Pakistan Against the Taliban Wave of Arrests Weakens Afghan Insurgents, but Still Doesn’T Signal Strategic Shift
Introduction
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Pakistan against the Taliban Wave of Arrests Weakens Afghan Insurgents, but Still Doesn’t Signal Strategic Shift
Guido Steinberg, Christian Wagner and Nils Wörmer SWP Comments
Since January 2010, Pakistani security forces have arrested nearly a dozen leading figures of the Afghan Taliban. While these arrests have dealt a serious blow to the Taliban, Pakistan’s leadership has not made any fundamental changes to its policy for dealing with insurgents. Pakistan still clings to its objective of exercising significant influence on Afghanistan’s political fortunes and will continue to look to elements within the Taliban as an ends to fulfilling this objective. Current actions should be seen as more of a reaction to changes in the larger political situation. Pressure has long been placed on Islamabad by the USA to finally take effective action against the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan’s military leadership wants to participate in talks that are currently being conducted with the Taliban and therefore also presents itself as willing to cooperate. The arrests have caused shifts within the Taliban’s internal power structure, which also has an impact on the situa- tion in Kunduz and German troops in Afghanistan.
On February 15, 2010, it was announced In the weeks following Baradar’s capture, that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence additional high-ranking leaders of the (ISI) had succeeded in cooperation with the Afghan Taliban were arrested on Pakistani CIA in arresting Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar territory. These included Maulawi Abdul near Pakistan’s port city Karachi at the end Kabir, the regional commander responsible of January 2010. for Eastern Afghanistan, and the “shadow This was the hardest blow dealt to the governors” of the Kunduz and Baghlan Taliban since 2001. Up until this point, provinces, Mulla Abdul Salam and Mulla Mulla Baradar was said to be the Afghan Mir Mohammed. Most recently, Mulla Agha Taliban’s second in command and the Jan Mutassim, the Taliban’s chief negotia- closest associate of their uncontested tor during the latest talks in Saudi Arabia, leader, Mulla Omar. While Omar (like was arrested in early March, when he was Osama bin Laden for al-Qaeda) is more of staying near Karachi. According to press a symbolic figure and has less operative reports, Pakistani security authorities have importance, Baradar functioned as the arrested additional leading Taliban figures. organization’s military leader. As a result of the latest wave of arrests, the
Dr. Guido Steinberg is researcher at the Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 8 Dr. Christian Wagner is Head of the Asia Division March 2010 Nils Wörmer is visiting fellow at the Middle East and Africa Division
1 Taliban’s most important executive body – the other hand, however, Pakistan allowed the so-called Quetta Shura – has been con- for the Taliban and its associates to retreat siderably weakened. across to the Pakistani side of the border and to organize the insurgency against the coalition troops and the new Afghan Pakistan and the Taliban administration. The army leadership To date, Pakistan’s leadership has always observed with concern that instead of the viewed the Afghan Taliban as an indispen- Taliban, now it was allies of Pakistan’s sible element of its Afghanistan policy. The major rival, India, who formed part of the arrests have now raised the question as to government in Kabul. Pakistan then con- whether Pakistan has changed this policy. tinued with its ambivalent policy as the Since its emergence at the start of the insurgency in Afghanistan increased in 1990s, the Taliban have been an instrument intensity from 2005/2006. The army leader- of Pakistan’s army and the ISI. In the 1980s, ship hoped this would provide them with the army supported seven Afghan mujahe- leverage to bring Pakistan’s interests to deen groups (the so-called Peshawar seven) bear in Afghanistan. and also steered them to a certain extent. It was not until 2009 that a partial The largest recipient of Pakistani and rethinking of this policy seemed to take American weapon shipments and finan- hold. The cause for this shift can be traced cial support was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s to activities by the Pakistani Taliban, which Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Party aim primarily at combating the Pakistani of Afghanistan). Since Hekmatyar was un- state. The Pakistani Taliban groups com- successful in the civil war after 1992, the bined under the umbrella of the Pakistani Pakistani military turned away from its Taliban Movement (Tehrik-e Taliban Paki- earlier favorite. stan, TTP), established in December 2007. Instead, Pakistan started supporting the Due to tight interactions among the Pash- newly established Taliban movement in tuns on both sides of the border, the gov- 1994 in the Afghan province of Kandahar. ernment’s tolerance for the Afghan Taliban Within just three years, Pakistan’s new and their cooperation with their Pakistani clients succeeded in taking over large por- counterparts have contributed to an in- tions of Afghanistan including its capital, creasing “Talibanization” of Pakistan’s Kabul. This also meant an important suc- border region (Federally Administered cess for Pakistan, which had achieved its Tribal Areas, FATA). goal of exercising significant influence on Apparently a line in the sand was crossed politics in its neighboring country. when the Pakistani Taliban expanded This approach was an element of Paki- their sphere of influence beyond the tribal stan’s conflict with India, which is the focal regions along the Afghan/Pakistan border, point of Islamabad’s foreign and security where state control had already collapsed policies. Pakistan’s army wants to control anyway. Initially, Islamabad accepted the Afghanistan in order to have the ‘strategic fact that the Taliban had taken over control depth’, which it believes is necessary if a of the Swat Valley. As the Taliban began military confrontation ever arises with to seep into the bordering areas, thereby India. approaching dangerously close to Islama- This scenario explains Pakistan’s pro- bad, Pakistan’s army decided to go on a foundly ambivalent policies following the counter-offensive in May 2009. American invasion of Afghanistan and the Following the killing of TTP leader fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001. On Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 by a US the one hand, Islamabad felt compelled to drone strike, Pakistan’s military began a support the USA’s military intervention major offensive in South Waziristan. Under and to assist in the hunt for al-Qaeda. On its new leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, the
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2 TTP along with al-Qaeda and militant Paki- equipment for F-16 fighter jets as well as stani groups initiated an unprecedented munitions and night-vision equipment. terrorist campaign in Pakistan’s major An agreement has also been reached to cities, which continues to this date. supply Pakistan with 18 additional F-16s in During its offensive, Pakistan’s army the spring or summer of 2010. This equip- avoided taking action against groups which ment does not serve a purpose in counter- concentrate on the war in Afghanistan, terrorism and must be seen in connection such as the Haqqani network. This under- with the India-Pakistan conflict. lined once again that it wants to continue Pakistan has been trying for years to to use these groups as Pakistani policy increase the power of its air force by buying instruments. Even the arrests at the start new F-16 jets and by modernizing those it of 2010 should not be seen as sufficient currently owns, but it does not possess the evidence for a shift in Pakistan’s policy. necessary financial resources. At the same Statements in early February by Pakistan’s time, the USA has been very cautious in Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, speak to supplying weaponry of this sort as it is this conclusion. He affirmed that Pakistan’s worried about further heightening the army is adhering to its objective of looking arms race between Islamabad and Delhi. to Afghanistan to address Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth in its conflict with India. A Pakistani Agenda According to a second interpretation, Paki- The Wave of Arrests stan’s army has taken the initiative as a With the wave of arrests over the first reaction to negotiations between Afghani- months of 2010 and the de facto destruc- stan’s conflict parties, which have been tion of the Quetta Shura, Pakistan’s leader- underway for some months now. ship reacted to the new overall political Talks have already taken place in the situation. The timing of its actions is an fall of 2008 and early 2009 in Saudi Arabia indicator for this causality. The announce- as well as in late January of 2010 in the ment of Baradar’s arrest coincided with the Maldives. The parties involved were the start of the American offensive in Helmand Afghan government and representatives and should be seen primarily as a reaction of the Afghan insurgency, principally the to America’s new Afghanistan strategy. Taliban and members of Hezb-e Islami. The Among politicians, journalists and scholars, extent to which the Taliban participated three different explanations are offered for on behalf of Mulla Omar is not entirely Pakistan’s actions: American pressure, Paki- clear. According to media reports, Pakistani stan’s attempt to guarantee its influence on negotiators were not involved in the dis- the ongoing negotiations with the Taliban, cussions in Saudi Arabia or the Maldives. and infighting within the Taliban move- Given Afghanistan’s importance for Paki- ment. stan and the close relationship with the Afghan Taliban, this was unacceptable for Islamabad. American Pressure Along the same lines, observers argue The most obvious interpretation for the that Pakistan’s leadership used the arrests events is that Pakistan’s leaders have to demonstrate its power and state its case yielded to longstanding American pressure for being incorporated into negotiations and are now being rewarded for their over Afghanistan’s future. In fact, Mulla cooperation. This interpretation is sup- Baradar is seen as an important pragmatist ported by press releases from early March within the Taliban leadership who would 2010, according to which the USA is sup- probably not dismiss the option of negotia- plying Pakistan’s air force with additional tion. An even more important fact is that
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3 Taliban negotiator Mulla Agha Jan Mutas- on the Taliban, they could be decisively sim, who is one level below Baradar in the repulsed in Afghanistan. If the arrests, Taliban hierarchy, was present at the talks however, are only an expression of a short- in Saudi Arabia. term policy change, the Taliban will com- pensate for these losses within months. Baradar’s capture meant not only that Infighting among the Taliban Mulla Omar had lost his deputy and mili- Internal conflicts among the Taliban tary chief. Mulla Baradar was also the last could also have played a role in the arrests. remaining member of a quartet of senior According to this interpretation, opponents commanders (the others were Mulla Obai- of a negotiated settlement intentionally dullah, Mulla Osmani and Mulla Dadullah), fed information to the Pakistanis about who were decisively involved in converting those members of the leadership who were the Taliban into a guerilla movement fol- prepared, in principle, to enter into talks. lowing the loss of power in 2001. It is entirely possible that the Pakistani Mulla Omar continues to be the uncon- authorities received information in specific tested leader of the Afghan Taliban. From cases from within the Taliban movement. 1996 to 2001, he was the de facto head of This would not be unprecedented. Mulla state of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Osmani, who was killed by an American Since 2001, the newly constructed leader- airstrike in December 2006 and Mulla ship structure of the Taliban has been Dadullah, who was shot by British special dominated by the so-called Rahbari Shura forces in May 2007, are examples of high- (leadership council). It consists of about 18 ranking Taliban figures, who by all appear- people and has committees including ones ances were tracked down based on tips for the military, finances and propaganda. from within their own ranks. The leadership of the movement is ar- Possible motives for this type of betrayal ranged within these committees in dif- include power rivalries based on political ferent constellations of people. and strategic differences of opinion as well From 2002 to 2009, the leadership coun- as personal resentment. It is striking that cil met principally around Quetta in the with the capture of Baradar and Mutassim, Balochistan province (giving rise to its two figures were removed, who either did name, the Quetta Shura). At the end of not fundamentally dismiss a negotiated 2009, however, there was increasing evi- solution (Baradar) or even went so far as to dence that Mulla Omar and other senior support it (Mutassim). It is also possible, figures had moved to Karachi. This showed however, that Baradar awakened envy and a reaction to American warnings in the fall resentment among his opponents due to of 2009 that air strikes would be expanded his prominent position within the Taliban to the Quetta region and no longer be lim- leadership. Mutassim’s arrest, in particular, ited to the tribal regions. is a hard blow to those Taliban elements The Rahbari Shura controls the regional which seem interested in negotiations. shuras responsible for coordinating mili- tary operations in Quetta, Peshawar and Gerdi Jangal, as well as the Miran Shah Consequences for the Taliban Shura in North Waziristan (although this The arrests have weakened the Taliban shura is considerably more independent considerably. This carries even greater con- than the others). The regional shuras co- sequences as more and more US troops ordinate and support the activities of the are being moved into Southern Afghani- shadow governors, who are assigned leader- stan and the coming year is supposed to be ship councils at the provincial level that are crucial for the future of the Afghanistan also called shuras. According to an estimate conflict. If Pakistan maintains its pressure from the ISAF Director of Intelligence, the
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4 Taliban had installed shadow governors in particular, which has thus far not been 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces by the end affected by Pakistan’s activities. of 2009. For this reason, some observers say The insurgency is dominated by three that there are in fact two different govern- groups, which are currently cooperating ments and governance systems in Afghani- and the majority of which are nominally stan. under Mulla Omar’s control. These groups Independent of these formalized leader- are the Taliban itself, the Haqqani network ship structures, the Taliban movement and the Hezb-e Islami. was dominated by a number of exceptional The Taliban groups under the Quetta personalities in the years following the Shura and Mulla Omar are based in Paki- military defeat of 2001. Mulla Akhtar stani Balochistan and control the insur- Osmani, Mulla Obaidullah, Mulla Dadullah gency in the provinces of Kandahar, Hel- and Mulla Baradar were all members of the mand, Uruzgan and Zabul in Southern Rahbari Shura or at least the military com- Afghanistan. The wave of arrests in Pakistan mittee of the Quetta Shura. Due to their affected these insurgents in particular. reputations as military commanders and The insurgency in the Eastern provinces their privileged access to Mulla Omar, of Paktia, Paktika and Khost, on the other they all had much more power than was hand, are controlled by the so-called accorded their formalized positions. Fol- Haqqani network. Numerous attacks in lowing the death of Akhtar Osmani in Kabul can also be attributed to this orga- December 2006, the arrest of Obaidullah nization. It is named after Jalaluddin by Pakistani authorities in March 2007 and Haqqani, who was already a well known the spectacular killing of Dadullah in May commander of Afghan mujahedeen in the 2007, Mulla Baradar had risen through the 1980s. Its fallback areas are in Pakistan’s ranks to become the uncontested second tribal area of North Waziristan and thus far in command to Mulla Omar. it has largely been spared from Pakistan’s Over the past two and a half years, attacks. However, the Haqqani network has Baradar and his closest associates oversaw been a repeated target of American drone daily military actions and also had a con- attacks for about two years now. siderable influence on the political agenda Hezb-e Islami is the driving force behind of the insurgency. It remains to be seen the insurgency in the northern part of the whether Mulla Baradar can be replaced. Afghan-Pakistan border region. Its fallback Following his capture, several commanders area is the region around Peshawar and to were named as potential replacements. the north of it. Hekmatyar’s group is prin- Most observers believe that Mulla Abdul cipally active in the Afghan provinces of Qayum Zakir, a former Guantanamo de- Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman and Kapisa. tainee, will take over Baradar’s position. It The fact that Pakistan’s security forces did is possible, however, that Baradar’s func- not expand their pattern of arrests in early tions will be taken on by several command- 2010 to include Hezb-e Islami could be ers, which would make the movement less an indication that Islamabad wants to susceptible in the case of future losses. strengthen Hekmatyar’s position within the insurgency. It is possible that Pakistan’s actions have New Balance of Power already had an impact on relations among The weakening of the Quetta Shura has also Afghanistan’s insurgent groups. Following changed the balance of power within the the arrest of Mir Mohammed, the Taliban’s Afghan insurgency. The wave of arrests has shadow governor in the northern province indirectly strengthened the position of of Baghlan, intense fighting erupted in ear- Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, in ly March between the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami.
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5 Repercussions for Kunduz escalate because US troops are currently The wave of arrests also carries conse- being moved there. Since the US govern- quences for the situation in Kunduz. Mulla ment no longer is counting on the German Baradar is seen as the architect of the Tali- military to participate in a substantive way ban offensive in the German area of respon- in fighting the insurgency, the American sibility. It can be assumed that the arrests military will take over this responsibility in of the shadow governors of Baghlan and the province as far as possible. Kunduz were painful for the Taliban. During the 2001 war, Mulla Baradar was already an important commander of Outlook Taliban forces during fighting in Kunduz. The wave of arrests in Pakistan is still not In April 2009, he ordered intensified clear evidence for a strategic change in attacks on German soldiers there and also Islamabad. On the contrary, it seems to be a made the necessary resources available. short-term reaction to changes in America’s
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Thus, Baradar created the conditions for strategy for Afghanistan and the Taliban. Politik, 2010 the Taliban to substantially expand their Indicators of a distinct shift in Pakistan’s All rights reserved activities in Kunduz in the spring and policies would be the arrests of key figure-
These Comments reflect summer of 2009. heads of the insurgency such as Mulla solely the authors’ views. The shadow governor Mulla Abdul Salam Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani or Gulbuddin
SWP served as the link between Mulla Baradar Hekmatyar. Nevertheless, Pakistan has dealt Stiftung Wissenschaft und and the Quetta Shura, on the one side, and the Afghan Taliban major blows. The extent Politik German Institute for the Taliban groups in the province on the to which the Quetta Shura is still capable of International and other. Apparently, he also fought in 2001 action is questionable, which means that Security Affairs under Baradar’s command and in recent contact with the respective commanders of Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 years advanced to become one of the most the movement in Afghanistan will be diffi- 10719 Berlin important field commanders in northern cult in the coming weeks. The military hub Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Afghanistan. Just a few days after Baradar’s of the Taliban’s operations in its heartland www.swp-berlin.org arrest, Abdul Salam was captured while on in Southern Afghanistan will be crippled – [email protected] the way to a meeting with his superior. at least temporarily. This considerably ISSN 1861-1761 Mulla Mir Mohammed, shadow governor of increases the chances of success for the
Translation by Robert Blasiak Baghlan, which is the province bordering American offensive in the southern Kunduz to the south, was also arrested provinces. (English version of SWP-Aktuell 30/2010) causing a weakening of the Taliban in the With their base of operations now German deployment zone. The transit unsafe, how quickly can the remaining routes through Baghlan are important not members of the Quetta Shura reorganize? only for the ISAF, but also for the Taliban To what extent will the leadership councils and other insurgents. Fighting between the in Peshawar and Miran Shah, which are Taliban and Hezb-e Islami in March 2010 also under pressure, be able to take over the can apparently be traced back to the power Quetta Shura’s functions and compensate vacuum that was created by Mir Moham- for its collapse? This all depends primarily med’s arrest. on further actions by Pakistan’s security The Taliban, however, are just one of forces. If they maintain this pressure, the several insurgent groups in Kunduz. Oper- Afghan Taliban will lose important fallback ations are also conducted there by Hezb-e areas, which could be a major blow to Islami, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Mulla Omar’s movement. If the pattern of and possibly the Haqqani network, which arrests stops, however, the Taliban will means that a weakening of the Taliban does likely succeed in renewing their leadership not necessarily translate into a dip in the structures on Pakistani territory within a insurgency. It is rather to be feared that few months. fighting in the province will initially
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6 Map Afghanistan and Pakistan, Provinces and Regional Surroundings
Source: http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_-UvdrAY1y5Q/SZXIuRrQ5_I/AAAAAAAABIU/VX1TpPeM33I/s1600-h/ afghan-paki-map.jpg; Adaptation: Can&Able
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