Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera. the Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist

Zitierhinweis

Mick, Christoph: Rezension über: Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera. The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult, Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2014, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas / jgo.e-reviews, JGO 65 (2017), 1, S. 158-160, https://www.recensio.net/r/74bcfa212bd240daadb7cdf3b59c686e

First published: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas / jgo.e-reviews, JGO 65 (2017), 1

Dieser Beitrag kann vom Nutzer zu eigenen nicht-kommerziellen Zwecken heruntergeladen und/oder ausgedruckt werden. Darüber hinaus gehende Nutzungen sind ohne weitere Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber nur im Rahmen der gesetzlichen Schrankenbestimmungen (§§ 44a-63a UrhG) zulässig. 158 Rezensionen während des gesamten Kalten Krieges galt und Gewalt in einem Maße nach sich, das vorher die nationalen Gegensätze zwischen den Fans nicht bekannt war. innerhalb des Vielvölkerreiches überbrückte, Insgesamt legt Zeller in seiner reich illus- war die Unterstützung sowjetischer Klubs und trierten und gut lesbaren Dissertation überzeu- der Nationalmannschaft, wenn diese auf aus- gend dar, dass und wie der Fußball als Zu- ländische Gegner trafen. schauersport systemkonforme Gemeinschafts- Für die postsowjetische Zeit zeigen sich bildung in der Sowjetunion ermöglichte und komplexe Wechselwirkungen zu anderen Sub- wie die Gegnerschaft zwischen „wir“ und „sie“ kulturen und nationalistischen Strömungen. unter Fußballfans gepflegt werden konnte, Die internen Hierarchien und informellen Au- ohne dass dies die Grenzen des Sowjetsystems toritätsstrukturen der Fan-Gruppen kommen gesprengt hätte. heute offener zum Tragen und ziehen Fan- Stefan Wiederkehr, Zürich

GRZEGORZ ROSSOLINSKI-LIEBE: Stepan Ban- in an attempt to ‘cleanse’ the region of Poles. dera. The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Na- There is already an extensive body of literature tionalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult. Stutt- on OUN and UPA war crimes which Rosso- gart: Ibidem, 2014. 654 S., 66 Abb., 7 Ktn. liński-Liebe draws on, but he provides addi- ISBN: 978-3-8382-0604-2. tional evidence. The main aim of the book, however, is not to prove that members of the A comprehensive and well-researched bio- OUN and its affiliated partisan units commit- graphy of Stepan Bandera, the wartime leader ted numerous murders and were anti-Semitic of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists but to prove that Bandera was a fascist leader (Bandera faction, OUN-B) is long overdue. and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists With this book, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe a fascist organisation. has only partly succeeded rectifying this deficit. Rossoliński-Liebe emphasises that Bandera The book is the result of his extensive research has become a projection screen for supporters in the archives of seven countries, his inter- and enemies alike. All of them project their views with veterans of the OUN and includes views of the OUN on Bandera. The ‘real a considered overview of contemporary pub- Bandera’ stays hidden. But this biography does lications. not answer the question about the ‘real Ban- Biographers often fall for their subjects. dera’ either. Rossoliński-Liebe too projects his This cannot be said of Rossoliński-Liebe, who highly negative views of the OUN on Bandera. tries to deconstruct the cult of Bandera, popu- The book is divided into 10 chapters. It lar in parts of Western Ukraine and the starts with a very short introduction outlining Ukrainian diaspora. There is much not to like the origins of the Ukrainian national move- about Bandera and the OUN. In the 1930s the ment and the ideology of the OUN. The next, OUN committed terrorist attacks against rep- short (24 pages) chapter is dedicated to resentatives of the Polish state and Ukrainians Bandera’s formative years. The first 25 years of who were willing – at least temporarily – to ac- Bandera’s life are quickly covered. Throughout cept Polish rule in these borderlands. At the the book, the reader does not learn much beginning of the Second World War, the OUN about Bandera’s personal life, and his character sided with Nazi Germany; it is highly probable stays elusive. A key chapter analyses the that after the German attack on the Soviet Warsaw and Lviv murder trials, in which Union, members of the OUN instigated Bandera was one of the defendants. He was pogroms and killed Jews who had escaped to sentenced to prison for having ordered the as- the forests. In 1943 and 1944, its underground sassination of the Polish minister of the In- army – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) – terior Bronisław Pieracki. Two chapters discuss murdered tens of thousands of Polish civilians the activities of the OUN/UPA during the

Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 65 (2017), H. 1 © Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, Stuttgart/Germany Rezensionen 159

Second World War. One of the most interest- and his followers. Was Bandera an ardent fas- ing chapters deals with Bandera’s life after the cist? He was certainly attracted by the political war and his assassination. The last three success of figures such as Hitler and Mussolini chapters discuss the mythologisation and glori- whose leadership style he tried to emulate. But fication of Bandera by members of the Ukra- there was also another, more pragmatic reason inian diaspora, the representation of Bandera why Bandera and the OUN embraced fascism. in Soviet propaganda, and the return of the For the Ukrainian national movement Ger- Bandera cult to (Western) Ukraine after the many was a natural ally against Poland and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union in the fight for an independent Bandera’s life and the history of the OUN Ukraine. With Germany ruled by the Nazis, are intimately linked, but this book is more ‘speaking fascist’ might offer some benefits. about OUN ideology and policy than a polit- Rossoliński-Liebe could also have done ical biography of Bandera. The author holds more to elucidate Bandera’s and the OUN’s Bandera implicitly responsible for the actions place in the Ukrainian national movement. of the OUN(b) but largely does not consider it Many Ukrainians were nationalists without be- necessary to prove Bandera’s direct involve- ing members of the OUN or supporting its ment. This makes sense as long as Bandera was methods. Rosssolinski-Liebe writes that in the free and capable of giving orders and oversee- 1920s and 1930s the “ideology of Ukrainian ing the activities of his organisation, but this nationalism” underwent a process of fascistiza- approach is problematic for the long periods tion (p. 23). Most Western Ukrainian politicians during which Bandera was either sitting behind and intellectuals, most Greek Catholic priests bars in a Polish prison (1934–1939) or interned and a substantial number of peasants were by Nazi-Germany (July 1941 – December Ukrainian nationalists, but only a minority were 1944, the last three months just under house actually members of or actively supported the arrest). The author produces conclusive evid- OUN. The strongest party in this period was ence from published and unpublished sources the UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic that in the 1930s and during the Second World Alliance), which was a nationalist but not a fas- War Bandera and the OUN embraced fascist cist party. In this respect, when Rossoliński- ideology. It is also clear that the OUN and Liebe takes the OUN as shorthand for the UPA were responsible for many acts of mass Ukrainian national movement as such, he plays violence against civilians. Bandera’s responsibil- into the hands of both apologists of the OUN ity for this violence is more difficult to prove. and Soviet propaganda. The OUN did not It is highly likely that he condoned the anti- dominate Ukrainian nationalism before the Semitic violence at the beginning of the Ger- war. During the Second World War, the two man attack on the Soviet Union. It is less clear branches of the OUN managed to marginalise how much he knew and what he thought about all other parties. This happened in a period the Holocaust and to what extent he condoned when compromises and peaceful strategies anti-Semitic violence and the mass murder of were not in great demand. Rossoliński-Liebe Polish civilians after he was interned by the could have done more to place the OUN in the Germans. He certainly did not publicly dis- historical context of the Second Polish Repub- tance himself from this violence. lic. The focus on proving that the OUN was a Rossoliński-Liebe shows that there were fascist organisation led him to neglect other in- striking similarities between the ideology, inner fluences. Some aspects of OUN ideology were structure, and political aims of the OUN and quite similar to the ideology of the Polish na- those of the Ustasha in Croatia or the Arrow tional democrats, especially the anti-Semitic Cross Movement in Hungary. What Ros- views held by the right wing of that move- soliński-Liebe addresses but does not fully dis- ment. During the Second World War in Lviv, cuss is the question how central fascism was to part of the Polish Home Army was strongly the ideology, views, and policies of Bandera influenced by the Polish national democrats,

Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 65 (2017), H. 1 © Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, Stuttgart/Germany 160 Rezensionen and some Home Army statements on the on the OUN and Bandera would be more use- Holocaust and on the necessity of ethnic ful if it were included in the introduction. Ros- cleansing in the region (in this case, the aim soliński-Liebe is also a bit unfair on the re- was to ‘cleanse’ the area of Ukrainians) are searchers who published on the OUN in the very similar to OUN comments. Rossoliński- 1980s. Some historians writing at the time on Liebe dismisses the OUN’s shift towards more the Ukrainian national movement were less democratic principles at the end of the Second critical of the OUN than they are today, but World War as a purely tactical move. There are this was mostly because of a lack of thorough strong indications that the OUN did not shed research and was also a reaction to the distor- its fascist ideology after the war, but the question of the history of Ukrainian nationalism by tion remains whether this fascism is the key for Soviet propaganda and historiography. The understanding the movement. Bandera and his book carries a liberal sprinkling of the term followers subordinated everything to the aim “fascist”, to hammer home the message. OUN of achieving national independence. When it members and Bandera are highly problematic was clear that the fascist powers would lose the ‘heroes’ but I fear that Rossoliński-Liebe’s de- war the OUN suddenly started to develop a construction will only appeal to the converted: strong liking for liberalism and democracy those who are already critical of Bandera and hoping that this would appeal to the victorious the OUN. The style of writing is sometimes Western democracies. Rossoliński-Liebe dis- unnecessarily polemical. By slightly toning misses the concept of integral nationalism a bit down his rhetoric Rossoliński-Liebe could have too easily and quickly. made it more difficult for admirers of Bandera The story of Bandera’s death reads like a and the OUN to reject his findings. It is a crime novel and is typical for the cold war. The brave book. The history of Bandera and the part on the mythologisation of Bandera after OUN are a minefield in today’s political land- the war is instructive but does not add much to scape, and many historians of Ukrainian his- the main argument of the book, i.e., that tory shy away from the topic. Bandera was a fascist and the OUN a fascist Christoph Mick, Coventry, Great Britain organisation. The discussion of historiography

KAI STRUVE: Deutsche Herrschaft, ukraini- Bevölkerung überging. Nicht nur in Ostgalizi- scher Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt. Der en, mit dem sich der Verfasser näher befasst, Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine. Berlin, Bos- sondern auch in Wolhynien, im Baltikum, in ton: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015. XV, 739 S., Bessarabien, der Bukowina und Teilen Polens 34 Abb., 4 Ktn. ISBN: 978-3-11-036022-6. war der deutsche Durchmarsch anfangs aber von Judenpogromen der Einheimischen beglei- Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion im tet. Rächende Identifizierung der Juden mit der Juni 1941 schuf eine Zäsur im Ablauf des kurzen Sowjetherrschaft, deutsche „Auslö- Zweiten Weltkriegs: Ukrainische Nationalisten sung“, schiere Raublust, so sahen die bisheri- begannen darauf zu hoffen, endlich zu ihrer gen Interpretationsversuche des jeweiligen lo- angestrebten Staatlichkeit zu kommen, die kalen Judenmordens aus. Deutschen sahen sich in der eigentlichen ideo- Kai Struves Habilitationsschrift ist ein Ver- logischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem „jüdi- such, in einem mikrohistorischen Zugang die schen Bolschewismus“, gegen den sie einen divergierenden Interpretationen durch eine Be- Vernichtungskrieg führten, und dementspre- ständigkeit schaffende Untersuchung zu erset- chend trat die Judenverfolgung in ihre letzte zen, was weitgehend gelungen ist. Im Theorie- Phase – die rasch eskalierende Ermordung von bezug setzt sich Struve dankenswerterweise zunächst zumeist sozial arrivierten Männern, von der modischen Annahme einer Vorausset- die bald in die völlige Ausrottung der jüdischen zungslosigkeit von Gewalt ab und postuliert