij Urs205 discussed land as well during this meeting, he also challenged the overall framework for reforms under JNNURM and the potential governance changes brought by this policy (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation 2006b).
This distinction between a more holistic perspective or “ideology” on NURM and urban governance versus one that is more project or issuebased is closely connected to another key division within the civil society field between “NGOs” and “activists” working with slums in Bangalore. During several interviews with civil society actors, the specific terminology used to describe organizations and actors working with slums was incredibly important. For example, during an interview with an “activist”, my research
204 Personal Interview, Bhuvaneswari Raman, March 8, 2014
205 At the time of this meeting in Mary 2006, Dr. Urs was the Director of the Association for the Promotion of Social Action or (ASPA). He has since left that position and now serves as the Director of Action Aid in Bangalore.
190 assistant referred to this individual’s organization as an “NGO”. The interviewee immediately corrected my research assistant by saying “not an NGO. We are not an
NGO”.206 As well, during another meeting with a selfproclaimed “activist”, Clifton
D’Rozario, he was careful to note how his social network did not include NGOs. He describes how “a lot of my friends from various organizations, not NGOs , from lots of the movements, they were of the opinion that why don’t you just go and say what you have to say”.207
The division between those who are for and against NURM reforms tends to align quite closely with the distinction between “NGOs” and those who referred to themselves as “activists”. Those who referred to themselves as “activists” viewed NGOs as less authentic in representing slum interests and this was largely due to the association that
NGOs have with international funding agencies and the Government of India and also the higher class and caste status of the directors/leaders of these NGOs. When asked about the difference between “activists” and “NGOs”, the Director of Action Aid, Kshithij Urs describes how “people might actually feel that NGOs are part of the problem...that is the conventional understanding. ...So that might be one of the reasons why activists may have resisted and might not want to be identified as NGOs.208
NGOs are seen as “part of the problem” for the urban poor largely because they are seen as lacking knowledge about slum residents and their needs. One activist who has
206 Personal Interview, Narasimha Murthi, March 11, 2015
207 Personal Interview, November 10, 2014
208 Personal Interview, October 1, 2015
191 been involved in conversations about BSUP in Bangalore and is from (and still currently lives in) a slum community near Koramangala in Bangalore discusses how:
All due respect to NGOs and their initiatives, the NGO phenomena is a failure as far as the urban poor issues are concerned. First of all they have not understood the core aspects of the urban marginalized communities. And because of their caste background, because of their approach and attitude and knowledge base, they absolutely stand helpless in terms of responding to the needs and issues of the urban poor. So first of all they don’t understand the phenomenon of slums.209
According to one slum activist, Issac Arul Selva, his closeness to the experience of the slum residents is unlike those of the NGOs. He describes the approach of the broader slum network that he organizes as “ethnographic.” In other words “they believe that I am one of the—one among them. I feel that I am one among them.”210 This was echoed by another activist who notes the large proportion of slum residents involved in their network and the ways in which this informs their work. He describes how “90% of the people in this office are living in slums. We don’t have an outsider or a third party person saying this should be your decision and this should be your demand. This whole organisation is driven by slum dwellers.”211
Other selfdescribed “activists” working in slums in Bangalore elaborate on this point, discussing not only the lack of knowledge about slums on the part of NGOs, but also the ways in which NGOs’ close relationship to the state212 and international funding
209 Personal Interview, Rajendran Prabhakar, June 22, 2014
210 Personal Interview, March 5, 2015
211 Personal Interview, Narasimah Murthi and Kaveri M., March 11, 2015
212 Two “activists” associated with Action Aid mentioned how “international NGOs and the Government of India are on the same page” (Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj and Malarvizhi M., January 23, 2014). 192 groups213 prevents them from criticizing urban policies and from fostering a more critical attitude amongst slum residents. One activist who works with slums notes how:
What most of the organizations are doing...if there is any revolutionary potential that the people have, you blunt it. You somehow ensure that it doesn’t find any form of expression, and then you reduce people to just being satisfied with handmedowns and whatever stupid handouts that the state wants to give. And these institutions, like the NGOs are doing that.214
Similarly, a different activist working in slums discusses the connection between
“ hifunda ”215 organizations and the inability (or lack of desire) of these groups to foster a critical perspective amongst slum residents. Because of their high funding, elite216 or
“corporate”217 status, and close proximity to the state, many activists see them as
213 The need to maintain separation from international organizations emerged several times during my fieldwork and greatly impacted my ability to work closely with several “activists” in Bangalore. One activist mentioned during an interview “I will be extremely honest, I was actually putting off meeting you” because of his exhaustion from dealing with international researchers and the inability for their research to change processes on the ground. He goes on to say how “researchers” fall into the same category as NGOs who promote a “neoliberal” agenda. He says “so what we’ve persistently advocated is for you to take the fight to the street. It has to be. These are battles that have to be fought on the streets, and these are battles that we fought against the NGOs, these are the battles that will be fought against the think tanks, against t he socalled researchers, and everyone else who is pushing this kind of an agenda” (Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014). Another activist, with whom I met four times (in the Action Aid offices), refused to allow me to visit his community for fears of being associated with an international funding agency. My research assistant, however, was allowed to visit unaccompanied by me. Despite many assurances, another activist was hesitant to share information about the work and strategies of his organization because he believes a “PhD thesis from an international student will go right to the government” (Personal Interview, Anonymous Activist, March 1, 2015).
214 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014
215 This interviewee uses this term to refer to “highlyfunded” NGOs, typically NGOs that receive international funding.
216 For one activist and researcher in the city, “elite” organizations are those with connections to the international groups. He describes one case of mistaken identity when he read a letter at a World Bank presentation and was subsequently “blacklisted” by several activists in the city because of this tie. In this respect, even short associations or interactions can be taken out of context and harm individuals or groups who are attempting to work with or on behalf of the urban poor. While the civil society field may be large in the number of groups operating in the city, this and similar examples demonstrate that one’s legitimacy within the field is constantly at risk and those who seek to be seen as legitimately helping the poor have to be somewhat vigilant about how they represent themselves.
217 “There are NGOs that are determining policy even in the state. You also have the multinational, corporation NGOs, the rich NGOs in Bangalore city. Suave, nice, very welleducated, left their corporate 193 implicated in the creation and promotion of policies that harm the urban poor and ultimately prevent slum residents’ from engaging critically in determining the future of their communities. He remarks:
Basically those hifunda NGOs, what they do is they pick a few leaders from the community and they kind [of] brainwash them and indoctrinate them and give them this spiel so when that person from that community speaks, he is actually just regurgitating what has been told to them. So he just replicates this whole NGO way of speaking and he is not really sharing an original thought.218
While activists see NGOs’ proximity to the state and to international funding agencies as harmful to the slum communities in which they work, other actors within this field (specifically those actors whose work is connected to NGOs) see connections to the state not as cooptation, but as one part of a broader campaign to assist slum residents:
It doesn’t mean that when we are working with the government we are coopted by the government. If they [the government] are taking a stand against the poor, then we have always stood up against them. And we have done a lot of protest[ing], a lot of demonstrations, we have been part of that kind of campaign [against slum demolitions] also. But in the same time, if the government is doing a good job, we have supported the government.219
Because civil society actors often serve as key brokers between several actors that shape outcomes within slum communitiespoliticians, bureaucrats, local slum leaders, etc.NGOs see their role as one that requires a multifaceted approach. This flexibility in their approach means that they can work with the government without cooptation and serve as brokers between different kinds of powerful actors within the community while still meeting their end goal of assisting slum residents. According to the Executive
jobs, sittingandtryingtodogoodinthisworld kind of NGOs” (Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014).
218 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, November 5, 2014
219 Personal Interview, Lakshapati P endyala, October 29, 2014 194 Director of APSA, Lakshapati Pendyala, their collaboration with the government and other organizations is essential to reduce the influence of often powerful actors operating in slums. Without this stateNGO collaboration, slum leaders would dominate slum communities and use policies like BSUP for their own ends. APSA brings the state in to reduce the power of other actors within the field who they see as fostering new forms of inequality in slums:
We negotiate, we will facilitate the discussions with the [relevant] government department. All the time we support the people. Being an NGO we do not support the government, we support the people. Sometimes we have to do advocacy work if certain level of the government officials are not willing [to help slum residents]. Then we have to go higher up and ensure that that kind of decisions have been taken [by the state] so that everybody [in the slum] gets benefits. Our role is to see in the community that one particular leader or some people are not misusing that particular program, you know? So we have to ensure that because sometimes there are certain slums who have leaders who are very powerful, you know. They all trying to take housing on different names, manipulating the list, so that is where we are, we are playing a watchdog role to make sure that everybody gets benefits from the scheme.220
In this sense, NGOs involved in BSUP policy implementation (like APSA and
AVAS) view these cooperative relationships with other actors outside of civil society not as a form of cooptation, but rather a necessary action to ensure effective and equitable policy implementation, thereby more effectively meeting the needs of citizens. They believe that they are engaging with the state on their own terms and still “support[ing] the people”221 by bringing benefits to slum residents through particular policies.
Those NGOs who work with the state often do not see their connections to state actors or international funding agencies as a drawback, but rather a means through which
220 Personal Interview, Lakshapati P endyala, October 29, 2014
221 I bid. 195 to effect even more structural change for the urban poor and to bring them benefits under these schemes. This stands in contrast to the “activists” who see engagement with the state largely as an endorsement of the “neoliberal” agenda of BSUP and JNNURM and as detrimental to the poor. According to a researcher and activist in the city, “once you become established, you seek to deprive people of what they deserve. ...People [NGO leaders] wanted to be a certain way, it’s not like they were coopted, that was their original intent.”222 Another activist echoes similar sentiments “you should readily know that there is a problem when the state can so easily coopt these institutions, these organizations. The moment the state is like ‘oh, yeah we’ll get an NGO’ then I think that is the first sign of a serious problem with what you are doing.”223
Dividing the field in terms of categories like “NGO” and “activist” serves largely to delineate the kinds of organizations and organizational practices that are acceptable when engaging with the urban poor and urban slums. This categorization is also an attempt to establish certain groups and actors as the most “legitimate” representatives of the urban poor in a city where numerous civil society groups work with slum communities. While some may say that these struggles over naming and classification have little meaning beyond rhetorical struggles, Bourdieu (1984) argues that the naming of groups is intimately connected with other forms of power (namely an enhanced ability to mobilize others around such a name and, in turn, influence power dynamics within fields). Specifically, he argues “to appropriate a common name and to commune in a
222 Personal Interview, Vinay Baindur, April 1, 2015
223 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014
196 proper name, and so to mobilize the union that makes them strong, around the unifying power of a word” (p. 481). In this sense, the power of categories like “activist” and
“NGO” goes beyond labeling and can be seen as part of a broader effort to engage in a form of politics that shapes the policies toward the urban poor.
In the following section, I outline the ways in which civil society actors describe the acceptable and unacceptable ways of engaging with the state and with citizens. In doing so, these actors also seek to draw boundaries between the civil society field and other social fields, despite their frequent transgression of these boundaries in practice.
Engaging with the State: Confrontation or Implementation?
Actors within the field not only internally segment others based on ideological differences and the particular classifications of groups (“NGOs” or “activists”), but civil society actors also divide the field based on how these groups should engage with the state and with slum residents. For some, the role of civil society groups is to serve as an outside, confrontational force working against the state and pressuring it to develop policies that are equitable and that serve the needs of the urban poor. For others, typically largescale NGOs in Bangalore, the role of these groups is one of “facilitation”
(Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2006a) or implementation as groups seek to assist the state in better targeting its policies toward those most needy. According to a staff member from Action Aid, Malarvizhi M., the key difference between her organization (and the activists associated with her organization) and other NGOs in terms of engaging with the state is whether you serve as a watchdog or as an arm of the state:
197 It is the government’s work to take care of its citizens, it is not our work. It is our work to see that the implementation is happening properly in the field and that the people are benefitting. That work should be our responsibility actually, instead of implementing the government programs. The NGOs are implementing. I think that most of the activists around here are overseeing implementation in their own capacity, using their own knowledge.224
From her perspective there should be some kind of relationship between civil society actors and the state, but this relationship is one that requires some distance.
The ability to criticize and hold the state accountable requires civil society groups to operate separately from, and, often, in tension with the state. According to one slum activist, this distance between the state and civil society is essential so that civil society groups can have greater flexibility in the form of engagement with the state and with state policies. From his perspective, activists who consciously stand outside of the system have a greater capacity to reject it as compared to NGOs who work within the existing frameworks:
Typically NGOs go and represent people to the government and ask them for changes or modifications in an existing structure. We sometimes ask for modifications, but sometimes we reject the idea of the project itself . Whereas NGOs don’t seem to have that much leverage to propose something radical.”225
This perspective, however, differs from that of other “activists” who believe that the state should play little to no role in assisting slum residents (whom they believe are fully capable of building their own homes and enhancing the wellbeing of their own communities) and that the role of civil society groups is to force conversations around
224 Personal Interview, March 17, 2015
225 Personal Interview, Issac Arul Selva, March 5, 2015
198 fundamental rights for the urban poor, not around specific policies. According to Clifton
D’Rozario, the state should play no role in assisting the urban poor:
So what we have been advocating all along is that you don’t have to do anything. The state does not have to go and take loans from some bank and do whatever drama to come and build, you know, multistoried buildings over here. You give the land to the people and they will do what they want with it.226
For some, the ability to separate and create boundaries between the state and civil society is essential for groups to play a watchdog role and to ensure that the state is acting on behalf of slum residents. For other groups, this boundary is necessary so that they can demonstrate their separation from other powerful actors and “vested interests”227 operating within slums (e.g., politicians, slum leaders, etc.). This need to appear neutral is essential as groups seek to effectively broker the relations of several different organizations and actors under BSUP. If an organization were to appear to have “vested interests” this may harm the legitimacy of the organization and its ability to work effectively in a slum community and with various state actors. The Director and Founder of APSA, Lakshapati Pendyala, describes how and why the organization portrays itself as politically agnostic:
APSA has credibility because the government knows that we are directly working with the people and we have been helping the people through communitybased organizations. And we don’t have any political identity or we don’t have any vested interests , we are really interested in the welfare of the people. So the government also recognizes us and at the same time the community also recognizes us. So we are basically playing that facilitating role, rather than taking sides.228
226 Personal Interview, Clifton D’Rozario, November 10, 2014
227 Personal Interview, Lakshapati P endyala, October 29, 2014
228 I bid.
199 Several other NGO actors in Bangalore express similar sentiments related to the idea of appearing neutral. For these actors, it is important to be perceived as not serving any interests other than those of the people and to shy away from the challenges that emerge from engaging in “politics” or with politicians. When discussing the implementation of BSUP in the Deshyanagar community, the Director of GRACE (one of the NGOs working in the community alongside two other organizationsMythri and
CIVIC)229 describes the aims of the NGO as fundamentally different from other influential actors connected to slum communities. He remarks how “the councilor and the
MLA [Member of the Legislative Assembly] do not want development for the people.
NGOs are completely different, we are for the people, we are looking for development for the people.230 Similarly, during a field visit to the Hakki Pikki community located near the outskirts of Bangalore, a representative from an activist network/NGO known as
Janasahayog spoke about the organization’s role in the slum:
I don’t do anything individually. They know their own problems. I know the sorts of problems they have too, but if I voice them it is not good. Then I will become a ‘big leader’, and you shouldn’t become that. You should be with the people in talking to the authorities. ...Actually in many places, what has happened is that they [slum residents] do exactly what the slum leader tells them to do. Many slums have been ruined this way. That’s why we want to let the people in the slums become the leaders. Whenever there has been a [singular] leadership approach, the slums have not developed.231
She goes on to describe how slum leaders and politicians are corrupt forces within slums, contrasting this with the approach of her organization that seeks to “give the people a
229 For an indepth analysis of this particular BSUP case study, and the role of NGOs in this community, please see C hapter Six of this dissertation.
230 Personal Interview, Bosco Anthony, February 24, 2015
231 Personal Interview, Chandrama, March 20, 2015
200 voice, to give the people information”.232 They choose to work primarily with bureaucratic authorities rather than politicians because the “authorities” are the ones who get things done and this allows them to avoid to “politics”.
In this sense, separation from slum leaders and politicians helps organizations to appear somewhat neutral from other powerful political interests in slums. For the
Janasahayog organization, taking a backstage approach and allowing slum residents to direct action also serves as a way to portray the organization as different from other actors who may have “vested interests” in working with slum communities. This backstate approach was echoed by the Director of Action Aid:
We don’t take a oneroute approach to activism. It’s a matter of principal, Action Aid does not want to advocate on behalf of people. That is how you work with people and, as much as possible, stay in the background because we don’t want to either promote ourselves as the spokespersons of the people or make it appear that we know the issues of people. So we don’t necessarily advocate things under our [Action Aid] own identity and this is a very informed decision. ...There is never an instance where we will go on our own and advocate on behalf of others.233
While not directly involved in the implementation of BSUP in Bangalore, the perspective of a prominent figure in Bangalore’s broader civil society is worth quoting at length as it points to the challenges inherent in neutrality and the limitations to appearing apolitical:
Among the middle class and among advisory actors, in particular, there is a reluctance to wade into the politics. They’ve committed the—what I call the cardinal sin of equating neutrality with good. Right? Somehow they convinced themselves that to be effective they have to be neutral, which is completely the opposite of all the evidence of studying any public policy at any time in the history of any society. Neutral people don’t change anything.”234
232 Personal Interview, Chandrama, March 20, 2015
233 Personal Interview, Kshithij Urs, March 3, 2015
234 Personal Interview, Ashwin Mahesh, April 28, 2014
201 From this approach, neutrality may not be the best approach to achieving various political aims, but many civil society actors believe that appearing distant from the state and other vested interests is essential when attempting to navigate the broader politics of slum communities and the BSUP policy intervention field.
In the next section of this chapter I describe how civil society groups often transgress the boundaries that they draw around the civil society field due to competing demands and forces from other social fields.
Transgressing the Boundaries of the Civil Society Field
Despite the apparent separateness or political neutrality of civil society organizations, nearly all civil society groups engage with the state through a variety of channels to meet the needs of residents living in slums. Even Action Aid, an organization whose members describe their role as serving as a force against the state has been deeply involved in the implementation of BSUP around Bangalore. While the Director of Action Aid, Kshithij
Urs, said that “we [Action Aid] critically engage with the current reforms process... our engagement is extremely critical. So we don’t we don’t want build JNNURM houses”235, the organization has directly assisted several communities under BSUP either through direct assistance during implementation to the communitybased organizations in slums or through their associated slum networks.236
235 Personal Interview, Kshithij Urs, March 3, 2015
236 For example, the BRIDGE network is a collective brought together by Action Aid. GRACE, an NGO that was involved in the implementation of BSUP in the Deshyanagar community (described in C hapter Six) is part of the BRIDGE network.
202 This separation from the state and politics rarely, if ever, works in practice as actors’ legitimacy is not only dependent upon their ability to appear neutral, but also their ability to demonstrate effectiveness in meeting policy needs and/or the needs of slum residents. While some “activists” see the role of civil society groups as largely one that should be confrontational and serving to ensure that the state acts on behalf of slum residents, it may not always be possible for groups working within slums to pursue particular agendas (that may be closer to the forms of engagement envisioned by
“activists”) because of the need to balance their institutional goals (to work in and serve a particular community) with other, often competing interests. An APSA staff member describes these dynamics:
The [area leader] says you can deal with other issues, but don’t come with the land issue. So when the Slum Board proposed BSUP, the NGO had to balance the interests of both [the community and the area leader]. They can’t do any work in the community if they go against the area leader, so they have to balance the interests and demands of both these parties.237
Organizations that claim separation from the state often engage with various political and bureaucratic actors, but the ability to do so requires a fine balance between helping slum communities (by engaging with the state) and not being seen by either residents or other actors within the civil society field as coopted by the state. One activists describes this balancing act:
The balance becomes a little tough. Sometimes we have to compromise a little bit because if we start opposing everything then the work will never get done. Now there is no personal intention here. I am not trying to appear like the big guy here. Sometimes, for people’s sake, we compromise a little . ...Sometimes, now we can go there fighting also. ...So this is the negotiation. The downside when such a compromise is struck behind closed doors, in some cases the other people who work in other NGOs or similar organizations may say that a compromise was
237 Personal Interview, Chitra A., December 9, 2014
203 struck because money changed hands or something . This is always the tricky part of the negotiation because you can’t have it all ways.238
Despite being skeptical of engaging with the state and portraying themselves as quite outside of the state, several activists echo similar sentiments to those expressed above about engagement with the state and with political and bureaucratic officials at all levels of government.239 A wellknown activist in the citywho also said that his approach was to remain distant from the statementions how:
Usually we hesitate to speak with power, okay? But when an issue arises, we meet them. ...For the policy issues, we need to work with the statelevel officials. If there are implementation issues at the local level, we sort it out with the local body or the local officials.240
Another slum activist describes how his longterm approach to assisting slums (as opposed to the “issuebased” approach of NGOs) requires a multipronged approach and the sustaining of various relationships. It is worth quoting at length because it demonstrates not only the multipronged approach of activists, but the more nuanced ways in which these actors assist bureaucratic actors to make politically unpopular decisions with the ultimate aim of assisting the urban poor:
There is no single window/single strategy. It is a multipronged approach. We need to kind of keep the bureaucrats on our side, the law on our side, the politicians also on our side. Anytime there is an issue concerning a slum, sometimes it goes into a loop of one or two years because you have to convince multiple parties over and over. We need to have [the] skills to be able to do that. So let’s say, for instance, the D.C. [District Commissioner] gives a piece of governmentowned land [to a slum community as part of the slum declaration
238 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, March 18, 2015
239 This interaction between “activists” and government officials became quite apparent during a visit to the Slum Board when I interrupted a meeting between a known “activist” (the individual who also did not want me to visit his community for fears of being associated with an international researcher) and the Technical Director of the Slum Board (and the individual in charge of BSUP in Bangalore), Sannah Chittaiah.
240 Personal Interview, Anonymous Bangalorebased Activist, February 15, 2015
204 process]. The person who is the leader in that particular area may oppose the coming of 100200 poor people, so he may not like it. Local politicians may not appreciate that the D.C. has given this land and they may try to dissuade him. So sometimes, for example, one strategy that we have used it to file a court case that directs the D.C. to necessarily obey the orders. We do this after informing the D.C. about our intentions, so we keep the D.C. in the loop. So this gives the D.C. an excuse to carry out what he always wanted to do and he can tell the politicians and others that ‘hey I did not have an option. I had to go ahead and do this because the court is at my back.’ So it’s really a multipronged approach. You need to be prepared to fight a battle on many levels. ...and this no NGO will do.241
This kind of covert collaboration resembles the interactions between the KUIDFC and political actors described in greater detail in Chapter Three . Because actors are reluctant to appear as driven by vested interests (due to the threats to their intrafield legitimacy and power that this poses), actors often engage in covert collaboration with state and political actors to ensures that all parties benefit without losing their legitimacy within other social domains. In this example, the actions of the activist resembles the actions of the MLA in the example described in Chapter Three (see p. 155 of this dissertation) because he seeks to pave the way for the DC to make a politicallycontentious decision without risk to the reputation of the activist or the DC. All parties are able to benefit because the activist can still appear as operating in tension with and distant from the state
(while still meeting the needs of particular slum communities), and the DC can meet policy aims without influence from other irrational demands.
These examples highlight how divisions and relations within the civil society field are not necessarily static. As civil society actors navigate relations between fields, they must balance the needs of diverse actors. Due to their need to appear legitimate within the civil society field, to slum residents, and to other powerful actors operating in slums, civil
241 Personal Interview, Issac Amrutharaj, March 18, 2015
205 society actors often transgress the boundaries and divisions that they create around and within the civil society field to produce outcomes and maintain legitimacy within other social fields. This highlights the relational nature of field dynamics and also the ways in which broader field dynamics shape how civil society actors engage with state actors.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I mapped the broader divisions within the civil society field and the boundaries erected by civil society groups between the field and other “vested interests” operating in slums. By mapping the broader institutional terrain, I demonstrated how legitimacy within the civil society field provides civil society groups with various benefits (e.g., increased access to politicians, the potential to shift conversations around the urban poor, dominance within the broader civil society field, etc.). For this reason, actors struggle within the field to erect boundaries around the most legitimate practices for engaging with slum residents and the state.
Civil society groups tend to divide the field along two main dimensions: proximity to “the people” and distance from the state. Those civil society groups that are seen as closest to the “true” needs of slum residents are seen as more equipped to represent residents’ needs when compared to elite NGOs operating in partnership with the Government of India and/or international NGOs. As well, those groups that are more distant from the state are seen as less influenced by political interests and thereby more able to effectively exercise their “social expertise” without pandering to irrational demands. In some respects, this resembles Ferguson’s (2006) “vertical topography of
206 power” (p. 104) whereby locality and proximity to grassroots is seen as a powerful form of capital and authenticity within civil society groups.
When comparing the dimensions of the civil society field with those that shape the scalartechnical field described in Chapter Three , they are similar, yet reversed. For the scalartechnical field (STF), proximity to the central government was seen as particularly powerful within the field as well as a high level of technical expertise.
However, to effectively exercise an agency’s technical expertise, distance from vested interests was seen as equally critical in the STF. In both cases, while these dynamics partly structured relations within the fields, in order for actors within these fields to demonstrate effectiveness under BSUP, they often had to engage in practices that they openly deemed as unacceptable for those within their respective fields. In both fields, however, their need to demonstrate legitimacy not only within their respective field, but in other social fields as well meant that actors often engaged in covert collaboration to successfully meet policy aims without risking their broader legitimacy within their field.
This convergence of practices not only challenges the boundaries of these particular fields, but also the verticality of the state and society (as the state “above” and the society as “below”) (Gupta and Ferguson 2008). In practice, both state and societal actors seek to construct and reinforce this verticality, despite engaging in practices that crisscross and defy the “vertical topography of power” (Ferguson 2008, p. 103).
In the case of the civil society field, these relationships between state and nonstate actors do not mean that groups engaging with the state are necessarily coopted. Rather, the relationships demonstrates the various “linkages and entanglements” (Coslovsky
207 2015, p. 1112) that emerge between state and nonstate actors trying to effectively produce policy outcomes. While there is already a large body of work that highlights the ways in which state and nonstate actors coproduce social policies (Abers and Keck 2006;
Clemens 2017; Coslovsky 2015; Evans 1995, 1997; Migdal 2001), this chapter aimed to show how the form and success of these collaborations is not just determined by particular state and societal inputs (e.g., a cohesive bureaucracy, a clear division of labor between state and society, etc.), but rather through intra and interfield negotiations and struggles. As will be described in greater detail in Chapter Six , the need to demonstrate legitimacy in multiple social fields often makes these statesociety relations highly contingent.
Now that I have laid out the two key social fields that shape BSUP implementationthe bureaucratic field and the civil society fieldin the next chapter I explore how a key policy document (the Detailed Project Report) moves through the bureaucratic field and how forces within the field shape the practices of implementing agencies under BSUP.
208
CHAPTER FIVE
“AT BREAKNECK SPEED” TRACING A POLICY OBJECT THROUGH THE BUREAUCRATIC FIELD
As you know the word ‘mission’ means it is sort of like a military operation. You go, you have targets fixed, you have deadlines fixed, you are fully focused on what you are doing. I mean this is your target, you move from one step to the other, groups are formed, and all of them go and try to attack a particular thing and achieve what they want to. …In a ‘mission mode’ you are fully focused; you are like in a battlefield, you’re doing a battle against a particular setup, and here it was poverty alleviation and housing.242
Introduction
To wage a “battle” against poverty and the lack of safe and secure housing for the urban poor is an extremely ambitious agenda for any government. For the Government of India, this battle is even more daunting given the increasing number of people living in urban slums and the nationwide shortage of housing for poorer urban residents. Data from the most recent Indian census estimates that number of people living in urban slums is approximately 17.4% of the total urban population (or approximately 65 million people), and this figure represents an increase of 13 million people since 2001 (Government of
India Ministry of Home Affairs 2001, 2011; Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2007). Data on the urban housing shortage in the country
242 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
209 estimates that 99% of the shortageor approximately 26 million homes throughout the countryaffects people living in cities from the economically weaker sections (EWS) of
Indian society (i.e., the urban poor). Despite the addition of eight million new homes between 2007 and 2012, there is still a massive shortage of housing for the urban poor in
Indian cities (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and National Buildings Organisation 2011). To effectively address the urgent and growing housing needs of the urban poor, to do so across 67 cities in India, and to complete this initiative within seven years, would require a highly coordinated effort between multiple institutions at the central, state, and local level. Agencies responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the Basic Services for the Urban Poor scheme would have to move through the multistage process of approvals with a level of focus, coordination, and efficiency akin to the discipline of an army during wartime.
To produce these kinds of largescale outcomes within cities could not be achieved by developing a policy at the Centre and simply recommending that states and cities implement it. According to several policymakers and bureaucrats, change could only be achieved in the existing institutional context through a highly disciplined, militaristic program with fixed goals, incentives for producing outcomes, punishment for inaction, and a great sense of “wartime” urgency. One official describes this need for urgency:
In India, it’s a paradox; when there is a flood, drought, or some kind of an emergency, you find the administration becomes very active, they deliver results, coordination is there somehow, people come together, and things go on. It is done. So it [implementing federal policies] is possible...but it’s like wartime and peacetime.243
243 Personal Interview, A. Ravindra, October 28, 2014 210
An official within the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance
Corporation (KUIDFC) provides similar remarks regarding the need for a militaristic mission to solve the problem of urban governance and poverty in Indian cities:
As you know the word ‘mission’ means it is sort of like a military operation. You know, you go, you have targets fixed, you have deadlines fixed, you are fully focused on what you are doing. I mean this is your target, you move from one step to the other, groups are formed, and all of them go and try to attack a particular thing and achieve what they want to. …In a mission mode you are fully focused; you are like in a battlefield, you’re doing a battle against a particular setup, and here it was poverty alleviation and housing.244
When discussing the ingredients necessary for the successful implementation of a policy like NURM, the Former Chief Secretary to the Government of Karnataka and
Urban Affairs Advisor to the Chief Minister of Karnataka describes how agencies require:
Very clear directives and failure to comply will entail very quick punishment: this leads to successful outcomes. See what happens in the normal course is there is an enquiry, which takes a long time so the urgency is lost. Here there is a sense of urgency, in the other one it is not. So only when that kind of a sense, if not of urgency, that commitment that it must be executed in time , things must be 245 delivered to the people, on time.
Ravindra’s comments were echoed by a key NURM policy architect and former Joint
Secretary for the Ministry of Urban Development, M. Rajamani, who describes how the need for immediate action informed and shaped the policy’s design:
There was a sense of urgency to roll out these reforms because the municipal corporations had been living handtomouth all along. We thought a sevenyear period is a reasonable period to spend this amount of money and to do these kinds of projects and also [to] implement the reforms linked to those. ...it has to be done you know with a sense of urgency because you need to catch up with the time that
244 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
245 Personal Interview, October 28, 2014
211 you have lost in the past. You lost a lot of time, collectively, the states, the municipal corporations, the central government; all of us collectively have lost a lot of time in bringing about a change in the urban front. So we have to pull up 246 our socks and ensure that these things are implemented at breakneck speed .
Developing a policy architecture that mirrored the urgency of a wartime effort and the discipline of a military organization was seen by some as the only way to ensure that cities and states met the objectives under BSUP. If the bureaucracy could operate with the discipline of an army, move through the hierarchy of approvals at a quick pace, and unify around a common purpose, the scheme could achieve its ambitious objectives to transform urban governance, improve urban infrastructure, and alleviate poverty and housing shortages within seven years. It is no surprise that officials frequently offered military metaphors when describing the level of discipline required to meet these ambitious aims because according to Weber, “the discipline of the army gives birth to all discipline” (Gerth and Mills 1946, p. 216).
Despite the grand visions of policymakers to produce this kind of highlevel efficiency and coordination, implementing such a largescale policy in Indian cities in an urgent and efficient fashion would prove to be near impossible for various reasons, most of which were attributable to the policy’s original design. While earlier chapters of this dissertation outlined the overall logic, actors, and forms of capital that structure two key policy fieldsthe bureaucratic field and the civil society field in this chapter, I examine one particular policy object as it moves through the bureaucratic field as a means to understand how the broader logic of the field shapes key policy processes. The Detailed
Project Report (DPR) is a document required by all agencies receiving funding under
246 Personal Interview, April 21, 2014 212 JNNURM and must be submitted and approved by officials at the city, state, and federal level before funds are released for implementation. DPRs are essentially contracts for implementing agencies and serve as critical objects of struggle both within the bureaucratic field as well as between state and nonstate actors. Due to its centrality to
BSUP’s overall implementation, I examine the creation of this document and how it is used by various actors to shape policy processes and outcomes within communities.
In this chapter, I argue that the DPR serves as a key “policy technique”
(Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007) that organizes relations not just between state and societal actors, but also between various agencies within the state because DPRs are used to hold implementing agencies accountable for any challenges that emerge in policy implementation. Despite the fact that implementing agencies were given little guidance from the Centre as to how to create DPRs and structure projects, their failures to meet the terms specified in these policy documents bolstered arguments about the incapacity of implementing agencies. To show success under the scheme and to maintain legitimacy within the bureaucratic field, agencies sought to churn out DPRs at the fastest pace possible to quickly obtain approvals and commence construction. To meet this end, they often avoided the timeconsuming process of obtaining feedback from other bureaucratic agencies and project beneficiaries, and they created DPRs with unrealistic implementation timelines, little regard to critical implementation questions (e.g., can land be obtained for a project?), no input from other parastatal and governing bodies about coordinating efforts, and minimal (to no) insight from local residents. In Bangalore, this resulted in countless implementation delays, and the majority of projects proposed by the
213 implementing agencies were unimplementable in their original form. In this sense, the desire for legitimacy within the field largely fueled the ability for state agencies to demonstrate effective capacity.
Beginning with a discussion of the purpose of the Detailed Project Report, I then examine the components of the DPR, and trace this policy object from the local level where it is created, through the hierarchy of policy approvals at the state and central level. At each level, new dynamics and organizations shape and mold the DPR process, complicating the simplified policy model originally outlined by policymakers. I demonstrate the ways in which the pressure to produce outcomes by the Centre was mismatched by the institutional realities on the ground, forcing actors to creatively strategize to meet policy objectives. As formal documentation of the implementing agency’s intent and plans for slum redevelopment, DPRs are critical objects of struggle both within the state as well as between state and nonstate actors.
Controlling Bureaucratic Discretion through Policy Techniques
Several scholars have examined the gap between the grand visions of policymakers and the processes of policy implementation on the ground. Scott (1998) examines several
“high modernist” projects and the ways in which states attempt to make populations and resources legible and, in turn, more manageable. Scott finds that these grand plans are often mismatched by realities on the ground as states fail to take into account the knowledge of local people and institutions. Lipsky (1980) discusses the ways in which the discretion of local, “streetlevel bureaucrats” changes and shapes policies in ways that diverge from the policy’s original design. Echoing this, but in the Indian context, Gupta
214 (2012) discusses how the Indian bureaucracy at the local level operates with neartotal discretion, creating policy outcomes that are far from the original policy objectives and are more often the result of a series of “fortuitous accidents” (p. 13) rather than targeted efforts.
Attempting to control the local discretion of bureaucrats, therefore, is often a key objective of states and policymakers who aim to create policies that are implemented in full faith by all actors. Pires (2009) discusses how attempts to create “predictive action” and control lowerlevel bureaucratic agencies through policies, however, actually limits the ability of governmental agencies to accomplish tasks and meet policy objectives, creating (most ironically) an even greater need for local discretion. Lange and
Reuschemeyer (2005) discuss how Weber’s idealtypical version of the bureaucracy as a
“gapless institutional framework” (p. 7) nearly always falls short of the realities of bureaucracies, whose officials operate not like thoughtless cogs, but as societal actors who are influenced by a mix of organizational and individual norms and values.
Coslovsky (2015) also discusses how the action of the bureaucracy more closely resembles that of a “heterarchy” with internal factions and an array of networks that coalesce in diverse ways around policy objectives. In this sense, the bureaucracy can be seen as an “emergent organizational form” (Stark 2001) rather than a solidified hierarchy with clear and predictive outcomes. Other studies have highlighted the conflicting demands facing bureaucrats responsible for implementing policies, noting how policy directives from above can conflict with pressures from below, forcing bureaucrats to adopt creative strategies that both comply with policy goals (to show success to their
215 superiors) while reducing the potential for conflict with implementing agencies locally
(Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster 2008).
While not explicit in conversation with literature on bureaucratic discretion,
Lascoumes and Le Galès’s (2007) concepts of policy instruments and policy techniques prove fruitful for understanding the role of the DPR in organizing particular social relations. The authors describe a policy instrument as:
A device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation (p. 4).
They view a policy technique as a “concrete device that operationalizes the instrument”
(p. 4). In their discussion on instruments and techniques, the authors tend to focus on how these instruments organize relations between the state and society relations, overlooking the ways in which policy techniques and instruments can also serve to organize relations within the state. Under BSUP, the DPR was a crucial policy technique that organized not only relations between state and societal actors, but also relations between state agencies.
In this chapter, I build on this work examining bureaucratic discretion and policy techniques and argue that while there is a large gap between the policy visions and the implementation on the ground, the case of BSUP in India is not one of “barely controlled chaos” that Gupta (2012, p. 14) finds in the implementation of rural poverty policies in
India, nor is it the case of a hierarchical, “gapless institutional framework” conceptualized by Weber and discussed by Lange and Reuschemeyer (2005). Under
BSUP, bureaucratic actors are motivated to adhere to formal policy processes as directed,
216 countering the idea that all bureaucratic action is discretionary at the local level (Gupta
2012). However, the lack of guidance from the Centre and the mismatch between policy frameworks and the logic of the bureaucratic field fueled a system whereby effective policy implementation required agencies to work outside of the formal policy framework to meet policy ends. In moving outside of the policy framework, bureaucratic agencies then found themselves accountable to numerous state and nonstate actors when creating and implementing DPRs, which created new forms of oversight and complicated feedback loops during each phase of the process.
In the next section of this chapter I outline the specific components of a DPR and its overall role in the BSUP policy process.
The Essential Role of the Detailed Project Report (DPR)
The Detailed Project Report (DPR) is one of the most critical components of the BSUP scheme. This document is a prerequisite for cities and states to receive funding for urban infrastructure and housing projects under the scheme. According to the Government of
India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (2009a), the DPR is:
An essential building block for the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in creating infrastructure and enabling sustainable quality service delivery. The DPR is to be prepared carefully and with sufficient details to ensure appraisal, approval, and subsequent project implementation in a timely and efficient manner (p. 6).
This essential “building block”, however, cannot be developed independently from the city’s broader vision for development and growth. For this reason, cities participating in
NURM are required to first submit a comprehensive City Development Plan (CDP) that outlines the current state of and future visions for the city’s infrastructure and
217 development. The goal of the CDP is to detail a city’s existing financial and institutional
247 ecology as well as the priorities and strategies for future development and investment.
The relationship between the CDP and the DPR as envisioned by policymakers is a complimentary one; DPRs for specific projects within the city (e.g., a housing development project for a group of slums) are to emerge from and fit into the city’s broader plan and vision outlined in the CDP. DPRs should include “sectoral strategies, priorities of infrastructure investment, financial mechanism along with required funds”
(Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2009a) and, ideally, the required development and investment plan for a particular project that fits into the broader budgetary and investment plan for the city. For example, under this model, projects that are proposed for urban housing by the Karnataka Slum Development Board should also account for other proposed projects in the same area (e.g., a new bus terminal or a proposed sewage pipeline, etc.), thereby ensuring the most efficient and effective urban development and land use.
In addition to serving as a “building block” for a city’s broader plan, the role of
DPRs and the particular institutional infrastructure of multilevel approvals for DPRs was developed to reduce the discretion of local actors and ensure that projects meet the policy requirements laid out by the Centre. In theory, by creating a series of oversight layers at the local, state, and federal level, and roles for each implementing agency, there would be
247 The CDP for Bangalore does not specify a particular time period by which the city must meet stated goals and objectives. There are, however, several references to a seven year time frame throughout the document, likely reflecting the broader JNNURM timeframe. Seven years is an ambitious time frame by which to accomplish the two main visions for Bangalore as outlined under the CDP, which are to ensure there are “no more new slums” (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike and Urban Systems Private 2009, p. 5) and to “redevelop existing slums and surroundings to enable Bangalore regain its lost glory without endangering the lives of the urban poor” (p. 12). 218 fewer implementation challenges and agencies would make fewer errors in their work.
For this reason, producing NURMcompliant DPRs was a key mechanism to reduce the discretion at the local level and to ensure that the processes on the ground were consistent with the Centre’s vision for urban development. The Managing Director of Government of India Schemes at the KUIDFC, Ahmed Ateeq, describes the goals of this institutional structure:
Under the mission mode, the whole guidelines are such that at no point in time, none of the stakeholders involved can be caught napping. They have to be fully alert. The kind of procedures that have been brought in has brought a lot of alertness. Nobody can get lazy with multiple players involved, and the chances of anybody making a mistake are much, much less. ...The guidelines are such that at 248 every stage the roles are properly specified.
According to key policy architects for NURM, this organizational structure aimed to improve oversight and reduce local discretion, but was also created because cities and states lacked the capacity and will to implement urban infrastructure and governance projects effectively. Om Prakash Mathur, an economist and former member of the NURM
National Technical Advisory Group (NTAG), discussed how “the organizational framework that was suggested and should be set up at the city and state level, just did not
249 exist” for cities and states. This new organizational design, therefore, was seen as the way to greatly improve the functioning of cities and states as they attempted to implement largescale urban development projects.
Because DPRs are the fundamental “building blocks” upon which the entire
BSUP policy is based, understanding the DPR development process and approval criteria
248 Personal Interview, October 16, 2014
249 Personal Interview, March 20, 2014
219 is essential for city and state agencies to move through the policy process efficiently.
According to the official NURM toolkit, DPRs are to flow through the hierarchy of the administrative system, with projects developed at the municipal level, then placed before a Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA) that approves and forwards DPRs to a Statelevel
Steering Committee (SLSC), that then forwards DPRs to two agencies at the central level for approval. According to the official BSUP toolkit, once proposals are approved at the central level, the Ministry responsible for BSUP (the Ministry of Housing and Urban
Poverty Alleviation) recommends projects for funding to the Central Sanctioning and
Monitoring Committee (CSMC). These recommendations then move laterally within the central government to the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for releasing funds back to the SLNA. The SLNA is then responsible for releasing funds to implementing agencies so these agencies can commence or continue work.
While the toolkit does not specify a timeline for the overall DPR approval process, during a meeting of the BSUP CSMC, committee members agreed that projects are “required to be finished in 1215 months” after approval of the original DPR
(Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2009a, p. 6).
Essentially what this means is that once a DPR is approved, implementing agencies are expected to solicit tenders for construction, begin construction and complete it within
1215 months. While this may seem like a feasible timeframe to complete housing developments, this timeframe does not account for the fact that implementing agencies have to go through several rounds of approvals during project implementation.
Specifically, funds for BSUP projects are not provided in full upon the approval of DPRs,
220 but rather are given to implementing agencies in four installments.250 Agencies must have an external evaluator visit each project site and measure the physical and financial progress of a BSUP site. This evaluation confirms a project’s progress toward meeting the plans detailed in a DPR and is used to inform a “utilization certificate” that is provided to the SLNA who releases the next installment of funds. While this is another attempt to limit local discretion and reduce the potential abuse of funds, the process of measuring progress under BSUP is incredibly challenging. A project manager for NURM at the KUIDFC describes this:
I’ll tell you even more weird things which you cannot count, which you cannot quantify at all and where you can mess it up. Beneficiary identification and allocation: that is number, right? Site availability, have you managed to clear the site? Okay. But beneficiary willingness, how will you calculate that? [Is it] beneficiary willingness to pay the amount, to shift, to accept the particular configuration that you have been allotted? All of this is random, there is no way you can quantify that. ...What do you do when three out of four people are ready to agree [to construction] and the other one is not ready? So you cannot construct. So does that mean you have 75% progress towards the site availability?”251
Preparing all components required for the DPRs and obtaining approval is both a critical and timeconsuming part of the larger BSUP policy process. Without DPRs, cities are unable to receive funding from the Centre and unable to move forward with housing projects. While the development and implementation process presented by the Centre is presented as a clear, linear progression through the stages of DPR creation, approval, and disbursal of funds, the actual policy process differs quite drastically. The remaining sections of this chapter examine the components of a DPR and follow the DPR through
250 Projects originally received funds in four installments, but this was changed to three installments in 2012 by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation to speed up implementation.
251 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2014 221 the process of creation and approvals, mapping the mechanisms and practices that shape the policy technique and practices within the state. This process demonstrates how a
DPR, once in the bureaucratic field, is molded and adapted based on the forces and motivations of various actors and organizations.
Due to the sheer number of agencies and actors (both state and nonstate) involved in and impacted by the implementation process, agencies responsible for implementing the scheme must engage in numerous negotiations at each stage of implementation in order to move the policy through the process. With each new set of negotiations, new chains of command are created within existing chains of command, multiplying the potential for error and complicating the linear policy vision advanced by policymakers.
These negotiations prove to be timeconsuming and challenging for implementing agencies who face constant pressure to meet policy objectives within specified timeframes. Implementing agencies, therefore, work under dual pressures to meet the needs of a variety of state and nonstate actors, while also meeting the formal demands of the policy bureaucracy.
The next section outlines the components of a DPR and some of the challenges that implementing agencies faced in creating DPRs during the initial stages of the policy.
The Components of a DPR
While the following sections in this chapter will outline the development of the DPR and its approval process in practice, it is important to briefly outline the specific components of a DPR under BSUP. Developing a DPR can prove to be a timeconsuming process, requiring months of preparation and including several components. According to the
222 Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (2009a), cities are only eligible for assistance if they have “prepared a detailed project report comprising technocommercial analysis, legal assessment, establishment of institutional framework(s), risk assessment, environment and social assessment, financial operating plan, and an implementation plan.” Minutes from a meeting of the BSUP Central
Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee further outline the responsibilities of implementing agencies when preparing DPRs:
Appraising agencies [need] to ensure that DPRs posed to the Mission Directorate in MOHUPA comply with JNNURM guidelines, instructions issued by CSMC/CSC [central sanctioning and monitoring committee/central sanctioning committee] from time to time, [the] state PWD [public works department] ...and relevant State Government Orders. ...appraising agencies would be responsible to ensure that land proposed for housing is free of encumbrance, DPRs/estimates (rates and bills of quantities) are certified by the competent authority, eligible beneficiaries are identified, action is taken for biometric identification, [a] whole slum approach is adopted, a definite plan of action is worked out to put the place vacated by slumdwellers to productive use in the case of relocation projects, town planning norms as applicable under state laws are followed, State/ULB [urban local body] shares are available, beneficiaries have agreed to pay for their contribution and the Guidelines of JNNURM, toolkits and instructions issues by the CSMC/CSC are adhered to (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2009b, p. 910).
More specifically, DPRs must include nine components or “chapters” (see Figure 5.1 below). While each DPR differs slightly based on the unique characteristics of the proposed site, generally speaking, a completed DPR is approximately 100200 pages long, and one DPR can include a proposal to develop several slums (referred to as “slum clusters”).
223 FIGURE 5.1: Format and Components of Detailed Project Reports
1. A 1page project abstract 2. Background on the proposed project that specifies the population of interest, the existing infrastructure, the “city profile”, existing schemes aiding slum populations, a socioeconomic survey of the slums, and the “slum profile” of the city (i.e., total slums and “slum clusters” included in the DPR) 3. A description of the connection between the proposed DPR and the broader CDP as well as a status on the completion of required reforms under BSUP 4. A project description which details the justification for a particular project, the cost of the project, that status of lands to be utilized in a project, details of beneficiaries impacted by project, details of relocation site (if applicable), details of land tenure, environmental benefits (if any) to the project, details of sanctions and approvals from other authorities 5. A detailed project budget that includes the cost of housing, water supply, sewerage, storm water drains, roads, footpaths, street lighting, solid waste management, parks and other open spaces, community toilets, and any community facilities (e.g., a religious temple) 6. A proposal for additional health, educational, and social security facilities near the project site (if not already provided) 7. A project management plan that outlines the implementing agencies, the institutional process followed to implement and monitor the project, process to be followed for awarding tender, process to be followed for construction, and detailed timelines and milestones for project completion 8. Several supporting documents that supplement the project details (e.g., map of the city and slum to be developed and surrounding areas; approved building design and layout; list of beneficiaries; site photographs; financial status of the implementing agency and a copy of the signed MoA) 9. A completed technical checklist (with 24 components that indicate the project design and finances are aligned) and a completed administrative checklist (with 31 components that indicate the project proposal aligns with the CDP and MoA). These checklists must be signed by the nodal officer of the implementing agency and the officer in charge at the statelevel nodal agency.
A Lack of Guidance Coupled with Immense Pressure from the Centre
During the initial phases of the NURM scheme the agencies responsible for creating and evaluating DPRs were operating with little to no guidance from the Centre. Despite the fact that the larger policy was inaugurated in 2005, guidelines for how to develop DPRs for the BSUP submission of the policy were not issued by the Ministry of Housing and
224 252 Urban Poverty Alleviation until 2009. For four years, agencies in Bangalore knew that they needed to create projects and begin to implement the scheme, but were given little to no guidance as to the best approach for implementation. According to Dr. Debolina
Kundu, the HUDCO Chair at the National Institute of Urban Affairs in New Delhi, the newness of the policy and its processes made the initial stages of NURM even more complicated: “for the first time the reforms came up, the concept of preparing DPRs at the local level and then sending it across to the Centre for approval came up, and the
253 cities were totally ignorant to the entire process.” Establishing the foundation for policy processes was critical if the policy was to succeed, yet the Centre did little in the initial years of the policy to ensure that implementing agencies had the tools necessary to be successful. According to a seniorlevel bureaucrat within the KUIDFC, the policy “took that much time because, though it was mission mode, making the ground level system to
254 come to the level of standard that was expected in the mission mode was a tough task.”
Ashok Jain, the former Managing Director of JNNURM within the KUIDFC, echoes similar concerns about policy processes during the initial stages:
All these administrators were in a hurry. They propose some project, but in order to prepare the project report, we need good experts. Though the Government of India provided for that [via the appointment of consultants], doing a study, doing a survey, and preparing DPRs will take a lot of time. So all these DPRs were prepared very hurriedly. That is why you should give more time towards preparation of DPRs. ...Unfortunately, that opportunity was not there because it 255 was a firstofitskind project, a new project, that’s why it did not happen.
252 The Bangalore City Development Plana required component of the JNNURM process and the document from which DPRs are to be conceptualizedwas not approved by the municipal council until September, 27 2006.
253 Personal Interview, February 28, 2014
254 Personal Interview, October 16, 2014
255 Personal Interview, November 7, 2014 225
Excerpts from meeting minutes of the Statelevel Empowered Committeethat occurred during the years between the unveiling of the scheme in 2005 and when guidelines for DPRs were provided in 2009reference the need to expedite project processes and DPRs in the early stages of BSUP. There are several examples of this in official minutes, including: “Mumtaz Begum, Mayor of Bangalore expressed that the preparation of DPRs was already delayed and now should be expedited” (Karnataka
Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2006c), “the Honorable
Chief Minister and Chairman of the SLSC [Statelevel Steering Committee] expressed that several states had already availed funds from JNNURM and Karnataka should not lag behind. ...He desired that the DPRs be placed before the GoI for approval soon”
(2006c), “the committee directed the Implementing Agencies take up the task of preparation of DPRs in earnest and submit the same to the KUIDFC without delay”
(Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2007a), and “the committee desired that the Implementing Agencies expedite submission of DPRs as committed” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation
2007b). These minutes demonstrate the pressures facing implementing agencies to produce DPRs at a quick pace, not only from actors at the state level, but also from actors
256 within the Government of India.
256 Pressures to perform under strict timelines were evident not just in the beginning of the policy, but throughout. Several references to the timebound nature of the scheme can be found in SLEC meeting minutes in 2010 and 2011 (five and six years after the policy’s unveiling). For example, “the Committee instructed KSCB [Karnataka Slum Development Board] to speed up the pace of work so that the grant amount under JnNURM sanctioned for this project is claimed within the Mission period” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2010b). Notes from another meeting at the state level echo these notes, “the KSDB shall speed up the pace of work so that the project can be completed within the committed time line” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2011b, 2011c). 226 Without much guidance from the Centre and despite the challenges facing implementing agencies on the ground (e.g., poor cooperation from other urban governance bodies), implementing agencies like the Karnataka Slum Development Board
(KSDB) were still expected to submit projects under BSUP during this time period. The
Technical Director for the Karnataka Slum Development Board, Sannah Chittaiah, describes how this lack of guidance, coupled with pressure to produce DPRs at a fast pace, forced implementing agencies to produce these documents with little planning and foresight, leading to a series of complications in approval and implementation:
JNNURM launched in 2005, December 3. We did not get any toolkit, any guidelines. See in 2006 and 2007 our DPRs were approved based on the line estimates [for per unit housing costs] without a detailed engineering investigation or a social investigation. [We did this] for the approval sake. These DPRs were given approval in 2006/2007 at that time due to the urgency. All our consultants prepared these DPRs and did not do an indepth analysis of the engineering or the social side. In this form we [the KSDB seniorlevel bureaucrats] accepted the DPRs, this was our fault. We did so for approval sake, for taking funds from the 257 central government at the initial stage.
To meet these demands, DPRs were prepared hurriedly, often without taking into consideration key factors like: land ownership, the total size of a proposed redevelopment site (and whether the proposed number of dwelling units would fit onto a particular plot of land), the number of residents in a particular community and whether the residents agree to the redevelopment, and/or the potential escalation of costs that could occur due to delayed timelines. Ganga Devi, the former BSUP project manager within the
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (i.e., the
Karnataka Statelevel Nodal Agency for BSUP) describes similar challenges in the initial
257 Personal Interview, December 1, 2014
227 stages of the policy, specifically related to the estimates of per unit housing costs put forth in DPRs:
So in the very beginning, they [the implementing agencies] didn’t know for what amount they were to prepare the DPRs. They just prepared a DPR with a 1 lakh amount and they submitted it. Later on, because none of the [construction] agencies were coming forward [to bid on projects], the state government agreed to pay the difference [of .8 lakh]. Later on they learned that DPRs should be prepared for something more like 3 lakh [to account for cost escalation].258
According to a midlevel bureaucrat the KUIDFC, this lack of guidance from the
259 Centre was “the major reason for delay [of BSUP]” , resulting in DPRs that were not implementable in their original form, requiring new rounds of approvals at the state and central level, and delaying timelines even further. These time constraints, however, affected all parties involved in the implementation, not just the implementing agencies.
This same official notes how “the Centre always pressurized [us] to complete the work as fast as possible. ...The Centre will always put on pressure. Even the state government will always put pressure on the implementing agency because they won’t get the work done within the timeline.”
The goal of completing projects in a timely fashion outweighed the need to produce DPRs that were integrated with the city’s larger plans for development and that adequately accounted for implementation challenges. Speaking about the creation of
DPRs and CDPs in cities under NURM, a scholar of urban governance described how
“these things are totally contradictory, the way DPRs, CDPs are being prepared, the way
258 Personal Interview, November 5, 2014
259 Ibid.
228 260 they are being conceptualized, this will not work.” As implementing agencies began to move through the DPR approval and project implementation phases, it became clear that the policy had many builtin contradictions and ambiguities, making it difficult (if not impossible) to move through the policy process quickly.
While there is no official timeline outlined in the NURM/BSUP guidelines for the estimated time to prepare DPRs, according to interviews with key bureaucrats responsible for creating DPRs and obtaining their approval, the actual time that it takes to go through the policy structure and obtain approvals for one DPR can be anywhere from one year to
18 months. This is important to note given that the BSUP CSMC guidelines presented above were that BSUP projects were to be completed in 12 to 15 months. One official within the Statelevel Nodal Agency describes this challenge with DPRs and the overall timeline:
The timeline was not so realistic. Only while sitting in this room can [one] say that within this month this is going to happened, this is going to be completed. But in reality, due to the involvement of various departments, various clearances, that elongates the process. So it is not at all realistic. ...While preparing the DPR we include some action plan, we put a graph saying ‘this will be completed within this month, within this month, we can complete’, but practically it is not at all possible.261
In this sense, the guidelines provided by the central government did little to account for the realities of implementation on the ground, resulting in poorly constructed, checkbox
DPRs.
The next sections of this chapter outline the processes of preparing and approving
DPRs at the local, state, and central level, demonstrating the multiple layers of
260 Personal Interview, March 13, 2014
261 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, November 5, 2014 229 bureaucratic oversight that are not portrayed in the formal models outlined by the Centre.
In doing so, I highlight the various chains of command that emerge and shape the DPR process as it moves through the bureaucratic field.
DPR Processes at the Municipal Level
As described above, DPRs are technical documents that outline the specific aspects of a slum redevelopment project under BSUP. These critical documents are the responsibility of the implementing agency to develop, and, once created, DPRs must go through a timeconsuming process of reviews and clearances at several levels. While the original policy Toolkit outlines no steps of approvals for implementing agencies at the local level
(these agencies simply create the DPR and then forward it to other levels of approval), the process of approvals at the local level actually involves several organizations and actors as implementing agencies must negotiate with citizens, civil society actors, and politicians (at the local, district, and state level) to move policy documents through the approval structure to implement the project.
Before construction begins for any BSUP project, the two main implementing
262 agencies for BSUP in Bangalore (the municipal government or BBMP and the KSDB
262 It is important to note that the BBMP implemented five BSUP pilot projects during the beginning stages of the scheme and received approval to develop BSUP housing in another 13 locations around Bangalore during Phase I of the scheme. However, according to the official proceedings from the SLEC, the BBMP commenced work in five locations, but experienced several difficulties implementing the housing program in the other eight locations. According to the official meeting minutes, “work in other 8 slums has not started due to various reasons like land litigation, noncooperation by existing slum dwellers, interdepartmental transfer of lands, etc. …The existing slum dwellers in some of the slums are demanding tenural rights for land” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2009c). For this reason, the BBMP transferred the remaining eight locations to the KSDB, making the KSDB the only implementing agency in the city. This decision was approved by the SLEC during the 15th meeting of the SLEC on March 1, 2010. Even though the Karnataka Slum Development Board is a statelevel agency, I focus on the experience of this agency as it prepares DPRs because the KSDB was responsible for the majority of BSUP’s implementation in the city. 230 must conduct a number of surveys within each community to determine the number of project beneficiaries, their eligibility for the housing program, and the structural designs for each housing unit. According to Sannah Chittaiah, the Technical Director for the
Karnataka Slum Development Board (KSDB), “for BSUP, we went for inhouse preparation of DPRs. ...The soil survey, structural designs and drawings, we have outsourced that, we have taken all the details [from the consultants], [and] then we have
263 prepared the DPRs.” Once these surveys are conducted as well as the required socioeconomic survey, the KSDB then submits the DPR to the SLNA, which must include proposals for project construction, a detailed list of project beneficiaries, and a
264 budget for total costs.
Whether the implementing agency does all the work inhouse or subcontracts portions of the work to outside consultants depends on the implementing agency. In the example above, the KSDB subcontracted the soil survey and structural design portions of the DPR to external consultants, but, according to KSDB staff, they conducted the socioeconomic survey “inhouse” using staff from the engineering and revenue
265 departments. The rationale for this decision is related to the organization’s internal
263 Personal Interview, December 1, 2014
264 In theory these processes are supposed to happen with some level of community involvement. However, as will be described in C hapter Six in the case of the Deshyanagar BSUP project, the Slum Board developed and pushed projects through the approval process without consultation from communities. Once the KSDB attempted to implement the approved schemes, communities that were unaware of plans and would refuse the project and often force the KSDB to refine their original project plans. When asked about the challenges that emerged after the DPR approval specifically from communities, the Technical Director of the KSDB notes: “at the time, due to the urgency, all our consultants prepared [DPRs] not doing an indepth analysis of the engineering as well as the social side. It was our fault, and we did so for approval sake, for taking funds from the central government at the initial stage. ...we are not doing this now” (Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 5, 2014).
265 Personal Interview, Ravi Kumar, December 2, 2014
231 structure. The KSDB has several units that are organized by zones within Bangalore with local engineers responsible for engaging with a specific set of slum communities within their zone. According to the KSDB Technical Director, this history and rapport between the engineers and slum communities allows for improved policy processes under BSUP:
“what are the main reasons for success? The success goes to our engineers. Our engineers have been acquainted with the beneficiaries for 20 years. From the beginning of their job
266 they know [the community]. That is the biggest advantage to our board.” Once the surveys are conducted and they have obtained the inputs from several consulting agencies and internal staff, this information is gathered by the Deputy Chief Engineer and scrutinized by the Technical Director within the KSDB technical wing. From here, the
Technical Director will forward the DPR to the KSDB Commissioner for the final round of internal review and approval.
Once the DPRs are completed by the KSDB, the DPR will then be forwarded to relevant committees within the municipal government. For BSUP projects proposed by the KSDB, these projects would have to be approved by the Social Justice and Welfare
267 standing committee within the municipal council. According to a former member of the
BBMP Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for NURM, M. Subramanyam, the DPRs for the BSUP program would go to this committee because of the financial model adopted
266 Personal Interview, December 1, 2014
267 According to documentation from the BBMP, “each Standing Committee shall consist of 12 councilors of the corporation elected at its first meeting after the general elections and at the first meeting in the same month in each succeeding year according to the principled proportionate representation by means of the single transferable vote. No Councilor shall be a member of more than one standing committee at the same time. The Mayor and the Deputy Mayor shall Exofficio be members of all the standing committee shall be one year from the date of their election. Where a casual vacancy occurs in the membership of a standing committee, it shall be filled by the chairmanship by the election of another councilor” (Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. n.d.). 232 for the program within cities. He describes how:
In Basic Services for Urban Poor, if you’re a beneficiary of that slum, you have to pay 10% of the total [project] amount as a contribution, okay? What BBMP did, along with the Welfare Section, they made a resolution that the beneficiary contribution of 10%, they, the BBMP, has agreed to bear this cost through the Welfare Section under the 22.5%. This 22.5% is reserved only for the 268269 development of backward classes.
According to the former Special Commissioner of Projects for the BBMP, K.R. Niranjan,
“the 22.5% has to be spent by the BBMP on the welfare of these [SC/ST] people. So we say our aim is to also give infrastructure to these people, people mostly low caste people.
Other poor people are also in the slums, but it is mostly low caste. ...We have said we will
270 pay this 10% and they can get 100% of their house free.” This use of BBMP funds to pay for beneficiary contributions was independently confirmed by two bureaucrats responsible for implementing the policy at the KUIDFC and three staff at the KSDB. In a quarterly report on NURM developed by the KUIDFC on behalf of the BBMP, there is a resolution dated February 24, 2011 that was passed by the BBMP to allow “10% of the beneficiary to be met by the ULB” (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development
Finance Corporation 2014b, p. 124). This unique policy strategy allowed implementing agencies to effectively jump a major hurdle in the implementation process, which was the collection of beneficiary contributions. By allowing municipal funds to cover the cost of
268 The Special Component Plan (SCP) for SCs (introduced during the 5th Five Year Plan 19741979) and the Tribal SubPlan for the STs (introduced during the Sixth Five Year Plan 19801985) was intended to ensure adequate allocation of resources the SC and ST population in each state (National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution n.d.). The current designation for Karnataka is 15% funds for SC and 7.5% of funds for ST populations.
269 Personal Interview, November 28, 2014
270 Personal Interview, September 26, 2014
233 the contribution, municipal councilors would be seen in a positive light by BSUP beneficiaries (they could claim success for their constituents) and they could help the
KSDB to more efficiently implement the BSUP scheme. In this sense, all actors were able to demonstrate success.
Once the relevant standing committee within the BBMP approves projects, they move forward to the municipal council for approval. According to the head of the BBMP
NURM Project Implementation Unit, Narayana Raj, all DPR proposals have to be approved by the municipal council, and the KUIDFC requires that implementing agencies
271 include a copy of the council approval with their DPR documentation. According to a seniorlevel official within the KUIDFC:
The implementing agency has to go to the council and show to the council what they intend to do and the urban local body has to clear the programs, they have to make a resolution. So these resolutions were made, and then with those resolutions, the project is taken before the KUIDFC. The KUIDFC has a project management unit here, so they—this project management unit used to examine the DPRwith the assistance of a project implementation unit in the slum board. 272
This process may seem relatively straightforward to complete for one community impacted by the housing scheme, but during the initial stages of the BSUP scheme in
Bangalore, the KSDB clustered several communities into one DPR. The DPR submitted for Phase I of the BSUP scheme, for example, included 28 slum communities spread throughout the city. According to Slum Board officials, the motivation for this clustering approach was to minimize the lengthy approval process for DPRs and address the
271 Personal Interview, October 21, 2014
272 Personal Interview, October 16, 2014
234 273 timebound nature of the scheme. By combining several communities into one DPR, the Slum Board hoped to reduce the overall DPR approval process and begin implementation of several projects across the city at a quicker pace. According to Ganga
Devi, the former project manager for BSUP at the KUIDFC, “for every individual slum we can’t prepare a DPR because the DPR itself is [a] big effort to prepare. If you go on
274 preparing a DPR for every slum, it will be a very cumbersome.”
While this “slum cluster” approach helped implementing agencies to commence more projects during the early stages of the policy, it eventually created more implementation problems during the later stages of the policy. Sannah Chittaiah, the
KSDB Technical Director, describes some of these challenges during this first phase:
Here 18 MLAs will come for 28 slums in a single DPR under BSUP. ...For this DPR it is a cluster, we made a cluster. We will chose from these slums, 100 [dwelling units] from this slum, another 200 from this slum, from this slum another 300. So we put them all together and prepared a DPR...In BSUP what happened was we took a large number of slums and combined them into one DPR, so in one project there were around 20 slums. So if you complete 19 slums, and if one is left [incomplete] then we can’t declare that project as a completed 275 project. ...In one DPR there was 46 slums.
In this sense, efforts to save time by clustering slums into one DPR proved harmful to the
KSDB in the long term because the organization was unable to show success. In later phases of the scheme, the KSDB moved to a model where the organization created one
DPR per project (and these projects were generally within one political constituency so as
273 Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014; Personal Interview, Ravi Kumar, December 1, 2014; Personal Interview, Balraj, December 1, 2014
274 Personal Interview, November 5, 2014
275 Personal Interview, December 1, 2014
235 to eliminate conflict between politicians) so that implementation challenges in one
276 community would not prevent the entire project from being marked as completed.
At the municipal level, implementing agencies must go through many more organizational and political layers to obtain approvals for DPRs than is outlined in the official guidelines. While the formal policy structure outlines a simple process of creating a DPR at the local level and then forwarding to the Statelevel Nodal Agency, to effectively move the DPR forward in the policy process, implementing agencies had to engage with a variety of bureaucratic and political actors to obtain approvals for projects under BSUP. This process of negotiating between organizations and actors created challenges for implementing agencies who were pressured to complete the DPRs within a quick timeline.
In the next section of this chapter, I examine approval processes at the state level and how the lack of formal guidelines, coupled with immense pressure to produce outcomes in a quick timeframe, forced agencies to often work outside of the formal policy framework to achieve outcomes.
DPR Processes at the State Level
After obtaining a series of approvals at the municipal level, implementing agencies must work closely with officials from the Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA) to prepare and finalize documents for state level approval. Within each SLNA, there is an associated project management unit (PMU) that is to be staffed by five experts and to work closely with implementing agencies and the SLNA staff to “provide the requisite technical and
276 Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014
236 managerial support to SLNA to ensure effective implementation of the programme at
[the] State level” (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty
Alleviation n.d, p. 4). The PMU was also created to keeping policy processes moving ahead at a quick pace. A key policy architect described how “that’s why this PMU and all was created. …with the idea of speeding up the DPRs and speeding up the implementation, nothing wrong with that, it was necessary, otherwise, how would they
277 [implementing agencies] have done it?” In this sense, the role of the PMU was quite essential in policy processes and in steering policy outcomes. One official within the
KUIDFC described this key role within the Statelevel Nodal Agency (SLNA): “so
SLNA is the main agency that monitors, supervises, interacts, and then examines all these aspects. Within the SLNA there is the PMU. The more active the PMU, the better the
278 SLNA can deliver .”
The BSUP PMU in Karnataka began the scheme fully staffed with five project experts working to meet policy objectives. However, within the first two years of the scheme, staffing changed, leaving only one person to complete the work of the entire unit. Ganga Devi served as the Management of Information Systems (MIS) specialist within the KUIDFC PMU, and as the only remaining staff member in the unit, she became the key node through which information about BSUP processes flowed. Despite efforts to replace PMU staff, high turnover coupled with the slow recruitment process led her to be the only person overseeing policy processes on the ground for the majority of
277 Personal Interview, M. Rajamani, February 17, 2015
278 Personal Interview, Ateeq Ahmed, October 16, 2014
237 BSUP’s duration in Karnataka. In this role, she was responsible for visiting all project sites (to the best of her ability since there were numerous sites and thousands of dwelling units across Bangalore and Mysore), assisting the KSDB with processing DPR approvals, addressing any concerns related to DPRs raised by the SLNA, monitoring physical and financial progress at each site (in order to complete monthly progress reports that were required by the SNLA for every BSUP project), and forwarding policy documents (e.g.,
DPRs) to the Executive Director of JNNURM within the KUIDFC for approval. With pressures to complete DPRs at a quick pace, oversight of the daytoday project processes proved challenging for Ganga Devi. She discussed how:
I did all the work, it was my responsibility what and whom to oversee. ...I have to work with the KSDB, that is the implementing agency...I have to give the report to the UDD, I have to give the report to the state government, I have to give the report to the Ministry, Government of India. So at various levels, I was in meetingsconducting, convening the meetings, attending the meetings...whatever has to be done, it was done by me. ...Whatever comes related to the project 279 implementation has been done by a single person.
It is no surprise, then, that BSUP faced challenges on the ground with implementation. If the PMU was seen as an essential piece in the efficient and effective work of the SLNA, then a PMU with only one staff member to manage the development of approximately 18,000 housing units in Bangalore (spread across 65 slum communities) and 6,328 housing units in Mysore (spread across 67 slum communities) can inevitably lead to gaps in oversight and slow policy approvals (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and
Development Finance Corporation 2014a).
Pressures to complete the scheme in a timely manner coupled with the lack of
279 Personal Interview, February 23, 2015
238 capacity within the SLNA led to a “check box” system of approvals at the state level. A senior official within the Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department described this “check box” process when he remarked, “it’s better to take the approvals on the ground projects and then use the entire amount of time to actually implement the projects rather than I mean—nit picking on small, small things.”280 For this reason, DPRs that were prepared hurriedly by implementing agencies (with little guidance from the
Centre) were then approved at the state level without much scrutiny. Part of this was due to the rushed timeline and lack of capacity at the state level, but, according to one official within the KUIDFC, it was also partly due to the strong role of the Centre in overseeing policy processes:
We have in the KUIDFC a lot of technical experts who work here, but you cannot say we go through [the DPRs] 100%. We have a checklist, which is prepared again by the Government of India, but we will just go on ticking it like ‘oh this is done, okay this is done.’ Because it is going to be scrutinized again in Delhi, we don’t put much effort into it.281
These dynamics demonstrate that the ability of the SLNA to effectively coordinate policy processes (and complete key tasks like DPR approvals and oversight), depends not only on the authority granted to it under the official NURM framework, but is also shaped by internal dynamics and broader pressures forcing particular kinds of action under the policy. Given the timebound nature of the scheme, pressures to complete policy processes rapidly forces agencies to review and approve projects with little regard to their ability to be effectively implemented. Further, as agencies that seek to maintain legitimacy and a positive reputation within the broader bureaucratic field, the
280 Personal Interview, April 15, 2015
281 Personal Interview, Bhatan Lal, April 21, 2014 239 Slum Board and the KUIDFC are more motivated to demonstrate their aptitude to complete policy processes as opposed to successfully producing housing for the urban poor. For this reason, DPRs that were created were often unimplementable in their original form. Despite going through several stages of approval, DPRs were approved without ever really considering or consulting with those most affected by the plans outlined in these documents (i.e., residents, civil society groups, politicians, etc.).
Now that the local and statelevel processes of DPR creation and approval have been outlined, I turn to the processes at the central level.
DPR Approval Processes at the Central Level
After obtaining the approval at the state level, the Statelevel Nodal Agency (i.e., the
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation) sends DPRs for approval to the Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee (CSMC) within the
Government of India. Because several components of the DPRs are highly technical, with specifications about land use, soil and environmental conditions, and building materials,
DPRs must be appraised by technical experts at the central level prior to final approval from the CSMC. For BSUP, DPRs are reviewed primarily by two agencies, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) or the Building Materials and
Technology Promotion Council (BMTPC) (both of which are overseen by the Ministry of
Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation), but outside consultants and evaluators can also
282 be hired to review projects. According to a former official within the central government, if these appraising agencies find any issues with the DPRs, they can resolve
282 Personal Interview, Bhatan Lal, April 21, 2014; Personal Interview, Sudhir Krishna, March 13, 2015; Personal Interview, M. Rajamani, February 17, 2015
240 issues in two main ways:
For major deficiencies, you [can] send them back with your observations, like what it is you want to know in the DPR so they can fix it and send it back. If there are a few shortcomings which can be rectified, you know at the central level, then the people from the state would be called and they would be asked to come with 283 information and then fill in the blanks. So that expedites the whole thing.
Echoing a similar idea, but from the perspective of the SLNA, one official from the
KUIDFC notes how: “if they [the Centre] feel that there is something that they are not able to understand, then they will call for the statelevel consultant who has prepared that report or the agency who is putting forth that. And they will both try to convince those
284 people.”
After these agencies appraise DPRs for meeting particular technical specifications, they forward them to the Secretary for the Ministry of Housing and Urban
Poverty Alleviation who then approves the document prior to sending it to the CSMC.
The decisionmaking process at this level depends, however, on the cost of the project under review. According to the Revised BSUP Guidelines provided to implementing agencies in 2009:
The Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee is authorized to appraise and sanction projects costing up to Rs.500 crore...without further reference to the Expenditure Finance Committee (EFC)/Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA). However, projects costing above Rs.100 crore BSUPModified guidelines will require approval of Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation and Finance Minister, in each case. All projects costing above Rs.500 crore will be approved by the competent authorities as envisaged in Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) (Government of India Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2009a, p. 7).
In this sense, agencies have an incentive to propose projects under a certain cost to avoid
283 Personal Interview, M. Rajamani, February 17, 2015
284 Personal Interview, April 21, 2014 241 delays that may result from the process going through the process of official government approvals.
The approval process and timeline at the Centre varies depending on the total
285 number of projects under review and the timeliness of other agencies. Once DPRs are released from the SLNA to the central level, approvals generally take one to two months.
The Ministries in charge of each submission then recommend a release of funds to the
SLNA who then is responsible for ensuring proper fund usage and project implementation. This process can take additional time as there is a need to coordinate information between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Urban Development, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation: One official described this coordination process in greater detail:
Yeah it used to take another month or so, month, in some cases slightly more because the money was released by the Ministry of Finance, we need to take internal approvals of the minister for and then send it to the Ministry of Finance because this was an additional central assistance, there was somebody monitoring there from the Ministry of Finance you know has to how much was getting sanctioned, how much was being released, how much was getting utilized, how much is remaining unutilized, so it used to go there so totally yes you can say 286 about a month.
As mentioned above, because funds are released in increments, the process of reviewing and monitoring projects and confirming the evaluations and reports from thirdparty evaluators on physical and financial progress is essential for ensuring project
285 An official within the Ministry of Urban Development noted how the CSMC “expect[s] state proposals to be vetted by central technical agencies in four to six weeks time. That is a normal rule, but sometimes it will be more or less that this. Sometimes it is more because the financial year is ending, states rush to make use of their financial allocation and if they have not been able to submit their DPRs in the earlier part of the financial year then they send them in the later part so a lot of proposals get clustered in the last quarter of the financial year” (Personal Interview, Anonymous Official, March 13, 2015).
286 Personal Interview, M. Rajamani, April 25, 2014 242 processes move quickly. As one representative noted, while it would be advantageous to carefully evaluate each DPR and project for progress at the state and central level, there simply is not enough time to do so and the financial and institutional realities of the policy do not allow for this:
It [the DPR] goes to Delhi for like four to six months. It is very normal for these things to take this long. Implementation will take another eight months, so you’re looking at basically a year—a gestation period of nearly a year or if not more, okay? So the value of that [housing] unit cost kind of diminishes by the time it even hits the ground, so you have to take a decision very quickly. So if you look at the JNNURM projects, the unit cost has become a major issue in the sense that you estimate a certain amount [in a DPR] and by the time the project hits the ground they [the implementing agency] say it is not possible to do it. They have to go through the revision process for the DPR. This requires discussion and a lot of times the additional amount of money that was required to complete the project never came in and the project got stalled. So our mandate was to get clearances as 287 quickly as possible.
Cost escalation was a key concern under BSUP and if projects were stalled or delayed, this would result in a rise of costs for construction and other materials. This would create issues for implementing agencies who would then have to ask for additional funds from the state and central government, who would, in turn, require a new or revised DPR to do so. This would delay processes even further due to the extensive nature of oversight and approval at the local, state, and central level.
While the policy processes at the local and state level diverge from official frameworks, the interviews with officials at the central level demonstrate that processes for DPR approval at the central level most closely match those envisioned in the original policy design. While some actors at the state and local level come to the CSMC meetings to discuss policy processes and challenges, the majority of the negotiations over policy
287 Personal Interview, March 18, 2015 243 processes (and transformations of the DPR) occur at the state and local level.
Conclusion
By tracing the system of DPR creation and approvals, in this chapter I demonstrate how the DPR serves as a key “policy technique” (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007) that organizes relations between various agencies within the state. DPRs serve as critical documents, outlining the plans, budgets, and timelines for implementing agencies under
BSUP. Despite the fact that implementing agencies and oversight bodies recognize that
DPRs are often prepared hurriedly and not heavily scrutinized, these documents are still critical to shaping relations between state actors under BSUP; whenever any challenges emerge during implementation, oversight agencies will cite the original plans outlined in
DPRs to hold implementing agencies accountable and pressure them into action.
Efforts on the part of the Centre to limit the discretion of local actorsand to fuel reform in cities that had been historically overseen by state governments (as described in more detail in Chapter Three) fueled the creation of a policy framework that had multiple levels of oversight and approval. While this aimed to reduce local errors and ensure effective management of BSUP funds, in practice this resulted in a cumbersome approval process for agencies who were unable to effectively meet the goals of the scheme in the timeframe given.
Under BSUP, implementing agencies were given little guidance from the Centre as to how to create DPRs and were asked to prepare DPRs at a rapid pace. To show success under the scheme and to maintain legitimacy within the bureaucratic field, implementing agencies sought to churn out DPRs at the fastest pace possible to quickly
244 obtain approvals. To meet this end, they often avoided the timeconsuming process of obtaining feedback from other bureaucratic agencies and project beneficiaries, and they created DPRs with unrealistic implementation timelines and little regard to critical implementation challenges. In Bangalore, this resulted in countless implementation delays, and the majority of projects proposed by implementing agencies were unimplementable in their original form. In this sense, pressures within the field strongly shaped the capacity of implementing agencies to effectively meet policy aims.
Because the broader bureaucratic field disincentivized implementing agencies from engaging with slum residents, the Slum Board often created DPRs with little to no local consultation. This resulted in numerous project delays and issues during implementation as state and nonstate actors struggled over the terms of BSUP projects. In the next chapter of this dissertation, I trace the struggles that emerge during the implementation of two BSUP projects in Bangalore. Specifically, I examine how the nonstate actors seek to shape BSUP implementation processes by pressuring implementing agencies into action through various means. In the case of the Deshyanagar
BSUP project, civil society actors used the Detailed Project Report as a means to hold the
Slum Board accountable to meet the demands of local slum residents.
245
CHAPTER SIX
“GO BACK, ASSEMBLE, GET NGOs” STATESOCIETY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE POLICY INTERVENTION FIELD
“It might make sense to think of the new organizations that have sprung up in recent years not as challengers pressing up against the state from below, but as horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the statesometimes rivals, sometimes servants, sometimes parasites, but in every case operating on the same level and in the same global space” (Ferguson 2008, p. 103).
Introduction
Given the urgent timelines facing implementing agencies under BSUP, these organizations often created proposals for projects that rarely took into account the actual needs and interests of slum residents. Instead, agencies like the Karnataka Slum
Development Board would create Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), send them through the extensive and multistaged process of approvals at the local, state, and central level, and only after these approvals were granted (a process taking anywhere from 12 to 18 months), would the Slum Board approach slum communities and speak to residents about their proposed redevelopment plans.
The Slum Board’s BSUP implementation strategy led to numerous complications as residents often resisted project plans and refused to comply with the Slum Board’s demands. This resistance was so strong that in many cases the agency had to adjust the
246 plans outlined in the original DPRs to account for slum residents’ requests and/or abandon projects altogether. To overcome this lack of legitimacy within the policy intervention field, therefore, the Slum Board often enrolled the assistance of other actors operating and living in slum communities. More specifically, a seniorlevel official within the Government of Karnataka Urban Development Department described how engaging with NGOs is one strategy adopted by the state to overcome implementation hurdles at the local level:
One option is to go back, assemble, get NGOs, discuss, reconvince them, that processit may not fructify also. You may attempt it, there are chances it could work. I mean, I would say that there is a 2030% chance that they [slum residents] may agree, but in all likelihood they will not agree.288
Despite the potential for failure with this strategy described by this official, collaborating with NGOs was a very common strategy of the state during policy implementation.
NGOs and activists were so central to BSUP policy implementation in the city that, according to one activist, “if an NGO was unlikely to cooperate on the [BSUP] scheme, then this particular slum was not likely to be selected for the scheme.”289 NGOs often served as key mediators between slum leaders, slum residents, bureaucrats, and politicians and helped the state to navigate these complex relations. An official within the
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) describes how the state must negotiate these complex relations to overcome implementation issues:
Each and every location has different problems. Each and every beneficiary has a different set of issues so it’s not possible to generalize and say that ‘this is
288 Personal Interview, March 18, 2015
289 Personal Interview, Vinay Baindur, May 1, 2014
247 happening’ and ‘that is not happening’, and you cannot come to an average also because each case is different. It’s very challenging and it involves a lot of ground level effort and bargaining with the organizations to get things going.290
Though these negotiations and bargains between the state and nonstate actors may not always guarantee success, in the several cases of BSUP project implementation that were examined in this study, the Slum Board did exactly what these officials describe above. After facing obstacles and resistance from slum residents, state actors often returned to communities, enrolled the assistance of NGOs and communitybased organizations, and asked these agencies to use the trust that they had with communities to convince slum residents of the value of this particular policy approach. To overcome key implementation problems, therefore, required that the state create partnerships with
NGOs and community leaders who could translate the ideas and knowledge of the policy to community members. In the cases where BSUP has been implemented in Bangalore, it is because the state was able to successfully enroll the assistance and symbolic capital of other powerful actors in slums. In doing this, the state was able to amplify its symbolic capital and legitimacy within the policy intervention field by borrowing it from organizations that already have trusting relations with slum residents.
While this resembles a kind of “symbiosis” (Clemens 2017) or “statesociety synergy” (Evans 1997), by tracing the policy processes of two BSUP projects, in this chapter I argue that these symbiotic partnerships are characterized by extensive struggles between state and societal actors. Further, these relationships are largely contingent as civil society actors balance their assistance to the state with their need to maintain
290 Personal Interview, Shalini Karpagam, March 31, 2015 248 legitimacy with the broader slum community. Partnerships between state and societal actors that begin quite amicably quickly turn confrontational as civil society groups react to pressures from slum residents and slum leaders to challenge the state’s approach to policy implementation.
Beginning with an examination of the Byrasandra Colony, I examine these dynamics and demonstrate how the lack of acceptance of particular symbolic representations advanced by the state leads to numerous complications before, during, and after implementation. In the Byrasandra Colony, the Slum Board worked closely with a citywide NGOthe Association for Promoting Social Action (APSA)to convince skeptical residents to agree to the policy. What began as an amicable collaborationstrongly resembling something like “cogovernance” (Ackerman
2004)the collaboration shifted over time as APSA’s longstanding relationship with the community and its need to demonstrate legitimacy both to residents, the Slum Board, as well as slum leaders in the community greatly shaped how it engaged with the state over time. These dynamics demonstrate the delicate balancing act that both state and nonstate actors engage in as each seeks to structure and frame the policy intervention space to various ends.
Following this case study, I then examine the case of the Deshyanagar BSUP project. While this case study similarly demonstrates how state and society partnerships evolve and change based on competing demands within the policy intervention field, this case also demonstrates how the Detailed Project Report (DPR)as a formal documentation of the Slum Board’s plansbecomes a critical tool in shaping policy
249 processes. While the struggles within the Byrasandra case are largely symbolic (e.g., whose claims about key policy terms are the most legitimate?), in the Deshyanagar case, this document is seen as a legitimate document of the Slum Board’s intent and civil society groups use this document to engage in struggles over the terms of policy implementation in this community.
I now turn to an indepth look into the implementation processes at the local level in the Byrasandra community.
The Byrasandra Community BSUP Project
Byrasandra is a small community located in the Bangalore constituency of Jayanagar with 75 families living in the community. The majority of the residents in this community have been living in the area for roughly 40 to 50 years. Close to the colonyabout a tenminute walkis a satellite office for a wellknown Bangalorebased NGO, APSA, and this organization has worked in slums throughout the city for nearly four decades. APSA has worked in this particular community for approximately 15 years, providing English classes and jobtraining courses for local women and children, offering a variety of cultural events for local communities members, and often serving as an intermediary between local slum residents, local slum leaders, politicians, and bureaucratics on various matters impacting the community. According to the Founder and Executive Director of
APSA, Lakshapati Pendyala, a primary role of the organization is to “bring the government official, the state, to the people, so they [state officials] are accountable
250 straight away and also people know who are the people in the government working for them.”291
When APSA first learned about BSUP at a governmentfacilitated NGO forum in
2006, they saw their role initially as informational. They took the information gleaned from the NGO forum back to the community and informed them about the scheme and their rights under the policy.292 What began as an informational campaign, however, gradually transformed into a very central role of the organization as key brokers between the slum community’s leader, the Slum Board, a local politician, and slum residents. In facilitating the daytoday implementation processes and negotiations over BSUP in the community, the organization had to balance the competing needs of various actors with their own need to be seen as legitimate within the broader policy field and the broader civil society field.
Like most BSUP projects in Bangalore, the implementation of BSUP in
Byrasandra was fraught with challenges from the beginning. When the local Slum Board
293 engineer , Balraj, came to the community to meet with residents and discuss the
291 Personal Interview, Lakshapati P endyala, October 29, 2014
292 I bid.
293 Local engineers have assigned constituencies and must maintain regular interaction with slum communities in these areas. They are supposed to inform communities about development projects, resolve infrastructural or other issues that emerge in slums, and help with the slum declaration processes when applicable. The Chief Technical Officer of the Slum Board claims that the local engineers have regular interactions with slum communities [he remarked during an interview that “our engineers are more effective than your appointed experts. This is why this organization is a success. For 2025 years the engineers know these communities. They know the people by name. Everyday they visit their communities, they meet with them, the discuss their difficulties” (Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014]. Despite this claim, several residents from the focus groups conducted with several communities told me they rarely, if ever, see their local Slum Board engineer/representative. They only interact with these officials when they go directly to the Slum Board to make requests or demand action (Byrasandra Focus Group, Bangalore, November 24, 2014; Hakki Pikki Focus Group, Bangalore, March 20, 2015; 251 program, local residents were skeptical of the program, expressing feelings of mistrust in the government and fears about losing their homes. When asked how Slum Board officials attempted to address resident skepticism and alleviate resident concerns about the BSUP scheme, a senior official within the Slum Board remarked, “we say, look this is the urban space, there is not enough of it, you have come forward willing for vertical development.”294 However, residents were not convinced by this narrative and refused implementation of the scheme in this community for several months.
The resistance to BSUP eventually led local community leaders to approach
APSA, requesting that they serve as an intermediary between the state and the local people. According to a local APSA staff member, Baghya, “the [community] leaders came and spoke to us and said ‘madam, you guys do something. If you say it, they will listen.”295 APSA intervened, trying to “sensitize” residents about the details of the program and build their trust in the program.296 To “sensitize” the residents, local APSA staff informed residents that they were “letting go of a golden opportunity” by refusing to accept the homes under BSUP, and for several months, APSA held meetings with community members to convince residents that they needed to vacate the lands to begin construction. According to a different APSA staff member working in the community,
Chitra, the staff held weekly meetings with community members to discuss the policy
Deshyanagar Focus Group, Bangalore, March 2, 2015; Pantharapallya Focus Group, Bangalore, October 20, 2014).
294 P ersonal Interview, Ravi Kumar, December 2, 2014
295 Personal Interview, November 17, 2014
296 Personal Interview, Baghya, November 17, 2014; Personal Interview, Chitra, December 10, 2014
252 during the early stages of the policy. She often responded to skepticism from residents by telling them “you really need to move, you really need to do this, you won’t get this opportunity again.”297
Similar to other BSUP projects, contestations over land and housing construction were central to the early implementation challenges. There was “a lot of infighting”298 within the community regarding the construction of G+3 units, and according to local residents, some even offered anywhere from 15,000 or 20,000Rs to get the project changed from G+3 homes to singlefamily homes.299 This was where negotiations and confusions over land began to emerge and APSA became a crucial actor in promoting the legitimacy of the Slum Board’s claims about land in the city. When residents refused G+3 construction, APSA staff informed community members that there simply was not enough land to construct singlefamily homes for residents. According to Baghya, an
APSA staff member, they often told slum residents that “to build a single house, to construct it, there is just not enough space here. The space is very limited. This is all we have. What can be done? Only when you build on multiple levels will everyone get [a home].”300 This narrative of land scarcity defined negotiations in the early stages and served as a primary justificationby APSA and the Slum Boardfor why multistory construction was the only possibility in this community. Residents eventually gained a
297 Personal Interview, December 10, 2014
298 I bid.
299 B yrasandra Focus Group, Bangalore, November 24, 2014
300 Personal Interview, Baghya, November 17, 2014
253 sense that “they didn’t have any other option, they haven’t got a plot of land anywhere
301 else, this was the only thing they had going for them” and it was their “trust in APSA”
302 that finally allowed the project to commence. In this sense, the state relied heavily on
APSA’s trust and legitimacy with residents to push its particular policy approach.
Demolition of existing homes began in 2010 with the demolition of the local community leader’s home occurring first. Once residents witnessed the demolition of the leader’s home, they felt more confident moving ahead with the demolition of their own homes and the construction of new BSUP units.
The broader role of the slum leader is worth underscoring because informal slum leaders are often important power brokers in slum communities. Informal slum “leaders” often broker interactions between political parties and residents, often helping to “fight eviction and bring individual and collective claims to officials” (Auerbach and Thachil,
2016, p. 2). These leaders are also gatekeepers for civil society groups who must balance their need/desire to work in slum communities, with the requests of the slum leader.
According to the Executive Director of APSA, the role of the organization is not only to broker relations between the state and residents, but also to “to see, in the community, that one particular leader or some person is not misusing that particular [welfare] program [to his/her personal benefit].”303 According to APSA staff member Chitra, their
301 Byrasandra Focus Group, November 24, 2014
302 Personal Interview, Chitra, December 10, 2014
303 Personal Interview, Lakshapati P endyala, October 29, 2014
254 ability to work in a community and they approach they take is strongly influenced by the slum leader. She describes how:
Now we are very careful because if we do the work that the leader is supposed to do, they don’t allow it. ...We have a problem in the Gulbarga Colony, where the leader is not allowing us to come into the area, so we can’t go. The community needs our help in this area, but the leader doesn’t want it. Sometimes the leader will tell us ‘you do this only, do not touch other things [issues].’ But if the slum leader is cooperating, the community is also cooperating. ...We have to play both, we cannot alienate the leader and work in the community.304
Because of the powerful role of slum leaders in communities, APSA had to balance the needs of the Slum Board (to garner trust from community members) with the need of the slum leader to not usurp his power in the community:
When the Slum Board proposed this scheme, we had to kind of balance the interests of both [the leader and the Slum Board]. We can’t do any work in the community if we go against the area leader they have to balance the interests and demands of both these, you know, parties. ...We need everybody. Politicians we need, the leader we need, the community we need. In this, if we rub anybody the wrong way, we cannot go into that area.305
In this sense, civil society groups assist the state in meeting its policy objectives, but must balance these requests with their own organizational needs to sustain and work in slum communities as well as the needs of other powerful figures in the community. In case of
Byrasandra, the demolition of the slum leader’s house was a symbolic gesture that demonstrated a commitment to the overall program and the faith that the leader had in the
Slum Board’s promises to follow through. Because of this, it alleviated many of the concerns of residents who are often skeptical of trusting the Slum Board’s claims and policy promises.
304 Personal Interview, Chitra, December 10, 2014
305 I bid. 255 The construction took place over the course of two years (20102012) and questions about land, and, in particular, the amount of land available for the project began to emerge as the program progressed. Despite the fact that there were 75 families living in the community, the slum board had only proposed the construction of 60 dwelling units for this community (Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance
Corporation 2010b), attributing this to a lack of land available to build more units.
According to APSA staff member, Baghya, the slum board had told them “there is no space to construct 15 more houses”, which created serious problems for APSA within the community:
We certainly faced problems, I mean from the political leader we did not have any trouble. From the area leader, we did not face any issues. What problems we faced were from the people. The Slum Board is yet to construct 10, no, 15 houses still. 15 houses have not yet been constructed, only 60 houses were given in the beginning. The 15 people who have yet to get their homes, they caused a lot of problems. They have even come to our office and fought with us. In our office, there is myself and a coordinator and our staff, and there have been fights with them. …Then we sat them down, talked to them. …We went to the Vidhana Soudha306 and went and gave a letter to the [housing] minister. Now they [the Housing Department] has sanctioned the building of five homes. Now those five homes are done, but still ten homes remain to be built.307
When asked why she believed the Housing Minister responded to their requests for more housing units, Baghya describes how the local area leader, Mr. Swaminathan, visited the
Minister’s office multiple times to discuss community issues, and “because he had already presented the case, then that person [the Housing Minister] said that I have seen
306 The seat of the state legislature for Karnataka as well as the location of several state government departments (e.g., Urban Development Department, Housing Department, etc.).
307 Personal Interview, November 17, 2014
256 you, you have already prepared a case, it is possible.”308 In this case, APSA’s persistent communication with higherlevel officials allowed for an amendment to the original
BSUP project, which is something rarely done due to the bureaucratic process of approvals required under the scheme.
While the remaining five units are still under construction—with residents living on land adjacent to the BSUP units—Baghya describes how those families who have yet to receive a home under BSUP have claimed these lands for themselves:
For those ten people, there is some space out front where those sheds [are] in place. There is some space, and there is a person next door whose site we are asking for. There is a bit of space that connected to our area and they are claiming it as theirs and have put a compound.
In the Byrasandra case, the amount of land was originally portrayed as fixed and scarce, with only enough for 60 housing units. The state promoted this particular “symbolic order” (Bourdieu 2014) regarding land in the local field and—because of a lack of trust in the state by community members—relied on APSA and the local slum leader to promote this particular knowledge about land as scarce, which allowed for the justification of multistory construction. This strategic alliance served incredibly valuable for the Slum
Board in the local field of implementation to build trust with residents, eliminate potential challenges to implementation, and move the BSUP project forward. However, as actors whose legitimacy in the field is a critical form of capital in their work with community members, APSA staff quickly realized that they could not ignore complaints from the 15 families who remained without homes. Land, suddenly, was freed up, with negotiations occurring at the highest levels of the state government and with a nearby landowner to
308 Personal Interview, November 17, 2014 257 create additional units for those initially excluded. In this case, knowledge about land became a tool of negotiation, a form of capital to be wielded by state actors to justify certain kinds of development practices locally and by NGOs to retain legitimacy with their constituents. They engaged in their own form of negotiation to obtain benefits for their constituents, but did so in a way that was not completely cooptation [ a las
Loveman (2005)], but a mix of cooperation with and strategic resistance to the state.
Because NGOs often face their own need to retain symbolic capital within the field, they must strategically engage with actors in a way that helps them to maintain effective relations with several power brokers operating in slums. The symbolic order of the field, in this case, was under constant negotiation as various actors sought to define this order to improve their position.
The role of NGOs cannot be emphasize enough under this policy. In this case,
APSA played a central role in translating policy visions, promoting specific forms of knowledge of the state, and building trust in communities was central to the policy’s progress. Had residents of Byrasandra worked with a different NGO or a group of activists, it is highly likely that the policy process would have been different. In this case,
APSA began in a strong partnership with the state, but given its desire to be seen as a legitimate actor both to slum residents, but also to the slum leader, the organization had to meet other demands from other actors in the field. In doing so, the organization was able to sustain its work in this particular community (by pleasing the slum leader and slum residents).
258 While the struggles outlined in this case were largely over the symbolic terms of the policy, in the next case study I examine how actors use the Detailed Project Report to force the Slum Board into action.
The Deshyanagar Community BSUP Project
The Deshayanagar community is located on a small plot of land and has been sandwiched between Cooke (“Cox”) Town and Frazer Town near the Bangalore East Railway station
(in the Sagayapuram ward). While the community has been located in this area since the early 1970s, this slum only recently became an officially “declared” slum by the Slum
309 Board in 2005. Once a slum is notified, it becomes the responsibility of the KSDB to upgrade and maintain and also becomes eligible for state and central government schemes like BSUP. Approximately 112 families reside in the area, and, the community has worked closely with a local NGO called GRACE for the past ten years. While
GRACE has only been in Deshyanagar for a short time, Bosco Anthony, the founder of
GRACE, has worked in the community since 1987 with another organization called
Mythri (now he is a current board member of Mythri) and is wellknown in the community. Around the time of the BSUP scheme’s implementation in the community, another, and much larger, civil society organization called CIVIC created a partnership with GRACE to do work in Deshyanagar under a different centrallysponsored scheme
(which aims to provide employment to the urban poor) called the Swarna Jayanti Shahari
Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY). Kathyani Chamaraj, the Executive Trustee for CIVIC, describes the development of this partnership:
CIVIC had a project at that time to work in a few slums on the rights to food,
309 Personal Interview, Bosco Anthony, October 18, 2014
259 health, education, water, and sanitation, etc. Since we are not a grassroots group, we were looking for NGO partners through whom we could reach out to the slums. Mythri was one of the NGOs we approached for collaboration and we had a MoU with them. They suggested that we work in the Deshyanagar slum and Mr. 310 Bosco Antony of GRACE was their contact person working in the slum.
The partnership that developed between GRACE and CIVIC emerged around the time (2008/2009) that the Deshyanagar community learned about the plans for the community’s redevelopment, but the plans for the community were approved under policy processes much earlier. In 2006, the community became one of 28 communities to be included in the KSDB Phase I DPR for the city of Bangalore. Although the DPR for this project was approved by the central sanctioning and monitoring committee for the
BSUP submission (during the committee’s sixth meeting on November 28, 2006)
(Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation 2006), the development in
311 Deshyanagar was not completed until 2011. Despite official recommendations from the
Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation that BSUP projects go through the approval and construction process in 12 to 15 months, the extended timeline of the
Deshyanagar project was largely due to challenges that emerged as the KSDB attempted to implement the scheme in this community.
The first challenge that emerged on the ground was that community members had no knowledge of the development plans for their community until the KSDB officials
310 Personal Email Correspondence, October 24, 2016
311 Because projects are clustered together in one DPR, the KSDB could not declare the Phase I project as completed until the construction was finished and the dwelling units were occupied in all 28 slums. As mentioned in C hapter Five, this created complications for showing “success” under the policy because challenges in one community could prevent the KSDB from saying that the project was finished even if the construction was completed in all the remaining communities.
260 approached them to discuss relocation in 2008. This was confirmed in conversations with eight residents (during two visits to the community) as well as interviews with staff from the two main civil society organizations working in the community, GRACE/Mythri and
CIVIC, who remarked that the community was never consulted to discuss the scheme.
Chamaraj discusses the experience of CIVIC staff when they first began work in the community:
When our coordinators went to work in Deshyanagar, the first thing they heard was that a BSUPJNNURM project for rehousing the slumdwellers was in the offing there. The KSDB engineers had been coming there and telling the slumdwellers that they should all move out and come back after two years when they would all be given a flat there. There was no offer of transit housing within the neighbourhood. But the slumdwellers were unwilling to move out as they were not sure they would get a house there once they returned after two years. They were given ID cards, but the ID cards did not say that they were entitled to a flat there when they come back after two years. They did not know 312 what the project details were or what kind of house they were getting.
The idea that community members would have no knowledge of a planned redevelopment stands in stark contrast to the official narrative provided by the Slum
Board. When speaking with Slum Board officials about the role of communities in the
DPR planning and project discussions, they note a high level of community involvement in all projects. The former KSDB Commissioner describes how:
At the time of preparation of DPRs, we have done that...while preparing DPRs, they [slum board staff] have convened the local meetings, resident welfare meetings...they have conducted meetings at the local slum level, they have convinced them about the program, they have explained all these guidelines about 313 the program in those meetings, informal meetings.
Despite these official narratives, community members and NGOs working in the
312 Personal Interview, June 22, 2013
313 Personal Interview, April 20, 2015
261 community confirmed that their first discussion of the policy was when they learned from
Slum Board officials (who came to the community) that the community was slated for relocation to Sadaramangala, which is located approximately 20KM away from the site
314 where residents were currently living. Community members were resistant to the plans for relocation due to the need to be close to their workplace and the uncertainty
315 associated with uprooting their lives. According to Bosco Anthony, GRACE worked closely with community members and held regular meetings with engineers from the
Slum Board to advocate that the project would be developed in situ , and in the 11 th meeting of the SLEC (October 2008), the KSDB proposed to change the DPR plans for relocation to Sadaramangalla to an in situ development in Deshyanagar (Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2009a). The SLEC approved the proposal for in situ development during this meeting and the KSDB sought additional funds to prepare a revised DPR for these new plans. While residents’ concerns over relocation were partially alleviated through the plans for in situ development, there were additional concerns over the construction process. Specifically, residents were concerned that if left their homes to allow for the construction of new homes, they would potentially
316 lose their land. Similar to other cases of BSUP in the city, residents expressed a mistrust of the Slum Board, despite the Slum Board’s claims that the residents would be
314 Work on this slum was originally supposed to be awarded to the Karnataka Housing Police, but then that “did not materialize” so it was awarded (by the KSDB) to KARNIK (or Karnataka State Building Centre or Nirmithi Kendra) during the same meeting ( Karnataka Urban Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation 2009a).
315 Personal Interview, Bosco Anthony, October 18, 2014
316 Deshyanagar Focus Group, October 18, 2014
262 provided with the new homes within two years, residents were reluctant to move off site without the promise of nearby transit accommodation and a guarantee that the homes
317 would be provided to them once completed.
Because of the uncertainty over the project processes within the community, shortly after CIVIC began work in the community (in April 2009), staff CIVIC obtained the DPR for the Deshyanagar project under the Right to Information Act. The organization used the project plans and the official BSUP Toolkit to inform discussions with community members. CIVIC held a meeting with community members, GRACE, and KSDB staff on May 18, 2009 to share key findings from the DPR obtained through
RTI. This conversation focused mainly on, amongst other things, the lack of budget allocation and plans for transit accommodation (temporary housing while the BSUP housing units were being built), the lack of a timeline and plan for construction, and the
318 lack of information about who the beneficiaries of the project would be). After this conversation, CIVIC sent a letter to the KSDB Commissioner, the Chief Minister of
Karnataka, the Principal Secretary of the Urban Development Department, and the
Managing Director of the KUIDFC on May 21, 2009, highlighting several where there is disconnect between the DPR plans approved by the state and Centre and the requirements for BSUP and DPRs established by MoHUPA. According to the letter, the DPR for the
Deshyanagar community did not meet numerous aspects of the MoHUPA guidelines for
BSUP, including: 1) the DPR should include a comprehensive socioeconomic survey of
317 Deshyanagar Focus Group, October 18, 2014
318 Personal Interview, Bosco Anthony, February 24, 2015; Personal Email Correspondence, Kathyayini Chamaraj, October 24, 2016 263 the community, which is required by MoHUPA; 2) the DPR should be accompanied by a list of beneficiaries; 3) biometric cards should be issued to all beneficiaries; 4) project processes should be discussed with beneficiaries ahead of time to ensure community approval of a project; 5) according to the guidelines, beneficiaries must be involved in the planning and monitoring and evaluation of the project in their community; 6) security of tenure should be provided to the tenants; 7) a “whole slum” approach should be adopted
(including the construction of community centers, schools, angandwadi centers, etc.; 8) the layout plan should be “socially cohesive and should facilitate social interaction amongst the dwellers”; 9) there should be action to develop parks, greenways, and similar spaces close to the proposed development; 10) at least 10% of the project funds should be kept in a revolving fund to account for operation and maintenance costs of the BSUP site;
11) the project is to be completed between 12 and 15 months; 12) the construction of the facilities should be of highquality and there should be mechanisms for internal and external quality assurance; 13) there should be a convergence of central schemes in the community; and 14) related to BSUP and other centrallysponsored schemes, “there is a need to generate awareness amongst the targeted so that they are able to receive what is intended for them by the Government”. Highlighting the disconnect between plans and process, residents requested that these points be clarified and that transit accommodation was provided to them. A separate letter sent to the KSDB by CIVIC, Mythri, and the
Deshyanagar People’s Committee on June 6 th, traces the next stages of the process, which include the KSDB Commissioner committing to transit accommodation with the assistance of residents:
While assuring the residents that he would make all arrangements for their transit
264 stay immediately, the [KSDB] Commissioner asked the residents to clear a portion of the land so that construction of one block could begin. The residents honoured their word by clearing a portion of the site on 22 nd May 2009 just. However, till 29 th May 2009 no arrangements had been made for transit stay for 42 families.
With no action by the Slum Board, the residents of Deshyanagar met on May 29 th,
2009 and wrote to the KSDB Commissioner requesting that he meet with residents on
June 3, 2009. The Technical Director, Sannah Chittaiah went to the community on June
3 rd and assured them that nearby transit accommodation would be provided by June 8 th.
Transit accommodation (i.e., temporary accommodation for slum residents while their former homes are redeveloped) was never provided for the community after requesting this from the KSDB, so CIVIC and Mythri approached the local councilor and
319 MLA to seek assistance. This strategy also proved unfruitful and so residents shifted to the footpath adjacent to the construction site and awaited construction of the BSUP units.
As each block of housing was completed (there were four blocks in total with 32 units in three blocks and 16 units in one block). With the completion of each block, residents were told by the KSDB to shift into the semifinished units with several families occupying one flat. Once the entire site was completed, families would be allotted their individual housing units, but this process took several months, with the construction and allocation of units completed in 2011, two years after the meetings with the KSDB in
2009, and five years after the DPRs approval by the Centre in 2006.
The process of obtaining transit accommodation for residents was a challenge for the implementing agencies in numerous communities under BSUP (ultimately resulting
319 Personal email correspondence, Kathyayini Chamaraj, October 24, 2016; Personal Interview, Bosco Anthony, October 18, 2014 265 in the agency budgeting for this in Phase III of the scheme)320. As discussed by a KSDB official, the challenge of finding transit accommodation required negotiations with numerous actors. The KSDB had to first find the available land, which often required negotiations with local resident welfare associations and/or councilors who, in most cases, were reluctant to have transit accommodation in or near their community. In the cases where the KSDB was able to find land, this then would require negotiations with other governmental agencies at the local and state level to secure use of the land.
Coordinating the work of and receiving approvals from all of these various agencies is an incredibly difficult task and often creates a number of complications for the KSDB.
According to a seniorlevel KSDB official, direct communication is preferred when attempting to resolve these kinds of policy issues, but when these interagency negotiations prove ineffective, the KSDB will strategize to pressure agencies that are not
321 assisting in the policy process. One official describes how “we fail because noncooperation from the BBMP” and when the BBMP does not respond, “the government has to interfere. The secretary of the [Urban Development] Department, the secretary who controls the BBMP, has to come to our rescue, he has to help us. So he has to convince [the BBMP]. If not him, then we will go to the Chief Secretary to address
322 these issues”. In this case, when the municipal corporation was not responding to requests for action by the KSDB, the agency moved to higherranking officials and agencies within the state scale to then place pressure on the municipal corporation. This
320 Personal Interview, Ganga Devi, March 2, 2015
321 Personal Interview, Chikkamuniyappa, April 20, 2015
322 I bid. 266 strategy often proves more effective than onetoone negotiations between the Slum
Board and the BBMP due to the administrative structure of governance in Bangalore and
Karnataka. In Karnataka, the municipal corporation falls administratively under the
Urban Development Department and the Slum Board falls administratively under the
Housing Department. Despite the need for the Slum Board and the BBMP to collaborate and coordinate under BSUP, the administrative structure and chainofcommand is so different for the two agencies that it creates numerous complications when trying to implement such a largescale scheme. The Slum Board has no authority to tell the municipal corporation when and how to act, so it must frequently circumvent the agency and force other actors to place pressure on it to perform. By pressurizing those actors who reside at the “top” of the political hierarchy, the slum board is then able to move projects forward despite initial resistance and inactivity from the municipal corporation.
Obtaining the DPR through the RTI gave the community and the civil society organizations working within it a means through which to advocate for changes to the project’s original design. While the DPR was approved at the state and central level, the gaps in the DPR plans that were highlighted by GRACE and CIVIC gave the community leverage to engage with the KSDB over project processes. Despite plans to relocate the community to Sadaramangalla, residents’ refusal to relocate forced the KSDB to shift the original plans for relocation to an in situ development approach, requiring a revised DPR to be sent through the approvals process. The Phase I DPR went through several iterations due to similar kinds of delays brought forth by communities impacted by the scheme. In this case, Deshyanagar residents’ refusal to relocate and the delays in finding
267 transit accommodation required the KSDB to submit a new DPR and go through the approval process again. The process of revising a DPR often gets resolved at the state level prior to being forwarded to the central government (to reduce the approval time and to ensure that revisions go through quickly). For example, for the Phase I DPR, issues related to the proposed cost of the housing units by the KSDB (the KSDB proposed costs that were above the 1.8 lakh/unit) went through months of negotiation between the
KUIDFC and the KSDB. During a meeting of the SLEC on December 8, 2010, the group required that the KSDB submit a revised DPR to adjust for changes to the projects and the cost. The KSDB then sent a letter to the KUIDFC on February 23, 2011 with the revised DPR, accounting for the concerns of the SLEC. On March 7, 2011, the KUIDFC responded, noting that the revised DPR was still above the projected cost of 1.8 lakh/unit) and that the revised DPR needed to be adjusted, to which the KSDB responded with the necessary adjustments only a day later on March 8, 2011. This internal process of approvals preceded the approval process at the SLEC, which occurred on March 28,
2011. The SLEC ratified the revised DPR during its 19 th meeting on May 30, 2011 (five months after the initial issue was raised by the SLEC).
What the Deshyanagar case demonstrates is the ways in which DPRs are still contested, even after they go through the system of approvals. In this case, actors who are unsatisfied with policy processes were able to obtain the DPR and use this document to leverage change within a community. The persistence of the community, coupled with the assistance of a major civil society organization operating in the city, allowed
Deshyanagar to resist the original plans to under the DPR to relocate the community and
268 advocate for the housing project to be developed in situ . In this sense, the bureaucratic structure was still penetrable by nonbureaucratic actors, creating new channels of oversight that bureaucratic actors were accountable to when moving through policy processes.
Conclusion
When examining policy processes on the ground, it becomes apparent nonstate actors prove both critical in bolstering the capacity of the state, but also pressuring the state to better meet the needs of slum residents. Given the resistance to project plans from slum communities, the Slum Board needed the assistance of civil society groups to complete policy objectives. However, engaging in these collaborations was not a simple partnership of mutual benefit. Rather, these partnerships often changed over time as civil society actors sought to demonstrate their legitimacy to multiple powerful actors operating within slums. In this sense, in partnering with civil society groups, the state actually creates the possibility for resistance to state plans. Clemens’s (2017) describes this when explaining her concept of the symbiotic state: “a state that contracts out responsibilities to private organizationswhether social service or nonprofits or forprofit defense firmscreates a regime characterized by variation in the exercise of sovereignty and the ability of citizens to make rights claims (p. 44). In the case described by Clemens, this variation in sovereignty may result in more exclusionary practices by the state (as exhibited in the early stages of BSUP statesociety partnerships). However, in the case of
BSUP, variations in sovereignty allowed slum residents to capitalize on the various weaknesses of the state and play powerful actors against one another to achieve particular
269 aims. In this sense, symbiotic or synergistic (Evans 1997) partnerships between state and societal actors are largely contingent upon the particular constellation of actors at a given time.
270
CONCLUSION
FIELDS OF GOVERNANCE TOWARD A RELATIONAL THEORY OF STATE CAPACITY
“Because states are fields, they are battlefields. It is those battles, as well as the struggles between the rulers and the rules, and among the rules, to which theorists of politics, states, and empires must attend” (Steinmetz 2017, p. 387).
Introduction
Increasing urbanization across the Global South has forced governments and development practitioners to identify the most effective means of providing basic services and infrastructure for growing urban populations. In India, for example, a major urban policy was unveiled in 2005the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
(NURM)to strengthen the weak governing capacity of municipalities and improve the infrastructure of cities throughout the country. The policy was ambitious in its scope, and at the time of its inauguration, NURM was the largest urban scheme in India’s history (in terms of total investment and number of cities covered). Under NURM, roughly $20 billion would be invested in 67 cities, and municipalities and states were given seven years to complete infrastructure projects and meet the scheme’s ambitious objectives. The policy had several aims, including: overhauling urban governance practices, enhancing
271 economic growth in cities, improving urban planning and development, and preventing the emergence of new urban slums.
Despite the initial promise of NURM to transform Indian cities, the scheme was marred with implementation challenges from the beginning and has been widely criticized for failing to meet many of its original goals. Cities and states only superficially adopted governance reforms and many of the infrastructure and housing projects proposed for cities remained incomplete several years after the scheme was unveiled.
While many cities and states have been unable to drastically overhaul urban governance and enhance city infrastructure, there are some cases where cities have been able to achieve outcomes under the scheme. In the south Indian city of Bangalore, for example, implementing agencies for the Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) submission of
NURM have been able to overcome numerous institutional hurdles to produce housing for the urban poor throughout the city. As well, in many cases around the city, slum residents and civil society groups have been able to actively pressure the state to better meet the needs of slum communities.
While the success of BSUP in Bangalore is debated323, in this study I do not engage with these debates nor do I seek to explain the scheme’s overall impact in
Bangalore. Instead, I follow Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar’s (2017) idea of “state performance” by focusing on “what states actually do” (p. 3) under BSUP in Bangalore.
323 The scheme has been heavily criticized by activists and civil society groups across the country who see BSUP as part of a larger elitedriven agenda to invisibilize the urban poor. As well, numerous officials within the Government of Karnataka criticized the scheme’s slow progress toward reducing slums in the city. As described in the introduction of this dissertation, the total number of housing units produced for the urban poor under BSUP (approximately 18,000) is also quite small given the estimates of Bangalore’s total slum population. 272 The authors emphasize the idea of state performance rather than effectiveness because it does not imply a normative assessment about policy impact. By following this approach,
I am less concerned with explaining the scheme’s overall impact in Bangalore, and more with understanding how state actors navigate institutional complexities and engage with various nonstate actors to achieve policy aims under the BSUP scheme.
During sixteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Bangalore and New Delhi,
India, I traced the implementation of the Basic Services for the Urban Poor scheme at the city, state, and central level. Through interviews (with policymakers, bureaucrats, politicians, and civil society actors), focus groups (with slum residents impacted by
BSUP), participant and nonparticipant observation (of meetings about housing rights for the urban poor), and analysis of policy documents and news articles, I mapped the institutional terrain that shapes BSUP policy processes. More specifically, I examined the struggles and negotiationsboth within the state and between state and nonstate actorsthat shaped the state’s ability to implement this largescale scheme in Bangalore.
Extending Bourdieu’s theory of social fields to India, I argue that the Indian state is a dynamic field whose broader structural composition, differentlypositioned actors, forms of capital, and relations to other social fields strongly shape state capacity and state practices. I find that the state’s capacity to navigate policy processes under BSUP largely depends on negotiations and relations within the bureaucratic field, the outcome of which is contingent upon actors’ ability to navigate competing power hierarchies and effectively exercise forms of political, social, and symbolic capital within the field. The possibilities for state action are further mediated by civil society actors whose engagement with (or
273 resistance to) the state is shaped by the internal logic, boundary struggles, and forms of capital that structure relations within the civil society field.
While state capacity is typically understood by examining various “inputs” (e.g., bureaucratic autonomy, cohesiveness, legalrational authority, etc.) or “outputs” (e.g., economic growth, reduced inequality, etc.), I heed Sabel’s (2005) call for an “emergent or bootstrapping view” (p. 5) of development policies and seek to capture the relations and processes that shape the state’s governing practices. In doing so, this research reveals the relational nature of state capacity and urban governance in India and demonstrates how policy outcomes are determined by the balance of social forces between multiple social fields at a given time.
As the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I provide a summary of the theoretical and empirical contributions of this research, discuss the limitations of this study, and explore areas for future research. I begin with a synthesis of the main findings of this research.
Synthesis of Theoretical and Empirical Contributions
By examining the processes of BSUP implementation as they unfold, this dissertation offers three interconnected theoretical contributions. First, I demonstrate that state capacity under BSUP is not solely dependent on particular institutional designs or various state and society inputs (e.g., a cohesive bureaucracy or a clear division of labor between state and societal actors, etc.), but rather is the result of negotiations and struggles within and between the bureaucratic and the civil society fields. As well, by acknowledging how state actors mobilize particular forms of symbolic and political capital to achieve aims
274 under BSUP, this dissertation highlights the possibilities for effective state capacity outside of the idealtypical Weberian framework. Second , I advance scholarship on the
Indian state by providing an indepth account of the everyday practices and decision making of the state at multiple governance scales. In doing so, I demonstrate 1) the complex and competing hierarchies that shape state practices and 2) the possibilities for greater social inclusion within elitedriven, high modernist development policies. Finally ,
I expand upon Bourdieu’s theory of social fields by highlighting the interdependence of social fields as well as the ways in which actors transgress the homology of fields. This recognizes the possibilities for greater agency both within and between social fields.
Relational State Capacity
State capacity is often discussed in terms of the institutional structure of the state, with the most effective states seen as those with cohesive and highly technocratic bureaucracies, legalrational forms of authority, and a unified development vision
(Chibber 2002; Evans 1995; Kohli 1987, 2004; Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005;
Rueschemeyer 1986). While this literature tends to privilege the state as the key protagonist, others have acknowledged the critical role of state and societal actors in coproducing development policies and shaping state practices (Abers and Keck 2009;
Agarwal and Ribot 1999; Evans 1995, 1997; Migdal 2001; Shaw 2005; Tsai 2006). These scholars argue that various forms of “cogovernance” (Ackerman 2004) and
“statesociety synergy” (Evans 1997) are essential for enhancing the work of the state and for producing better development outcomes The ability of the state to execute plans, therefore, is not solely dependent upon institutional designs, but more often depends on
275 complex “linkages and entanglements” (Coslovsky 2015, p. 1112) between state and societal actors as societal actors emerge to fill gaps in state capacity (Abers and Keck
2009; Clemens 2017).
In this study, I agree with scholars who argue that state capacity is structured by complex relations between state and societal actors. I extend this argument, however, by demonstrating the ways in which these alliances are contingent upon field logics that shape the decision making of state and societal actors. More specifically, by mapping the logic of the bureaucratic field in Chapter Three, I demonstrate how state capacity depends on a few factors, including: how well state actors mobilize the social capital and reputation of leaders, how adept they are at strategically (and often covertly) engaging with political officials, and their ability to demonstrate certain kinds of policy expertise and legitimacy within the field. I extend this analysis in Chapter Five by examining how the desire to maintain legitimacy within the bureaucratic field (given the potential material and symbolic rewards within the field associated with this increased legitimacy) on the part of BSUP implementation and oversight agencies fuels the creation of policy plans that are largely unimplementable in their original form. In this sense, the logic of the bureaucratic field strongly fuels whether and how state actors engage in policy processes, somewhat independent of their actual capacity to effectively govern.
Given the logic and incentives of the bureaucratic field, state agencies often produce policy plans (i.e., Detailed Project Reports or DPRs) without consulting with local actors, creating near constant implementation challenges. In Chapter Two I describe how this results in problems for implementation agencies as slum residents refuse the
276 plans proposed by the state, forcing the Slum Board to delay or completely abandon proposed BSUP projects. Because of the state’s weak legitimacy within slums, it must enroll the assistance of civil society actors to convince skeptical residents to agree to policy plans. More specifically, the Slum Board extends its reach into slum communities by building on the symbolic capital that civil society groups have with local slum leaders and slum residents.
While this resembles a kind of “symbiosis” (Clemens 2017) or “statesociety synergy” (Evans 1997), by tracing the policy processes of two BSUP projects in Chapter
Six , I argue that these symbiotic partnerships are characterized by extensive struggles between state and societal actors. These relationships are largely contingent as civil society actors balance their assistance to the state with their need to maintain legitimacy with the broader slum community and within the civil society field (as discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five ). Partnerships between state and societal actors that begin quite amicably quickly turn confrontational as civil society groups react to pressures from slum residents and slum leaders to challenge the state’s approach to policy implementation. The literature on synergy and symbiosis tends to privilege the perspective and needs of the state (e.g., the state lacks capacity and nonstate actors jump to the fill the void or pressure the state to act, albeit in various forms), but I argue that it is important to recognize how the needs of and pressures facing nonstate actors evolve over time, forcing both state and nonstate actors to realign their practices and reassess their partnership.
277 The Dynamic Fields of the Indian State
Given that this study was conducted in the Indian context, the theoretical takeaways described above are also relevant for developing a deeper understanding of the Indian state. That being said, there are some additional contributions worth noting. While there is extensive literature on the Indian state that examines the role of nationallevel factors in shaping state capacity and policies (e.g., Bardhan 1984; Kohli 2004; Pritchett 2009), few studies unpack the everyday implementation and decision making practices of the
Indian state, especially at multiple scales of governance.
By tracing the dynamics within the state and the forces that shape state practices, in Chapter Three I demonstrate how state actors adopt diverse strategies to navigate the competing power hierarchies within the bureaucratic field. Within the bureaucratic field, state actors must navigate not only the hierarchical forms of authority outlined within the official BSUP policy framework, but also hierarchies within and between bureaucracies
[e.g., the national Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the statelevel Karnataka
Administrative Service], hierarchies within urban governance organizations, and hierarchies of legitimacy between agencies within the same governance scale to achieve policy aims. In this sense, the comments of a former IAS officer prove highly relevant to understanding the broader bureaucratic field: “hierarchies are important in the IAS as anywhere else in the government. It is not only important as a positioning tool within the service, but also to peg oneself against other hierarchies ” (Raghunandan 2016, emphasis added).
278 As well, by demonstrating the ways in which nonstate actors are able to shape and mold the practices of the state (as discussed primarily in Chapter Two and Chapter Six ), this research highlights the possibilities for greater social inclusion and agency under these elitedriven, high modernist development policies. Given the fact that the Indian state continues to create largescale, centrallysponsored urban schemes like NURM
(with the most recent iteration being Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Smart City mission), understanding both the logics that shape state practices as well as how societal actors resist and shape these schemes is critical for the Indian context.
A More Agentic Theory of Social Space
Using Bourdieu’s theory of social fields to understand governance in India is a novel application of his theory and one that proves incredibly fruitful for understanding the dynamic relations that shape urban governance. While Bourdieu’s theory of social fields offers greater flexibility for understanding how groups interact and negotiate to shape particular social worlds, several scholars have criticized his concept of fields as still too rigid (Eyal 2013; McQuade 2016). By viewing fields as delineated, autonomous social spaceswhere relations within them are strongly determined by individual habitus , forms of capital, and the broader homology of a fieldthis leaves little room for agency and forms of action that occur between fields (Eyal 2013; McQuade 2016; Medvetz 2012).
In this study, I expand upon theories of social fields by highlighting the ways in which actors actively contest the symbolic order and homology of fields. In Chapter Two, for example, I highlight how slum residents exploit the state’s inability to monopolize symbolic capital in the policy intervention field, and, in turn, resist and shape the state’s
279 plans for slum redevelopment (typically in concert with civil society groups). While
Bourdieu’s theory of fields often implies a certain level of predictabilitywith dominant actors maintaining this dominance through various strategies and subordinate actors remaining subordinatethe case of BSUP in India challenges this predictability, demonstrating how actors strategically leverage partnerships to overcome subordinate positions within the field and contest the symbolic order of the field. This highlights the potential for the urban poor to resist the symbolic violence imposed by topdown, exclusionary development policies often created by elite civil society actors and their elite corporate and technocratic allies (Chatterjee 2004).
Relatedly, several scholars construct a characterization of civil society groups or social mobilization in India as tending to operate through “elite” versus “poor” channels
[or “civil” and “political” society a las Chatterjee (2004)]. In Chapter Four and Chapter
Six of this dissertation, I trace the processes of various civil society groups and find that the actual practices of these groups often overlap and converge [following the work of
Kamath and Vijayabaskar (2014)] in unique ways that do not neatly fit this dichotomy. In order for civil society actors to meet policy objectives and shape conversations and action around BSUP, they have to pursue multiple channels, align with various state actors (both elite and streetlevel), and adopt a variety of creative strategies that do not meet the elite/subordinate divide between civil and political society. In this sense, this demonstrates greater agency within the civil society field.
Having revisited the main theoretical and empirical contributions of this study, the next section of this chapter examines some of the limitations of this research.
280 Limitations of this Study
With every research project, there are limitations that are important to acknowledge.
First, as a qualitative case study of BSUP’s implementation in one city at one period in
India’s history, this study represents a particular perspective on urban governance in India that is not meant to be generalizable to other contexts. Instead, in the spirit of Burawoy’s
(1998) extended case method, I aim to use the ethnographic findings from the case of
Bangalore to “extract the general from the unique” (p. 5). While I firmly believe that the main takeaway of this dissertation regarding the relational nature of state capacity advances new theories of the Indian state and state capacity, I acknowledge that the specific logic of the bureaucratic and civil society fields described in the case of
Bangalore is likely to vary significantly within and outside of India (the next section of this chapter proposes some key variables that may be translatable to other contexts and studies of relational state capacity).
The second limitation of this study is regarding the conceptualization and presentation of social fields in this work as it relates to Bourdieu’s perspective on social knowledge and social categories. In particular, Bourdieu was notoriously sensitive to the role of sociologists in producing particular representations of the social world and reifying social categories. According to Bourdieu (1985), “knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence , of political struggle” (p. 729). For this reason, the sociologist must engage in a form of reflexive science that unpacks takenforgranted categories, questions the ontological
281 status of social groups, and interrogates the role of the researcher in social knowledge production.
The presentation of the two dominant fieldsthe bureaucratic field and the civil society fieldas distinct in this dissertation, therefore, is one representation of the social world that is both challenged by scholars of the state (e.g, Gupta 2012; Gupta and
Ferguson 2008; Mitchell 1991; Schmitter 1985) and not so neatly found in practice. For example, as described in the empirics of this dissertation, both civil society actors and the state frequently transgress the boundaries of their respective fields and social categories, with civil society actors engaging in implementation work and the state embedding itself with political actors to enhance its capacity. In this sense, while these groups are presented as distinct in my analysis, I have attempted to unpack these categories by demonstrating how the logic within and between fields shapes action and how actors transgress the boundaries of these social categories in practice.
In the next section of this chapter, I examine areas for future research, building upon the themes and theories generated from Bangalore.
Areas for Future Research
As mentioned above, this study represents a particular case of policy execution in India at a particular time, and therefore, the findings cannot be generalized to other contexts.
However, this study does generate a number insights and additional questions that could potentially be tested and explored in other contexts both within and outside of India. I organize this section by the questions this research raises for future research.
282 (How) have state agencies learned from the experience of BSUP and have these lessons been applied to subsequent urban policies? In other words, in what ways is urban
governance transforming as a result of these schemes?
During my fieldwork, numerous BSUP projects were still underway throughout the country, but a new centrallysponsored housing project for the urban poor had also been recently presented by the central government (in 2013). Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) aimed to make India slum free by 2022 and provided states and cities with additional funding toward the development of housing for the urban poor. RAY was a program separate from
JNNURM and BSUP (though BSUP projects were eventually subsumed under the banner of RAY), and a number of institutional changes were undertaken (both within Bangalore and in the Government of Karnataka) to ensure a more streamlined implementation of the program.324
First, the management of the scheme was transferred from the Karnataka Urban
Infrastructure and Development Finance Corporation (KUIDFC) to the Directorate of
Municipal Administration (DMA). Both are statelevel agencies, but as described in
Chapter Three , the KUIDFC is known for being an agency with more technical capacity, stronger leadership, and better quality staff. When I initially heard about the shift from the KUIDFC to the DMA, I interpreted it as another example of institutional confusion and poor state planning. As well, this made me question whether the state was attempting to sideline policies for the urban poor by housing RAY in a bureaucratic agency with purportedly lesser capacity. While these issues remain unresolved at this time, the shift
324 One of these changesthe switch from multistory housing to single story housingwas already described in C hapter Two o f this dissertation, so I do not address this shift in this section. 283 from the KUIDFC to the DMA does make logistical sense for the management of RAY at the statelevel. Because RAY targets numerous cities throughout the state (as opposed to just two under BSUP), and the DMA oversees all the municipalities in Karnataka, shifting from the KUIDFC to the DMA was one effort to streamline management of housing schemes in the state. To understand the implications of this change in management on the implementation of housing schemes requires further investigation.
Another example of an institutional change that occurred under RAY was briefly describ ed in Chapter Five . Specifically, a key challenge under BSUP for implementing agencies (IAs) was the clustering of numerous slums into one Detailed Project Report
(DPR). Due to the lengthy process of approval for DPRs, IAs like the Karnataka Slum
Development Board, bundled several slums into one DPR to hasten the pace of approvals and commence construction. Under this model, one DPR could include proposals for the redevelopment of anywhere from 2030 slums in various locations throughout the city.
While efficient in theory, in practice this approach made it difficult, if not impossible, for implementing agencies to coordinate action and demonstrate progress under the scheme; if even one slum out of 30 was delayed, the Slum Board could not formally declare this project as complete.
Under RAY, the Slum Board still clustered slums under one DPR, but the number of slums was usually around ten and slums were clustered within assembly constituencies as opposed to crossing multiple political constituencies.325 By reducing the number of slums in each cluster, this helps implementing agencies to better capture progress under
325 In Bangalore, there are 28 state assembly constituencies (represented by Members of the Legislative Assembly or MLAs) and 198 municipal wards (represented by municipal councilors).
284 the scheme. By selecting clusters of slums within a single political constituency, this also helps to reduce the number of potential veto players for a project and minimizes the implementation complications that emerge as multiple politicians seek to influence the implementation in various ways. According to the Technical Director of the Slum Board,
“under BSUP we will have to deal with 18 MLAs for 28 slums in a single DPR. In RAY it is one DPR, for one MLA.”326 While a single constituency approach does appear to be more efficient, it is unclear whether this actually improves the housing and living conditions for the urban poor or whether this is merely a technique to streamline rentseeking practices of politicians and bureaucrats. This would be another area for investigation.
These examples highlight some small changes that are occurring in the management and oversight of largescale urban schemes. The impacts of these changes are uncertain, but it would be interesting to examine how the experiences under BSUP have shaped the state’s ability to more effectively manage these schemes and to what end.
How do the governance dynamics found in Bangalore compare to other urban
contexts in India?
As mentioned above, the changes from BSUP to RAY indicate that state actors are shifting their practices as a result of these largescale urban schemes. However, these changes to implementation are now subject to new dynamics between the Government of
Karnataka and the Government of India that will likely impact policy processes. Since
Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in 2014, all Rajiv Awas Yojana projects
326 Personal Interview, Sannah Chittaiah, December 1, 2014 285 have been subsumed under Modi’s Housing for All scheme (i.e., Pradhan Mantri Awas
Yojana), and it is unclear how changing Centrestate dynamics will impact policy implementation in the future. There are already signs of tension between the Government of Karnataka and the Centre, with the Chief Minister of Karnataka publicly complaining that reduced funding from the central government has put a strain on the state’s urban development efforts (Deccan Herald 2017). These shifting dynamics will not only have material implications for urban development, but may also restructure the particular logic of the bureaucratic field as officials within the Government of Karnataka may be less concerned with intrafield legitimacy based on their ability to demonstrate progress to
(and receive praise from) the Centre.
The relationship between the central government and states as well as how policy processes vary among Indian cities is another area for future research. As described above, changing Centrestate dynamics are likely to restructure the broader rules of the bureaucratic field as statelevel officials may be less concerned with the approval of the central government (due largely to changing party politics in Karnataka and at the
Centre). This is one factor that may fuel variation of policy processes between states and cities in India.
Following the arguments put forth in this dissertation, I would also claim that the particular logic of the bureaucratic and civil society fields will result in differing implementation and governance processes across states and cities. For example, if the civil society field is more oriented toward policy advocacy efforts as opposed to grassroots activism, this may shape the level of involvement that these groups have in
286 shaping policy processes at the local level. Further, if the state government has greater legitimacy to execute its will (or if it is not impacted by risking its legitimacy in slum communities), it may rely less on civil society or other powerful actors within slums to fill gaps in capacity, precluding opportunities to shape processes on the part of societal actors. While these are all hypotheses generated from one particular case, a more comprehensive look at the variations between states and cities in India would have strong implications for understanding variations in state capacity and urban governance around the country.
How do the logics of different social fields compare?
When comparing the dimensions of the civil society field ( Chapter Five ) with those that shape the scalartechnical field described in Chapter Three , I found some interesting similarities and differences. For the scalartechnical field (STF), proximity to the central government was seen as particularly powerful within the field as was a high level of technical expertise. However, to effectively exercise an agency’s technical expertise, distance from vested interests was seen as equally critical in the STF. Civil society groups tended to divide the field along similar dimensions, but these dimensions were reversed.
Proximity to “the people” was a criteria for authenticity, and those groups that were more distant from the state were seen as less influenced by political interests and thereby more able to exercise their “social expertise” without pandering to irrational demands.
In both cases, while these dynamics partly structured relations within fields, in order for actors to demonstrate effectiveness under BSUP and meet other organizational aims, they often had to engage in practices that they openly deemed as unacceptable. In
287 both fields, the need to demonstrate legitimacy not only within their respective field, but in other social fields, meant that actors often engaged in covert collaboration with political officials and other actors to successfully meet policy aims without risking their broader legitimacy. In this respect, there is an “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983) between the civil society and state fields, as actors engage in similar kinds of practices to achieve aims in an uncertain governance field. While both fields purportedly value political agnosticism and seek to distance themselves from vested interests, actors recognize that the only way to achieve outcomes is by fostering relations with political actors.
This convergence of practices not only challenges the boundaries of these particular fields (a limitation of this study mentioned above), but also the verticality of the state and society (as the state “above” and the society as “below”) (Gupta and
Ferguson 2008). In practice, both state and societal actors seek to construct and reinforce this verticality, despite engaging in practices that crisscross and defy the “vertical topography of power” (Ferguson 2008, p. 103).
Toward a Relational Understanding of State Capacity
As cities across the Global South continue to grow, the ability for states to effectively manage this growth becomes increasingly crucial. By examining one of India’s largest urban schemes in history, this study sought to understand how state actors achieve aims under India’s Basic Services for the Urban Poor scheme. I found that the ability for state actors to meet policy goals was shaped by the logics of various social fields. From this approach, policy outcomes were contingent upon the balance of diverse social forces at a
288 given time. This relational understanding of state capacity not only illuminates the unique forms of state capacity that can emerge in seemingly “bankrupt” governance fields, but also the possibilities for societal actors to mold and resist high modernist policies.
By tracing how largescale policies work in practice, this research also has important implications for our understanding of centrallydriven, highly technocratic development policies [a model that Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) call “skipping to
Weber”]. A deeper understanding of the fields of governance (and the relations between these fields) can help to design policies that better account for the dynamic societal forces that shape the ability of the state to effectively govern.
289
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